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RESPONSIBLE WHISTLEBLOWING:
THE PANAMA PAPERS, WIKILEAKS, AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE

By Allison Fink*
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The Panama Papers, the first of which were released in April 2016, are a massive set of leaked documents that expose the use of offshore tax havens by the rich and powerful (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists [ICIJ], 2016). The confidential files originate from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, and implicate several high-ranking political figures, including the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister David Cameron, King Salman of Saudi Arabia, associates of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, who resigned as a result of the scandal. The documents do not necessarily reveal illegal activity; offshore bank accounts and shell companies are perfectly legal for wealthy individuals who want to hide assets from public scrutiny, and Mossack Fonseca makes a profit by ensuring that its clients stay within legal boundaries (Harrington, 2016). Allegations have surfaced that in some of the files, the individuals named may have been engaging in illegal activity such as money laundering or tax evasion, but in most cases political scandal is the most detrimental repercussion (Harrington, 2016).

The release of the Panama Papers is the latest instance of whistleblowing to hit the news. The 40-year spanning, 2.6 terabyte leak dwarfs those of the whistleblowing organization WikiLeaks, which became a household name in 2010 (Harding, 2016). WikiLeaks and the ICIJ, the institution that distributed the Panama Papers, seem to be similar in nature; both are nonprofit organizations, encourage anonymous whistleblowing, and claim that they seek to improve accountability for governments and those in power (ICIJ, 2012; WikiLeaks, 2011). However, the two organizations are fundamentally different.

Relevance to National Security

One of these differences is that the ICIJ takes a cautious approach to whistleblowing, withholding most of the Panama Papers for the time being, while WikiLeaks is more haphazard, leaking information in “data dumps.” The difference in style led WikiLeaks to criticize the ICIJ on its official Twitter page, asserting, “Panama Papers: If you censor more than 99% of the documents you are engaged in 1% journalism by definition” (WikiLeaks, 2016b). WikiLeaks then suggested taking matters into its own hands, saying, “Should we release all 11 million Panama Papers so everyone can search through them like our other publications?” (WikiLeaks, 2016a). WikiLeaks finds fault with the ICIJ for taking time to sort through its data, but WikiLeaks’s approach of releasing huge quantities of unredacted material is a cause for concern to the national security enterprise.

Consequently, this issue does involve the national security enterprise. Two elements of national security in the United States are to keep its citizens physically secure and to promote democratic values. Among these values, free speech and freedom of the press are principles that

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can come into conflict with physical security. When given confidential information by whistleblowers, the press plays a prominent role in moderating this debate, deciding when national security interests outweigh the public’s right to knowledge, and vice versa. The ICIJ represents ethical whistleblowing; their journalistic approach promotes the kind of transparency that is beneficial to society, while WikiLeaks does not partake in responsible whistleblowing, but rather endangers national security.

**Defining Terms**

In discussing the practices of the ICIJ and WikiLeaks, it is important to first define the term “whistleblowing,” and to delineate standards of ethical journalism. Jubb (1999) developed a definition of whistleblowing that includes six essential elements: (1) a disclosure (2) on public record (3) by a person with privileged access to an organization’s data or information (4) about actual, suspected, or anticipated illegality or wrongdoing (5) which implicates the organization (6) to an external entity. Under this definition, the actions undertaken by the ICIJ and WikiLeaks can be characterized as whistleblowing. Both ensured that suspected wrongdoings brought to their attention by someone who had privileged access to an organization’s information were made known to the public. Mossack Fonseca, their clients, and the variety of institutions implicated by WikiLeaks—though mainly the United States government—have since come under scrutiny.

Whether whistleblowing is justified, however, is another matter altogether, and it is a critical element of ethical journalism. The preamble to the Society of Professional Journalists’ (SPJ’s) Code of Ethics declares that their members “believe that public enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of democracy” (SPJ, 2014). Despite their commitment to inform the public and promote democratic ideals, the SPJ also acknowledges that ethical journalists “balance the public’s need for information against potential harm or discomfort,” “recognize that legal access to information differs from an ethical justification to publish or broadcast,” and “consider the long-term implications of the extended reach and permanence of publication” (2014). In order for democracy to flourish, the public must be provided with information whereby they can make decisions about their lives and communities (SPJ, 2016). It is the role of journalists to keep the public informed, but they must determine what information, should it be released, would actually benefit society.

**The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists: Responsible Whistleblowers**

The ICIJ has adhered to ethical standards of journalism from the beginning of the Panama Papers leak, starting with the motivations of the anonymous source who obtained the documents. The leak began when an anonymous source gave the documents to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, who then shared the files with the Washington, D.C.-based ICIJ, so that a global investigation could be organized (Harding, 2016). According to Süddeutsche Zeitung journalist Bastian Obermayer, the anonymous source known as John Doe leaked the Panama Papers because he or she believed that Mossack Fonseca was “doing real harm to the world” (Worthington & ICIJ, 2016). The anonymous source’s ambition is straightforward; he or she hoped that society would be improved by exposing the underhanded, albeit largely legal, business dealings of Mossack Fonseca.
The method of publication that the ICIJ has chosen to employ for the Panama Papers exemplifies responsible whistleblowing as well. While WikiLeaks has been critical of the ICIJ’s choice to withhold some information instead of releasing the entire cache of documents (WikiLeaks, 2016a, 2016b), the ICIJ is engaging in ethical journalism by sorting through its data. Regarding their decision not to release all the information in the files, including personal information, the ICIJ stated that as an investigative journalism organization, they would only publish stories that are in the public interest (Guevara, 2016). The ICIJ sets qualifications for the stories they publish, and screening the material the organization receives allows it to remove other information, such as personal data, that would serve no compelling purpose were it to be released to the public. In this way, the ICIJ displays ethical journalistic methods, balancing the public’s need for information with potential harm (SPJ, 2014).

Furthermore, the information contained in the Panama Papers that the ICIJ has published effectively accomplishes this balancing act. While the use of tax havens is legal as long as they are not used to hide income from criminal enterprises, the Panama Papers do highlight the double standard among the political elite. Governments tax their citizens, sometimes upwards of 50% of their income in European countries, yet the same people who have power over the tax codes are able to hide their income. Whistleblowing of this kind serves the public interest because it impacts the ordinary citizen and supports the possibility of social change.

By keeping to ethical standards of journalism, the information released by the ICIJ did not undermine the national security of the United States. In fact, the Panama Papers are a manifestation of the importance of a free press in a democratic society, and illustrate that physical security and promotion of democratic values can exist simultaneously.

**WikiLeaks: Irresponsible Whistleblowers**

In contrast to the ICIJ, WikiLeaks represents a whistleblowing organization that does not adhere to ethical journalistic standards, and poses a threat to national security. First, WikiLeaks’s motivations for publishing may not be quite so pure. Julian Assange, the founder and editor in chief of WikiLeaks, has an air of anarchy about him. In a 2006 essay entitled “Conspiracy as Governance” that Assange posted to his personal website, he writes, “To radically shift regime behavior we must think clearly and boldly. . . . We must think beyond those who have gone before us, and discover technological changes that embolden us with ways to act in which our forebears could not.” Before founding WikiLeaks, Assange was not a journalist; his emphasis on technology as described in his essay relates to his background as a computer hacker. While whistleblowing is certainly applicable to unethical practices in governments, Assange’s perceptions of the conspiracies that lace the political realm seem a bit extreme, and he indicates that he will take whatever measures necessary to change “regime behavior” by advocating bold action.

In order to shift regime behavior, WikiLeaks is not opposed to publishing personal information in the name of transparency. While the ICIJ has limited the material that it releases, WikiLeaks has done the exact opposite, publishing troves of unredacted information (Fenster, 2012). In the largest data leak in history at the time (November 2010) and what became known as “Cablegate,” WikiLeaks released more than 250,000 classified cables that had been sent to the U.S. State Department from embassies around the world. Amid other information, the names of confidential informants to American diplomats were published, exposing their missions and their persons to danger (Page & Spence, 2011).
In addition, Assange’s list of things that qualify as conspiratorial governance must be quite expansive, because WikiLeaks has published information from anonymous sources under his direction that undermines national security. Besides the names of confidential informants, Cablegate drew back the curtain on U.S. diplomacy for all to see, also including candid views of foreign leaders and assessments of nuclear and terrorist threats. Among the disclosures were criticism of the United Kingdom’s military operations in Afghanistan by U.S. and Afghan officials, details of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, and covert efforts of the U.S. to fight al Qaeda in Yemen (Leigh, 2010).

By releasing these diplomatic communications, WikiLeaks causes strain in foreign alliances and impairs efforts of the intelligence community, impeding two instruments of national power. The necessary balance between freedom of the press and national security is highlighted by Cablegate, and the defining question to be asked is whether the public has a right to know this information. The answer, in this case, is no, especially considering that the lives of intelligence agents could be put at stake.

Still, there are some who would make well-founded arguments in favor of WikiLeaks. Supporters of the organization claim the First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides justification for the material WikiLeaks releases, and maintain that greater transparency in government will ultimately improve society (McNair, 2012; Rosner, 2011). Indeed, the case could be made that WikiLeaks has exposed legitimate abuses of power. The release of the Afghan and Iraq war logs (in July and October of 2010, respectively) detail unreported civilian casualties caused by coalition troops (Rosner, 2011). Arguably, the need for transparency could outweigh the government’s interest in keeping this information secret.

However, greater transparency is not always beneficial, and even advocates of WikiLeaks recognize that there are reasonable explanations for why political leaders might wish to keep some secrets (McNair, 2012). What if the Afghan and Iraq war logs had contained information about the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound? WikiLeaks does not make a habit of being discerning, and had WikiLeaks published this information in the name of transparency and the public’s right to know, the man responsible for 9/11 may very well still be at large (McNair, 2012).

Furthermore, it has often been said that the press keeps the government accountable; likewise, who watches the press? The First Amendment provides legal protection for journalists, but publishing just because one can is also an abuse of power. The First Amendment is not an absolute right, and the example often cited is that free speech is not an excuse to shout “fire” in a crowded theater (Lacy, 2012). In this situation, the security of the theater’s patrons outweighs the First Amendment rights of the individual who wants to make a scene. In the same way, the national security interests of the United States, in certain cases, outweigh the First Amendment justifications of the press to publish classified information. The ICIJ has not endangered national security through the publication of the Panama Papers because they adhered to ethical journalistic standards. WikiLeaks, with the release of Cablegate, did not adhere to these standards and failed the task of responsible whistleblowing.

As a final point, the importance of national security to democratic freedoms should be noted. As author Lee O. Lacy explains, “The national security interests of the U.S. protect our way of life and permit the benefits of a free society. WikiLeaks and its conspirators assail U.S. national security and ultimately impugn a free society” (2012). The freedoms guaranteed to Americans would not exist were it not for national security, and publishing documents that could harm the United States and those who work to keep it safe will not improve society or spark...
positive social change. Freedom of the press is an integral part of democracy, but an unreservedly free press does not lead to democracy; it leads to anarchy.

The press has a responsibility to act with caution. WikiLeaks, in similar fashion to the ICIJ, must adopt ethical standards and take time to evaluate the information it receives, releasing only what will actually work to better society. Only in this way will WikiLeaks be a force for good, staying within the confines of national security interests.

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FROM ENabler TO ENEMY: CHANGING DYNAmics BETWEEN DONALD TRUMP AND THE PReSS

By Rui Aguiar*
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The announcement. June 16, 2015. A hot summer’s day. The beginning. On that date, Donald J. Trump declares his intent to run for president of the United States. His words are acrid. He lashes out against the current administration. He rejects President Obama and mocks what the United States has become. He faces and takes in the roar of the cheering crowd in the bottom of Trump Tower as he challenges the status quo, spouting inflammatory rhetoric about what’s wrong with America and how he alone can and will fix it. The process begins.

The 2016 Election: A Surprising Outcome

On November 8, 2016, Donald J. Trump was elected president of the United States. This historic decision led to an unprecedented divide across America, with protests and riots escalating across the country that would continue for months. However, there was something more shocking about the result of the election than its devastating aftereffects. The press was to enter a period of struggle regarding the presidency, and, counterintuitively enough, it was partially their fault. For some time before the election, the media had been covering Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric, carefully observing and critiquing him and his policies, mostly in a negative manner. However, the evidence suggests that Trump’s policies were covered to such an extent that they were legitimized in the eyes of many American voters—so much so that a substantial fraction thought he could enact his policies and bring real change to America (Nyhan, 2015). Information about Donald Trump’s campaign was primarily disseminated by the media. Yet, the press also spent most of the latter part of the 2016 election rallying against Trump. So, why did people take his policies so seriously? How did the media’s coverage of Trump lead to a legitimacy of what was once considered a “joke” campaign?

If one were to observe the press coverage of Trump by major news networks during the weeks leading up to the election, the obvious conclusion would be that the media was his enemy. Indeed, Trump frequently was the subject of headlines, and almost never in a positive light. The existing scholarly argument regarding this period of time concurs with this hypothesis. Organizations such as the Media Research Center have documented the tone of press coverage of Trump as the Republican presidential candidate and concluded that news articles featuring Trump following the Republican National Convention have been, on the whole, negative in tone (Noyes, 2016). His scandals and the infeasibility of his policies were incessantly harped on by nearly all members of the established press. However, to look at the issue from such a constrained viewpoint would be to miss the larger, more important dynamic between Trump and the media. Initially, the mainstream media did not take Donald Trump’s campaign for president very seriously. In fact, The Washington Post wrote an article after Trump’s campaign announcement claiming that “Trump’s (campaign) faces an uphill battle” (DelReal, 2015). Yet,

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he was given extensive coverage on most major news networks (Confessore & Yourish, 2016). This dichotomy between the media’s perspective regarding Trump and its actions in covering the Trump campaign created a changing dynamic between Trump and the press.

I argue that this extensive coverage was how the media unwittingly propelled Trump to the nomination, only turning on him too late in the campaign process. Many scholarly articles written by professors of political science and communication before the Republican National Convention focus on how the media was, on the whole, beneficial to Trump’s campaign (Wells et al., 2016). Looking at the press’s coverage of Trump chronologically is where current arguments fall short. Many scholarly articles look at press coverage in the pre-nomination, post-nomination, and presidential stages of Trump’s campaign as isolated time periods. This is a dangerously incomplete view, and the coverage must be looked at holistically to be best understood. Additionally, many sources fail to apply traditional scholarly theories to Trump. Concepts such as “agenda setting,” defined by McCombs and Shaw (1972) as the “ability [of the news media] to influence the salience of topics,” and the “honeymoon period,” defined by the Collins English Dictionary (n.d.) as “a period of popularity enjoyed by a new government,” have not yet been analyzed with respect to media coverage and the Trump administration.

My argument bridges the gaps in chronological analysis and situates itself in the scholarly conversation regarding how modern political theories may or may not apply to the Trump campaign and presidency. In the pre-nomination coverage of Trump by major news networks such as CNN, the BBC, and the New York Times, I argue that agenda setting propagated Trump’s ideologies across America. This, in turn, helped to propel Trump to the nomination and eventually the presidency. I also discuss how Twitter played a role in this phenomenon. However, as the Trump campaign continued, media coverage turned negative; I analyze this negative coverage and predict that this will continue to be the overarching tone of coverage for Trump as a president, as evidenced by lack of a honeymoon period. An important caveat is that this negative coverage may not have discouraged Trump’s core voter base from supporting him. As America moves into a period of schism and divide, understanding how Trump was and is portrayed in the media is crucial to understanding the implications of media coverage on presidential elections.

**Methods of Analysis: A Chronological Approach**

To better understand the salient issues of media coverage regarding the 2016 campaign, proper context of how the media covered the election is essential. To understand where the problems of media and the election stem from, I conduct two strands of primary analysis: first, analysis of scholarly articles relating to press coverage; and second, analysis of news stories relating to Trump’s 2016 campaign. This paper is organized through three chronological periods: the pre-nomination, post-nomination, and election phases of the campaign. I group these sources into a chronological perspective.

For the pre-nomination period, I look at sources such as “How Trump Drove Coverage to the Nomination: Hybrid Media Campaigning” by Chris Wells et al. (2016), a professor of journalism, to help provide background regarding the scholarly debate revolving around issues of Trump’s election. This source also shows how the media may have played a role in the Trump nomination. For the post-nomination period, I examine sources such as “The election is not rigged against Trump. But the media *is* biased against the GOP,” written by political journalist Edward Morrissey (2016), and “Trump Criticizes Media for ‘Phony’ Polls, Says He’s Winning,”
by Wall Street Journal writer Michelle Hackman (2016). These articles discuss the inherent media bias against the Trump campaign and look at the hostility between the Trump campaign and many members of the press. Sources such as these help contextualize the primary issues and the underlying theme of “evolution over time” behind my argument. For the presidential time period, I look at current events relating to Trump and the press, such as “White House bans certain news media from briefing” by BBC News (2017), to better understand Trump’s relationship with the media during his tenure as president.

These sources facilitate a better understanding of the coverage of the Trump campaign, and help form the chronological and holistic structure of my argument. Primarily, scholars looking at the Trump presidency claim that the media is damaging to the president’s image. Yet, this argument is incomplete. To frame the argument in this way is to forget the evolution of the media’s role over the course of the campaign. It is through holistic analysis that I hope to bridge this gap in the scholarly debate.

The campaign trail. Perceived as a joke by many. Still, he persists. The debates begin. Civility has become a thing of the past. The media eats it up. All cameras are focused on him during the debates. Interruptions, falsifications, contradictions. Grand claims of fixing the broken American dream and providing a better life for all. Cheering crowds at rallies as inciting words drive him to victory in the primary.

Pre-Nomination Coverage: A Story of Sensationalism

The press’s coverage of Trump was characterized by its fluid changes. Therefore, I will first look at the changing trends in media over the course of Trump’s campaign.

The press coverage of the presidential candidate Donald Trump starts to become a story of interest after his campaign declaration. As a billionaire real estate mogul, Trump had been mentioned in the news from time to time in the past. However, the coverage of presidential candidate Trump comprised an unprecedentedly large body of news. The pre-nomination part of the 2016 election was primarily characterized by an influx of news about Trump. The media coverage regarding Trump prior to his nomination was important because of two crucial reasons. First, there was far more reporting on Trump than on any other prospective presidential candidate; and second, the news specifically focused on Trump’s challenge against the Republican establishment and his unique policies. In fact, one study by a Harvard professor of political science noted that "From the time he announced his candidacy until the start of the conventions . . . Trump had not experienced anywhere near the (amount of) press criticism directed at him during the final two weeks of the convention period" (Morrissey, 2016). Clearly, a defining characteristic of Trump’s early campaign is both the amount and tone of its news coverage. The most effective way to categorize news coverage of Trump pre-nomination is to separate these characteristics of the coverage and look at them in isolation.

The sheer amount of news coverage revolving around Trump’s campaign is an essential part of categorizing the media’s coverage of Trump. Ev Boyle, a former associate director at the USC Annenberg Center on Communication Leadership and Policy, analyzed the frequency of articles mentioning Trump as opposed to other presidential candidates on news website home pages. The results concluded that Trump’s name appeared on major news websites more than all the other candidates combined (Boyle, 2016). In looking at one well-known newspaper website’s headlines, Trump was mentioned over 1,300 times. Clinton, the second-most frequently
discussed candidate, was only mentioned slightly over 300 times (Boyle, 2016). This attention provided Trump with an estimated $2 billion worth of news coverage (Confessore & Yourish, 2016). Other candidates received far less coverage. The sheer amount of information and number of stories revolving around Trump even before he was nominated is staggering. However, it is not simply the amount of coverage that is unique to Trump, but what this coverage focused on.

A key aspect regarding news coverage of Trump was the media's emphasis on his controversial ideas and power to enact them. Though Trump did not have very concrete policies, much of the media latched onto ideas such as “building the wall” and legitimized them. This claim can be demonstrated through analysis of scholarly sources relating to media coverage of Trump. Brendan Nyhan, a professor of political science and government at Dartmouth College, remarks that Trump’s claims created the illusion for the American public that the executive branch has unlimited power in the American government, and Trump would use that power to flawlessly enact his policies without resistance (2015). Julia R. Azari, an assistant professor of political science at Marquette University, also noted the importance of pre-nomination legitimacy through press coverage (2016). Though much of the coverage regarding Trump attempted to portray him as “unpresidential,” news that looked at and analyzed the themes of Trump’s policies and rhetoric likely unwittingly portrayed Trump as more presidential (Azari, 2016). Essentially, the media created a false picture of how Trump would govern, emphasizing how his policies would affect Americans rather than what kind of resistance would rebuff his ideologies (Azari, 2016). Trump was not shy to capitalize on the benefits afforded him by the media, either. Throughout the course of the primaries, Trump was much more available to news networks than his opponents, allowing the media to generate thousands of stories (Wells et al., 2016). There is strong evidence suggesting that the large amount of news coverage of Trump helped increase his standing in the polls. Many of Trump’s core supporters reveled in the characterization of Trump as an atypical candidate, an outsider who would challenge the corrupt status quo (Wells et al., 2016).

This media coverage on major news networks, despite their general left-leaning bias, is still important. Though a large portion of his supporters may not have watched the left-leaning news networks, the coverage of Trump by major news networks likely percolated down into other types of media and propagated the importance of their source material to other local forms of media (Boyle, 2016). This propagation of information and trickling down of news material illustrates the theory of agenda setting, where major news networks influence public perception of the importance of issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). This type of agenda setting has been shown to impact American opinion across party lines regarding the importance of an issue (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Because the topic of Trump was so prevalent, it influenced American perceptions of his importance and helped direct an audience of voters to his message. Also, this emphasis on Trump likely impacted coverage of Trump in local news outlets that his supporters and undecided voters may have listened to. The media’s extensive coverage of Trump resulted in his supporters becoming more confident in Trump, and many others who would not have considered supporting Trump beforehand subsequently received the full extent of his message. Trump’s attention and willingness to interact extensively with the media worked to legitimate his campaign and propel him to the Republican nomination.

**Trump and Twitter: Translating Social Media into National Media**

A substantial amount of the pre-nomination campaign coverage focused on Twitter,
which Trump used liberally. Trump’s Twitter account, with its millions of followers tracking his inflammatory tweets, played a significant role in the amount of media coverage that he received. Trump actively tried to dominate news coverage by creating “tweetstorms,” or a high volume of Twitter posts, when his media coverage was low (Wells et al., 2016). When looking at the number of times Trump tweeted—up to 59 times in a day—it is not difficult to imagine that he was succeeding at garnering media attention through the social media platform (Roussi, 2016). In fact, Trump’s digital strategist frequently encouraged Trump to tweet more often during his campaign (Roussi, 2016). Additionally, Trump’s tweets lacked substance, instead attempting to trigger an emotional response (McConnell, 2015). This ad hominem rhetoric, or rhetoric directed against a specific person, may have contributed to the extensive coverage of his tweets. According to Stephen McConnell, a doctoral student at Colorado State University, most of Trump’s tweets could be categorized as ad hominem attacks, and many of these attacks received pervasive coverage in the media (2015). This coverage was well received by Trump’s supporters, hundreds of who would respond with praise to Trump’s tweets (Jensen, 2016). Trump’s Twitter activity was a major point of media coverage, and conventional news coverage of his Twitter attacks on other candidates helped drive him to the nomination.

**Post-Nomination Coverage: An Increasingly Hostile Relationship**

The coverage of Trump became drastically more negative following his nomination. This period of Trump’s campaign was characterized by the media rejecting Trump as a valid candidate, and Trump subsequently retaliating against those who questioned his legitimacy. Rich Noyes, a research director at the Media Research Center, noted that in the course of a 12-week period of time, over 90% of media coverage of Trump following his nomination was negative (2016). Even some of the news articles written at the time of the campaign, albeit from more conservative news outlets, remarked on the excessively harsh treatment of Trump by the press. Howard Kurtz, a Fox News columnist, claimed that the press portrayed Trump’s campaign as “Apocalypse Now” (2016). The depiction of Trump in the press following his nomination can be broken down into two categories: the attacks on Trump’s rhetoric and the delegitimizing of Trump’s radical policies. The media of the post-nomination period of the election behaved completely differently regarding Donald Trump than it had before the nomination.

The deconstruction of Trump’s rhetoric and scandals was one of the defining factors of the press’s approach to Trump in the later stages of his campaign. Trump had no shortage of scandals, and the media did not fail to capitalize on and cover them extensively. Issues such as Trump’s treatment of women and his refusal to release his tax returns received more airtime on major news networks than several of Clinton’s most major scandals combined (Noyes, 2016). Additionally, the frequency with which Trump’s scandals were mentioned in the media far outweighed that of Clinton or any other third-party candidate. In one particular edition of the New York Times, Trump’s personal rhetoric was mentioned negatively 11 times, while Clinton was not mentioned negatively at all (Concha, 2016). Trump’s scandals were clearly a focal point for the press following the Republican National Convention.

The first real scrutiny of Trump’s policies by the press also began to occur following the Republican National Convention. The pattern of the press’s coverage of Trump’s policies can be most effectively observed by looking at reactions to two of Trump’s policies: his promise to build a wall on the Mexican–American border, and his economic plans for America.
Trump’s border wall was a point of great controversy throughout his campaign. Conceived as an idea to keep illegal immigrants out of America, the wall, in conjunction with increased border security, was proposed as a way to help prevent unauthorized border crossings (Minian, 2017). Additionally, Trump insisted that Mexico would pay for the construction of the wall (Nakamura, 2017). Trump’s promise to build the wall was heavily scrutinized and questioned by the press, so much so that Trump frequently lashed out at their coverage, claiming that “Dishonest media says Mexico won’t be paying for the wall . . . Media is fake!” (Worley, 2017). Looking more closely at the media coverage of the wall, it’s easy to see how Trump would be easily frustrated by the negative press. Prominent left-leaning political news websites such as Salon and Media Matters for America heavily criticized the wall, writing articles such as “Built on a false siege: Donald Trump’s border wall lacks context” (Boehlert, 2017) that focused on a fundamental lack of rationality behind the wall policy. More prominent news outlets such as The New York Times described the construction of the border wall and other points of Trump’s foreign policy as an “aggressive use of presidential power that follows through on the nationalistic vision Mr. Trump presented during his presidential campaign” (Davis, 2017). Words such as “aggressive” and “nationalistic” evoke images of a belligerent and provocative Trump, and convey the bias with which the article was written. The coverage of Trump’s wall was largely unfavorable.

Another important case study of post-nomination media is the coverage of Trump’s economic policies, which focused heavily on tax reform and budget restructuring. The mainstream media was much more clearly in favor of Clinton’s policies than Trump’s. One example of this bias comes from Patrick Gillespie (2016), an analyst from CNNMoney who wrote a detailed, point-by-point analysis of what was wrong with Trump’s economic plan. Forbes, another prominent news website, also published an article about how Trump’s economic policies “might spark recession” (McGrath, 2016). Finally, CBS noted that Trump’s economic plan would add over 26 times as much to the national debt as Clinton’s policies, and that Trump’s tax plan would “incur revenue loss” (“Trump v. Clinton,” 2016). Similar to Trump’s immigration and border control policies, the coverage of Trump’s economic plan was primarily negative.

The increasingly critical coverage by the press created a hostile climate between Trump and the press. Reporting on Trump’s rhetoric concerning the media following the Republican National Convention suggests that this is the case. The Guardian, a British news source, quoted Trump as saying, “I’m not running against Crooked Hillary . . . I’m running against the crooked media” (Helmore, 2016). Trump’s likening of the media to his opponent Hillary Clinton and his description of the media as “crooked” demonstrates just how biased he felt against the press. The dispute got so extreme that at one point, he considered banning the New York Times from his events due to its negative coverage (Helmore, 2016). As Trump’s campaign pressed onwards, he criticized any media station that dared speak out or question his rhetoric and policies. At one point in Trump’s campaign, he claimed CNN, a prominent news network, was “Hillary Clinton's press shop,” and that they were conspiring to rig the election against him (Gass, 2016). He also claimed that those who made the decisions at CNN were “disconnected from real life” and that they should be covering more substantial stories, such as the allegedly rampant corruption occurring in the Clinton Foundation (Gass, 2016).

Trump’s hostility towards the media also stemmed from allegations of how Trump would lose the election. Fortune Magazine published an article on how Trump called the polls conducted by the media that showed Clinton winning “phony polls” (Associated Press, 2016).
He even suggested that the First Amendment granted too much freedom with respect to the press, and that the press should be restricted and more easily sued (Meyer, 2016). The fact that Clinton led in many polls leading up to the election almost certainly played a role in this attitude.

An analysis of Trump’s media coverage shows how Trump’s bias against the media began when he was chosen as the Republican nominee. Further examination indicates that this bias continued into his presidency.

How Trump Voters Responded to Negative Coverage: A Counter-Perspective

Though the media coverage of Trump did become negative in the later stages of his campaign, it is important to note that this may have actually strengthened the opinion of him among a large portion of his voters. Brett Edkins, in a study by Forbes Magazine, notes that “The media’s persistent criticism of government reinforces the right wing’s anti-government message” (2016). The media’s negative portrayal of Trump only enhanced his image as the Washington outsider who would shake up the corrupt government. Additionally, a study by the Harvard Kennedy School notes that, with respect to the 2016 election, negative coverage “erodes trust in the press” (Patterson, 2016). The very act of covering Trump negatively may have worked against the intentions of the press, delegitimizing them in the eyes of voters. The bottom line is that despite negative news coverage generating Trump’s animosity towards the established press, this may not have impacted the election that much, and may have even strengthened his support among some of his base.

Trump and the Alt-Right

Though Trump became increasingly hostile towards many members of the established press, there is a small caveat when observing news coverage from the alt-right. The alternative right, or “alt-right,” is defined by the Southern Poverty Law Center (n.d.) as “a set of far-right . . . groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack.” Generally, the alt-right’s ideology aligned with Trump’s policies. Trump seemed to treat alt-right news sources with much more respect than other, more conventional outlets. The most notable relationship between the alt-right and Trump is the one that exists between Trump and Breitbart, a media entity which is so close to the Trump campaign that Steve Bannon, the founder of the website, is one of Trump’s top advisors. In fact, during one of his press conferences as president-elect, Trump called CNN “fake news” and refused to answer the CNN reporter’s question, and opted to take a question from Breitbart instead (Savransky, 2017). The pattern to note is that the alt-right news sources continued to positively cover Trump when his policies were revealed and deconstructed, and they have maintained a positive relationship with Trump into presidency.

The election. The polls all predict a landslide victory for Clinton (“General Election,” 2016). They are wrong. Trump takes Florida. He takes Ohio. He takes Pennsylvania. He takes Michigan. He takes the White House. The world is stunned.

The presidency. His inaugural speech is full of protectionist words and extremist oration. The first few weeks of his presidency are no better. The rhetoric of empty threats is given life in the form of executive orders. His speeches—still criticized by the media—now promise action to accompany his words.
President Trump: A Downwards Spiral

As Trump ascended to the presidency, the trend of negative press coverage continued. The tension between the press and Donald Trump has become so intense that Steve Bannon declared that Trump’s war on the media is “not only not going to get better, it’s going to get worse—every day” (Moraes, 2017). Trump himself tweeted, “the FAKE NEWS MEDIA (@nytimes, @CNN, @NBCnews) . . . is the enemy of the American People!” (Cummings, 2017). Clearly, Trump’s relationship with the media has not improved since he gained the power of the executive branch. This is likely due to the negative coverage of Trump’s policies and rhetoric by much of the press, coverage that has helped drive Trump’s approval rating to the lowest since he took office. Continuing the trend following the National Republican Convention, the coverage surrounding Trump has been overwhelmingly negative. Take the case of Trump’s disastrous executive order banning Muslims from several Middle Eastern countries from entering the United States. Brian Stelter, a prominent correspondent for CNN, remarked in the days following the ban that most journalists covering the issue were “furious and embarrassed” (Schwartz, 2017). There is a clear bias in most of the media when covering Trump’s policies. This news coverage will likely shape the next several years of Trump’s time in office, and it will have a clear impact on how he portrays himself to the American people for the years to come.

Trump’s Nonexistent “Honeymoon” Period: Why The Lack of One is So Important

Perhaps the most telling sign that press coverage of the Trump administration will continue to be negative is the lack of a honeymoon period with the media. A “honeymoon period” is defined by the Collins English Dictionary as “a period of popularity enjoyed by a new government, or a new occupant of a post” (n.d.). Interestingly, in Trump’s case, there was no honeymoon period. A Quinnipiac poll noted that shortly after Trump’s election, his approval ratings were already at historically low levels (Krauthammer, 2017). Additionally, this trend of negativity seems not to be letting up. Trump’s approval ratings are sinking daily, and a survey conducted by Gallup concluded that a majority of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance as of March 2017 (“Gallup Daily,” 2017). This lack of a honeymoon period is telling, in that the media generally allows new presidents a small period of time in the beginning of their presidencies before they start criticizing and having difficulties with them. Even Richard Nixon, one of America’s most vilified presidents, had a period of time in the beginning of his time in office during which the majority of the American public approved of his presidency (Jones, 2009). This was simply not the case with Trump, and if anything, the opposite has occurred. What would have been Trump’s honeymoon period has just been a time in which his relationship with the press has worsened. This is likely a predictor of a dismal relationship with the press as Trump’s presidency continues. Trump is unique in the sense that he has not been allowed the leniency that other presidents have generally had in the early phases of their presidencies; rather, he has been attacked more harshly than ever.

Concluding Thoughts: Broader Implications of the Power of Media

Press coverage is one of the most important aspects of the Trump campaign and administration. The media’s extensive, generally positive depiction of Trump in the pre-nomination period helped to bring him to light as an important candidate who would tackle
issues created by the corrupt climate in Washington. Additionally, much of the press’s coverage of Trump likely trickled down into local news stations, even reaching voters who would not have listened to the primarily left-leaning press’s depiction of Trump. While this is an astounding implication, the significance of media in the Trump election does not end with the conclusion of the presidential primaries. The evolution of the relationship between Trump and the press has also worked to become a defining point of the new presidential administration. The current dynamic has been characterized by the negative press coverage that began when the media began to pick apart Trump’s controversial policies and rhetoric. As Trump began to lash out against prominent news outlets into his presidency, this trend of negative coverage continued, and so did Trump’s aggressive response. The coverage became so polarizing that Trump was denied a honeymoon period, something that even controversial presidents have received in the past. Currently, Trump’s approval rating is the lowest it’s ever been, and his war with the press continues daily. As Trump’s policies and rhetoric mold the next several years of his administration, it is important to remember the power and importance of the media in the 2016 election.

References


Assumed Identity in the Public Sphere: Causality and Consequences in the 2016 Election

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“By ‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens” (Habermas, 1962/1989). This opening statement in Jürgen Habermas’s (1962/1989) essay “The Public Sphere” sets up the theoretical framework, as well as the fundamental flaw, of his idea of the democratic public sphere. Originally conceived in his seminal book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas’s (1962/1989) concept is still considered the foundation of contemporary studies on the public sphere. He discusses both the physical and psychological spaces that constitute the public sphere, the historical context in which these spaces came about, and how members should engage in its discourse. What Habermas does not fully examine is the tendency towards and consequences of homogeneity within the public sphere, and how this tendency is, in many ways, facilitated by his model. The ramifications of this circumstance are explored in modern revisionist theories on the public sphere, aided by the acknowledgement of multiple “publics” in which people of similar mindsets or backgrounds can come together and discuss common themes. A multiplicity of publics is beneficial to those who seek a safe place to express their opinions without judgment; one caveat, however, is that some publics may be automatically stigmatized or discriminatory. The only solution to such a schism is a society that is without bias and prejudice; but how can such a society exist when its members are ideologically separated? This schism is particularly prevalent within the two-party political system within the United States, and between the Democratic and Republican parties, or liberals and conservatives, respectively. Using both the traditional and revisionist theories of the public sphere, one can begin to elucidate the circumstances that lead to such extreme partisanship.

Defining the Public Sphere

Habermas (1962/1989) begins his discussion of the public sphere by distinguishing between opinion and public opinion:

The term “public opinion” refers to the functions of criticism and control of organized state authority that the public exercises informally, as well as formally during periodic elections. . . . Whereas mere opinions (things taken for granted as part of a culture, normative convictions, collective prejudices and judgments) seem to persist unchanged in their quasi-natural structure as a kind of sediment to history, public opinion . . . can be formed only if a public that engages in rational discussion exists.

Opinions, in Habermas’s (1962/1989) use of the word, could then be thought of as a set of ethics or values passed from one generation to the next. They may vary depending on the society, but

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they are generally accepted and understood by members of that particular culture. The inherent value of the public sphere is that unlike opinions, which, as Habermas (1962/1989) states, “seem to persist unchanged,” public opinions are constantly in a precarious state of fluctuation.

He discusses the use of press in revolutionary periods as a forum for public discussion. For instance, during the 1848 Revolution in France, otherwise known as the February Revolution, “over 450 clubs and more than 200 papers came into being [in Paris] between February and May alone” (Habermas, 1962/1989), with almost every politician and radical thinker forming his own journal. He goes on to say, “Until the permanent legalization of a public sphere that functioned politically, the appearance of a political newspaper was equivalent to engagement in the struggle for a zone of freedom for public opinion, for publicness as a principle” (Habermas, 1962/1989). He explains that during this period of social and/or political change, journalists began writing from the opinion of the public rather than private interests. The type of press Habermas (1962/1989) is discussing here is not the kind that merely regurgitates the facts of a particular issue; he is instead referring to a more polemic, engaged, even politically charged form of writing that at once reflects the views of the public, but also incites debate. In this way, the press became an institution essentially by the public, for the public, a mediated space in which people could express their opinions without fear of persecution from feudal powers.

Revisionist Theories on the Public Sphere

In her article “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” critical theorist Nancy Fraser (1990) discusses the original concept of the public sphere set up by Habermas (1962/1989) in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere as she attempts to establish a new conception of the post-bourgeois public sphere. “The idea of ‘the public sphere’ in Habermas’s sense,” Fraser (1990) states, “designates a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk.” Using Habermas’s (1962/1989) model, Fraser (1990) delineates three analytical sections of the public sphere: the state, the official economy of paid employment, and arenas of public discourse. One of the values of discourse in the public sphere, as opposed to the state or the market, is that citizens can openly circulate opinions that are critical of the state and without capitalist intentions. Habermas (1962/1989) expresses a similar point, observing that the proliferation of capitalist society and its inherent undermining of unbiased public opinion in favor of private interests serve to undermine the public sphere.

While Fraser (1990) believes that “Habermas’s idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and to democratic political practice,” she points out the ways in which his model is not wholly satisfactory:

He never explicitly problematizes some dubious assumptions that underlie the bourgeois model. As a result, we are left at the end of Structural Transformations without a conception of the public sphere that is sufficiently distinct from the bourgeois conception to serve the needs of critical theory today.

Fraser (1990) cites some of the major revisionist theories by authors such as Joan Landes, Mary Ryan, and Geoff Eley, all of whom contend that Habermas (1962/1989) idealized the liberal public sphere and its exclusion of women and the existence of multiple publics. In his essay,
“Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” historian Geoff Eley (1994) argues that while, at times, Habermas (1962/1989) acknowledges the limitations of the class and property-bound basis for the public sphere, he does so in a way that does not jeopardize his key claim about the democratic nature of his model. Like Fraser (1990), Eley (1994) points out that

It is important to acknowledge the existence of competing publics not just later in the nineteenth century, when Habermas presents the fragmentation of the classical liberal model of Öffentlichkeit [public sphere], but at every stage in the history of the public sphere.

Acknowledging the multiplicity of publics within the public sphere raises the question of citizenry, and how some voices within the public sphere achieve greater legitimacy than others. Eley (1994) uses Fraser’s (1990) argument about the role of gender within the public sphere to explain this phenomenon.

How men functioned within the public sphere was constructed in opposition to traditional notions of femininity. The presence of the female figure in the public sphere, the authors claim, was seen as counterintuitive to the aims of the sphere;

A new, austere style of public speech and behavior was promoted, a style deemed “rational,” “virtuous,” and “manly.” In this way, masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the republican public sphere, as was a logic that led, at the height of the Jacobian rule, to the formal exclusion from political life of women, in the context of the French Revolution (Fraser, 1990). In other words, the fundamental concept of womanhood defined that of manhood.

In 17th- and 18th-century France, women, especially those of elite status, served a crucial role in public discourse in the space of the salon. The notion of politesse defined discussion within the salon, and because women were thought to have a “natural aversion to coarseness,” they were actively sought out by gentlemen who believed they could improve themselves through conversation (Cohen, 2002). While women were valued in this capacity, they still did not share the same level of equality as men. As Eley (1994) states, “The new category of the ‘public man’ and his ‘virtue’ was constructed via a series of oppositions to ‘femininity’ which both mobilized older conceptions of domesticity and women’s place and rationalized them into a formal claim concerning women’s ‘nature.’” Moreover, as the concepts of public and private life became increasingly polarized, and the latter became increasingly feminized and domestic, women were excluded from the public sphere; “the natural identification of sexuality and desire with the feminine allowed the social and political construction of masculinity” (Eley, 1994).

Fraser (1990) argues that one of the fundamental flaws of the “bourgeois public sphere” is that it claimed to represent the interests of the public. Multiple publics or “subaltern publics” can have their advantages, but they can also be detrimental if they prove to be undemocratic and exclusionary. According to Fraser (1990), “the view that women were excluded from the public sphere turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim to be the public.” The Habermasian (1962/1989) model does not account for this claim, or at least does not polemicize it in the way Fraser (1990) and her colleagues do;
On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, and working class publics. Thus, there were competing publics from the start, not just from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies. (Fraser, 1990)

Publics and Counterpublics

In his book *Publics and Counterpublics*, Michael Warner (2005) argues that as a fundamental aspect of modern culture, the concept of a public is a social construct. He examines the dynamics present within publics, particularly in regards to speech and active participation and how the concept of “otherness” comes into play within the public arena. His discussion of counterpublics is based on Fraser’s (1990) definition of “subaltern publics,” but he expands upon her theory by suggesting that one’s presence in a counterpublic is inherently stigmatized (Warner, 2005). In other words, Fraser’s (1990) idea of a counterpublic includes marginalized members of society, while Warner’s (2005) includes those who are discriminated against by their willingness to participate in what is considered socially taboo.

Counterpublics are, by definition, formed by their conflict with the norms and contexts of their cultural environment, and this context of domination inevitably entails distortion. Mass publics and counterpublics, in other words, are both damaged forms of publicness, just as gender and sexuality are, in this culture, damaged forms of privacy. (Warner, 2005)


Yet the bourgeois public sphere continued to rely on features of certain bodies. Access to the public came in the whiteness and maleness that were then denied as forms of positivity, since the white male *qua* public person was only abstract rather than white and male.

He goes on to say that “The bourgeois public sphere has been structured from the outset by a logic of abstraction that provides a privilege for unmarked identities: the male, the white, the middle class, the normal” (Warner, 2005).

Understanding the Party Lines

Warner (2002) draws a distinction between *the* public and *a* public:
The public is a kind of social totality. Its most common sense is that of the people in general. A public can also be a second thing: a concrete audience, a crowd witnessing itself in visible space. . . . Such a public also has a sense of totality, bounded by the event or by the shared physical space.

Therefore, a public exists within the public and is defined through the medium of speech or text. A public can be joined willingly, but given its concrete form, it can, in principle, be exclusionary. Such a phenomenon can be understood in the context of the current election cycle. The line that has been drawn between Democrats and Republicans on issues of policy is reinforced by social media algorithm-based news. When people get their news from Facebook, Twitter, or other social media platforms, they are only presented with authors who express opinions similar to those of other articles selected by the user. Therefore, while social media allows people to participate, perhaps even simultaneously, in multiple publics, the tendency to only read left- or right-leaning texts creates a polarization between publics.

Despite the role of social media in inciting this division, the phenomenon of compartmentalized knowledge this media creates is far from new. Walter Lippmann’s (1925) theory on the impossibility of the “omnicompetent, sovereign citizen” as described in his book, The Phantom Public, is uncannily reminiscent of the present election cycle. In the chapter “Principles of Public Opinion,” Lippmann (1925) argues that the role of the public in politics is reduced by the appointment of “executive actors” who carry out actions on the public’s behalf. Given Lippmann’s (1925) perception of the general ineptitude of the public, these executive actors serve the public by allowing them to give up the burden of decision making. Such nonparticipation in the simplest of political actions was prevalent during the time Lippmann wrote his book, but such indecisiveness is still seen today as people fail to overcome the constraints of partisan opinions. On this process, Lippmann (1925) writes:

1. Executive action is not for the public. The public acts only by aligning itself as the partisan of someone in a position to act executively.
2. The intrinsic merits of a question are not for the public. The public intervenes from the outside upon the work of the insiders.
3. The anticipation, the analysis, and the solution of a question are not for the public. The public’s judgment rests on a small sample of the facts at issue.

In other words, the failure to be fully versed on the issues of both one’s own party and the opposing party or parties fuels partisanship. Moreover, it sets up a scenario in which members of the opposing party become marked bodies of otherness, seemingly incapable of being understood.

“Today newspapers and magazines, radio and TV are the media of the public sphere” Habermas (1962/1989) writes. “We speak of the political public sphere in contrast, for instance, to the literary one, when public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state.” By this, he seems to mean that political spheres cannot achieve the same level of critical discourse as the public sphere. Lippmann would probably argue that this is because members of the general public do not have enough information to engage in political discourse. Politicians, or “executive actors” in Lippmann’s (1925) words, are then characterized by a limited set of values that set them in opposition to their opponent. If voters are not given all of the facts about a candidate, they cannot make informed decisions. They can, however, single out the candidate
with a public or following with which they can identify; e.g., Trump’s public is perceived as socially, politically, and morally backwards by Clinton supporters, and vice versa. According to Warner, a public is both self-aware and self-organizing. Consider a rally for Trump and the way his protestors are mistreated by members of his public. The reaction of the Trump protesters proves that this is not a public sphere in Habermas’s (1962/1989) sense of the term; it is private, self-isolating, and exclusionary.

**Conclusion**

Trump’s public is what Warner (2005) believes constitutes the bourgeois public sphere, “privilege for unmarked identities: the male, the white, the middle class, the normal.” Habermas (1962/1989) claims,

> To the public sphere as a sphere mediating between state and society, a sphere in which the public as the vehicle of public opinion is formed, there corresponds the principle of publicness—the publicness that once had to win out against the secret politics of monarchs and that since then has permitted democratic control of state activity.

The lack of discourse within the political sphere is detrimental to the foundations of democracy. It stigmatizes dissenters and perpetuates partisan ideology, but also creates a system in which the nuances of political alignment are imperceptible. It also fails to recognize how heavily social stigma plays into politics. The system that silences political opposition is ideologically based on the one that marginalized nonhegemonic groups. For the political public sphere to function, social inequality must be eliminated. In Fraser’s (1990) words, “this theory should render visible the ways in which social inequality taints deliberation within publics in late capitalist societies.”

**References**


OUR HOME ON NATIVE LAND:
NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN CANADIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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As 2016 came to an end, social and mass media abounded with stories of both hate speech and crimes which target social categorizations of intersectionality, such as race, religion, gender, sexuality, class, and education. This recent surge of overtly expressed and, at times, extremely divisive language is frequently attributed to political origins (notably, presidential campaign discourse), as though citizens become endowed with a behavioral compass through political rhetoric alone. However, this assumed “permission” for citizens to more openly and morally discriminate between themselves and others is equally claimed to be a gross misinterpretation of that discourse. While some political leaders may adamantly argue against their role in offering these apparent permissions, whether implied or explicitly stated, it appears to be often more difficult for them to justify their remarks regarding citizenship class; pitting “true” citizens against “false,” this type of divisive anti-immigration discourse now seems pervasive in Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States. Considering Canada’s close proximity in terms of geography and mainstream culture, we wondered what might occur should Canada accede to this disturbing trend of self-proclaimed “true” citizens unabashedly ostracizing apparent immigrants, or “foreigners.” With citizenship rights asserted based on presupposed national origins, if cultural definitions and national identities are created and maintained by individual members of the public through iterations of everyday discourse, those broad membership categories in popular use (“Black,” “White,” or “Muslim,” for example) seem highly problematic, blurring categorical boundaries and simplifying cultural complexities.

However, the current trend of referring to country of origin in order to distinguish between ostensibly “authentic” and “fraudulent” citizens seems a peculiar concept in North America, where there is a long and arguably proud history of immigration. How might one justify the belief that immigration could be disastrous for a society when that particular society was founded, evidently, on extensive immigration? We found this logic, implicit in recent discriminatory claims, challenging to reconcile. Since it appears that, for many, an everyday definition of true or rightful citizenship is based on ancestry or place of birth (at least including a few generations), we were interested in discovering how Indigenous Peoples entered into the equation. With communal identities such as “First Peoples,” “First Nations,” “Aboriginal,” and “Indigenous,” a well-established consensus seems to exist which recognizes that these cultural groups were indeed the originating human presence in the area, dating back “tens of thousands of years” (Canadian Museum of History, n.d.). Comparatively, European immigrants (predominantly British and French) have only occupied North America for roughly 520 years (beginning with Cabot’s expedition; see Government of Canada, 2015). We therefore found it

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intriguing that European culture came to dominate the shaping of what is now a “Canadian” society, while relegating other cultures to the periphery of the Canadian national identity (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010a). As there appeared to be little mention of Indigenous membership within the Canadian identity in these public disputes over true citizenship, we wondered if this pattern might also be mirrored in political discourse.

Recent efforts made by the Canadian government to correct past injustices highlight the lingering effects of Canada’s turbulent and complicated history between First Peoples and Europeans: issuing an official apology for the Indian residential school system (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010b), creating a National Aboriginal History Month (Government of Canada, 2016a), and establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010d). Many complex and deeply rooted problems remain, with Indigenous Peoples facing considerably harsher daily realities, on average, than any other cultural group within Canada (for instance, see Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010a; Park, Tjepkema, Goedhuis, & Pennock, 2016; Pauly, MacDonald, Hancock, Martin, & Perkin, 2013). Additionally, political efforts have not all received unanimous social approval: by investigating the Canadian public’s reactions to former Prime Minister (PM) Harper’s residential school apology in 2008, Anderson (2012) found that “the most contested theme in the PM’s speech” was “the nature of Canadian diversity” (p. 581). Since 1.4 million Canadians, or 4.3% of the population, identify themselves as Aboriginal (Statistics Canada, 2016a), the question of Canadian inclusivity towards Indigenous citizenry holds significance, and assimilation is still central to the debate. We wondered if true Canadian citizenship actually required a unified monocultural identity, or if a unified national identity could form instead through an appreciation of cultural identities present within Canada; how does everyday discourse define a true Canadian?

**Critical Discourse Analysis: Taking a Linguistic Approach**

There seem to be some inconsistencies in the definition of a Canadian citizen between what a populace presupposes, what politicians pronounce (and what the public then infers), and what has been stated by law. Legally, citizenship in Canada is defined as having been either born in Canada or naturalized through immigration (Government of Canada, 2016b; Statistics Canada, 2016b); but this simplified definition seems to apply ambiguously to Indigenous identities, which fulfill the criteria of citizenship apparently only by surrendering their cultural precedence (conceding births within Canada or on Canadian land, and not, for example, on unceded territories). The ambiguity seems to widen when considering that national identities encompass both objective sociopolitical constructs and subjectively meaningful, but widely varying, sentiments for each citizen (Raney, 2009). Correspondingly, a clearly defined Canadian national identity, once incorporated into social interactions, may become blurred by personal experiences, everyday discourse, and mass media.

Since dominant social institutions and ideologies, when coupled with “the perceptions and representations of others,” may result in unintentional attributions of agency (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, pp. 606–607), reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians may be facilitated by understanding the diverse conceptualizations that emerge in Canadian discourse regarding Indigenous identifications. Furthermore, it seems imperative to investigate whether Indigenous identities should be claimed as Canadian (that is to say, “Indigenous Canadians” rather than “Canadian Indigenous Peoples”), given that core issues have involved domination,
assimilation, and even ethnic decimation of culture, language, and epistemology (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010c). This, then, poses a new question: how might the Canadian national identity be evaluated for meaning, and what are the implications of assigning dual identities?

Bucholtz and Hall (2005) outline a model that incorporates research findings from a variety of disciplines (including sociology, anthropology, psychology, and linguistics) to comprehend the complexity of identification and the “myriad ways that identity comes into being” (p. 608). Using a sociocultural linguistic approach, Bucholtz and Hall (2005) also emphasize the importance of discourse in identity formation; since “identity is emergent in discourse, and does not precede it,” most scholars “locate identity as an intersubjectively achieved social and cultural phenomenon” (p. 607). An investigation of identity formation and application, if dependent upon social interaction, would therefore seem to benefit from an analysis of those discourses in which certain identities are uniquely relevant and impactful (e.g., government-to-citizen communications).

Wodak (2012) echoes this discussion with an emphasis on context and contention, in that humans construct meaning through our unique faculty of language, and over time, individuals come to agree with others in their environment over shared understandings of specific terms. As highly meaningful constructs, identities are also intersubjectively constructed and context dependent, “shared and always negotiable” (Wodak, 2012, p. 216). Identification inherently distinguishes one category’s members from another, and presupposes both similarities (defining “in-groups”) and differences (defining “out-groups”); consequently, boundaries must be invariably delineated. Moreover, Wodak (2012) explains how discursive agreement about meanings can create power imbalances, with the popular group gaining control over which definitions become realized or suppressed. Since distinctions are based on what is subjectively relevant to the dominant group, defined identities may become blurred, collapse into overgeneralizations, or be used interchangeably despite their appreciable differences. Regular social interactions may thus create negative categorizations, such as a “fear of foreigners” (Wodak, 2012, p. 223), and although the discourse may begin innocuously, the iteration of negative sentiments may come to broadly stigmatize group members as definitively dangerous and culpable. Iteration may therefore solidify the dominant group’s perceptions and beliefs, and allow even greater complexities to develop within the previously generalized, negative identity.

Accordingly, group memberships become assigned or accepted through iterative discourse; and, according to Schegloff (2007), membership categories themselves are not isolated but organized into sets based on similarity (categorization “devices”), overlapping each other in areas where they share certain features. Distinguishable by countless identifications, every individual simultaneously belongs to a multitude of categories, and single identifications may be expressed in countless ways (e.g., a person fitting an age category may be a “youth,” “teenager,” or “14-year-old” simultaneously). To Schegloff (2007), membership categorization devices function similarly, have an innate “richness” of inference, are “protected against induction” (pp. 469–470), and may even come to mind in indirect ways (such as through actions or utterances typically associated with the invocation of a category).

Schegloff (2007) also emphasizes that discursively assigned identities are “profoundly more consequential” than merely signifying objective traits (p. 469), and these identities can be closely examined by linguistic methods, such as critical discourse analysis. For instance, Baker, Gabrielatos, and McEnery (2013) compiled a 143 million-word corpus of British newspaper articles spanning 11 years, and analyzed them for specific collocates with the word “Muslim.”
They also reviewed similar research that identified specific negative associations that commonly emerged from the discourse about this identity (generally, a threat to society, democracy, and the military), attributing this “dangerous” prosody to the newspapers’ overuse of negative lexical associations. They found two streams of prosody, of being “easily offended” or dangerously “alienated” within Britain (pp. 271–272), while revealing how a biased discourse can develop through uncritical, overgeneralized descriptions of membership categories.

Moreover, Gabrielatos and Baker (2008) found a multitude of “conflated and confused meanings,” “nonsensical terms,” and negatively biased collocates, also assigning responsibility to the British press for “creating and maintaining a moral panic around [refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants, and migrants]” (p. 33). These authors came to identify faulty reasoning and subliminal connotations through concordance analysis (or evaluating a label’s use within the context of the text), and demonstrated how everyday discourse may become tolerably biased towards exceptionally negative categorizations through corpus linguistic methodologies. They clarified how one may uncover influential associations of an identification by examining its key collocates, and revealed how participants within a discourse may become primed to associate particular actions, characteristics, or situations with a particular identification label.

After a relationship becomes established between or within identifications, analysts may also consider the temporal context, since identities dependably fluctuate over time. Evidence for breakthroughs can evolve directly out of the problems discovered through critical discourse analysis, and these “fissures” can, themselves, offer hope for possible, or even preexisting, progress (Macgilchrist, 2016). Furthermore, those seeking to discover, and attract public attention towards, hidden problems of membership categorization can begin by drawing attention to the discursive context: modes of communication, history, and dissemination of similar discourse; and the experiences, motivations, and apparent values supported by its participants. It appears as though any discussion of apparent societal values, whether truly believed and intentionally supported or not, can only begin once covert or suppressed sentiments are first uncovered. We hope to demonstrate this process with the following case study, in which we analyze a more recent sampling of Canadian political discourse.

Case Study: A Corpus-Based Membership Categorization Analysis

Method

We took a corpus-based approach to investigate collocational “patterns of representation” (following Baker et al., 2013, p. 255) of the Indigenous Canadian identity, as discursively constructed by the two most recently elected heads of the Canadian government: current PM Justin Trudeau and his predecessor, Stephen Harper. Specifically, we compared the written transcripts of all speeches and statements released by Trudeau at the time of our data collection to those released by Harper during the first 11 months of Harper’s first term as PM (to accommodate the limitation that Trudeau had only been in office for 11 months when we collected our corpora).

All transcripts were analyzed as released on official websites (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007, 2016a, & 2016b). The corpus for Trudeau consisted of 11 speeches and 153 statements, delivered between November 4, 2015, and October 3, 2016, and contained 52,080 words. Comparatively, the corpus for Harper contained 90,947 words within 71 speeches, from February 6, 2006, to January 4, 2007. These transcripts may have undergone minor changes...
during delivery; however, it is assumed, from their claims regarding those specific versions, that both Trudeau and Harper approved of the texts as published.

By examining Trudeau’s initiation of “Real Change” from Harper’s government (Liberal Party of Canada, 2016), as it relates to the Indigenous Canadian identity, we identified 13 relevant keywords, carrying out our analysis using AntConc software (Version 3.4.3m; Anthony, 2016). Since Indigenous self-identification terminology has fluctuated over time with evolving communities and relationships, frequencies of “Aboriginal,” “First Nations,” “Indian,” “Indigenous,” “Inuit,” “Métis,” and “Native” were summed, and a combined percentage was calculated for each corpus. Additionally, because the corpora differed greatly in size, we calculated percentages of each keyword’s use (by dividing the frequency of each keyword by the total word count for each corpus), and included all possible keyword rankings, rather than relying solely on word frequencies (see Table 1).

Findings and Prospective Implications

“Canada,” “Canadian,” and “Canadians” were among Trudeau’s most frequently used words, with “diversity” and “Indigenous” in his top 100. His use of the word “diversity” is consistent and positive: “strength” is its second most frequent collocate, partly due to repeated affirmations that Canada’s strength comes “from” its diversity and not, as he often specifies, “in spite of” it. His use of “Indigenous” is followed most frequently (in 42 out of 70 instances) by either “peoples” or “communities,” which includes 18 references to a partnership, collaboration, or relationship with Indigenous Peoples. Similarly, his 11 uses of the term “nation-to-nation,” across nine texts, draws emphasis to a division between Indigenous and Canadian national identities.

Despite the substantial size difference between corpora, it seemed striking that Trudeau used “Indigenous” identifications almost ten times more than Harper, and “diversity” seven times more. In combination with frequent references to “Canadian diversity,” these identifications appropriately represent his well-publicized stance of incorporating Indigenous identities within the Canadian label. In one statement, Trudeau claims:

No relationship is more important to our government and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples. Today, we reaffirm our government’s commitment to a renewed nation-to-nation relationship between Canada and Indigenous Peoples, one based on the recognition of rights, respect, trust, cooperation, and partnership. (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016b)

Similarly, in a previous speech, he claims that “no relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with First Nations, the Métis Nation, and Inuit Peoples” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016a). However, positioning himself as representing all of Canada in this “nation-to-nation” relationship, he decisively separates Indigenous people (First Nations, Métis, and Inuit cultural identities) from the Canadian national identity, and discursively constructs an explicit “us-them” distinction of identity and difference (Wodak, 2001).

Additionally, in his speech to the Assembly of First Nations, Trudeau states, “Every child and young person living in Canada deserves a real and fair chance at success. First Nations students are no less deserving” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2016a). This phrasing implies that although First Nations students deserve support equal to Canadian youth, they are not necessarily
Canadian. Furthermore, the First Nations label incidentally exhibits favoritism for one Indigenous category while excluding the distinctive Inuit and Métis cultural identities, and the distinctions between First Nations and Canada conflict with commitments to serve “all Canadians” (a phrase used 86 times). We therefore question whether Trudeau was developing a truly inclusive space for Indigenous membership within the Canadian identity.

Like Trudeau, Harper used the words “Canada,” “Canadian,” and “Canadians” with a high frequency; in contrast, “diversity” and “Indigenous” placed far from his top 100, with diversity ranked at 734 and Indigenous at 5,372. With only one explicit mention of partnership or collaboration with Aboriginal Peoples, his 14 uses of “Aboriginal” all occurred within three speeches, referring to either historical injustices or contemporary movements for countering historical inequalities for Indigenous Peoples. Interestingly, Harper categorized “Aboriginal Canadians” three times, explicitly combining the two identities in a way that Trudeau did not. Two instances acknowledged Aboriginal Canadians who fought during World War II, describing “Native soldiers [as] daring fighters,” and depicting Tommy Prince, a Manitoba Ojibway, and several others as “Canadians . . . [who] stood up for Canada” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007). His third use of “Aboriginal Canadians” occurred when stating:

[U]p to $300 million is targeted specifically at improving housing for Aboriginal Canadians who live off-reserve. An equal amount will go to meet the acute housing shortages of [N]atives who live on reserves, and their urgent need for improved water and sanitation services will be addressed by the municipal rural infrastructure fund. (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007)

While explicitly assigning a Canadian identity to Tommy Prince, Harper seems to separate the Aboriginal Canadian identity (an assimilated member of the dominant Canadian society) from that of a Native (a marginalized member of some “other” category).

**Additional context: duality and time.** This common dual identity assignment, or categorizing subsets of a larger group by using multiple labels simultaneously (e.g., “Aboriginal Canadian”), appears to be more often discussed in the literature in relation to immigrants who are in an identity transition, allowing them to claim both identities when assigned a new national identity. Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012) assert that most immigrants even prefer the dual identity (e.g., “Chinese American”); however, Indigenous people are far from immigrants. We therefore question, when the Indigenous Canadian dual identity is also considered, whether national and ethnic identities are always compatible in this way, and whether the assignment of dual identities can be presupposed as generally acceptable simply because it appears to be preferred by immigrants.

Supporting the compatibility of these identities, Lee and Edmonston (2009) show the existence of a growing trend in census data for Canadians to report their national identity (i.e., “Canadian”) as their ethnic identity, which does seem to suggest a blurring between these two concepts for some Canadian citizens. However, even when national and ethnic boundaries overlap, it is not necessarily a positive change. Lee and Edmonston (2009) also speculate that increasing immigration rates may be negatively influencing the sentiments of Canadian-born citizens regarding their national identity membership, and therefore might induce some to purposely distinguish themselves in a novel way from Canadian immigrants—another way to maintain an “us-them” distinction. Accordingly, when Harper assigns the Aboriginal identity to
certain Canadians in the same way that prior nationalities are assigned to immigrant Canadian identities (the dual identity), and with phrasing such as “the Aboriginal inhabitants of our country” (emphasis added; Office of the Prime Minister, 2007), Harper seems to provide fitting examples of enduring archaic colonialist discourse (Anderson, 2012).

Harper’s use of “Aboriginal Canadian” appears to sustain colonialist attitudes by prioritizing the “Canadian” identity above that of “Aboriginal,” linguistically assimilating a subordinate identity into a dominant, and therefore primary, identity. In contrast, there are others (such as Callaghan, Cull, Vettese, & Taylor, 2006; Hallett et al., 2008; Ramos, 2006; Rawana & Ames, 2012) who instead distinguish Aboriginal people residing in Canada as “Canadian Aboriginal,” perhaps intentionally granting greater importance to an Aboriginal heritage. Also, although few question that European emigrants had, historically, come to inhabit Indigenous lands, Harper’s inclusion of the phrase “our country” endows Canada, the sociopolitical construct, with ownership of this geographical location, by claiming it for himself and other Canadians with the use of “our.” The apparently straightforward combinations of “Aboriginal Canadian,” “the Aboriginal inhabitants,” and “our country” may each help to simultaneously reinforce the land entitlement claimed by the dominant (i.e., Eurocentric) culture while relegating Aboriginal Peoples to a resident or inhabitant status. If “Canadian” includes “Aboriginal inhabitants,” it seems unclear why they were dissociated (with other options like “of this country” or “of Canada”).

Lacking a clear egalitarian perspective, Harper’s use of language connoting dual identity and terminology that is implicitly divisive seemed to align his stance with the same assimilation that he had publicly condemned (Anderson, 2012). He appeared to maintain an outdated, obsolete attitude by ultimately endorsing unequal power relations between Canadian and Indigenous identities. Conversely, Trudeau’s opposition to incorporating Indigenous identities within the inherently culturally diverse Canadian identity seemed to locate him at another extreme, having established a hierarchical and exclusionary version of “equal pluralistic coexistence of various ethnic groups” (Wodak, de Cillia, & Reisigl, 2009, p. 9). Nevertheless, the influence of historical events on emergent discourse is also important to consider, as emphasized by Wodak (2001); thus, when attempting to explain the discursive differences between Trudeau and Harper, historical events that occurred between their respective first years in office should be considered. One such notable event is the official apology offered by Harper to former residential school students—and all those adversely affected by the schools—in June 2008, three months after the United Nations released its Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2016), but just over a decade following the last residential school closure (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, n.d.). In this apology, he affirms “we [the Government, Canada] now recognize” five times (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010b), situating Canada within the global discourse concerning Indigenous rights, and helping to bring this injustice towards Indigenous Peoples officially to light for the Canadian public.

By speaking about and apologizing for residential schools while occupying the highest governmental position in Canada, Harper may have encouraged the shift in government-to-citizen discourse by bringing the marginalization of Indigenous Peoples to the forefront of Canadian political discussion. Therefore, Harper’s stance around this time appears to be more comparable to Trudeau’s current approach of separating “Indigenous” and “Canadian,” although it seems inevitable, by the very genre of apology, that a clear distinction between the speaker (apologizer) and the audience (to whom the apology is offered) will arise (Villadsen, 2008). Accordingly, in contrast to his previous use of the “Aboriginal Canadian” dual—and perhaps
even intentionally inclusive—identity, Harper later states, “this experience has been on your shoulders for far too long. The burden is properly ours as a Government, and as a country” in his official apology (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010b). In this, he seems to clearly and intentionally distinguish between two groups: the out-group consisting of Aboriginal communities, and the in-group of Canadians. Yet, further along in the same speech, he proposes “a new relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and other Canadians” (emphasis added; Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010b). In an apparent instance of self-contradiction, he nevertheless assigns Aboriginal Peoples an implicit Canadian identity once again.

**Conclusion**

Although the personal sentiments of Harper and Trudeau concerning Indigenous and Canadian membership categories may remain uncertain, the apparent societal values that emerge through their speeches (as well as through those of other politicians), whether truly believed or inadvertently misunderstood, can begin to be exposed through a similar process of close examination of public discourse. Public dissention may arise not only through the literal and explicit labels in common use, but also from context, or the ways in which those labels become used. Through our brief discourse analysis, we hope to demonstrate the potential richness, complexity, and practicality of taking such an approach when attempting to investigate the underpinnings of social interactions that come to impact society on numerous levels (e.g., individual, sociocultural, and national). By considering the inseparable relationship between ideas, actions, and discourse, discourse analysts can help to illuminate themes (such as the attribution of diverse identities) hidden within these myriad public discourses. Furthermore, values that garner apparent support from individuals may become credited or discredited by contextually evaluating relevant discourse (for example, through participant beliefs and experiences, discourse-historically, or within its genre). As with our case study, just what becomes illuminated by this type of close examination may be many more questions than answers; nevertheless, when reconciliation and cross-cultural integration are imperative, these newly formed “fissures” seem preferable to uneasy silence. To move forward, it may help to first inspect where one truly stands.

**References**


the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Keywords</th>
<th>Keyword Frequency (Percentage of Corpus)</th>
<th>Keyword Ranking*</th>
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<td>Trudeau (Corpus size: 52,080 words)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>133 (0.255)</td>
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*Ranking begins with 1 (most commonly used). **Estimated from single-word rankings.
Since its founding in 1928, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood has been banned, rehabilitated, purged, marginally accepted, and declared a terrorist organization. The organization has fluctuated in size, ideology, and relation to the sitting government, but it has consistently been perceived as a threat to existing government. This perception is not wholly incorrect. In Tarek Masoud's introduction to *Counting Islam: Religion, Class and Elections in Egypt*, he writes that experts' failures to accurately predict many events of the Arab Spring did not extend to their predictions of a Brotherhood victory should Egypt hold "more-or-less free elections" (2014, p. 3). Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood even succeeded in achieving greater electoral success than any other opposition group under President Mubarak in the 2005 elections, despite its status as an illegal organization and regardless of a ban on parties based on religious grounds (Wickham, 2013). Again considered a threat by the Mubarak government, the Brotherhood faced severe setbacks in the 2010 election (Wickham, 2013). The regime's crackdown, however, proved to be a key ingredient in its undoing, and 2011 saw the collapse of President Mubarak's 30-year regime. In the elections that followed, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) not only won a plurality in parliament, but took the presidency as well, in the first free and fair elections in Egypt's history (Wickham, 2016).

Western observers, initially optimistic, became increasingly cynical as groups they associated with terrorism and theocracy saw electoral success, even if their success was the product of democratic processes (Walsh, 2003). Unlike militant Islamist groups, the FJP could not be easily explained as the armed control of a few extremists loathed by the people. Why did Egyptians vote for the Muslim Brotherhood's party? Should the FJP's success be viewed through a political, religious, or economic lens? In a country whose revolution was founded on a slogan of "bread, freedom and social justice," why were Islamists elected, rather than their socialist competition (Masoud, 2014, p. 3)?

A plethora of explanations have been offered for the success of the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, as well as for Islamist parties in the Middle East and Maghreb in general. I consider these explanations to be complementary rather than competing. As in most cases, if one asks whether it was factor X or factor Y which caused result Z, the answer is usually *both*. I contend that the Muslim Brotherhood's FJP saw electoral success in Mubarak-era and postrevolutionary elections because it was better organized and enjoyed better access to voters than leftist organizations, because it was rich in emotional capital, and because it strategically targeted middle-class voters, who could "afford" to vote ideologically and sought political and economic change in Egypt (Masoud, 2014, p. 120).

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Organization

Superior organization is one of the most frequently cited factors in the Brotherhood's successes, both inside and outside of the political sphere. Particularly compared with leftist parties, the Muslim Brotherhood held two key organizational advantages. First, the Brotherhood enjoyed better access to voters than did its rival leftist parties. While both the FJP and the leftist parties advocated social justice and redistribution, leftist parties were hobbled by an economy with state-controlled unions, a large agricultural (rather than industrial) sector, and the significance of patron-client relations between rich and poor (Masoud, 2014). Under the Mubarak regime in particular, the political relations of the poor were vertical: they would vote for their local notable or umda (local official) and in return hope to receive services. These voters could not afford to vote ideologically, either for the Brotherhood or for leftist parties (Masoud, 2014). While this caused difficulty for the Brotherhood, it was even more debilitating for the left, whose base was traditionally poorer. State control of unions further restricted flow of leftist political propaganda to workers, another key constituency (Masoud, 2014). The predominance of agriculture over industrial work frustrated leftist goals again. The diffusion of workers and the importance of clan and family ties over class ties frustrated the left, sending agricultural voters to the ballot box for their umda or a member of their tribe more often than for a socialist who better represented their political interests. Collectively, this lack of networks put leftist parties at a severe disadvantage. Even after the fall of the Mubarak regime, leftists did not have sufficient time to build institutions and trust to see success at the ballot box (Masoud, 2014). These organizational factors and the left’s networking deficits worked in direct favor of the Brotherhood. With their networks rooted in mosques, prayer houses, and social programs, the Muslim Brotherhood was not only better able to access voters, but able to claim voters who, if better educated, may have preferred the more redistributivist platforms of leftist parties (Masoud, 2014). Access to voters, then, is not so much a story of Brotherhood success as it is of leftist failures at the hands of structural disadvantages.

The second component of organizational success is the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. In “The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt,” Eric Trager (2011) explains the internal structure of the Muslim Brotherhood with a focus on its membership process. He argues that the length, rigor, and doctrine of the process guarantee that only the most devoted candidates for membership are allowed membership (Trager, 2011). The Brotherhood’s emphases on obedience and working for religious, rather than for political or social goals, creates a very different culture than that of mainstream political parties (leftist or otherwise), and this culture gave the Brotherhood an advantage when it took its agenda to the polls. This difference in culture is captured by Wickham, as she describes the 2012 presidential runoff and the behaviors of Shafiq and Morsi volunteers at polling stations: “At several of the polling stations we visited, there were no Shafiq [a rival candidate] agents on-site; at others, they were present but visibly distracted . . . . By contrast, at least one Morsi [FJP] agent was present in every polling station we visited, keeping a close eye on the ballot box” (p. 263).

While this anecdote does not fully capture the Muslim Brotherhood’s internal culture, it does illustrate the differences between the political behaviors of Brotherhood agents compared to those working for a mainstream political party. Why were Brotherhood agents so much more diligent and vigilant than their peers? Trager (2011) explains the process to become a member of the Brotherhood as one requiring great patience and willingness to be observed, tested, and reeducated (Trager, 2011). First, potential members are scouted at universities or in
neighborhoods. If, after up to a year of observation, they are considered suitable for potential membership, they become a muhib (follower) and are educated in morality and religiosity. Muhib are included in usras, or families, which support one another and are expected to share personal concerns with one another. Successful muhib then become muayyad (supporter), successful muayyad become muntasib (affiliated), successful muntasib become muntazim (organizer), and finally, successful muntazim are promoted to ach’amal (working brother). This multistage process initially includes many men who will not pass the early levels, including members of the state security forces (Trager, 2011). The length and intensity of the process, which involves being constantly observed and tested, guarantees that only the most loyal prospects become members of the Brotherhood. Because a man has invested so much of his time and energy into the Brotherhood, or because he is so dedicated to becoming a member, the organization enjoys greater loyalty and a greater willingness to make personal sacrifices than other political organizations (Trager, 2011). To its members, the Brotherhood is not simply a political cause, but the nexus of religious, political, and personal life. While the advantage the Brotherhood and FJP enjoy because of this organizational structure is difficult to quantify, it is both observable and logical.

**Emotional and Symbolic Capital**

The Muslim Brotherhood’s wealth of emotional and symbolic capital gave the FJP an advantage over its leftist rivals. Until the 2007 release of its party platform, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed the benefits of relative policy ambiguity (Brown & Hamzawy, 2008). Using vague but popular slogans such as “Islam Din wa-Dawla” (Islam: State and Religion) and “Islam Huwa al-Hal” (Islam Is the Solution), the Brotherhood allowed supporters and potential voters to cast their own interpretations of Islam, social justice, and a positive future onto the Brotherhood and the FJP. The organization was able to capitalize not only on the networks provided by mosques and Quranic classes, but also on their symbolism, language, and trust (Walsh, 2003; Wickham, 2016). While it can be argued that the leftist parties could have capitalized on their connection to Gamal Abdel Nasser, there are two flaws to this: first, they did not; second, Nasser’s position was nowhere near that of God, and while popular, he was not universally loved (Wickham, 2016). Further, the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as an outsider political force and its religiosity lent it an appearance of being “clean” and uncorrupt, similar to the early AK Parti (AKP) in Turkey (Wickham, 2016). As politics in Egypt have long been considered “dirty,” political parties face a greater degree of suspicion than that faced by religious organizations. The Brotherhood’s identity as a primarily religious and social group, and only secondarily as a political entity, gave it an advantage again over leftist parties that had to speak the language of politics rather than the language of God.

**Voting Populations**

To outsiders, one of the most puzzling factors in Egypt’s postrevolutionary elections was the failure of leftist, redistributivist parties in a country in which over half of people claimed the welfare of the people was the responsibility of the government (Masoud, 2014). The January 25 uprisings had a slogan of “bread, freedom and social justice,” and yet the Egyptian people shunned socialist parties in favor of Islamists both before and after Mubarak left office (Masoud,
2014, p. 3). To understand this trend, one must look at the elections before the revolution and after the revolution, keeping in mind both history and Egypt’s social makeup.

Both during and after Mubarak’s government, the majority of Egyptians were poor. Forty percent of Egypt’s population lives on less than two dollars per day (Wickham, 2016). As stated above, many of these poor people work in agriculture and live in rural areas, fostering vertical political structures. The poor then voted for local notables they hoped would provide basic public services in return for their vote, or were paid outright for their vote. This trend of patronage meant that the poor simply could not vote ideologically, even if they truly supported the Brotherhood’s or the leftist’s platform in principle (Masoud, 2014). This hobbled the left, which depended almost exclusively on poor voters and radical intellectuals, which were sparse in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood had other options—namely, the middle class. Rich enough not to need patronage but too poor to see the benefits of the Mubarak government, the middle class was the perfect target for the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was not, as some assumed, voted into office by poor Egyptians who depended on the organization for their health care or food, but by lower-middle and middle-class voters who took advantage of its vocational training courses and tutoring for their children (Masoud, 2014).

After the January 25 Revolution, patronage did not disappear. As we have seen with the resurgence of military dictatorship, the deep state in Egypt was not overthrown in the January 25 uprising, and poor rural Egyptians were likewise not immediately freed from existing power structures. To assume that poor Egyptians suddenly voted for their ideological preference in 2012 would be incorrect. However, other factors came into play after the removal of President Mubarak that continued to favor the Brotherhood’s FJP over leftist parties. The first was organization, as discussed above. Networks through mosques and families favored the Brotherhood, but the Mubarak government had successfully closed off ties between leftist parties and their potential voter base. Without open unions and institutions, the left faced deep structural obstacles that could not be overcome between January 25 and the 2012 elections (Masoud, 2014). The second was misperception and a trust deficit. Whereas the Brotherhood enjoyed symbolic capital and subconscious trust associated with religion, the left did not have a deep cultural base with which to work. The trust placed in the Brotherhood and its better access to voters led to a perception that it, rather than its leftist rivals, was more likely to follow through on delivery of bread and social justice (Masoud, 2014).

Conclusion

There is no single explanation for the success of the FJP over Egypt’s leftist parties, either before or after Mubarak’s government. Rather, both qualitative emotional and quantitative economic factors combined to give the Brotherhood and its party a decisive advantage over the left, which the latter proved unable to surmount. Structurally, the Brotherhood had better connections with and access to voters and a more viable demographic target. Structural challenges alone do not explain the FJP’s victories, however. The Brotherhood’s superior organization—the result of individual choices and actions—gave the group a significant advantage over its rivals. This organization was better at capitalizing on its extant privileges, such as emotional and religious capital. While the left, for example, could have drawn parallels between its goals and the reforms of Nasser, it failed to do so. Overall, leftist parties were not as vigorous or politically savvy as the Brotherhood (Wickham, 2016). Taken together, these structural and individual advantages placed the FJP far ahead of its secular opposition in 2005,
2011, and 2012, albeit by diminishing margins. After the reclamation of the government by the military, however, it is unclear whether these advantages and disadvantages will matter in the future, in which free and fair elections are unforeseeable and the Muslim Brotherhood is declared a terrorist organization (Wickham, 2016).

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While it is certain that globalization has promoted social development processes over the past centuries, the phenomenon has also created many social problems. One example is gender inequality, which still remains a major barrier to human development. 

Equality is a condition for social justice and hence a prerequisite for development. Regarding gender equality, Benavente, Guzmán, Hurtado, Pavez, and Valdés (2012) note,

The concern to establish . . . [it] . . . as an objective of public management is reflected in various regional and international agreements, that have been ratified by States and that have given rise to new policies in all Latin American and Caribbean countries.

Public Policy and Gender Mainstreaming

The first step to introduce this research is to assess the concept of public policy in conjunction with the mainstreaming of the gender perspective. According to Marta Ferreira Santos in “Gender and Public Policies,” public policies “can be understood as a government course of action, guided by certain objectives, that reflect or translate an interplay of interests” (2006). The aforementioned “interplay of interests” presumes an important role in the formulation of a public policy, as it indicates to whom the policy is addressed (its beneficiaries), what changes are to be achieved through its implementation, and what resources (human and economic) are accounted for in order to achieve the proposed objectives. A major component of public policy is law. Laws serve as means of execution, and they include specific legislation as well as more broadly defined provisions limited to constitutional and international law. When referring to a public policy (specifically, one that is based on gender impact), national and international law provides a framework for identifying basic human rights and for defining violations of these rights. World conferences, for instance, represent massive political platforms through which immediate issues—such as human rights, social development, environmental challenges, etc.—are widely discussed. As to gender equality advocacy, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1979) and the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) gave birth to treaties which serve as concrete frames of reference in terms of the interplay between the recognition of women’s rights and the prevailing gender inequality situation.

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A Human Rights-Based Framework

As proposed initially, the full attachment to any document that defines the rights of women is central to the formulation and implementation of a policy with a gender perspective. Authors Kristen Timothy and Marsha Freeman (2000) agree that:

The Conference Declaration and Platform for Action is built on a rights framework, invoking the substance and the language of human rights in every section, and referring specifically to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women as well as to the other human rights treaties. (para. 1)

Although mentioned secondly in the sentence, the CEDAW is widely considered to be the first international bill of rights for women. Through the agency of this convention, an official definition of “discrimination against women” is established, and is cited as follows:

The term “discrimination against women” shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. (United Nations, 1979)

In accordance, The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action—derived from the Fourth World Conference on Women held in 1995—begins with a preamble, in which the participating governments reaffirm their commitment to “The equal rights and inherent human dignity of women and men and other purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments” (United Nations, 1995). Again, both documents focus on recognizing women’s rights as the basis for any governmental action.

Reaffirming the Commitment to Women's Rights Through Policies: The Analysis Matrix for Identifying Fair Gender Equality Policies

The determination to analyze gender-based policies that impact positively on achieving a more equitable society arises from the conviction that the states of the world have a duty to maintain an active role in building institutional mechanisms that tackle all sorts of discrimination. As a result, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) designed an analysis matrix for identifying fair gender equality policies. The analysis matrix constitutes a fairly simple guide that allows policymakers to analyze a gender-based public policy. The document comprises a set of guidelines that determine whether such policy is fair—i.e., promotes greater justice—and if such will derive the expected outcome.

The purpose of the matrix is:
to discover and analyze public policies which, in the context of specific historical processes and using society’s available resources, produce results that tend towards a justice of distribution, recognition and representation, at the same time as strengthening women’s achievements in the three areas . . . of concern: physical autonomy, economic autonomy and autonomy in decision-making. (Benavente et al., 2012)

Two key concepts—1) the demands in distribution, recognition, and representation; and 2) the principle of women’s autonomy—are elucidated below.

**The Three Pillars for Building Greater Gender Equality: Physical Autonomy, Economic Autonomy, and Autonomy in Decision Making**

The principle of women’s autonomy is essential to gender mainstreaming within public policy analysis, as women must “have the capacity and conditions to freely make decisions impacting their [private and public] lives” if the exercise of their human rights is to be guaranteed (ECLAC, n.d.). The following concepts are described as “the three pillars for building greater gender equality in the region,” and can be defined as follows:

- Physical autonomy: Control over their [women’s] own bodies;
- Economic autonomy: Income generation and ownership of their [women’s] personal financial resources; and
- Decision-making autonomy: Full participation in decisions that affect their [women’s] life, individually and as a group (Benavente & Valdés, 2014).

Gender mainstreaming in government policy must tackle the situations that limit the autonomy of women, which might also limit their capability for ensuring recognizable achievements in society. Addressing realities in key areas for equality, such as paid and unpaid work and poverty (economic autonomy); the participation of women in decision making within the distinct stratum of government (decision making autonomy); and sexual and reproductive rights and gender-based violence (physical autonomy) must be prioritized in order to attain greater equality among women and men in all societal spheres.

**Meeting the Demands of Women’s Equality**

The preceding description of the principle of women’s autonomy suggests that discussion of the three possible dimensions of gender policies cover demands in distribution, recognition, and representation.

According to the United Nations, a policy of distribution or redistribution “aim[s] at eliminating the differences involving inequalities in the distribution of resources (natural, material, financial and time), opportunities and responsibilities” (Benavente et al., 2012). A policy that is focused on achieving a justice of distribution for women would be more likely to eliminate issues like the gender pay gap. According to a recent report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics titled “Highlights of Women’s
Earnings in 2014,” “Women who were full-time wage and salary workers had median usual weekly earnings of $719,” therefore earning 83% “of those of male full-time wage and salary workers ($871)” (2015).

A justice of representation is essential not only for ensuring women’s equality, but for maintaining a culture of democracy altogether. In “Female Candidates and Legislators,” Jennifer L. Lawless argues that “Women’s numeric underrepresentation is critical because of the consequences it carries for political representation and democratic legitimacy” (2015). In the United States, only 18.3% of women hold office in national legislature, compared to developing countries such as Nicaragua (42.4%) and Mexico (37.4%) (Lawless, 2015). These differences occur mainly because Latin American countries have implemented a system of electoral quotas for women, which require political parties to nominate a minimum percentage of female candidates. This mechanism gives way to certain balance within the representation of men and women in public institutions. Nevertheless, while some countries have reported an increase in the number of women active in public positions, others have not seen significant changes. This suggests that the system of quotas is perhaps needed but not always effective. Conclusively, U.S. policymaking must be challenged in terms of ensuring a justice of representation for women in decision-making positions.

Last but not least, as Benavente et al. also state, “Demands for recognition, on the other hand, focus on the specificity of a group and the affirmation of its value, such that they tend to differentiate between groups” (2012). In accordance, the term “gender gap” seems to be very much used to discuss the lack of female recognition in many areas of academic and social achievement. Women’s accomplishments in the sciences—including physics, chemistry, medicine, and economics—as well as in literature have long been poorly recognized by the global community, which gives priority to male research. Such is the case with the world-renowned Nobel Prize, of which “out of the total 847 persons awarded, a meagre forty-four have been women” (Hedin, 2014). For this reason, gender discrimination in the field of academic research must be understood as political in nature and must be regulated.

Abiding by such concepts—the demands in distribution, recognition, and representation, as well as the principle of women’s autonomy—is regarded as imperative for gender mainstreaming in public policy. One reason for this is that it centers all actions upon the recognition of the rights provided inclusively for women at the CEDAW and the Fourth World Conference on Women.

**Establishing the Ground Rules for the Recognition of Fair Gender Policies**

The following step in developing this research is to introduce the guidelines outlined by the analysis matrix for identifying fair gender equality policies. These guidelines diverge into phases or steps, and coincide with what political scientists would define as “phases in the public policy cycle”—i.e., specific steps that must be followed in order to formulate a policy. The analysis matrix is divided into four main segments, which also represent the four main phases in the formulation of a fair public policy.

Phase A, described as the “identification of public problems behind the public policy response,” is that which initiates the process of formulating a fair, gender-
sensitive policy. While it is true that all steps are vital to this process, phase A is designed in such a way which enables policymakers to make an educated guess as to whether or not the policy will succeed. It is within this phase that one of the first challenges of the gender-inclusive policy approach arises, due to the fact that the participation of men and women in raising equality issues—socially oriented, real-life experiences that involve discrimination which favors one gender—may not be approached and recorded in a nondifferentiating way among genders; thus, one of the policy’s building blocks is deemed unequal at the outset.

According to the authors, in order to fulfill the first precept of phase A, “frameworks of meaning,” it is important to raise certain questions. First, Benavente et al. ask the following: “What background was considered in the discussion of the problem?” (2012). This refers to the historical context of the policy itself, i.e., the fundamental reasons why the creation of the policy is unavoidable. This context is usually linked to repeated, unresolved legal cases to which no appropriate policy may apply. One example is the Maria da Penha Law (Procuradoria Especial da Mulher, 2010); it was created based on Maria da Penha’s experience with domestic violence and the impact of her case on the judicial process of integrating an appropriate law that punished any act of violence against women in Brazil (UN Women, 2011). In this case, the historic background of the policy (Maria da Penha’s experience in Brazilian courts), as well as a rights-based approach, were suitably taken into account.

The second question that ought to be answered is the following: “Which actors were involved in defining the problem?” The policy actors group is mainly made up of the branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) and other informal actors—for example, interest groups (such as human rights advocates and feminist groups) as well as general public opinion. It is truly important that all opinions are heard and all interests taken into account in order to improve policy capacity. For example, the representatives of the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and the Committee for Latin America and the Caribbean for the Defense of Women's Rights (CLADEM) advocated for the creation of the Maria da Penha Law. These NGOs denounced the Brazilian government before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH) for not taking effective measures to prevent and punish gender-based violence (Benavente & Valdés, 2014). It is by means of the power exercised by these policy actors that Maria da Penha’s voice was heard and a new law to protect women’s rights was born.

Within the second component of phase A, “problem identification,” Benavente et al. stipulate that “The context in which the equality policy is developed will show gender [in]equality in a specific population or territory and its characteristics, as well as aspects relating to institutional development and frameworks” (2012). This suggests that policymakers examine the issue targeted by the new policy. Moreover, we may ask, “What specific injustices are being tackled by this public policy?” It is vital to understand what actions have already been taken by government agencies to yield solutions for a particular situation of inequality, such as physical violence against women. Understanding what has been done in the past will allow policymakers to identify how a new policy might convert precedents into more concrete and absolute lawful methods of attacking injustices. A well-suited example is Uruguay’s policy of fighting against domestic violence. In this case, the problem was identified through
“The high incidence of violence against women and the lack of comprehensive measures to focus on the phenomenon [while] also considering the inclusion of children and adolescents, thus incorporating an approach that intersects gender and generations” (ECLAC, 2014). Clearly, the situation of inequality was acknowledged and described. According to the authors, during 1995, domestic violence was included in Uruguay’s penal code as a crime, which, however, proved insufficient to solve the problem. Hence, the situation called for the development of a policy that tackled violence against women directly, especially female deaths due to gendered violence (femicide).

The following step listed in phase A, “identification of gender injustices,” entails a “Diagnostic that incorporates the differentiated effects of the problem on men and women, and the rules that facilitate or hamper an appropriate solution” (Benavente et al., 2012). In other words, one may ask what specific unfair situations—mostly based on asymmetric and unequal relations of power between men and women—produce inequality among men and women. These injustices can be better identified by applying the concept of the demands of justice (that is, redistribution, recognition, and/or representation). If these concepts are not supported by existing policy, then there is a situation of inequality that can be uprooted by “[providing] sensitive services to such differences and [avoiding] disadvantageous treatment” (ECLAC, 2010). For this, it is also necessary to consider a set of variables among the targeted group, such as age, geographic area (location), education level, vulnerabilities, ethnicity, and poverty, among others. In that fashion, the policy will take on an integrative approach that suffices the needs of different groups of women, thus enforcing equality in the implementation of the respective law. For example, Brazil’s Maria da Penha Law was designed to deal with the fact that women suffer from a specific sort of violence (gender-based violence), a blatant expression of the gender order and the subordination of women. Gender-based violence was, as a matter of fact, the identified gender injustice (maltreatment) in this case. Uruguay took a similar approach. Policymakers identified the reasons for their overall situation of domestic violence against women: they pinpointed causes and perpetrators, and also took a human rights approach where women’s rights were fully respected, ergo not breached.

**Women’s Physical Autonomy Under Menace: The Role of Gender Public Policy**

As exemplified above, the analysis matrix for identifying fair gender equality policies has been useful in the institutional struggle for the elimination of gender-based violence in Latin American countries like Brazil and Uruguay. Identifying fair gender equality policies must be requisite in Latin American policymaking in order to drastically reduce the number of women suffering the scourges of violence, and domestic violence in particular. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2013), one in three women throughout the world will experience physical and/or sexual violence by a partner or sexual violence by a nonpartner. In the Americas, 29.8% of women are affected by this kind of oppression (WHO, 2013).

In like manner, a problem which has been of great concern to the international community is the outrageous increase during the last decade of women killed at the hands of their intimate partners or former partners. For example, Brazil, with a rate of 4.8 homicides per 100,000 women, occupies the fifth position among a group of 83
countries (Waiselfisz, 2015). This study, conducted by the WHO, examined a group of 83 countries with homogeneous data in order to make a comparison of the incidence of femicide worldwide. The information dates from the year 2010 to 2013. Due to the
effect of the Maria da Penha Law (enacted in 2006), from 2006 to 2013, the growing
number of these killings fell to 2.6% per year and the growth rate dropped to 1.7% per
year. Even so, these rates should eventually drop to the point of nonexistence.

This shows the importance of acquiring public policies that are based upon the
concept of women’s physical autonomy. The authors of “What Kind of State? What
Kind of Equality?” argue that “In order for women to escape from poverty and attain
economic autonomy, their bodies must be respected in various senses, in particular they
should not be subjected to any form of economic, sexual, physical or psychological
abuse” (Montaño et al., 2010). In other words, if their physical integrity is respected,
women should be able to remain self-determinant in other aspects of their lives, such as
financially, which is essential for their overall social development. Adolescent
maternity, maternal mortality, unmet demand for family planning, and female deaths at
the hands of their intimate partners or former partners are presented in the
aforementioned report as the greatest obstacles to ensuring women’s physical autonomy
(due to the increasing figures of the respective indicators in the last 15 years).

The Remaining Phases in the Analysis Matrix for Identifying Fair Gender
Equality Policies

The phases “formulation (B),” “implementation (C),” and “assessment (D),”
presented by the authors of the analysis matrix for identifying fair gender equality
policies, are vital for the sake of the formulation and implementation of a gender-
inclusive public policy. As mentioned above, the policy would not be viable if all steps
were not completed. Therefore, due to such incompletion, the law would not be
considered fair.

Conclusion

Latin American countries have taken the lead in tackling gender inequality by
passing laws to protect women from violence. However, these actions surely do not
determine the overall reduction, or even the elimination, of domestic violence and
femicide rates in the region. This issue has also been important in U.S. legislation.
According to Montgomery et al., “Violence against women is increasingly recognized
as a critical national public health concern in the United States, as evidenced by the
recent signing of the Violence Against Women Act by President Obama” (2015). In the
same study conducted by the WHO on the rates of female homicides from 83 countries
around the world, the United States was ranked 18th out of 83 countries with equal
recollected data (such study refers to the year 2010). Indeed, as Montgomery et al.
show, “It is [also] estimated that in their lifetime, nearly 1 in 3 U.S. women has
survived physical violence, and 1 in 10 has survived rape” (2015). These figures
indicate that there is still much to be done in terms of the overall reduction of violence
against women in the United States.
In order to overcome the challenges posed by gender inequality, governments worldwide must not only commit to formulating policies with a gender perspective, but to determining if such policies are ultimately fair—i.e., if the policy in question abides by the concept of demands in distribution, recognition, and representation, as well as the principle of women’s autonomy. Such gender-based policies take on an integrative approach so that each respective population suffering from discrimination is incorporated into the solution of the problem (resulting in an intersectional approach).

Gender equality is a precondition for all other global goals to be met. If the unfair conditions made possible by the persistence of gender inequality around the globe are conquered, ending global poverty, as well as ensuring inclusive and quality education for all, will perhaps become two very uncomplicated and accessible tasks. Tackling gender inequality is imperative if we are to progress towards more inclusive and humane societies.

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OVERCOMING GENDER DISPARITY IN EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN

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Since the mid-1900s, after the abdication of King Amanullah of Afghanistan, the gender inequality gap between men and women in the country has fluctuated according to each ruler. This infamously reached its apex during the Taliban’s rule, when girls were banned from attending school and fewer than 900,000 boys were enrolled (Kavazanjian, 2010). The research conducted here (from 2003–2016) was aimed at discovering how education offers the resilient women of Afghanistan the best chance at closing the gender inequality gap via economic empowerment. It was determined there is a highly positive correlation between women with a secondary education (and tertiary; however, women comprise only 15%–20% of degree holders in Afghanistan) and their employment rates—so much so that it may possibly create an “unbalanced economic situation” (Fluri, 2011).

In an embattled country whose people have endured more strife, agonizing pain, and misfortune than most nations in modern history, it’s quite remarkable that Afghanistan remains intact, albeit covered in scar tissue and bandages. However, Afghanistan’s backwards, constantly sweeping regime changes, nonmalleable roots in patriarchal cultural norms, and Sharia law have sadly condemned women to live in obscurity, in the shadows of men. Progress moves slowly in the “graveyard of empires,” and girls both young and old must overcome mountains of obstacles in order to receive a proper education at any of the three levels (primary, secondary, or tertiary). Key obstacles for women in education include traditional and religious barriers, insecurity, poverty, incompetence, long commute distances, and a lack of female teachers, among others (Shayan, 2015). For females over the age of 15 in Afghanistan, literacy rates are remarkably low, (24%), and less than 50% of the almost five million girls enrolled are expected to graduate any level of schooling (UNESCO, 2016). The lack of educated women in Afghanistan has been a glaring, internationally recognized problem for years now. Attempting to increase educational opportunities would be a momentous step towards the necessary empowerment of Afghan women, in both economical and civic contexts.

The following discussion will include analyses of the current “school life expectancy” (as stated by UNESCO), along with enrollment ratios, attendance, and graduation rates of young women in Afghanistan, at all three levels of schooling (preprimary education will not be considered as a level of schooling here). The importance of an informal education must also not be underestimated. In an agrarian, rural society like Afghanistan (76% of the population is rural, according to UNESCO data), informal education provides many children with necessary life skills, such as animal husbandry, while serving as a liaison for children who cannot attend formal education.

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schooling. However, before diving into a sensitive topic such as this, proper historical context of recent major eras for women’s rights in Afghanistan is required.

Habibullah Khan’s Rule (1901–1919)

Amir Habibullah Khan was pronounced King of Afghanistan in 1901 by way of primogeniture. King Habibullah is often referred to as the “forgotten king” (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003), but he actually laid the groundwork in regards to modernization for his son and successor, Amānullāh Khān. Habibullah enacted a series of laws during his time on the throne, mainly improving Afghanistan’s weak infrastructure; however, some laws were geared towards gender equality. Some of Habibullah’s notable contributions include establishing Afghanistan’s first college, first hospital, first hydroelectric plant, and improving Afghanistan’s roads and economic relationships with neighboring countries (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). In the beginning of his rule, he began to allow the return of exiled Afghans, most importantly one Mahmud Tarzi. Tarzi was arguably the most influential man not named king to aid in the advancement of women’s rights. His family would soon become intertwined with the Khan family for the next few decades. As one may imagine, future attempts at modernization would not at all be conceivable without the wide-ranging advances Habibullah brought to Afghanistan. Sadly, but unsurprisingly, Habibullah Khan was assassinated in 1919 by extremists.

King Amānullāh’s Reign: The First Major Beacon of Change (1919–1928)

Following the assassination of his father, Amānullāh took the throne in 1919 as king of Afghanistan. Amānullāh built on the foundation created by his father to lead the first major attempt at modernization for Afghanistan, beginning with the “liberation of women from tribal cultural norms” (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). Throughout his rule, Amānullāh and his influential wife, Queen Soraya (daughter of Mahmud Tarzi, who’s own influence will be discussed), vigorously challenged several longstanding traditions: in effect, they notably opposed the veil, polygamy, and the lack of education for girls. The women in Amānullāh’s family also campaigned for women’s empowerment, and they can be credited with forming the Organization for Women’s Protection, founding the first magazine for women, and opening a hospital for women (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). Around this time, Mahmud Tarzi was an influential public figure who strove for the betterment of women. He used the example of the women in his own family who practiced monogamy, had an education, and were also opposed to the veil. It can be seen here that Amānullāh’s initial reforms for women have deep roots in the ideologies of Tarzi and his family. Soon enough, however, Amānullāh’s modernist reforms led to his violent abdication, and thus, the “first battle over education was won by rural conservatives” (Deo, 2014). In hindsight, King Amānullāh’s reign proved to be one of Afghanistan’s brightest moments. It was one of the few times Afghanistan appeared to take truly meaningful steps towards gender equality and modernization, so it’s quite unfortunate to see how his support dwindled until his exile. The effects of his ousting lasted for decades: political stability was nonexistent for some time, and the
topics of education and women’s rights became increasingly volatile (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003).

**A Period of Political Instability: Zahir Shah and Mohammad Daoud**

For two decades, leaders of Afghan royalty came and went as if through a revolving door. Each leader set new laws regarding women and education that seemingly conflicted with their predecessors’, in the most extreme ways. Among the monarchs who had their moments of power were Amir Habibullah II—who revoked much of the progress made by Amānūllāh—and Nadir Shah, who implemented Afghanistan’s second constitution and cautiously reintroduced women’s rights (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). Both rulers were ousted or assassinated within three years’ time, and Zahir Shah assumed control of power from his father for the next 40 years.

During his reign, Zahir Shah—along with his cousin, Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud—learned the lesson of Amānūllāh Khān: to tread carefully in regards to implementation of new policies. Afghanistan was moving towards modernization once again, though in small steps. Zahir Shah seemed to focus more on maintaining peace between the government and its populace, rather than introducing effective reforms (with an arguably hidden agenda centered around the unawareness of both government and citizens). To that extent his reign was very successful.

In 1959, the wearing of the veil was again voluntary (though not banned), and via the 1964 Constitution, women were given the right to vote and run for public office, and Sharia law was to be practiced only in areas with nonexistent statutory laws (Kandiyoti, 2007). By 1965, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA, backed by the Soviet Union) had formed, and would soon play a prominent role in Afghan politics and society. In 1963, however, Zahir Shah and his prime minister were not seeing eye to eye, leading the king to strip his cousin of power. This move would foreshadow the king’s eventual downfall in a coup d’état instigated by Mohammed Daoud, who would lead the country for five crucial years. Daoud’s success as leader of Afghanistan in those five years is comparable to his cousin’s in the 40 years that he ruled. Like Amānūllāh Khān, he too had a solid plan to move the nation toward modernization. Daoud had enough potential as a leader to help Afghanistan develop at a remarkable pace. However, Afghan communists of the PDPA viewed this potential as a threat and staged their own military coup against Daoud. Thus, in 1978, the PDPA began their 11-year rule (Deo, 2014).

**The PDPA, and the Second Era of Women’s Reforms (Late 1970s)**

With the PDPA in control, social and economic reforms were once again moving at a pace similar to that of King Amānūllāh Khān’s rule, but without taking Afghanistan’s cultural and traditional caveats into consideration. Themes of literacy, education, and gender equality carried over from the last regime, with the PDPA changing tactics and implementing sweeping reforms at a pace that was unwelcome by rural Afghans and mullahs (religious leaders). Along with the ideologies that rolled over from their predecessor, they also instigated large land reforms, many of which were met with major backlash (Kandiyoti, 2007). Reflecting the experiences during
Amānullāh Khān’s reign, “the revolutionary pace of social change caused concern among the mullahs and tribal chiefs in the interiors” (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). The traditional patriarchs of rural Afghanistan once again rallied and revolted against the intended progress of the PDPA, beginning with killings of innocent women, social workers, and PDPA members. These troubles, coupled with the party’s “internal squabbles” (Deo, 2014), led to the infamous military intervention of the Soviet Union in 1979. What followed was an exhausting, brutal, decade-long war for both sides, with the Soviets facing constant pressure from the mujahideen: “freedom fighters” backed by the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China. Interestingly enough, however, women still experienced an increase in rights during the war, until the withdrawal of the Soviets and installation of the mujahideen’s seven factions in their place.


The mujahideen declared Afghanistan an Islamic state in 1992 after they filled the power void left by the Soviets. The rebels installed a severely strict series of laws, many of which were to the detriment of women. They eradicated much of the progress towards gender equality by burning down educational infrastructures, forcing women to be fully clothed in public, and putting on massive displays of public atrocities not seen in the nation’s history (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). Mujahideen also eradicated their legendary, righteous reputation they once had as true freedom fighters. Ordinary, local Afghans comprised the majority of the group, and their true nature was not that of their ruthless leaders who plunged the country into more chaos. The same international forces that previously backed the mujahideen were now backing the Taliban, and in 1996 they ousted the mujahideen.

Taliban’s Insurgence (1996–2001)

The Taliban came into power with a belief in strict Islamic law, and because of the excessive barbarism displayed by the mujahideen, some citizens initially welcomed them (Kandiyoti, 2007). Shortly into their rule, however, the Taliban completely eradicated whatever semblance of gender equality remained in Afghanistan. Television was banned, as was music, films, and essentially any media outlet that would not directly and solely promote Islam. Women were no longer allowed in public unless accompanied by a mahram (male relative), could not receive an education, and were often forced into child marriages and raped (Ahmed-Gosh, 2003). The Taliban’s carnage, coupled with the September 11th attacks, led to international military intervention, which then pushed Afghanistan into the daily world news cycle. In November of 2001, the Taliban fell at the hands of foreign forces and the Northern Alliance (which, ironically, included many remaining mujahideen rebels).

International Intervention (2001–Present Day)

Since 2001, Afghanistan has been receiving aid from the international community to repair the country’s depleted infrastructure. The new Afghan
Constitution was ratified in 2004 with the help of the international community, and includes assurance of an equal country. Many projects have commenced to reconstruct the nation’s schools, hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure. Today, more than seven million children are enrolled in school in Afghanistan, compared to a mere one million just a few decades ago. However, the country’s progress is far from complete. While it’s noteworthy to see such a drastic increase in student enrollment, “the education they are receiving is yet to prove useful and worthy of community support” (Deo, 2014). In fact, there have arguably been very few “effective programs to create and foster balanced education for women” (Articles 22 and 44) promised by the Afghan Constitution (2004). Furthermore, the lack of new textbooks in circulation and teacher training is hindering progress. The government, in order to show some semblance of improvement to the international community and the Afghan people, built an enormous number of schools, a feat unparalleled in the past, but it failed to recognize the need for quality within school walls.

It’s also crucial to discuss that while the international community has mostly moral intentions now, they are misinformed on how to approach the situation (Barakat & Wardell, 2002). As Bahri (2014) puts it, part of the problem now with regards to women’s rights in Afghanistan is that the West has attempted to employ its own notions of gender equality in a culturally insensitive manner. There’s a solid backing to the belief that this lack of cultural relativism has provoked many Afghan men to take conservative, defensive stands towards gender equality (Bahri, 2014). Any time a foreign nation or influence, with or without the promise of “help,” objectively tells a country in need what’s “right” or “wrong,” that country’s citizens will inevitably react with some level of discomfort or discontent. This is especially the case in Afghanistan, considering its turbulent past. It simply does not matter how violent or corrupt the situation at hand is; cultural differences and sensitivities will always make situations such as Afghanistan’s complex and delicate. Fluri (2011), in her academic paper “Capitalizing on Bare Life: Sovereignty, Exception, and Gender Politics,” includes quotes from interviews conducted with international aid workers in Kabul from 2007 to 2008. The general theme of international impressions of local Afghans was insulting, to say the least. The workers are quoted accusing Afghans of “artificial hospitality” and displaying a “lack of capacity,” among other things (Fluri, 2011). The initial lack of cultural appropriation, or even an honest attempt at understanding the complicated nature of Afghanistan’s condition, has temporarily placed a fairly low ceiling on the potential help international aid agencies could bring to the nation.

Gender Inequality in Education Today

Strict cultural and religious mores are negatively correlated with gender equality, regardless of whether they are present in democratic or autocratic regimes (Cooray & Potrafke, 2011). As the last century of history suggests, it was Afghanistan’s deep tribal roots in patriarchy, political volatility, and Islamic law that sparked its intolerance towards gender equality, especially in education. Today, after 15 years of controversial aid, the nation’s Human Development Index stoops to 0.465, ranking it at an abysmal 171 of 178 countries (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015). Only 24% of girls over the age of 15 are literate, and school life expectancy is
remarkably low. Furthermore, less than 50% of girls currently in school will graduate at any level. The gender parity gap between males and females in Afghanistan is embarrassingly large, especially given the amount of attention it has supposedly received in the 21st century. Seven million children are currently enrolled in school, but attendance rates, a much more telling statistic than simple enrollment numbers, are very low, particularly for girls. According to UNESCO, in 2011 the attendance rate for girls from the “richest quintile” was only 64%—and this was the highest number out of any female demographic. Less than 30% of girls from poor, rural families were attending school in 2011, clearly proving the lack of significant meaning behind school enrollment for girls in Afghanistan. However, despite some lack of statistical encouragement, there is a large educational movement in Afghan youth culture today.

Children and young adults in Afghanistan are not missing school time by choice; they yearn for knowledge now more than any period of recent Afghan history. There are many cases of females risking severing close familial ties in the pursuit of higher education (Holland & Yousofi, 2014). But because of external factors, such as long travel distances, familial and communal pressure, or financial problems, access to education is slim. There is also the hypothesis that “the more limited is democracy, the greater is the bias in educating girls, and therefore the greater is gender inequality in education” (Cooray & Potrafke, 2011). The issue of travel distance particularly applies to villagers in Afghanistan’s countryside, where limited numbers of schools in those areas accounted for roughly 40% of the supply-side constraints in regards to nonenrollment in 2006 (Guimbert, Miwa, & Nguyen, 2008). According to Guimbert et al. (2008), other prominent supply-side constraints for nonenrollment in rural Afghanistan were inadequate facilities (29%) and no gender-separated schools (24%). There’s an extensive list of problems to overcome to achieve gender equality in education, but the aspiring youth of Afghanistan has not shied away. They are very much aware that they will soon be the leaders and hopefully the revolutionaries of the society they currently dwell in (Holland & Yousofi, 2014).

Recent Field Experiments in Afghanistan

While conducting research, I came across two noteworthy field experiments on education in Afghanistan. Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov (2013) conducted a randomized field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, where they “examine[d] the effects of a development program that mandates female participation.” They had four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: A development program mandating female participation will increase the acceptance of women's involvement and role in local governance.
Hypothesis 2a: A development program mandating female participation will increase socialization among women.
Hypothesis 2b: A development program mandating female participation will increase women's engagement in economic activity.
Hypothesis 3: A development program mandating female participation will increase women's engagement in household decision-making.
Hypothesis 4: A development program mandating female participation will improve perceptions of women’s status in society. (Beath et al., 2013)

The field experiment produced mixed results. On a positive note, the data clearly suggested that widespread “community driven development intervention” (Beath et al., 2013) influenced men of rural villages to be open to the possibility of women adopting more significant roles in their communities, notably in local governance. The program also positively affected Afghan women’s participation in socialization and economic activities. There were more positive outcomes that emerged from this experiment, but there were two overarching problems in the results: 1) the position of women in their own family hierarchies did not noticeably change, and 2) general views about girls’ school enrollment did not change either. The second of these “failures” is relevant because it is an indicator that forced participation in community activities will not influence the minds of rural Afghans when it comes to girls and education. This suggests, as does the violent, abrupt endings of many of Afghanistan’s leaders, that with the current mindset of some Afghans, progress towards educational equality must be achieved with a focus on cultural appropriation. This, of course, is why progress will arrive at a sluggish pace.

Burde and Linden (2013) of New York University and the University of Texas at Austin, respectively, conducted a field experiment over two years in Ghor, a rural province in northwestern Afghanistan. It has been noted quite often that unrealistic travel distances to schools is a crippling issue impacting school attendance rates in rural Afghanistan. Their experiment was aimed at evaluating “the effect of village-based schools on children’s academic performance using a sample of 31 villages and 1,490 children in rural northwestern Afghanistan” (Burde & Linden, 2013). The results here are exceptional, and quite honestly the degree of success they achieved is hard to fathom, given the cultural setting. They found that “placing a school within a village has a dramatically large effect on children’s enrollment and test scores,” particularly for girls (Burde & Linden, 2013). The data suggests that the presence of a school within reasonable distance increases enrollment rate of girls by 52%. Even more surprising is the effect on girls’ test scores: they scored “0.65 standard deviations higher on the exam given in the fall of 2007 and 0.66 standard deviations higher in the spring of 2008” (Burde & Linden, 2013). Results showed that boys also benefit greatly from the program. The importance of this experiment is that it shows there is a possibility to close the gender inequality gap in education, and village-based schools are one prime method of achieving such a goal.

Bangladesh’s Experience: Are There Lessons to Be Learned?

Starting in the 1990s, Bangladesh began reforming the gender inequality in their education system. For decades, there was a notably large void between the education of boys and girls, similar to that of Afghanistan. Today, Bangladesh stands as an example of success in the realm of education among developing nations. Access to education for girls, particularly secondary education, rose dramatically, so much so that longstanding societal patterns in Bangladesh regarding women and education were transformed (Blunch & Das, 2015). Bangladesh improved girls’ educational standards by providing
girls who stay in secondary school with monetary incentives, and the international community also lent a fair share of aid in the name of educational reforms. In a study conducted by Blunch and Das (2015), they argue that in Bangladesh, a “supply-side push for education tapped the latent demand for education among families of girls, which seems to have existed alongside conservative norms and values.” Obviously, arguing that a “latent demand” for educating girls in Afghanistan currently exists in mullahs and other conservatives would be futile, but there are lessons to learn from Bangladesh’s recent educational success.

Afghanistan and Bangladesh do have stark differences: Bangladesh was at one point colonized, and thus has an incomparably larger number of English speakers; its population outnumbers Afghanistan at least 4:1; and it does have a much higher demand for education of girls. Because of these differences, Bangladesh’s success may not be replicated identically in Afghanistan. However, this comparison is not futile. Unlike Bangladesh, Afghanistan has not accordingly increased the supply-side of schools in rural areas. This is a glaring problem, considering as much as 80% of the population live in remote areas (UNESCO, 2016). The importance of establishing more village-based schools cannot be stressed enough. Attempts at providing Afghan girls or their families with monetary incentives for school attendance or enrollment (as Bangladesh did) may not be recommendable, though. In Afghanistan, the idea of extrinsic motivation for educating girls would most likely be met with strong resistance. They may view the stipends as disrespectful, prompting them to revert to starker conservatism, similar to the reaction of Afghan men to the cultural insensitivities of international aid organizations. The lesson that Afghanistan should learn from Bangladesh’s success is the importance of increasing supply-side of schools in rural areas. Bangladesh’s current educational system simply provides more evidence that Afghanistan must focus on increasing the supply-side of schools in the countryside. For now, it can disregard the low demand-side; that will come. Considering the number of schools the Afghan government is building in nonrural areas, this shouldn’t be an issue for it. However, because of the shortage of village-based schools, informal education has assumed a crucial role in rural Afghanistan.

Informal Education

In developing countries, unemployment rates among women are typically low. Afghanistan is no exception, where only 44% of the entire population works (UNDP, 2015), and an overwhelming majority of the workers are male. One method of combating unemployment among women may be via informal education. Given Afghanistan’s fragile situation, informal education provides children (mainly girls) with opportunities otherwise not available by “providing a structured program of learning in a non-institutional environment based on a learner-centered curriculum and flexible schedule” (Tietjen & Prather, 1992). The flexible scheduling cheapens school costs, and the demand-side for such an education increases because girls can balance schooling and home responsibilities (Kavazanjian, 2010). Similar to the results achieved in the field experiment in Ghor, eradicating overwhelming travel distances has positive effects on schooling of girls. Furthermore, a beginning in informal education may serve as a pathway to a future in formal education.
Studies conducted in the last few decades in developing countries like India, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Nepal have also shown the success and importance of an informal education program. In India, there was the Promoting Primary and Elementary Education Project (PROPEL), which in 1979 had a dropout rate of around 20%, much lower than the 50%–70% dropout rate for girls enrolled in formal education in the country at that time (Kavazanjian, 2010). In Nepal, during the mid-1990s, primary schools were out of reach for the majority of children, similar to Afghanistan. However, during this time almost two million Nepalese children were enrolled in some sort of informal education program, and 70% of those children were girls (UNESCO, 2000). Even more surprising was that around 1.4 million of these students were deemed literate (Kavazanjian, 2010). As Soharwadi (2012) stated in her article “Effects of Informal Education on Employment of Women: A case study of Bahawalpur City,” informal education has the potential to help women in developing Islamic countries because they can learn useful trade skills, such as farming and animal husbandry.

Afghanistan should examine these neighbors and their success with informal education. The communal element of informal education should appeal to traditionalists in the rural outskirts of the nation, where Sharia law is still practiced. More importantly, informal education could be used to improve literacy for children across the nation. It would be a remarkable success if informal education in Afghanistan could help children reach literacy rates similar to that of the PROPEL program in India. It would further ease a potential transition into formal education. However, informal education should also be used in a way to “promote the training of female teachers” (Kavazanjian, 2010), since there is a huge shortage of capable female teachers in the country.

Education and Employment of Women

The education of women has long been labeled as the most crucial element in “dismantling systematic oppression of women based on gender, by providing them with tools that enable them to . . . succeed outside the domestic sphere” (Kissane, 2012). Unfortunately, women all over Afghanistan today are facing immense problems with education, and therefore employment. Countrywide, only around 25% of women are employed in some way, most of whom are uneducated. Educated women receive higher salaries than uneducated women in Afghanistan due to their ability to translate (which is a highly recruited asset among international companies), their possession of office skills (using a computer, managing files, etc.), and, of course, because of the mass shortage of educated women in general (Fluri, 2011). In fact, according to the interviews conducted by Fluri (2011), there is a greater demand for educated women in the workforce than there is supply, which results in increased salaries for the ones who do get hired. The mere presence of an educated Afghan woman in an international aid organization gives them an automatic boost in reputation and opportunity. Most educated women live in urban areas, where the greatest opportunities lie.

In 2003, only 22.4% of households in rural Afghanistan included an employed woman (Maletta, 2008). The data Maletta (2008) used, which was collected from the 2003 and 2005 Nationwide Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (NRVAs), showed that poor rural women, on average, worked longer hours than women of a higher socioeconomic status who lived in rural or nonrural areas. Thus, “female activity is
positively correlated with wealth: women in poor households participate more than those in medium and better-off ones and the very poor participate even more” (Maletta, 2008). As urban, educated women are more likely to receive salaries, a little over half of working rural women work wage jobs. The most significant statistic for rural women, however, is the relationship between education and employment. Women with any amount of schooling are employed at a rate almost double that of uneducated women in rural Afghanistan (Maletta, 2008). In fact, 50%–60% of girls or women who have a secondary education are employed. This clearly shows the positive correlation between education and employment in rural Afghanistan.

As data suggests, there is an undeniable correlation between the education of Afghan women and their employment rates. In both urban and rural areas of Afghanistan, uneducated women (those lacking a formal or informal education) cannot compete with their educated peers. Urban areas such as Kabul view educated Afghan women as a luxury, a must-have for any major domestic or international organization. Women in rural areas of the nation are twice as likely to get a job with at least a secondary education. The facts are plain and simple: the Afghan government must refocus efforts on solving the gender inequality gap in education, particularly in rural regions of the country, where approximately 80% of the population resides.

Conclusion

There are no quick fixes for Afghanistan’s problems with gender inequality and education. Even if the answer appears transparent to me, or the international community for that matter, the issues plaguing the country’s infrastructure are as complex as any in the world. Several steps have been taken in the last 15 years to combat the issue, some of which include: de jure women’s rights via the Afghan Constitution of 2004, opening of new schools by the government at record paces, and unprecedented student enrollment rates. However, both Afghanistan’s government and the international community have arguably made more mistakes in that time period. While men and women are equal in theory, the sensitive barriers placed by traditional patriarchies and Islamists have not yet been crossed; women are still at the bottom of the totem pole. The state must ensure that when children go to school, they learn useful material. More importantly, if the government is opening up vast numbers of schools, they must target the majority of their population by opening village-based schools in rural Afghanistan. Until that point is reached, informal education will be crucial, especially in the countryside. Lastly, in their future attempts to aid Afghanistan, the West must show a sense of cultural sensitivity; otherwise, the backlash in Afghan society may potentially shut the door completely to Western help, which would only increase the influence of the backwards mullahs. Afghanistan has been resilient thus far considering its unfortunate recent history, and there is still so much reason to believe it can march towards a bright, stable future.

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COMMUNITY FACTORS TO REDUCE RISKY BEHAVIORS IN LGBT YOUTH FOLLOWING A HATE CRIME

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As awareness concerning human sexual identity increases, opportunity for discrimination and prejudice also increases. Gender identity, as described by the Human Rights Campaign, is a person’s concept of himself or herself as male, female, both, or neither, while sexual orientation is defined as “unchanging, undisputed physical, romantic, or sexual attraction to another person” (n.d.). The sexual minority population, also known by the acronym LGBTQIA (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, asexual), encounter unique challenges unlike those experienced by diverse heterosexual groups, including increased rates of homelessness, family abandonment, and bullying, resulting in discrimination against, as well as isolation and abuse of, the LGBTQIA population. This form of discrimination and prejudice is present in all age groups. Sexual minorities face hate crimes in communities where this population lives and works. To conform to the standard of what it means to be “normal,” members of this population, at times, internalize homophobia. Internalized homophobia is described as “the gay person’s direction of negative attitude toward the self, leading to devaluation of the self and resultant internal conflicts and poor self regard” (Meyer & Dean, 1998). To alleviate the pain accompanying negative reactions, some members of this population turn to alcohol consumption, marijuana use, and suicide. Therefore, this author aims to identify community factors that reduce risky behaviors among LGBT youth in communities that have experienced hate crimes.

Literature Review

A hate crime, defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is an offense comparable to murder, arson, or vandalism, perpetrated with bias against a personal characteristic such as race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity (n.d.). In 2013, the FBI reported 5,922 single-bias (relating to one characteristic of the victim) hate crimes in which 20.8% were related to sexual orientation and 0.5% related to gender identity, resulting in 1,261 reported hate crimes targeting the LGBT community (2014). Hate crimes result in physical, emotional, and psychological distress experienced by the victim. The growing number of Americans openly identifying within the LGBT population become targets of biased hate crimes. LGBT youth are targeted in these communities because of either speculation or certainty that they align themselves with a sexual minority identity. As a result, LGBT youth are susceptible to bullying in their school systems, by families, or through social media websites.

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Drug and Alcohol Use

During the adolescent years, drug initiation is at its prime, with sexual minority youth becoming twice as likely to use drugs compared to heterosexual youth (Duncan, Hatzenbuehler, & Johnson, 2014). The first study, conducted by Duncan et al., (2014), was conducted to examine drug and alcohol use in LGBT youth. This study analyzed illicit drug use in the past 30 days among LGBT youth, and compared the results to two neighborhoods with information provided by the Boston Police Department Community Disorders Unit. Researchers conclude that sexual minority youth are more likely to live in neighborhoods with high crime rates surrounding the LGBT community, with LGBT youth being more susceptible targets for hate crimes.

In order to investigate “coming out” (or disclosing a person’s sexual orientation identity to another person), Rosario, Schrimshaw, and Hunter (2009) reviewed the correlation between coming out and substance use and abuse in LGBT youth. Acceptance by friends and family increases self-acceptance and reduces stress (Rosario et al., 2009). After gathering responses over the course of one year from 154 LGBT youth and young adults (ages 14 to 21), the researchers analyzed their consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, and marijuana. The results showed a steady increase in cigarette use, alcohol consumption, and marijuana consumption collectively. Substance abuse in the first two interviews was a reaction in response to their emotional distress. Emotional distress was shown to have a correlation with both rejection and substance abuse. Those who perceived high acceptance rates showed considerably low to moderate levels of alcohol use. While the respondents born female were more likely to experience rejection as noted by Rosario et al., (2009), they were significantly less likely to consume alcohol (Newcomb, Heinz, & Mustanski, 2012). The authors suggest implementing support programs, treatment programs, and therapeutic interventions to decrease the number of LGBT youth consuming tobacco, alcohol, and marijuana (Rosario et al., 2009).

To find a solution to reduce this behavior, Newcomb et al. (2012) explore the risk and protective factors for alcohol consumption among LGBT youth. Their results show that there is an increase of alcohol consumption when comparing LGBT youth to heterosexual youth (Newcomb et al., 2012). Bisexual youth consumed more alcohol than those of any other sexual orientation. The demographics consisted of LGBT youth—specifically, 246 participants from the Chicago area between the ages of 16 and 20. A majority of the participants were African American, composing 57.3% of the participants. After accumulating the participants through a modified response driven sampling approach, the participants were to check in five times over a two-and-a-half-year period to record their current alcohol consumption status. After analyzing the results, it was shown that, on average, the participants consumed 2.4 drinks each time they consumed alcohol and their drinking age of onset was 15 (Newcomb et al., 2012). African Americans consumed 50 units fewer than any other ethnic group, with males of other ethnic backgrounds consuming substantially more alcohol (Newcomb et al., 2012). Contrary to initial literature, bisexual participants in this study did not demonstrate significant differences from other sexual minorities when comparing levels of alcohol consumption. The results were not significantly different when compared to heterosexual findings. Family support and acceptance is not as prominent in families...
with LGBT youth. The authors suggest increasing family support, general population acceptance, and affirmation to promote lower psychological stressors.

**Family Support**

Ryan, Russell, Huebner, Diaz, and Sanchez (2010) explored family acceptance and its implications for LGBT youth. The literature notes that rejection influences increased substance abuse and poorer mental health, suggesting that a higher rate of acceptance yields positive outcomes. In a study conducted by Newcomb et al. (2012), LGBT youth in African American families were less likely to consume alcohol, suggesting their familial support systems were strong, lessening their likelihood of consuming alcohol. Using a sample of 245 Latino LGBT young adults and families and 249 non-Latino LGBT young adults and families, Ryan et al. (2010) gathered information concerning family acceptance via individual, in-depth, two- to four-hour interviews with the young adults and their families. Variables considered in addition to sexual identity were ethnicity, religious affiliation, religiosity, immigration background, mental health, and socioeconomic status. The demographics included an even male/female ratio, with 42% of participants identifying as gay, 28% as lesbian, 13% as bisexual, and 17% as other. Whites showed an increased acceptance rate over Latinos, with immigration status showing a strong correlation to family acceptance (Ryan et al., 2010). Latino families primarily made up of immigrants were less likely to be accepting of their LGBT family members compared to American-born Latinos. Childhood religion and religiosity were notable factors in the likelihood of family acceptance, with families demonstrating higher religiosity showing decreased acceptance of their LGBT family members. An unpredicted result was that higher educational levels attained by the parents increased their likelihood of acceptance. Increased acceptance yields positive outcomes (Ryan et al., 2010). Advocacy; parent education and support; support for the youth and the family unit; and early intervention are suggested to promote increased family acceptance and positive outcomes among LGBT youth and young adults.

**Mental Health Support**

LGBT youth are at risk for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and suicide (Duncan & Hatzenbuehler, 2014; Mustanski, Andrews, & Puckett, 2016). Duncan and Hatzenbuehler (2014) analyzed the correlation between suicide, community, and sexuality in adolescents. In this study, the authors sent out a survey to Boston public high school students, and 1,173 responses were analyzed. Researchers separated the students that identified as heterosexual from the sexual minority students. They then compared the neighborhoods listed with the Boston Police Department’s data related to hate crimes targeting sexual minorities. One third of the sexual minority students were reported to have contemplated suicide in the past 12 months compared to 9.43% of the heterosexual students. Similarly, 17% of the sexual minority students reported a suicide attempt compared to 2.43% of their heterosexual counterparts. After analyzing all areas of research, it was concluded that adolescents who experienced suicidal thoughts or who attempted suicide were more likely to live in a community with a higher number of
sexual minority assaults and hate crimes. Conclusively, the researchers recommend the integration of a suicide prevention program in these communities. Wagstaff (2016) reports a high proportion of LGBTQ adults were victims of violence and maltreatment in childhood, resulting in PTSD symptoms in adulthood.

Victims of hate crimes are susceptible to PTSD, depending on the nature of the crime (Mustanski et al., 2016). The researchers examined the effect of victimization and its correlation to mental health disparities among 204 LGBT adolescents, aged 16–20, for a 48-month period. To assess the participant’s level of victimization, researchers utilized a 10-question survey, with a four-point scale, of verbal and physical threats or assaults in the past three months. Researchers dichotomized the results into two groups: “none” and “at least once.” The participants were grouped into classes:

- I - Low, decreasing victimization;
- II - Moderate, increasing victimization;
- III - High, steady victimization; and
- IV - High, decreasing victimization.

Classes II and III are at higher risk for a PTSD diagnosis than the normative, low-victimization group. The researchers conclude that not only isolated experiences of victimization impact mental health, but also that continued stressors increase their mental health problems.

**Youth Safety**

Stotzer (2015) explored youth involvement in anti-gay and anti-lesbian hate crimes in data obtained from the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations; these crimes among youth and adults occurred during the years 2002–2008, with 894 cases observed involving 939 victims. Stotzer (2015) calls attention to males being more likely to become a suspect in this type of crime because of their need to prove masculinity and heterosexuality. They do so through proven physical actions. Young males’ personal reflections demonstrated initially that they considered their actions to be thrill seeking, harmless, and amusing in nature. They were also often performed in groups. However, many of these crimes are thought to stem from early childhood (Stotzer, 2015). Little (2001) implies that the attitude that “boys will be boys” should be eliminated. Out of 28 school shootings analyzed before conducting a 2002 study, Stotzer (2015) noted that many of the perpetrators were victims of homophobic bullying. During data collection, neighborhood and community demographics were given to alleviate bias toward one community over the other. The majority of the victims were White (46.8%) and Latino (33.4%), while the suspects were mostly male (83.4%) and Latino (42.7%), followed by White (27.9%) and Black (26.2%). The author noted 12% of the crimes committed toward the LGBT population were committed by youth, the youngest of which was 11 years old. Stotzer (2015) suggests the goal for the community is to eliminate these types of crimes to protect and promote youth safety.
Acceptance in Schools/General Populations

Little (2001) explored embracing LGBTQ youth in school-based settings in Canada. The education system reported 10% of the students identifying as LGBTQ, with the school’s dropout rate at 28%. Little (2002) calls attention to stressors among LGBTQ youth, including workers and school employees rejecting or ignoring the LGBTQ youth’s difficulties. Increased stressors leads to challenges in serving this population. Little (2002) calls attention to eight significant factors contributing to LGBTQ youth’s stress:

- Homelessness,
- Homophobia,
- Heterosexism in schools,
- Isolation,
- Drugs,
- Alcohol,
- Maladaptive coping skills, and
- School-based settings.

Little (2001) asserts that racism and sexism have become less prominent while gender and sexual orientation discrimination remain intolerant and structural. The victims of homophobia become silent after a hate crime, feeling they must endure abuse alone. The author suggests that in order to overcome heterosexism, teachers should educate themselves and evaluate their feelings toward this population. A reappearing theme has been indifference in response to the LGBT community as well as ignoring discrimination. Isolation plays a significant role among LGBTQ youth, as it becomes a stressor that creates physical and mental health problems. These include chronic depression, school failure, and relationship issues (Little, 2001). Queer youth, or youth that refuse to label themselves regarding gender or sexuality, are less likely to seek support but are six times more likely to attempt suicide and are more likely to succeed (Little, 2001). Homelessness is prominent among LGBT youth, with 50% struggling with their sexual orientation identity. To cope, LGBTQ youth are 1.6 times more likely to engage in heavy substance abuse than heterosexual youth. Rosario et al. (2009) reported LGBT youth were significantly more likely to use substances than heterosexual youth. Despite backlash against having Gay-Straight Alliances (GSAs) in schools, their presence promotes an affirming environment to help LGBTQ youth find a safe place. Heck, Flentje, and Cochran (2011) found that students who attend schools with a GSA have reported an increased sense of school belonging compared to those in schools that do not have a GSA.

Based on this review of the literature, the following factors impact LGBT youth: support services, familial support, and acceptance. The literature has noted the following characteristics of a community—which are used as criteria to assess communities involved with the LGBT community—promote positivity for LGBT populations. Treatment programs, community services, therapeutic interventions, and school services are used to evaluate support services. Support from the general population, affirmation, advocacy, and positive role models are used to evaluate
acceptance. Familial support is also used to assess the community’s response to the LGBT community.

**Method**

A systematic review was used in assessing communities of LGBT youth to answer the following question: Based on the following community responses to hate crimes, what are the most effective community components in limiting risky behaviors in LGBT youth following a hate crime? A systematic review, as defined by Uman (2011), involves a “detailed and comprehensive plan that aims to reduce bias by identifying, appraising, and synthesizing all relevant studies on a particular topic” (p. 57).

**Data Collection**

The groups sampled include communities where hate crimes took place, where LGBT populations were directly involved in the crimes, and where there was a positive response to the hate crimes. Exclusion criteria include populations other than LGBT and negative community responses to LGBT hate crimes. Important variables include the LGBT population; hate crimes; and types of communities such as churches, schools, and neighborhoods. The following factors are used to assess the communities: support services, familial support, and acceptance.

In searching for hate crimes, the key terms “LGBT youth,” “hate crimes,” and “communities” were used and refined by crimes within the last 10 years using databases such as Google Scholar and Google to find recent newspaper articles and journal articles, utilizing variety in the communities. Analysis includes identifying the most effective aspects of community efforts.

**Findings and Discussion**

This research explores community factors that reduce risky behaviors for LGBT youth following a hate crime. In searching for communities that have institutional or organizational inclusiveness for the LGBT community, there were limited results. Other risky behavior support programs were found but not included in this research, as they were previously implemented, introduced to promote safety or support instead of serving as a response to hate crimes.

**Demographic Findings**

In response to hate crimes, there were no communities that provided family support programs—a contrast to the literature’s emphasis on the importance of familial support to lower incidence of risky behaviors. The communities assessed consist of three cities:

- Seattle, large city in northwest Washington, population of 684,451 (U.S. Census, n.d.);
• Dallas, large city in north central Texas, population 1,300,092 (U.S. Census, n.d.); and
• Coeur d’Alene, suburban city in north Idaho, population 49,122 (U.S. Census, n.d.).

**Coeur d’Alene, Idaho.** In response to the 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard, the Coeur d’Alene community performed a theatrical play to inform the community of the incident’s importance and impact on the community. In response to the production, Westboro Baptist Church, a church known for its protests, rallied in opposition of the play due to its objection to Shepard’s sexual orientation. To stand in solidarity with Matthew Shepard, the Coeur d’Alene community joined in a unity rally in encouragement and support of the play. To further their commitment to the cause, they donated money to the nearby high school’s GSA.

**Seattle, Washington.** In 2015, the city of Seattle formulated an “action plan to support a safe, inclusive, and welcoming environment for LGBTQ people in Seattle” in response to the 41 anti-LGBTQ hate crimes that occurred in 2014 in the city’s otherwise notably accepting community (Office of the Mayor, 2015). The plan focuses on four factors: public safety, LGBTQ youth, the built environment, and public understanding. Their police department will offer resources regarding:

- Shelter for harassment victims;
- Social services providers that work with LGBT youth;
- Rehousing and hotel vouchers for transgender youth that encounter high rates of violence;
- Attention to environmental limitations that provide criminals access to these crimes; and
- Public campaigns to promote education for all Seattle residents.

**Dallas, Texas.** Following three attacks targeting LGBT populations in the established LGBT-friendly neighborhood of Oak Lawn in Dallas, the community rallied together in mourning and support of the victims in an event named “We Are Not Afraid: LGBTQ Response to Hate” (Stewart & Gissel, 2012; Ennis, 2015). The patrons of the events waived rainbow flags and comforted one of the victims of a hate crime. In 2015, Michael Dominguez was knocked unconscious and stabbed, Shade Schuler was shot to death, and an unknown man was attacked by four men who subjected him to anti-LGBTQ obscenities and beat him with a baseball bat.

**Study Findings**

Contrary to recommendations in the literature, communities are not including familial support facilities to help LGBT youth and their families promote acceptance. Few communities have taken action following these events that are happening throughout the United States.
Discussion

Literature is limited in exploring LGBT youth and hate crimes. Though the literature describes the positive impact of family services related to LGBT youth and risky behaviors, the cities in this sample do not include family support options for LGBT youth. Surprisingly, few cities were found to accommodate LGBT youth, but displayed acceptance contrary to the rise in hate crimes in the United States. Seattle is progressing further than other cities in welcoming and accepting LGBT youth. Cities in the United States must mirror the actions taken by Coeur d’Alene, Dallas, and Seattle in promoting LGBT safety.

Strengths and Limitations

In searching for scholarly journals related to the LGBT youth populations, limited information has been published. Within each area of the literature, there were few articles that explored positive research associated with LGBT populations. In using the Internet to search for news articles reporting positive acceptance responses from communities in response to LGBT hate crimes, there were few communities found that responded to the extent of providing ways to reduce risky behaviors as characterized by this study. The researcher used the university’s search engine and Google Scholar to find journal articles, resulting in limited search findings. Including a personal interview with a focus group, increased access to journals, and the availability of more newspaper articles highlighting positive community responses to LGBT hate crimes would improve research findings.

Implications for Practice and Further Research

With the increase of hate crimes in the United States targeting the LGBT community, and considering that none of the literature found that family support services were present in the cities studied, communities such as churches, schools, and neighborhoods should include more family support programs in their areas. As crimes continue, establishing support systems is encouraged as LGBT youth struggle with their sexuality and engage in risky behaviors.

Interviews with high school students at a GSA meeting or with college students would be beneficial for further research. Such interviews would help to identify the most beneficial measures that, in students’ experience, will lower the incidence of risky behaviors among LGBT youth. Additionally, longitudinal studies, such as those of Ryan et al. (2010) and Newcomb et al. (2012), would provide more inclusive information on the beneficial effects of positively perceived family support on LGBT participation in risky behaviors such as drug and alcohol consumption.

Conclusion

Hate crimes targeting the LGBT community not only impact families, but the nation. Support services, family support, and acceptance will provide resources in communities to enhance education, acceptance, and respite for LGBT youth that
participate in risky behaviors or are inquisitive about risky behaviors. The impact of each hate crime seen on television extends beyond just one day; these crimes affect LGBT youth throughout their lives. It is the responsibility of each community to protect their citizens and promote aid to those experiencing such hate crimes. Communities must be proactive in their response to LGBT hate crimes, as such crimes influence their participation in risky behaviors. Family support is an important resource that would benefit LGBT youth and their families, just as acceptance and education helps lower the risk for hate crimes in the United States.

References


