PARADIGM SHIFT DRAFT
The aftermath of September 11, 2011 prompted critical uproar in the American civic landscape. Domestic terrorism, however, is not a recent phenomenon: the act of inflicting merciless violence on the lives of innocent bystanders is weaved quite profusely in monumental events in U.S. history. Schadenfreude, the pleasure one enjoys from someone else’s misfortune, has integrated itself in our daily lives: from watching professional wrestling to TV daredevil stunts, we otherwise see risk taking and violence as a form of entertainment. Terrorism, however, employs schadenfreude as unexpressed justification for acts of evil. The events of 9/11 dramatically changed how Americans perceive foreigners, and more importantly, how us-versus-them mentalities prevail in times of anguish and crisis. Current security reform is a byproduct of unforeseen catastrophe and the progression of terrorism, yet the current emphasis on surveillance undermines American privacy and veils the astonishing familiarity of terrorist mentalities.
Current security reform is a consequence of unforeseen catastrophe. Disaster sparks change, ironically, due to dangers that fail to trigger “appropriate sensory responses”; these threats conceal themselves and are often embedded in American civic life. There exists a psychological bias in bureaucracy that presses dominant leaders to maintain the status quo and to entrench their own idiosyncratic policy preferences; this type of organizational behavior resists change, while electoral politics give little incentive for the expensive, disruptive preparation for unlikely and oftentimes invisible attacks. The fatal flaws of pre-9/11 bureaucracy, for one, contributed to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, considered by political scientists as a colossal U.S. intelligence failure. American defensive strategy was not only inadequate, but widely-regarded for being so; U.S. intelligence had previously violated a slew of Japanese diplomatic codes, pointing to an expedited likelihood of a Japanese attack on the United States. Among the earliest protocols for long-term national security reform was the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency in order to ensure the integration of military and diplomatic intelligence and to prevent potential disasters in the future. Additionally, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 represented a large-scale failure of U.S. intelligence. Upon discovering Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missile sites, the U.S. prompted a major diplomatic crisis and military standoff that positioned the rival superpowers perilously close to war. The crisis sparked significant changes in U.S. policy, including the opening of direct lines of communication between the White House and the Kremlin, as well as a major restructuring of the chain of command authority in the American military, the most pressing initiative being the President’s new control over nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis resonated themes of the Vietnam War; American foreign policy suffered from the Cold War fears of the spread of communism and failed to address the root cause of the insurgency as a war of national liberation (Gilbert 2002). Consequently, U.S. military strategy was thwarted by its attempt to replicate traditional tactics of open combat, while intelligence focused only on conventional war metrics—body counts and weapons captured—and belatedly shifted to address the key elements of nationalist sentiment and counterinsurgency (Gartner 1997). MORE ANALYSIS ON SHIFT. Following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1973 and the fall of Saigon in 1975, the “Vietnam syndrome” made the U.S. public, Congress, and subsequent administrations especially wary of military intervention overseas, limiting the country’s pursuit for world democracy to small-scale operations in Grenada and Panama. This pattern repeated itself on September 11, 2001; intelligence agencies and counterterrorism experts had long argued that al-Qaeda presented a growing and significant threat in the 1990s—indeed, major terrorist plots of the scale of 9/11 had already been averted—but U.S. policy makers failed to adapt to meet this new threat (Gellman 2002; Rosenau 2007). The U.S. Commission on National Security for the Twenty-first Century, for instance, had already warned of terrorist attacks on the United States in early 2001 and recommended the creation of a Department of Homeland Security. Nonetheless, the events of 9/11 was the ___ that finally prompted sweeping changes of government and intelligence organization that many had clamored for years to achieve (___). MORE ANALYSIS ON SHIFT. In each of the three incidents, the United States was faced with a novel threat, the potential consequences of the threat were conspicuous, and the United States failed to adapt to imminent danger.
Current security reform is a consequence of the progression of terrorism. There is no widely accepted definition of terrorism. However, on distinguishing terrorism from other types of crime, ___ Hoffman concludes that terrorism is “ineluctably political in aims and motives,” violent or amidst the threat violence, and designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target. Hoffman’s terrorism is subsequently conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure—members lack uniforms or identifying insignias—and is perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity. Terrorism is henceforth the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change (___). The era of international political terrorism began with a series of skyjacking incidents in 1968, which were prompted by the previous year’s Arab-Israeli war. These events were followed in 1970 by the hijacking and destruction of several jets at Dawson’s Field in Jordan, and soon after in 1972 by the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics This period marked the transition—from the national to the global stage—of terrorism in support of left-wing and ethno-nationalist causes. With the end of the Cold War and developments in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, analysts now look back on the 1970s and 80s as the “old” paradigm of terrorism; groups associated with this era were generally motivated by left-wing ideologies—Marxism and related economic philosophies—or ethno-nationalism and separatism. The goal of Marxist terrorist groups was to use violence to politicize the masses and incite them to revolt against the capitalist system, while ethno-nationalist separatists wanted independence for their ethnic group or a merger with another state, often employing a long-term strategy of violence in order to force the “foreign” government out of a given country, such as the British out of Palestine and Ireland. Whether Marxist or nationalist, these groups were also predominantly secular in orientation, and the specific demands made by the “old” terrorists were often negotiable: common ___ included the release of certain jailed comrades or payment for the release of hostages. Even where the demands would have been difficult to meet—such as the reunification of a divided country, the reestablishment of an ethnonational homeland, or fundamental changes in the capitalist system—they were usually stated publicly in relatively clear and understandable terms, and there seemed to be room for dialogue or negotiation in many circumstances. Terrorists wanted maximum publicity for their acts, playing for an audience and soliciting audience participation, in order to communicate their ideological message.  “Terrorism is theater,” stated Brian Jenkins in 1974, pointing out that terrorist attacks were often choreographed for the media. An attack was nearly always followed by a communique taking credit for the act, laying out demands, or explaining why it was carried out against that particular target; in the case of accidental deaths, terrorists became spin-doctors, expressing sorrow for the deaths (___). The media obliged the terrorists with constant coverage and friendly reportage of their demands, otherwise validating terrorism as a tactic. The violence that they perpetrated, and the publicity they craved, were key facets of the terrorists’ broader strategy of building power to force political change . Nation-states were important sponsors of old-style terrorism.  Within the Cold War framework, terrorists often became proxies for both superpowers and middle powers intent on forcing political change without going to war. Selective targeting and mostly discriminate violence were carried out with generally conservative tactics.  Terrorists were interested in successful missions, and hand-held guns and machine guns, as well as bombs, proved time and again to be effective. When governments began to respond more effectively to airplane hijackings, terrorists reverted to more traditional tactics, displaying little interest in innovative tactics or non-conventional weapons such as weapons of mass destruction [WMD] for a number of practical, technical, and moral reasons, and due to the fact that it was unnecessary to kill very many people to get the attention they wanted. Additionally, these attacks generally took place within a self-proclaimed operational area that included both proximate regional targets and international centers. Although certain groups occasionally took action outside of their normal target areas, such as the Palestinians in Europe and the IRA in Germany, only rarely did international terrorism spill over outside of Europe and the Middle East. ***Although it is difficult to pinpoint when one trend ceases and a new one begins, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City and the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinrikyo cult might be taken as the inaugurating events for the new paradigm of terrorism . Broadly stated, the new paradigm holds that modern terrorism has different motives, different actors, different sponsors, and greater lethality than the traditional terrorism. Whereas the “old” terrorist groups were primarily secular in their orientation and inspiration, terrorism connected to religious fanaticism is on the rise, not only in Islam, but also in Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism . Hoffman declares that fanatical religious motivation is the defining characteristic of the modem terrorist, producing “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and worldview” when compared to his secular counterpart. It is the anarchist and nihilist groups that pose perhaps the greatest challenge to government action, because their strategy is non-sequential and non-political and their demands are non-negotiable, if they make any demands at all . New terrorists still demonstrate an interest in notoriety or celebrity, but generally show less interest in “theater” as a part of their political strategy, although it must be acknowledged that the September 11th attacks were highly symbolic and hauntingly theatrical. Some of the largest recent terrorist attacks have gone unclaimed, a trend which Hoffman asserts is a signal of loosening constraints on violence. When the new terrorists do communicate their objectives, they are often unintelligible; the new non-negotiability may also be due to a learning process on the part of terrorists. State sponsorship is still an important factor in the new terrorism, but the rise of globalization and the mobility of people and money create opportunities for terrorists to diversify their income sources through criminal enterprise . Terrorists are no longer able to depend on the superpowers to sponsor them as proxies, but have found new wealth in crime. For example, a number of Tamils arrested in Western Europe and the U.S. have been engaged in drug trafficking. The new terrorism also exhibits characteristics that contrast with traditional terrorism . First, terrorist groups are more likely to form networks, rather than hierarchies or cells; this is particularly true of the groups emerging from decentralized radical Islamic movements organized around charismatic clerics. These networks are transnational, amorphous, and diffuse, permitting the groups to engage in a wider range of activities, to consider new strategies like netwar, and to come together for one-time operations like September 11th. Second, new terrorist groups are much larger in size than their predecessors. Whereas the Abu Nidal Organization may have had four or five hundred members, Osama Bin Laden reportedly has between four and five thousand trained men at his call. Third, they are more likely to include amateurs, “part-time” terrorists who do not have professional training but who can access the resources and methods of terrorism through informal (often Internet-based) sources – and who therefore can be as deadly as professionals. With these large, networked, amateur organizations, target and tactics selection are more indiscriminate. New terrorist attacks exhibit greater lethality; a higher percentage of attacks in the 1990’s resulted in one or more fatalities than in any previous decade. Hoffman cites a number of reasons for the increasing lethality . The desensitization of the media and the public to terrorist violence leads terrorists to attempt ever more dramatic or destructive attacks to get the attention they seek. Terrorists have learned from the past and improved their tactics and weapons. · State sponsorship continues to provide terrorists with training, logistics, and the resources needed to buy new and deadlier weapons. Religiously-motivated terrorists find violence to be a divine duty, and seek religious justifications for committing violence against a broad range of opponents (anyone who opposes their faith). Amateurs are difficult to track and anticipate and have no central authority to put constraints on their behavior. The truly professional terrorists are becoming more sophisticated and competent. ***Perhaps the greatest danger in this increased lethality is the likelihood that new terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction. Thus it seems that the new terrorism is primarily a U.S. policy frame, not truly a global phenomenon, despite the valiant efforts of some world leaders to define it as such . The implications for other nation-states and international bodies of a truly new terrorism paradigm are extremely complex and challenging, and do not coincide with the institutional imperatives found in most U.S. government agencies If we believe the new paradigm, we are more likely to see new motivations and heretofore undiscovered actors, new technologies such as lasers and non-lethal weapons, new tactics such as cyberwar, and a much greater chance of WMD attacks . The new paradigm fits with the imperatives and goals of three other types of institutions. First are the proactive institutions that must somehow predict or preempt terrorist attacks, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Second are those whose missions are most closely related to the new threats, particularly the high-technology side – like the Air Force and DARPA, who will be asked to devise new technical solutions. Third is a different set of reactive organizations, emergency responders that would be called upon to respond to a massively destructive attack, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the State Department’s Foreign Emergency Support Team. These organizations have obvious incentives to make the shift to the new terrorism paradigm because it offers opportunities for expanded missions and increased funding. In fact, the Pentagon’s FY2000 budget for counter-terrorism was about $4.5 billion—plus another $2.3 billion for personnel costs associated with counter-terrorism and force protection—and the State Department’s was over $500 million; together they comprised more than half of the $10 billion spent in 2000. As the counter-terrorism “pie” has gotten bigger from $5.7 billion in 1996 to $10 billion in 2000 to roughly $11 billion in 2001, at least forty U.S. government agencies have found greater incentive to hype the new terrorist threat The infusion of an additional $40 billion in response to the September attack, with the promise of more funding to come, will only sharpen the incentive. Analysts and authors who wish to be accepted by this part of the policy community therefore are motivated to articulate and advocate the new paradigm. This is not to suggest by any means that they are engaging in some kind of intellectual dishonesty, but a confluence between the findings of social scientists or policy analysts and the imperatives of the institution funding their research is not unusual. Prior to September 11th, the idea of spending tens of billions of dollars a year would have seemed alarmist, but since that date it seems to be the universal expectation in the United States. To be fair, it is not only potential government contractors who wish to influence funding decisions. Schweitzer boldly offers that “we need a long-term strategy to counter terrorism in its many new forms… with a U.S. commitment on a level that rivals our expenditures to ensure we did not lose the Cold War.” Evolution, not revolution. A LOT MORE ANALYSIS NEEDED ON SHIFT. MOST CONTENT IS RESEARCH.
The current emphasis on surveillance undermines American privacy. Perhaps the most immediate and obvious changes after the attacks took place in U.S. airports. Two months after the attacks, Congress federalized airport security by passing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the Transportation Security Administration. Prior to 9/11, security had been handled by each airport, which outsourced to private security companies . The new TSA implemented procedures that included stricter guidelines on passenger and luggage screening. Only ticketed passengers could go through security, and an ever-changing array of machinery and procedures were introduced to scan for weapons and destructive items. As new threats were discovered after 9/11, new procedures were introduced, including removing shoes and banning liquids. Anti-Islamic violence in America jumped after the attacks. According to the FBI, 28 hate crimes committed in 2000 were found to be anti-Islamic. In 2001, that number jumped to 481, and it remained above 100 in subsequent years . Passed in the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Patriot Act was designed to enhance federal anti-terrorism investigations. Sixteen surveillance provisions are set to expire on Dec. 31. The House on Wednesday voted 251-174 to make most of those provisions permanent, with some new safeguards and with expiration dates for the act’s two most controversial powers, which authorize roving wiretaps and secret searches of records. But opponents in the Senate said those changes fail to adequately address the civil liberties concerns which those provisions raise. Information Sharing- Sec. 203(b) and (d): Allows information from criminal probes to be shared with intelligence agencies and other parts of the government. Expires Dec. 31. Pro: Supporters say the provisions have greatly enhanced information sharing within the FBI, and with the intelligence community at large. Con: Critics warn that unrestricted sharing could lead to the development of massive databases about citizens who are not the targets of criminal investigations. Roving Wiretaps- Sec. 206: Allows one wiretap authorization to cover multiple devices, eliminating the need for separate court authorizations for a suspect’s cell phone, PC and Blackberry, for example. Expires Dec. 31. Pro: The government says roving wiretaps are needed to deal with technologically sophisticated terrorists. Con: Critics say the language of the act could lead to privacy violations of anyone who comes into casual contact with a suspect. Access to Records- Sec. 215: Allows easier access to business records in foreign intelligence investigations. Expires Dec. 31. Pro: The provision allows investigators to obtain books, records, papers, documents and other items sought “in connection with” a terror investigation. Con: Critics attack the breadth of the provision, saying the law could be used to demand the reading records of library or bookstore patrons. Foreign Intelligence Wiretaps and Searches- Sec. 218: Lowers the bar for launching foreign intelligence wiretaps and searches. Expires Dec. 31. Pro: Allows investigators to get a foreign intelligence wiretap or search order, even if they end up bringing criminal charges instead. Con: Because foreign intelligence probes are conducted in secret, with little oversight, critics say abuses could be difficult to uncover. “Sneak & Peek” Warrants- Sec. 213: Allows “Sneak and peek” search warrants, which let authorities search a home or business without immediately notifying the target of a probe. Does not expire. Pro: Supporters say this provision has already allowed investigators to search the houses of drug dealers and other criminals without providing notice that might have jeopardized an investigation. Con: Critics say the provision allows the use of “sneak and peek” warrants for even minor crimes, not just terror and espionage cases. Material Support- Sec. 805: Expands the existing ban on giving “material support” to terrorists to include “expert advice or assistance.” Does not expire. Pro: Supporters say it helps cut off the support networks that make terrorism possible. Con: Critics say the provision could lead to guilt by association. A LOT MORE ANALYSIS NEEDED ON THE EFFECTS OF SURVEILLANCE. NEED TO ANALYZE PATRIOT ACT RESEARCH.
The current emphasis on surveillance veils the astonishing familiarity of terrorist mentalities. Violence as entertainment. Stirs “us versus them” mentalities. Schadenfreude. We enjoy watching the “bad guys” suffer. Schadenfreude is integrated in our culture. Violence is perceived as entertainment. This concept predated 9/11. Since then, war is glamorized more than ever: video games, movies, etc. While most Americans would agree that terrorism is the quintessential form of political violence, many fail to recognize that, likewise, counter-terrorism—whether retaliatory or preemptive, large scale (such as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq) or “low grade” (such as extraordinary renditions, targeted assassinations, or drone strikes)—is also a form of violence . Unlike in the case of dictatorships or other totalitarian forms of rule, in modern liberal democracies the state’s use of violence requires the consent of the people . EXPAND ON SCHADENFREUDE. MORE ANALYSIS NEEDED ON THE EFFECTS OF THE SHIFT ON OUR PHILOSOPHICAL WORLD VIEW.
Current security reform is a byproduct of unforeseen catastrophe and the progression of terrorism, yet the current emphasis on surveillance undermines American privacy and veils the astonishing familiarity of terrorist mentalities. FULL CONCLUSION NEEDED.