THE DIALECTICS: JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY

VOLUME VII

2014

© The Pennsylvania State University
Abington College

CONTENTS

Industrial Agriculture and Sustainable Solutions
Inga Jaeger
Cornell College
3

The Brain Game:
An Insight Into Education-related Migration Patterns
Catherine M. Potvin
University of Ottawa
16

Multiculturalism: An Integrative Force with Limits
Frank Weng
University of Toronto
25

Totalitarianism and Isolation:
Understanding the Clash Between the Leviathan and Liberty
Joe Calder
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
31

Addressing the Use of Sexual Violence as a Strategic Weapon of War
Joshua A. Jones
American Military University
39
THE DIALECTICS
An Introduction

The Dialectics: Journal of Leadership, Politics, and Society is a refereed, multidisciplinary publication housed at the Abington College of the Pennsylvania State University. The Journal’s aim is to promote discourse and scholarship and to encourage students to pursue and engage in thoughtful discourses on topics of societal importance.

The Journal’s publication has been made possible by the Lord Chancellor’s Chair and the generous support of Albert and Suzanne Lord.

For more information about the Journal, please contact:

The Dialectics
E-mail: dialectics@psu.edu

You may also visit the Journal’s website at:
www.abington.psu.edu/dialectics
A CALL FOR PAPERS

The Dialectics: Journal of Leadership, Politics, and Society will accept, on a rolling basis, high quality research papers on issues of public importance. We search for papers that have a single thesis, are focused, identify significant societal and global issues, and offer creative solutions or specific recommendations for addressing the challenges. Students from undergraduate and graduate institutions are cordially invited to submit their work for review.

Guidelines

- **Length**: 2,000 to 5,000 words;
- **Cover page**: title, the author’s name, a short biographical sketch, and full contact details;
- **Writing style**: clear, concise, engaging and informal, written for the general public;
- **Citation style**: the American Psychological Association (APA) style;
- **Deadline**: Papers will be reviewed on a rolling basis.

Please submit essays to dialectics@psu.edu in Microsoft Word attachment format, with “Dialectics Submission” in the subject line.

Review Process

The editor and a panel of referees will conduct a rigorous review of the submissions to select the essays for publication. Authors are advised that by submitting their essays to the Journal, they agree to subject their work to substantial editing, should their submission be selected.

Articles in the journal do not necessarily represent the views of the editor, the editorial board, or the Pennsylvania State University. Authors are responsible for the content of their articles.

For additional information, please contact:

Salar Ghahramani, J.D.
Editor
The Dialectics
E-mail: salar@psu.edu
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS

By Inga Jaeger*
Cornell College

In the United States, food is relatively cheap and easy to procure. In the grocery store, we peruse aisle upon aisle of neatly categorized, prepackaged food; in the checkout lane, we purchase products based on our own, highly individualized consumer desires; at home, we consume our often pre-prepared food with little thought of where it came from, how it was processed, or what resources were used to produce it. At its very essence, this is how our food system is able to successfully operate: by divorcing us from the reality of food production. For there is no trace of a chemical-soaked Iowa crop field in a box of cornflakes; there is no hint of the slaughterhouse in the plastic-wrapped package of precut meat.

While our current system of food marketing and distribution may satisfy consumer desires and soothe consumer anxieties, it also masks the underlying problems with our agricultural system. What is slowly beginning to dawn on our public consciousness, however, is that there are harsh consequences associated with our current modes of food production (Bell, 2012). These consequences take many forms within our industrial crop and meat production systems, and they are especially egregious in their environmental toll. Industrial crop production relies on massive injections of petroleum-based fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, and it also depends on fossil fuel-driven energy—all of which deplete and pollute our soil, emit massive quantities of carbon into the atmosphere, and reduce natural biodiversity (Bell, 2012; Lin, 2011; McKibben, 2007). Analogous problems may be found in industrial meat production: most animals raised for meat are housed in confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) which inundate the surrounding soil, water, and air with overwhelming quantities of toxin-carrying animal waste (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009).

There is also a growing recognition that the problems inherent in industrial agriculture harm humans as well as the environment. Serious health consequences stem from farm pollution; workplace injuries occur with alarming regularity at meat processing plants; small farmers are pushed out of agriculture as economic power is increasingly concentrated in large-scale corporate agricultural producers (Calamuci, 2008; McKibben, 2007; Saw et al., 2011). It is becoming ever more apparent that industrial agriculture has damaging consequences for both the environment and humans—and that these consequences are inextricably linked.

If this system has such negative consequences for humans and the environment alike, why is it the dominant mode of agricultural production? The answer lies in the logic of our capitalist economic structure, which demands that agribusiness participate in the “treadmill of production” by maximizing production and efficiency at all cost (Bell, 2012). In the following section, I will describe how the capitalist treadmill of production demands maximized efficiency and production; I will then examine how industrial crop and animal agriculture operate according to the demands of the treadmill of production. Finally, I will explore some ways in which “alternative” methods of agriculture—such as diversified crop and conservation agriculture, organic farming, sustainable animal agriculture, and local foods movements—represent a growing effort among socially and environmentally conscious farmers and consumers to step off

*Inga Jaeger is a recent Summa Cum Laude graduate of Cornell College, where she received a bachelor of arts degree in psychological services.
the treadmill of production. This latter trend is one of the brightest spots in the world of agriculture, as it holds the promise of a food production method that may remain viable for the foreseeable future.

The Treadmill of Production

In Western capitalist cultures, where almost every aspect of human existence is centered on the consumption of purchasable goods, the treadmill of production is one of the most significant aspects of everyday life. This treadmill influences, directly or indirectly, many of the most important structures of our society: our economy, our politics, our cultural values, and our relationship to the environment (Bell, 2012). And, in a very significant way, this treadmill dictates the current methods of production we employ in industrial agriculture.

Underlying the treadmill of production is the basic logic of capitalism. The most important rule in a capitalist economy is that producers must make and maximize profit (Bell, 2012). To make products, a producer must invest in “inputs,” or production costs: raw materials, production space, labor, and advertising (Bell, 2012). To make a profit, however, a producer must sell the finished product for more than the cost of production. This means that a producer will do everything in his or her power to reduce the cost of production (Bell, 2012)—or “maximize efficiency.” To lower production costs, the producer may try to use the cheapest possible materials, decrease worker wages, replace employees with automated production, outsource production to areas with looser workers’ rights and protections, engage in political lobbying against environmental regulations, and maximize productivity so that the greatest number of products can be made for the lowest possible cost (Bell, 2012).

This last point—that the greatest number of products must be produced for the lowest possible cost—is also significant for determining the price of the finished product. A given producer will always have to contend with competitors who are coming up with new ways to lower not only production cost but also a product’s retail price, in order to make it more attractive to consumers (Bell, 2012). A producer, then, must always try to sell his or her product for less in response to competitive pressure—and to sustain a profit, a greater total number of products must be sold to compensate for the lower retail price (Bell, 2012). This, then, is where we come to the idea of production as an ever-quickening treadmill: to compensate for a competitive “race to the bottom” in retail price, a producer must sell ever-increasing quantities of products, and to do this the producer must forever expand production (Bell, 2012). This market fixation on endlessly expanding production has led the West to accept economic growth as the most important indicator of economic and social prosperity (Bell, 2012). As McKibben (2007) puts it, “growth is always the final answer” to the question of how we all can increasingly succeed.

There is, however, an important aspect of this claim with which many sociologists and economists take issue: ever-expanding economic growth is associated with ever-increasing economic inequality (McKibben, 2007), since a significant feature of the treadmill of production is the way in which it tends to gradually concentrate economic power in the hands of fewer and fewer producers (Bell, 2012). In the perpetual race to stay competitive, inevitably some producers will fail to keep up and will “fall off” the treadmill (Bell, 2012). The ones who stay on the treadmill will, over time, accumulate wealth and economic advantage and may go on to monopolize their segment of the market (Bell, 2012). This concentration of economic power has
occurred on a global level, in almost all areas of trade. As Campbell (2009) notes, just 500 corporations now dominate 70 percent of world trade.

An important consequence of this power concentration is that the phenomenon tends to undermine local economies by driving small companies out of business. Furthermore, large-scale corporations are generally not responsible to local interests where they conduct business, and are therefore able to operate, with little to no accountability, in ways that harm local economies and natural resources (Campbell, 2009). As we shall see, this concentration of economic power has occurred in industrial agriculture, to the point where relatively few corporate entities dominate most of agricultural production (Brown & Schafft, 2011).

In addition to concentrating economic advantage in the hands of the already powerful, the logic of maximized efficiency and production tends to degrade the human and environmental resources upon which it depends (Barbosa, 2009). Marxist theorists have long noted that the above-described capitalist system—in which producers must continually decrease production costs in order to remain competitive—exploits workers (Barbosa, 2009). Employers have long used production cost-reduction strategies—such as decreasing worker wages and automating production—which undermine employee welfare (Bell, 2012). The treadmill of production depends on a similarly exploitive relationship with the environment, as ecological Marxists point out (Barbosa, 2009). For production to constantly expand, producers must continually increase environmental “withdrawals:” extractions of raw materials which are used to manufacture products (Barbosa, 2009). Production and consumption of material products also generally yields a perpetual stream of environmental “additions:” things we emit back into the environment, such as pollution and garbage (Barbosa, 2009). This degradation of environmental and human resources occurs to an extraordinary degree in industrial agriculture, as we shall see. The crucial point, though, is that in this economic equation, our treadmill of production has not yet accounted for a fundamental paradox: we are pursuing a model of infinite economic growth that is dependent on a finite natural resource base (Bell, 2012). Technological advances, so far, have allowed us to exploit and degrade the environment with relative impunity; however, we cannot deplete and pollute our resources forever. They are not infinite. At some point, we must reconcile our patterns of growth with this reality.

**Industrial Crop and Animal Agriculture**

How do the treadmill values of efficiency and production shape modern agriculture? Industrial crop agriculture’s dependence on fossil fuels and chemical applications, industrial animal agriculture’s fixation on maximum yield and speed of processing, and the economic consolidation and corporatization of both forms of agriculture in the last half-century all adhere to the logic of the treadmill of production (Brown & Schafft, 2011; Edwards & Driscoll, 2009; Lin, 2011; McKibben, 2007). The pattern that emerges in the story of industrial crop and animal agriculture is one in which maximized efficiency and productivity is relentlessly pursued at great cost to the environment and human beings alike.

**Fossil fuels.**

We tend to think of agriculture as a fundamentally pastoral—even picturesque—activity: a pursuit embodied in green pastures, golden crops, frolicking animals, and wholesome farm families. What this image fails to capture, however, is that modern agriculture is utterly
dependent on fossil fuels—or, as McKibben (2007) puts it, that “our food arrives at the table marinated in oil—crude oil.” In today’s food system, oil fuels farm machinery, oil manufactures synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, oil runs machinery that processes raw crops, oil creates plastic packaging for the finished product to be sold in, and oil ships food across the country or overseas to a distant point of sale (McKibben, 2007).

How has agriculture come to be so dependent on oil and other fossil energies? Before the discovery of these fuels, agriculture depended solely on energy from the sun to grow crops and energy from humans and animals to provide the labor necessary for planting, maintaining, and harvesting those crops (McKibben, 2007). Oil, coal, and natural gas, which contain the most concentrated and efficient energy sources known to humankind, revolutionized the way in which these energy requirements were met (McKibben, 2007). Synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, which is manufactured using oil and natural gas, has provided a new means with which to inject many times more nutrients into the soil than occurs in natural nutrient cycling (McKibben, 2007). Oil-fueled mechanization has almost entirely replaced human and animal labor on the farm: tractors, combines, and other machinery now perform all the necessary steps of agriculture, such as planting, weeding, irrigating, and reaping crops (McKibben, 2007).

But why, exactly, have fossil fuels come to dominate the agricultural system to such an extreme degree? So far, oil, coal, and natural gas have been relatively cheap to obtain and burn (McKibben, 2007). Labor fueled by oil, for example, is far cheaper for agricultural producers to purchase than human labor; one reason our food is currently so inexpensive is that this replacement of human labor with oil helps to keep food prices artificially low (McKibben, 2007). This cheapness, in other words, represents “maximized efficiency”: the farm product is produced for the lowest possible cost. Fossil fuel technologies similarly “maximize productivity,” or produce the largest quantities of product possible with the available materials. Synthetic nitrogen fertilizer, for example, can force greater crop yields—for a time, at least—per acre of farmland than natural nutrient cycling (McKibben, 2007). Similarly, mechanized farming enables a single agricultural producer to farm thousands of acres of land at a time rather than just ten or twenty, thereby maximizing production (McKibben, 2007). And, of course, when efficiency and productivity are maximized, profit is maximized; thus, the use of fossil fuels in agriculture satisfies the logic of the treadmill of production.

The cheapness, efficiency, and accessibility of fossil fuels, however, have also created major problems. At the rate we have burned through fossil fuels in the past two centuries, we are facing a “crisis of underproduction” (Bell, 2012). In other words, we have extracted fossil fuels at such extreme rates—rates that far outstrip the millions of years it takes to create fossil fuels in the first place—that we are threatening to wipe them out. This could already be happening: crude oil production has been generally flat or declining since 2004, which may indicate that we have already reached peak oil (Bell, 2012). Industrial agriculture—in which every step of the farming process depends on fossil fuel consumption—contributes significantly to this depletion, and there is no large-scale plan in place for what agriculture will turn to when fossil fuels run low (McKibben, 2007). This means that when oil wells start to dry up and oil prices soar, our food prices will soar, too.

Furthermore, the consumption of fossil fuels in industrial farming has serious environmental consequences, as it contributes enormous amounts of carbon to the atmosphere. Agriculture, a major driver of climate change, accounts for twenty percent of global carbon emissions (Wightman, n.d.): an irony, since climate change poses a major threat to agriculture through significant shifts in temperature and precipitation, pest populations, and nutrient
cycling—all which promise to severely disrupt agriculture during the decades to come (Lin, 2011).

Mechanized farming methods driven by fossil fuels also yield negative environmental consequences in the form of soil erosion and nutrient depletion (Kassam & Brammer, 2012). Crop soil needs constant application of new organic matter to renew its nutrient supply, and needs to be left, undisturbed, to replenish its nutrient content (Kassam & Brammer, 2012). Mechanized tillage disturbs the soil to a degree that disrupts this process, leaving the soil vulnerable to nutrient loss. Mechanical disturbance also loosens soil, making it vulnerable to erosion (Kassam & Brammer, 2012). Taken together, agriculture’s reliance on rapidly depleting fossil fuels, fossil fuels’ contribution to climate change, and mechanized farming methods put our food system in a very vulnerable position.

Additionally, the introduction of fossil fuels into agriculture has exacted a human toll by economically marginalizing farm workers. Because fossil fuel energy is so much cheaper to purchase than human energy, the mechanization of agriculture has displaced many American farm laborers (Brown & Schafft, 2011). In rural areas, where agricultural work opportunities once dominated local economies, fewer than seven percent of workers are now employed in the agricultural sector (Brown & Schafft, 2011). The proportion of the total U.S. population involved in agriculture has declined as well. In 1920, thirty percent of the U.S. population lived on farms; in 2007, less than one percent of the population lived on farms (Brown & Schafft, 2011). Farming, which once served as a steady livelihood for large portions of America’s population, is now beyond the reach of most workers. As a result, rural economies are in decline.

**Pesticides.**

Pesticides are ubiquitous in U.S. industrial farming, to say the least. About two billion pounds of pesticides are applied to U.S. farmland each year—a figure which represents one fifth of total worldwide pesticide use (Saw et al., 2011). Why is pesticide application so heavy? In modern industrial agriculture, crops are overwhelmingly grown in monocultures or “monocrops.” As we shall see, this type of agriculture, in which only one type of crop is grown in a given area, requires heavy pesticide inputs (Lin, 2011). Why, though, do we grow crops this way? Part of the reason that monocultures are so common in the United States is that the government subsidizes farmers who grow “commodity crops:” corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, and cotton (Lin, 2011). As Lin (2011) explains, “The commodity payment system encourages monocropping of select crops because payments are determined by acreage of crop produced, thereby incentivizing the maximum production of one or a few crops over large tracts of landscape.” In this context, then, “maximizing productivity” means maximizing production of a single crop, thereby ensuring a maximized—and government-subsidized—profit. The mechanized labor that has replaced human farm labor also supports monocrop agriculture, in that a given mechanized technology—such as a planter, harvester, or irrigation system—is designed for use on only one type of crop (Lin, 2011), thus maximizing single-crop yield. Monoculture crop agriculture, with the help of government subsidies and fossil fuel technologies, thus satisfies the logic of the treadmill of production.

Why do monocultures need pesticides? In monocultures, crop vulnerability to pests is especially high, because natural pest predators have no place in the agricultural ecosystem (Lin, 2011), resulting in an unprecedented “need” for pesticides. The increase in pesticide use in the United States has been dramatic: between 1950 and 2001, use of pesticides increased 32-fold
Pesticides are used as an easy chemical “fix” for the problems inherent in monocultures; we turn to pesticides, rather than change the way we plant crops, because monocultures guarantee maximum production and profit in our system of farm subsidies. The use (or overuse) of pesticides, however, has grave environmental consequences. Pesticides reduce agricultural biodiversity, which is important not just for pest control, but for whole-ecosystem resilience (Lin, 2011). Pesticides, along with fertilizer and herbicides, run off of farmland and pollute streams and groundwater (Horrigan et al., 2002). Pesticides also encourage the development of resistance among the pests they target (Bellinger, 1996). Pest resistance is rising rapidly: there are now over 500 species of insects known to be resistant to at least one pesticide, and seventeen which are known to be resistant to all pesticides (Bellinger, 1996).

Pesticides also pose a serious health risk for people who are exposed to them. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reports that 10,000-20,000 cases of pesticide poisoning are diagnosed by physicians every year; this, however, is likely an underestimation, as it does not account for misdiagnosis or victims’ lack of access to healthcare (Saw et al., 2011). Severe pesticide poisoning can cause respiratory, gastrointestinal, or neurological problems (Saw et al., 2011). Some studies have shown a correlation between pesticide application and birth defects: in one study using nationwide data, birth defects were shown to be most prevalent in children conceived between April and July, the time when pesticide application in the United States is heaviest (Bell, 2012). Other research shows that pesticide exposure is associated with increased risk of Parkinson’s disease and breast cancer (Bell, 2012). Some research has shown that children are some of the most frequently injured victims of pesticide exposure (Saw et al., 2011), and that children and pregnant women, in whom toxin exposure is more likely to cause disruption of cellular functioning, are especially vulnerable to the effects of pesticide exposure (Bell, 2012). In sum, human health, in this case, is subordinate to the maximized agricultural production and efficiency sustained by pesticide use.

Confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs).

In the United States, we raise the vast majority of our meat in confined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) (McKibben, 2007). In these facilities, the greatest possible number of animals is kept in the smallest possible enclosed area (Bell, 2012), thus maximizing efficiency by maximizing the animal-to-floorspace ratio. CAFOs also maximize production: hog CAFOs, for example, often house more than 50,000 animals in a single facility (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). In keeping with the mechanistic logic of maximized production and efficiency, CAFO animals that enter the food treadmill of production are treated more like machines than living organisms (Scully, 2009). From birth to death, every part of a CAFO animal’s life is mechanized: feeding, watering, waste removal, and antibiotic dosing is all automated, so that a single person can “care for” tens of thousands of animals at once—maximizing both efficiency and production (Scully, 2002). CAFO animals live the entirety of their lives far from the light of day; inside windowless buildings, under fluorescent bulbs, they suffer in confined spaces that are designed to exactly fit their body size (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). In this case, the logic of maximized efficiency leaves no extra room for an animal to turn around or lie down.

Research has solidly established that CAFOs are an environmental disaster, particularly in terms of the quantity of animal waste they yield (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). The average hog, for example, produces two to fifteen times the waste of the average human being—so the waste coming from a CAFO housing 50,000 head of hog represents the same amount of waste coming
from a medium-sized city (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). The systems for dealing with CAFO waste, however, are frequently inadequate. The waste emitted by a CAFO is pumped into nearby “waste lagoons”: huge, earthen pits where waste is meant to gradually break down and evaporate (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). However, the quantities of waste emitted from CAFOs are so immense that they regularly overwhelm their waste lagoons and leach into the soil and groundwater; evaporated waste particulates also pollute the air (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009).

Of course, pollutive CAFO waste does not just degrade the air and water—it hurts humans who breathe the air and drink the water. In the case of CAFO waste, this is a serious concern, for a waste lagoon is generally filled with a highly toxic mixture of excrement, afterbirths, stillborn fetuses, syringes, and large quantities of antibiotics, vaccines, and insecticides (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). Research shows that people who live close to CAFOs experience higher rates of respiratory and gastrointestinal problems, including cough, diarrhea, nausea and vomiting, dizziness, and shortness of breath; waste lagoon leakage can also spread diseases such as salmonellosis, chlamydia, and meningitis to humans (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). CAFOs also hurt their neighbors economically: nearby property values drop when a CAFO moves in, effectively “trapping” people in homes they cannot sell (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009). Furthermore, research shows that CAFOs are disproportionately located in African-American, politically marginalized, and economically disadvantaged communities (Edwards & Driscoll, 2009); the corporate entities that build CAFOs thus target populations that are less likely to have the resources to legally or politically oppose them.

Slaughterhouses.

The operations of the industrial slaughterhouse represent another exercise in maximizing efficiency and productivity in our food system, to the unspeakable detriment of animals and humans alike. In today’s meatpacking plant, the speed at which animals are “processed” is the most important aspect of production (Eisnitz, 2007). Some facilities maintain a rate of 75,000 slaughters per week—or one animal every four seconds (Eisnitz, 2007). Employees report that disciplinary action awaits those who slow the production line by adhering, for example, to the requirements of the Humane Slaughter Act (Eisnitz, 2007). The Humane Slaughter Act, passed by Congress in 1958, requires that animals be rendered unconscious before they are shackled and sent down the line to be killed, skinned, and dismembered; however, violation of the Humane Slaughter Act carries relatively lenient penalties (Eisnitz, 2007). In a workplace where maintaining the production rate is paramount, this means that on the kill floor, employees do not have time to properly stun and kill an animal before it is hoisted up by its back legs to be skinned (Eisnitz, 2007). As a result, animals are frequently skinned, boiled, or eviscerated while still conscious and kicking (Eisnitz, 2007). This type of high-speed, chaotic slaughtering and processing also increases the chance that E. coli, which lives in the intestinal tract of livestock, will find its way onto meat coming off the production line (Eisnitz, 2007); thus, industrially processed meat is frequently contaminated.

Apart from the incomprehensible suffering this system inflicts on animals, industrial meatpacking jobs are extremely dangerous for humans. Employees are expected to skin animals—often weighing several hundred pounds each—which are fighting for their lives (Eisnitz, 2007); unsurprisingly, 36 percent of meatpacking workers are injured each year (Calamuci, 2008). Contamination also exacts a terrible toll on the health of those who eat contaminated meat. Children are especially vulnerable to developing hemolytic uremic syndrome
from eating *E. coli*-tainted meat; this syndrome, which is the leading cause of kidney failure among children in the United States, can cause massive internal hemorrhaging, swelling of the internal organs, heart and liver failure, coma, and death in the children it affects (Eisnitz, 2007). Clearly, maximizing efficiency and productivity in the case of animal processing exacts a terrible toll on human health and safety.

**Economic concentration of crop and animal agriculture.**

Less than a century ago, crop agriculture was an employment sector dominated by small-scale, independent farmers; today, agriculture is monopolized by relatively few corporate entities that have concentrated and consolidated economic power to an extreme degree (Brown & Schafft, 2011). In the past century, the *number* of farms has dropped by half, from four million to two million; the *size* of farms, however, has increased by three hundred percent (Brown & Schafft, 2011). This does not mean small farms have disappeared; nine out of ten farms, in fact, are small-scale (Brown & Schafft, 2011). What this does mean, however, is that large-scale farms are amassing an increasing proportion of total farm wealth. Large-scale farms—those that annually net $250,000 or more in sales—account for only 7.5 percent of farms, but they control 60 percent of production (Brown & Schafft, 2011). Two companies—Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland—control 75 percent of the world’s grain trade (McKibben, 2007). Eighty-nine percent of American chickens are raised under contract to large corporate producers (McKibben, 2007). Four meatpackers—Tyson, Cargill, Swift, and Smithfield—process 80 percent of American beef (Calamuci, 2008).

It must be recognized that this concentration of power has occurred because it satisfies the logic of maximized efficiency and production: after all, those producers which have the most land, the most wealth, and the greatest access to production-streamlining technologies are the ones which will yield the most product at the most efficient rates. Earl Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture under Nixon, articulated this value when he told American farmers to “get big or get out” of agriculture (McKibben, 2007). Our system of farm subsidies supports this philosophy. Currently, 75 percent of all subsidy payments go to farms that are in the top ten percent in terms of size; in other words, federal subsidies go to producers that are already economically advantaged (McKibben, 2007). As wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large-scale producers, the majority of farmers—that is, small-scale farmers—are no longer able to make a living from farming alone. Farm families now derive 59 percent of their income from off-farm sources; only seventeen percent of income is derived from farm earnings (Brown & Schafft, 2011). Farming—once a viable employment alternative for rural families—is quickly disappearing into a corporate monopoly of agricultural wealth.

**Sustainable Agriculture**

Although industrial agriculture has serious consequences for humans and the environment, the question that invariably persists is: if industrial agriculture yields cheaper, more plentiful food, isn’t it better, in the end, for everyone? This is an important question: after all, almost one billion people—or 15 percent of the world’s population—go hungry every day, and 25 percent of the world’s children that are under five years of age are malnourished (Bell, 2012). Ostensibly, this would indicate that the relentless pursuit of “more” in terms of food production is justified. However, a closer look at our agricultural system reveals that it is already yielding a surplus of
food: enough grain alone is produced to provide every person on the planet with 3,145 calories per day (Bell, 2012). The solution to food insecurity, then, lies not in our ability to produce more and more food, but in our willingness to redistribute food equitably (Bell, 2012). In this light, ever-expanding agricultural production is not a means to an end (of feeding the world); it is an end in itself.

Why would we pursue industrial agriculture, given its dire environmental and human consequences, if the only “benefit” is ever-increasing production? The answer brings us back to the treadmill of production: we pursue industrial agriculture because the logic of capitalist growth demands it. When maximized efficiency and production—rather than environmental and human well-being—are the ultimate goals of the process, industrial agriculture starts to make sense. And in fact, by embedding these values in the very structure of our agricultural system, we begin to lend them an aura of inevitability (Bell, 2012): this is the natural, inescapable path of progress; this is just the way things are.

This acceptance of the agricultural status quo carries with it the danger of making us forget that industrial farming—and the treadmill values upon which it is based—is not a predetermined, unalterable reality. It is, rather, a social construction—and, as such, we can change it (Bell, 2012). And this is just what a growing number of farmers and consumers are doing through their practice and support of sustainable agriculture. Through what amounts to a reprioritization of goals—one that values human and environmental health over the relentless pursuit of efficiency and production—these people intentionally step off the agricultural treadmill of production. Organic, conservation, and diversified crop agriculture, as well as sustainable animal agriculture and local food production, are enabling increasing numbers of people to break free from the destructive cycle of intensive fossil fuel and chemical inputs, environmental pollution, and human and animal degradation that characterize industrial agriculture. In doing so, these farmers, and the consumers who support them, are forging a path toward a new kind of agriculture that helps more than it harms.

**Organic crop agriculture.**

Organic agriculture is a method of farming that prioritizes whole-ecosystem health over maximized production; as such, it eliminates the use of agrochemicals such as synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, reduces reliance on mechanized technologies, and conserves soil and water resources (Pimental et al., 2005). It is worth mentioning that organic production is the fastest-growing agricultural sector in the nation, and sales of organic foods increase by double-digit rates every year (Pimental et al., 2005), indicating a growing awareness among farmers and consumers of the costs of industrial agriculture.

In a twenty-year study by the Rodale Institute that compared organic crop agriculture with industrial (or conventional) crop-growing methods, organic agriculture was shown to result in far fewer fossil energy inputs, increased biodiversity through elimination of agrochemicals, enhanced soil nutrient content, and enriched soil biology as compared to conventional farming methods (Pimental et al., 2005). In addition to minimizing environmental degradation, organic agriculture may also hold some economic benefits. In the Rodale study, organic crop production resulted in significantly higher yields than conventional crop production during drought years due to farming practices that reduce water runoff (Pimental et al., 2005). Drought resilience is an important agricultural consideration in light of predicted climate change-resultant shifts in temperature and precipitation (Pimental et al., 2005). For the first five years of the Rodale
experiment, organically grown crops produced somewhat lower yields during years with normal rainfall; however, after this initial “transition period,” organic and conventional yields were not significantly different (Pimental et al., 2005). Organic agriculture, therefore, may be an economically viable as well as environmentally responsible method of farming.

**Conservation agriculture.**

Conservation agriculture provides one solution to the problem of soil depletion and erosion resulting from mechanized farming techniques. This method of crop agriculture minimizes soil disturbance through no-till farming and maintains cover crops that help to hold soil in place (Kassam & Brammer, 2012). No-till farming protects against the shattering of topsoil structure and loss of organic soil matter, both of which degrade soil quality in mechanized tilling; no-till farming also reduces water runoff by reducing soil compaction (Kassam & Brammer, 2012) and, as a result, decreases water pollution from farm runoff. Maintaining continuous cover crops helps to protect soil against water and wind erosion and contributes a constant supply of new organic matter to the soil that replenishes its nutrients without the use of synthetic fertilizers (Kassam & Brammer, 2012).

By reducing farm runoff, conservation agriculture decreases agrochemical pollution of streams and groundwater; by reducing mechanization, conservation agriculture also decreases carbon emissions (Kassam & Brammer, 2012). No-till agriculture can also be economically advantageous, in that it vastly reduces the amount of costly energy inputs required by mechanical farming techniques; this may be especially valuable in more impoverished areas of the world, where farmers cannot afford to purchase technological inputs (Kassam & Brammer, 2012).

**Diversified crop agriculture.**

Before the onset of monocrop-dominant industrial agriculture, crops were traditionally grown in polycultures: different kinds of crops were planted together in the same general area (Lin, 2011). Polycultures encourage greater biodiversity in that they provide a broader assortment of habitats and food sources for a more diverse range of microorganisms, insects, birds and mammals (Lin, 2011). One benefit of supporting farmland biodiversity is that it tends to help suppress pests. Natural enemies of pests that reside in biodiverse agricultural areas are able to control pest populations (Lin, 2011), thereby reducing or eliminating the need to inundate farmland with toxic chemicals that leach into soil, streams, and groundwater. In addition to being environmentally benign, this type of natural pest suppression may also be economically advantageous, as is illustrated in the case of “beetle banks.” Beetle banks are areas of native grasslands planted at the edges of crop fields that serve as habitats for carabid beetles—natural enemies of crop-destroying aphids (Lin, 2011). Research shows that while the loss of farmland to a beetle bank on a typical farm results in a crop loss of $45 a year, a beetle bank saves about $1,450 per year in reduced pesticide inputs and aphid-resultant yield loss (Lin, 2011).

**Sustainable animal agriculture.**

In traditional forms of agriculture, animal waste is not a problem as it is in the CAFO system; instead, it serves as an “elegant solution” to the need to replenish the soil with nutrients (Pollan, 2006). As Pollan (2006) describes it, CAFOs “take this elegant solution and neatly divide it into
two new problems: a fertility problem on the farm (which must be remedied with chemical fertilizers) and a pollution problem on the feedlot (which is seldom remedied at all).” The logical solution, then, is to restore the conditions under which animal waste helps, rather than harms, the environment. When animals are raised in relatively small numbers and are dispersed over a sufficient area of land, the environment is able to absorb their waste (Horrigan et al., 2002). This allows nutrients from the waste to reintegrate into the environment and enhance soil fertility (Horrigan et al., 2002). One way this may be accomplished is through rotational grazing, in which animals are raised—outdoors, rather than in confinement—over rotated areas of land that their waste fertilizes; this type of grazing requires the maintenance of cover vegetation, which also reduces soil erosion (Horrigan et al., 2002). While rotational grazing does not yield maximum meat production, it is much less damaging than CAFOs to the environment, to human health, and to property values.

**Local agriculture.**

One of the main benefits of relocalizing food systems is that it extends economic viability to small-scale producers. Agriculture today is overwhelmingly dominated by powerful corporate producers that have little to no investment in local interests and have little incentive to reinvest profits in a local community (McKibben, 2007). On the other hand, small-scale producers—who actually grow the food sold in their communities—are invested in local interests, are accountable to their neighbors, and are much more likely to spend their profits locally (McKibben, 2007).

Growing food locally requires less fuel consumption, in that the farm product does not have to be shipped hundreds of miles to get to its point of sale (McKibben, 2007); growing food locally thus decreases carbon emissions. Locally grown food also increases food security in rural areas. Today, many rural communities are “food deserts” that are devoid of fresh, accessible produce. McKibben (2007) illustrates this point by quoting the director of Second Harvest, the nation’s largest food relief program, who “describes Midwesterners ‘going to a food bank for a box of cornflakes to feed their children in a community where thousands of acres are devoted to growing corn.’” In local food economies dominated by commodity crops produced by distant corporate powers, people often do not have access to food that meets their nutritional needs; local agriculture can thus help restore food sovereignty to rural communities.

Farmer’s markets, where small-scale, local farmers gather weekly to sell their goods, represent one means by which local agriculture is increasingly thriving (McKibben, 2007). Community-supported agriculture (CSA) is another viable method of local farming; in the CSA arrangement, consumers pay a local farm a fixed fee in exchange for a weekly box of fresh produce, meat, eggs, or any other good produced by the farm (McKibben, 2007). CSAs and farmer’s markets embody a particularly interesting facet of the local foods movement: as of now, farmers who are growing fresh produce for local sale are doing so in or on the outskirts of cities (McKibben, 2007). In the United States, non-commodity crops (that is, fresh fruits and vegetables) are mostly grown in metropolitan areas: four-fifths of our fruit and two-thirds of our vegetables are grown in urban or urban-adjacent counties (McKibben, 2007). In some areas, the urban local foods movement has actually reversed the trend of economic consolidation in agriculture: the number of farmers in Oregon, for example, rose from 13,384 in 1974 to 21,580 in 2002 (McKibben, 2007). Local agriculture represents an alternative to the increasing concentration of economic power and wealth disparity in industrial agriculture and holds the promise of revitalizing local economies.
Conclusion

Research demonstrates that in many cases, sustainable agriculture need not result in reduced yield or economic loss for the farmers who practice it; in other cases, however, sustainable forms of agriculture will most certainly not force the same levels of production—or yield the same profits—as industrial agriculture. A farmer who raises twenty head of free-range, rotated-grazing cattle, for example, is simply not going to meet the same production and profit levels as a corporate entity raising 50,000 head of hog. There is just no way around it: through maximized production and efficiency, _industrial agriculture brings in the money._

But at whose profit—and at what expense? Industrial farming does very well in benefitting a relatively miniscule proportion of the population—the wealthiest of the industrial-level agricultural producers. The costs of this system, however, are tremendous: industrial agriculture degrades the environmental and human resources upon which it depends. It pollutes the water; it depletes the soil; it emits massive amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. It treats animals like machines; it shuts down local economies; it puts workers in danger. Are we willing to suffer these costs for the sake of nothing more than ever-expanding production and corporate profit? The resounding answer, coming from growing numbers of farmers and consumers, is “No.” By choosing a different path—a sustainable path—these farmers and consumers are choosing a food system that does not harm humans and that leaves vital environmental resources intact. It is a choice any one of us can make; the question is, can we make this choice together? If so, we will be choosing a far brighter future—for ourselves, for our children, and for the rest of life on this earth.

References


THE BRAIN GAME: AN INSIGHT INTO EDUCATION-RELATED MIGRATION PATTERNS

By Catherine M. Potvin*
University of Ottawa

While the “brain drain/brain gain” debate has been a subject of concern for many decades, the impact of globalization on educational and professional migration has only recently gained prominence in international discourse. The subject is complex and presents many angles for debate. When the lack of trained professionals is observed in tandem with a greater endemic unemployment rate and coupled with immense immigration flows, one must start to question if states are training the right professionals for their needs, and, if they are, why professionals aren’t staying in their home countries.

The Who and the Where

The term “brain drain” was coined in the United Kingdom in 1969 and referred to British scientists emigrating to North America (Levatino & Pécout, 2012). The definition soon broadened to include the Global South to Global North professional emigration, the main observed direction of educated immigration flows. Today, with the ease of personal mobility between countries, the movement of qualified personnel involves all countries regardless of development status. However, professional emigration from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries reaches around four percent of total emigration flows, while this rate nears 50 percent for emerging economies, and over 80 percent from small islands (Vinokur, 2006). While big powers such as the United States typically represent popular destinations, according to traditional migration pattern theories, “geographical proximity (and especially shared borders), existing cultural and historical ties, a knowledge of the destination country’s language, and the existence of considerable numbers of own nationals in the destination country, all enhance future migration flows” (Kelo & Wächter, 2004).

This being said, migration is a natural process and cannot ethically or legally be forbidden. However, when it comes to selective professional emigration—the source of brain drain—the matter becomes controversial. On the one hand, we must consider the individual’s right to study and/or practice what he or she chooses, regardless of the local availability of adequate institutions. We must also respect the right of the said individual to emigrate as he or she chooses in search of better employment and/or living conditions, regardless of country of education, as long as certain professional standards are upheld. On the other hand, by allowing freedom of movement to masses of specialized professionals, we may be denying entire populations of their rights to health, education, and other services requiring trained professionals to administer them (Levatino & Pécout, 2012). For example, in over 57 countries, the ratio of medical professionals per 1,000 habitants has reached a critically low 2.5 (or lower), a ratio so small as to lessen the national life expectancies of these countries (Raghuram, 2009). Whose rights we honor—and how—remains the main dilemma of the brain drain.

* Catherine Potvin is a recent graduate of the University of Ottawa, where she obtained double undergraduate degrees in biomedical sciences and international development and globalization.
Logistics of the “Brain Circulation”: Push-Pull Factors

Before analyzing the effects of such immigration, we must first discuss the reasons for emigration in the first place. There are two main types of brain drain-related immigrants: the students and the graduates. The first group consists of students who may not have access to adequate tertiary education and emigrate to new countries or continents in search of a better education. Institutional inadequacy may be due to inexistence of infrastructure, absence of programs of interest, overcrowding and/or low admission rates, expensive private systems, or lack of international recognition of the home institution.

In a global economy where studying in the next province costs as much as studying in another continent, many students from developing or overpopulated countries with low graduate employment—such as in China, which has a 30 percent graduate unemployment rate (Ross & Lou, 2005)—may choose to study in more internationally recognized institutions in a different economy. American institutions are regarded as the global standard in education quality (Marginson, 2006) and thus represent a popular destination for international students: for example, more than half of American doctoral graduates in engineering are foreign (Marginson, 2006).

According to some studies, most international students plan on returning to their home countries (albeit there are no mentions as to when), but research has demonstrated that the longer they stay abroad, the less likely they are to return home, thus anchoring the “brain deficit” (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997). It is estimated that, globally, during the last 40 years, over one million international students have stayed abroad or emigrated permanently after graduation (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997). Nevertheless, as Marginson (2006) writes:

But without such a global hierarchy [of tertiary education quality] there would be no positional advantage and hence no world-wide social competition through higher education.

However, the development of higher education capacity in the emerging nations, especially research capacity, can modify global asymmetries and uni-directional transformations. … Global hierarchy in higher education is not fixed for all time but subject to continual movement and flux.

It is, thus, no wonder that there is a global pressure for universities to uphold international standards of quality.

The other category of immigrants includes graduates and working professionals. The push-pull factors for this category are numerous. The most documented sources of push factors include income, health, and educational prospects for the immigrant and his family (Levatino & Pécoud, 2012). However, the lack of applicability of one’s education in one’s own home country is increasingly becoming an important push factor (Raghuram, 2009). For example, there is no place for a neonatal surgeon in an African village that lacks even a basic medical center or even patients who would be able to afford such surgery, regardless of the doctor’s will to practice in his or her own country. Therefore, the lack of adequate employment and working conditions represent a major push factor enabling the “brain exodus” (Kwok & Leland, 1982). Regardless of infrastructure or the existence of clients, lack of funding in many sectors inevitably leads to the deterioration of the infrastructure, cuts in wages, and lesser investments in research and
development. Such factors have incited Russian scientists to increasingly abandon their respective fields of expertise and emigrate elsewhere or occupy lesser positions, thus leading to a “brain waste” (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997).

On the other end of the equation are pull factors that can be either passive or active. Passive factors relate to the traditional pull factors: larger economies can offer better income, health, education, and professional advancement prospects than smaller, more isolated developing economies. These factors occur naturally and proliferate in liberal economies, and will likely permanently remain in existence.

However, new active factors are playing increasingly large roles in assisting the drain of working professionals. A relatively new phenomenon of “brain poaching” has become an ethical concern worldwide. Developed countries face two important problems: a thinning working-age population as the fertility rate drops, and a parallel increase in costs of training. Therefore, there is a need (not only an economic convenience) to import foreign workers to support the growth of the economy, regardless of consequences to source countries (Levatino & Pécout, 2012). This has led to the creation of private recruitment agencies in developed nations which actively find qualified foreign workers and offer incentives for immigration (Levatino & Pécout, 2012).

Because the recruitment firms are often privatized, there is little that source country governments can do to stem this brain poaching, as they are generally unable to compete convincingly with the incentives offered. Receiving governments also use tax breaks or exemptions, local training opportunities, and other incentives to attract foreign workers. This is, however, increasingly regarded as detrimental to the receiving countries’ local citizens, especially in welfare states, as more and more of the state’s revenue is allotted to importing foreign workers instead of training local ones (Vinokur, 2006).

The Consequences and the Externalities

Surely the “brain game” is not a simple, unidirectional flow of migrants from south to north in a net win-lose context. Traditional brain drain has turned into an issue of brain circulation, which offers so many externalities as to benefit—or harm—both source and receiving countries’ economies as well as the individual migrants. While benefits for the receiving country are more clear cut, the advantages for the source countries depend greatly on the rate of outflow of immigrants and the possibility of remittances—both unpredictable and hardly enforceable factors.

As we consider the existence of positive externalities, let us explore the externalities of traditional pull factors—for example, the better income, health, and educational prospects for migrants. While these remain the main reasons for “brain immigration,” one must also consider a multitude of factors in the receiving country that may prevent the pull factors from living up to the migrants’ expectations. Competitive job markets, different cultures and languages, and racial discrimination may very well prevent an immigrant from working in his specialized domain regardless of previously perceived opportunities. There is also a certain pressure on the receiving country’s government to protect locals prone to endemic unemployment and underemployment from a wave of incoming workers with temporary visas (Vinokur, 2006). This pressure on the government may result in increasingly strict immigration laws that may make it harder for immigrants to obtain residency status as well as sponsor their families (in applicable cases) to join them in their country of choice.
The lack of universal standards in tertiary education can also cause a loss of qualifications when crossing borders (Mackey & Liang, 2012). Most countries have their own standards when granting professional licenses and degrees. Unless the universities have achieved globally recognized standards and international validation of their degrees, many professionals suffer from the complete or partial loss of their qualifications when emigrating. These migrants thus often occupy lower positions, leading to brain waste (a doctor working as a nurse, a professor working as a secretary, an engineer working as a mechanic). Often, the revalidation procedures include courses or exams that are costly in terms of time and money—assets that many immigrants may not have upon arrival in a new country.

Another problem with externalities is the flagrant loss of human capital and the uncertainty of positive financial externalities flowing to the source countries. As both source and receiving countries debate over a need for compensation, some argue source countries do not suffer from as large a capital loss as is currently hypothesized. The potential increase in remittances to source countries is often cited as a major compensation for the brain drain they suffer. However, as we have noted previously, the longer an immigrant stays abroad, the less likely he or she is to return home. Coupled with this fact, we must note that remittances also decrease proportionally to the time spent abroad (Levatino & Pécoud, 2012). Therefore, as “brain return” become unlikely, remittances disappear and the financial losses of the brain drain become more apparent (Mackey & Liang, 2012), thus leaving source countries in a net loss situation.

Regardless of the negative aspects of brain circulation, at the center of the issue lies the basic freedom of mobility for all, which cannot ethically be withdrawn and is ironically supported by the brain game. The mobility of professionals allows for a global sharing of knowledge and makes available the use of specialized infrastructure and equipment by many specialists who would not otherwise have access to such technology. This increase in efficiency and global sharing may create positive externalities to source countries regardless of whether the migrants return home. After all, “the fact that scientists live abroad does not necessarily mean that their ties with the local scientific community have been interrupted or broken. … On the contrary … they contribute to the establishment of a more fluid network of international relations” (Kreimer, n.d., as cited in Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997). The same notion can be argued for migrating students or workers on temporary or student visas. Provided the experience gained abroad can be put to good use (in either country), the entire question of mobility does not necessarily represent a complete loss for anyone, although the gains are not necessarily equal (Levatino & Pécoud, 2012).

The Brain Game: Whose Turn Is It?

The biggest concern regarding graduates emigrating shortly after their studies is the loss of the investment by the home country in their training. When a country with limited resources invests a large portion of its budget into educating a disappearing workforce, it would only seem economically logical to cut back on educational spending. This leads to highly privatized educational systems in developing states (Vinokur, 2006) that may raise local inequality rates and reinforce social divisions due to high tuition rates (Ross & Lou, 2005; Rudzki, 1995). For example, the privatization of universities in China has raised the country’s Gini coefficient, effectively worsening the income and opportunity disparity between its citizens. As described by Ross and Lou (2005), one woman was seen in front of the local hospital with a sign reading “A
kidney for my daughter’s tuition,” as parental contribution to their children’s education becomes expected and tuition rates skyrocket in the best schools.

Privatization also creates local social issues as universities grow and may buy farmers’ lands or overtake smaller village school properties without proper compensation (Ross & Lou, 2005). Finally, due to immense pressures to meet international standards and become globally competitive, private universities may fall under foreign ownership in a bid to limit or even reverse “brain flows.” Foreign ownership can—just as with all commercial outsourcing from north to south—prevent much of the profit from entering the local economy and impedes proper, sustainable development and growth (Vinokur, 2006).

However, some governments are doing the opposite and investing more in education to achieve the same results. This investment primarily aims at reforming tertiary education systems to reach international standards without privatizing the system. Privatization has proven harmful to international cooperation as global networks become more volatile and less rooted in states (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997). This is true for both university relations and professional networks. This being said, such educational reforms require immense capital investments both in infrastructure and professional staff—something which remains an impossibility for many developing countries regardless of short-term public aid that may be offered from international sources.

Other solutions include less drastic reforms that adapt tertiary education to local needs rather than achieve international recognition. As Levatino & Pécout (2012) explain, both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have pushed for a tailoring of education to promote skills that are “useful in origin countries but less tradable across borders” and offering “training that is focused on local conditions [and] can help to limit workforce attrition.” While this tactic may seem logical to some and may even benefit implementing countries, it still represents a moral dilemma, as freedom of education is recognized as a universal right. China, on another note, opted for an open-door policy for all its students, offering extensive exchange programs to allow both Chinese students to study abroad and to attract foreign students. This allows overcrowding to be controlled and stimulates the inflow of foreign capital in the form of tuition fees (Rudzki, 1995; Ross & Lou, 2005). China has on other occasions, however, also resorted to “restrictive and authoritarian” measures to discourage and prevent outbound flows. Such tactics tend to fail in preventing emigration and strongly discourage migrant returns as personal mobility is endangered by political instability (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997). This may explain the slight increase in brain return to Latin and Asian countries, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, as authoritarian regimes have given way to democracies and individual mobility rights are being respected (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997).

Other types of strategies to stem and reverse “brain outflow” of workers have been attempted. On a national level, source countries often offer tax benefits and better employment opportunities as incentives to returning workers. Higher investments in infrastructure and adequate wages (for example, based on productivity instead of the national average, thus positively reflecting the returning worker’s experience) both offer incentives to return (Kwok & Leland, 1982).

As previously mentioned, receiving countries using fiscal incentives may ultimately suffer from the loss of state revenue which these incentives imply. However, source countries may break even or perhaps benefit from such incentives as local citizens’ tax contributions will actually be reinvested locally and specialists’ productivity will be profitable in the home country. Furthermore, in many cases these countries may already have been spending a large proportion
of their income (when such income was available) to import foreign experts of their own after having lost their locally formed workforce to the brain drain (Kwok & Leland, 1982). Therefore, the benefits from a brain return include less expenditure on foreign hiring and a positive return on educational investments. For developing countries, a returning workforce may thus represent a win-win situation for both country and worker. For example, “the returning South Korean scientists and engineers have made a decisive contribution to the development of science and technology in their country and to the diversification of international relations with the rest of the world” (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997).

Internationally speaking, two main approaches have been adopted to prevent negative consequences of brain drain. First is the aforementioned idea of compensation between countries in exchange for accepting educated migrants. Through this initiative, a number of exchange programs and international scientific cooperation networks now allow migrants to work on topics affecting their home country and offer the option to return to the source country for longer periods of time without risking their visa or residency status in the receiving country:

Skilled migrants who have settled in other countries, especially the more advanced economies, are to be encouraged to share their knowledge and other resources for the development of their country of origin. Many examples exist of successful cooperation and networks between migrants, such as scientists and technologists, in the interest of the countries they have left. (United Nations [UN], 2002, as cited in Levatino & Pécoud, 2012)

While these joint projects and cooperation networks may prove successful and mutually beneficial (as seen in Colombia and South Africa, among others), they are most effective in globally integrated and developed economies. Other, less networked and integrated nations (such as small islands or smaller economies) may not have the infrastructure to support such initiatives (Gaillard & Gaillard, 1997).

Other international initiatives involve large institutions such as the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) issuing calls for developed countries to refrain from hiring skilled workers from countries that are already deficient in such a workforce, despite some of the advantages a source country may ultimately receive from their expats (Levatino & Pécoud, 2012). The WHO declares:

Receiving countries have a responsibility to ensure that recruitment of workers from countries with severe workforce shortages is sensitive to the adverse consequences. The significant investments made in training health care professionals and the immediate impact of their absence through migration must figure more prominently as considerations among prospective employers and recruitment agencies. Discussions and negotiations with ministries of health, workforce planning units and training institutions, similar to bilateral agreements, will help to avoid claims of “poaching” and other disreputable recruitment behavior. (World Health Organization, 2006, as cited in Levatino & Pécoud, 2012)

Again, however, such international declarations and codes of conduct are difficult to implement due to the member states’ conflicting interests and the ethicality regarding the freedom of movement and education.
Conclusion

Migration is a necessary and natural phenomenon. However, as long as world economies are not equal, the brain game will continue to be played as students and workers migrate to the best schools and brightest career paths. While source countries may suffer from such consequences, the repercussions are not all negative, as

Migrants have the opportunity of acquiring or improving skills and experience abroad and, even if they stay abroad, may prove as investors, philanthropists, bearers of new knowledge or promoters of trade and cultural exchange, to be valuable resources for their country of origin. (United Nations, 2006, as cited in Levatino & Pécoud, 2012)

Nonetheless, policies that should be considered to stem some of the more dire consequences of brain drain include:

- **Investing heavily in domestic education to locally train needed workers instead of hiring foreign-trained specialists.** Often, these specialists lose qualifications when crossing borders and ultimately hold employment below their level of training, leading to brain waste. Meanwhile, while waiting lists to get into medicine or nursing are growing, admissions remain low and many states do not consider training more staff, as it is cheaper to import foreign professionals. If we trained citizens or young immigrants locally before poaching internationally, there may be less underemployment in all countries and opportunity-related pull factors may be diluted.

- **Creating a national database of foreign university programs performing at local standards.** This would require a governmental team to investigate foreign universities’ curricula and compare them to our own standards. By doing this, local employers may be less likely to place foreign professionals in positions below their qualifications. While this would not reduce brain drain per se, it may reduce brain waste by honoring legitimate foreign qualifications held by the arriving migrants.

- **Imposing a national quota to prevent an overwhelming outflow of trained professionals.** For example, if a doctor to patient ratio of 1:500 is deemed ideal, no practicing medical professional should be allowed to exit the country unless another is formed to take his position. Personal freedom of mobility is therefore not revoked, but simply regulated in order to protect local populations. Other measures such as enforcing a time span in which graduates must practice in their country before being allowed to emigrate may limit the loss on the investment of their education.

- **Imposing conditionalities on public education as insurance on educational investments.** By offering subsidized or free, internationally recognized and standardized tertiary education (where feasible by the state), the social divisions dilemma may be overcome. However, in an effort to reduce loss on investment, all graduates of working age who decide to emigrate
must repay the state in full for their education before, or within a determined time span after, emigrating.

These are only a few ideas that could be implemented in some countries alongside current measures to help reverse brain drain and optimize brain gain. It is needless to say that all measures depend on structural and systemic environments in each country. Many do not have access to primary or secondary education, let alone tertiary institutions, and even fewer can access internationally recognized institutions offering degrees validated across borders. I certainly do agree that institutions must prepare their students and workers for local conditions and offer programs tailored to national needs. However, I do not think that these programs should be the sole offering to the workforce, as this may become a new push factor as individual choice shapes migration patterns.

The issues are complex, the externalities numerous, and the moral connotations are inextricably enmeshed within this vast set of factors. Though the term may have been coined only a few decades ago, the brain game has existed since the dawn of time, and I do not believe we will ever achieve a perfect global balance of workforces, each perfectly tailored to their respective environments. But as emerging economies are becoming global powers, as the United States is relinquishing its status as a global hegemon, and as public aid for development is concretely targeted at relevant issues (such as infrastructure, education, and health) in an increasingly efficient manner, I do believe that a functional “brain balance” can be achieved during the next decades. In fact, we have already started to see a new type of emotional rather than intellectual migration, as the brains from the Global North flock to the Global South in search of a simpler, happier life. And such are the rules of the brain game.

References


MULTICULTURALISM: AN INTEGRATIVE FORCE WITH LIMITS

By Frank Weng*
University of Toronto

Multiculturalism is one of the many features associated with contemporary Canadian society. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the discourse of whether the federal government’s multiculturalism policy has been an integrative force in Canadian society. I first demonstrate the philosophical forces rooted in the discourse through a case study, and then I explore the criticisms scholars have made of the policy. Ultimately, I argue that although multiculturalism has not addressed economic barriers for visible minorities, it has become an integrative force because a degree of mandatory integration among multicultural groups is enforced.

Prior to examining the two philosophical forces, terms must be defined. The federal government has defined multicultural policy to mean “the management of diversity … [through accommodating cultural diversity and eliminating societal barriers to improve integration]” (Library of Parliament, 2009). It assumes that there is no dominant culture in Canada and it operates on two levels: first, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration’s Multiculturalism Directorate funds programs support the policy. Second, multiculturalism is reflected in various provincial government policies in which variations of the idea is adhered to (McAndrew, 2005).

There are two philosophical forces that dominate the discourse on multiculturalism: one that favors the individual against one that favors the collective. The case Dhillon v. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) embodies the tension between the two forces. In the case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether Sikhs could wear turbans while serving in the RCMP. The accused argued that his religious right was infringed upon when RCMP prevented him from serving. The Court ruled in his favor (MacNaughton & Connell, 2011). Hence, the Court favored the right of the individual to practice his religion. The significance is that by adhering to multiculturalism, an ethnic minority group’s right to religious practice was prioritized above the collective and historical Canadian symbol represented by the RCMP. Ostensibly, the two forces were represented in the dispute and the individual prevailed.

Many scholars have criticized multiculturalism’s extreme emphasis on the individual and its disintegrative consequence. Some critics claim that an emphasis favoring the individual pushes ethnic groups into separate, geographically divided “cultural boxes” in which the native tongue is preserved and cultural purity of the homeland is maintained; hence, they practice monoculturalism by living in self-contained areas and are not integrated into Canadian society at all (Gwyn, 1995; Bissoondath, 1994). Precisely because multiculturalism celebrates the cultural origins of ethnic groups, they are encouraged to prolong a static and folkloric cultural identity that is a frozen fragment of the culture of their homeland. Not only is a static cultural identity easily subjected to stereotypes, it also widens the cultural gap among different ethnic groups—making integration more unlikely (McAndrew, Helly, Tessier, & Young, 2008). By prolonging cultural origins, ethnic groups can have dual loyalties, because this prolongment entails importing values, loyalties, and feuds from the homeland (Bissoondath, 1995; Granatstein, 1998). Others warn that because multiculturalism assumes that there is no dominant culture in

*Frank Weng is a third-year student at the University of Toronto, St. George Campus. He specializes in political science and is pursuing a minor in history.
Canadian society and because the government actively encourages the use of other languages to display cultural diversity, the adoption of several official languages presents a danger (Rocher, 1984).

However, the Canadian government has addressed many of these criticisms. For instance, the points system in the immigration application process is designed to filter out applicants who lack sufficient knowledge of the official languages. The points system is used to select immigrants and considers their education, language, and work experience such that a standard is set to prevent cultural isolation; hence, those who demonstrate insufficient language skills are eliminated from the process. But because the system is not applicable to the family members of the immigrant, the members may avoid learning the languages and avoid integration.

By cutting oneself off from society, one is denied participation. In fact, one is required to speak an official language for citizenship, for school, and for professional accreditation. Typically, immigrants expect to be integrated because they voluntarily leave their own culture (Kymlicka, 1998). Indeed, a survey reveals that 82 percent of immigrants claimed to be capable of conversing in an official language upon arrival in 2000 (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010).

In terms of dual loyalties, an often-cited example is the Sri Lankan Tamil population in Toronto (Nurse & Blake, 2009). Ninety percent of the Canadian Tamil population is in Toronto. A majority of them arrived as refugees in the 80s due to civil war, with little fluency in English or knowledge of Western ways. Because the majority of them escaped as a direct consequence of their defeat in their civil war, they carried a strong sense of nationalism for Tamil autonomy. This sense is increased by multiculturalism’s emphasis on demonstrating cultural pride. Hence, their communities have supported various organizations dedicated to supporting the war effort in Sri Lanka. Therefore, they show dual loyalties by honoring multiculturalism and supporting their homeland.

However, the first generation is the only one that shows significant dual loyalties. A survey shows that 75 percent of immigrants that arrived in the 90s “were in contact with family in their countries of origin at least once a month;” the percentage dropped to 18 percent for the second-generation immigrants who maintained a similar level of contact (Statistics Canada, 2003). This suggests that there is a generational phenomenon whereby later generations reduce their level of homeland contact. It is natural that later generations who stay in Canada and are less attached to their homeland have less loyalty to it. Thus, loyalty to one’s land of ethnic origin decreases as lineage continues even if multiculturalism is honored.

A counter argument is that second-generation immigrants have not always felt a sense of belonging in Canada regardless of their lack of loyalty to their homeland. For instance, when asked about the perception of acceptance, the percentage of first-generation White immigrants who claim to feel accepted was the highest and West Indians and Chinese the lowest (Breton, 2005). However, for the second generation, the percentage decreases by six percent for the former group and around 30 percent for the latter two groups (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). This is because as Canadian-born citizens, the second generation expects a higher degree of economic opportunity and social acceptance, which they feel is unmet. Indeed, it is this generation that does not shy away from radical expressions of alienation and are responsible for London bombings and Paris riots (Gregg, 2006).

Yet Canada has not seen radical expressions like those in Europe. This is precisely because Canada has constitutionally embedded the notion and taught the idea that multiculturalism is a source of pride. In fact, 82 percent of Canadians agree (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010). Multiculturalism has encouraged interaction among individuals of
various ethnic backgrounds by providing a locus for mutual identification. In countries where multiculturalism is not embedded in and taught by schools, intolerance and violence are more likely to occur (Banting & Kymlicka, 2010). Not only does this disprove the notion of “mosaic madness,” whereby—due to a lack of a single Canadian vision—Canada becomes a “mult-everything” society, it shows that multiculturalism is a vision that unites Canadians (Bibby, 1990). By uniting Canadians who accept diversity as a societal norm, the chances for radical expressions due to ethnic alienation are diminished.

Another reason for the lack of radical expression is that the policy has increased its funding for ethnic coalition organizations. In 2001, over 65 percent of funds dedicated to multicultural programs were allocated to organizations that are coalitions of ethnocultural origins, whereas organizations that represented one specific ethnic community received 10 percent—a drastic decrease from the past (McAndrew, 2005). Because coalitions allow interactions among cultures, folkloric notions are dissolved and old ethnic feuds are eased. Furthermore, because organizations that promote ethnic homogeneity receive fewer funds, the platform for organized ethnic expression is reduced and progress toward integrative cultural development is made.

A lack of radical expression from alienated ethnic groups does not mean societal barriers do not exist. This is especially true for visible ethnic minorities. Economically, for example, while the poverty rate for British Canadians is 11.8 percent, it is 18 percent higher for West Asians. This can be attributed to uneven income levels. While Whites’ incomes are $1,895 more than the local average, the incomes of visible minorities are $7,686 less than the local average (Reitz & Banerjee, 2007). Hence, while Germans and Ukrainians show high degrees of economic incorporation, Chinese and Indians do not (Breton, 2005). Evidently, White ethnic groups tend to experience fewer economic barriers.

But because existing policy focuses on raising awareness of racism, it is unclear whether the policy has had a substantial effect in bridging economic gaps. From 1991 to 2001, there has been an increase in the allocation of funds (from 9.6 percent to 29.1 percent) to initiatives that combat racism. The amount for the development of skills for economic integration has been slashed by 2.4 percent (McAndrew, Helly, Tessier, & Young, 2008). The rationale for the cut is to raise awareness of discrimination so that private businesses are mindful of it, but it does not guarantee a bridging of the economic gaps among ethnic groups, nor does it show promise in reducing the resentment of second-generation immigrants.

Although allocating funds may not be effective, the constitution does provide the capacity for governments to address issues resulting from multiculturalism. Enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedom is section 27, which notes that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians” (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982). In addition, each province has its own variation of multicultural laws that adjust to provincial needs. For instance, British Columbia’s Multiculturalism Act requires the government to “carry on [government programs] in a manner that is sensitive to the multicultural reality of BC” (Multiculturalism Act, 1996). Hence, the federal and provincial governments have the capacity to take action according to their respective needs.

Indeed, Quebec has taken advantage of that capacity and has rejected multiculturalism (Winter, 2010). In 2002, the ruling of the Supreme Court that allowed kirpans, a ceremonial dagger worn by Sikhs, to be carried into schools was seen as an imposition of the federal multicultural policy; hence, interculturalism was proposed. In theory, interculturalism runs
contrary to the laissez-faire liberal approach of multiculturalism; instead, the government is minimally active in promoting integration other than by achieving equality in economic opportunities. Although this is yet to reach fruition as noted above, the liberal approach of multiculturalism was unacceptable for Quebec due to its need to protect its minority status. Hence, interculturalism proposes that the government actively “reconcile ethno-cultural diversity with the continuity of the French-speaking core” (Bouchard & Taylor, 2008).

Interculturalism is a unique alternative to the federal policy, but it does not offer a solution for addressing economic gaps. It is unique because it is widely supported for the way it addressed Quebec’s dominant culture. Rather than celebrating differences and a lack of a single culture, it assumes that there is a basic level of cultural convergence—such as speaking French—that lies between a “melting pot” and a “mosaic.” Also, it reasonably accommodates respective cultures by removing religious symbols from civil space. For instance, rather than allowing the turban to be worn in courts, it prevents every group from wearing any religious clothing in courts. This reassures equality in religious representation. Most importantly, however, interculturalism echoes concerns about discrimination in the labor market for visible minorities in Quebec but does not provide a solution for bridging the gap between ethnic minorities. Hence, although it demonstrates the capacity for Quebec to adhere to its needs, economic barriers that alienate second-generation ethnic groups are similarly neglected by interculturalism.

In conclusion, although economic barriers that alienate second-generation, visible ethnic minorities are unaddressed, the multicultural policy of the federal government has been an integrative force because a degree of mandatory integration is enforced. Whether through compelling immigrants to learn the official languages, promoting multicultural ideology to become a point of national pride, increasing funds for multiethnic groups, and allowing provinces the capacity to enforce their variations of multiculturalism, integration has been the pivotal objective. But I suggest that economic barriers continue to persist for visible minorities, and ultimately I seek to reveal the philosophical forces and criticisms of the policy in order to shed light on the discourse.

References


TOTALITARIANISM AND ISOLATION: UNDERSTANDING THE CLASH BETWEEN THE LEVIATHAN AND LIBERTY

By Joe Calder*
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill

There are few desires as natural to mankind as freedom. Yet, throughout history, men and women have bowed their heads to autocrats, tyrants, and dictators. Consider the Russian state, which for over 1,000 years ruled as a patently oppressive and totalitarian state. Even after their “democratic” revolution in 1991, Russia still exists as a state that is unresponsive to its people and is continually guilty of a laundry list of human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2012b). How can a regime so ignorant of the needs of its people continue to exist after years of abuse?

Perhaps the most fundamental basis of totalitarianism can be represented by the clash of two human desires: freedom and security. I argue that authoritarian rule is facilitated by both the individual isolation of citizens and the state’s isolation from the international community. On the internal level, cost-benefit analysis and prisoner’s dilemma-based game theory give insight into the individual’s decision to submit to oppressive state apparatuses. Furthermore, a pervasive sense of individual isolation makes revolt seem impossible to most citizens, thereby perpetuating oppressive regimes. Internationally, policy intended to isolate absolutist states (such as sanctions, embargoes, or general ill will) further bolsters the stability of totalitarian states.

The Allure of Totalitarian States

First let us look at why totalitarianism may be appealing to some citizens. In his magnum opus, Leviathan, Hobbes discusses one of the most potent reasons for absolutist rule: security. Hobbes explained that a totalitarian force (the Leviathan) was necessary to protect man from his baser instincts (Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2013). Fukuyama (2011) cites Hobbes in saying that man is most clearly motivated by the fear of violent death. From this he derives the fundamental right of nature, which is the liberty each man has to preserve his own life. Human nature also provides three causes of quarrel: competition, diffidence (fear), and glory; “The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.” The state of nature is thus characterized by “Warre … of every man against every man.”

Furthermore, “because any government would be better than a civil war… [and] all but absolute governments are systematically prone to dissolution into civil war, people ought to subject themselves to an absolute political authority” (Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2013). Hobbes’s philosophy centers on the logic that people must submit themselves to authoritarian rule because it better facilitates their own safety than other states. Essentially, it frees them from the “fear of

*Joe Calder is a student at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, where he is pursuing majors in economics and global studies.
violent death” (Fukuyama, 2011). Hobbes’s logic is sound, until we apply his theoretical framework to real authoritarian states.

Hobbes’s social contract (which holds that those who have subjected themselves to a ruler do so in exchange for a guarantee that the state will protect their remaining rights) comes directly into conflict with many contemporary and historical examples of totalitarian regimes (Lloyd & Sreedhar, 2013). So when an authoritarian regime begins to take those remaining rights away from individuals, the façade of totalitarian protection from civil war and other violence begins to come crashing down. I intend to examine why dictatorial regimes can remain standing even after they have violated the social contract.

**Internal Authoritarian Tactics**

Authoritarian regimes consolidate power through the active isolation of their own people (Soper, 1985). While this can mean that totalitarian regimes isolate their people from each other, it can also refer to isolation from information about the state. Soper (1985) writes that authoritarian regimes implement three main strategies in order to hold their power: secrecy, fear tactics, and systematic lying. I argue that these three policy choices actively damage civilian ability to interact with one another, thereby disrupting cost-benefit analysis and preventing the overthrow of authoritarian regimes.

**Secrecy.**

Soper’s (1985) first contention is that authoritarian regimes use secrecy in order to sustain the absolute state. As Soper (1985) puts it, distrust “develops because of the regime’s inherent distrust in man.” Furthermore, “secrecy is considered … valuable since it permits the regime to quickly formulate and implement a policy without … a broad consensus.” Here, we begin to sense the state isolating itself from the people. The further people are from the state apparatus, the harder it is for citizens to question its inner workings. When secrecy goes deeper than just the opaque nature of government and moves to shut down the media apparatuses of the people, dictators are further insulated from any sort of insurrection. Zakaria (2003) uses the historical contrast of Prussian and English press freedom to underscore this point:

> One has to consider the role of the press. In England, the free press served as an important voice of political dissent…. The first newspapers in Prussia, by contrast, were set up by Frederick the Great as organs of state propaganda.

> When secrecy of the state is ensured through a restrained or nonexistent freedom of the press, citizens of that nation are unable to fully participate in the cost-benefit model. Isolated from information, they cannot engage in the cost-benefit analysis that would drive them to revolt. This is because citizens cannot accurately determine the capabilities of the states and thus cannot assess the associated costs and benefits of revolution. For the totalitarian state, secrecy has dual benefits. First, it disenfranchises citizens from the information necessary to revolt; second, it allows the state to take decisive action without delay or political recourse—freeing the state from the bargaining model inherent to political survival.
Fear tactics.

Soper’s second strategy of authoritarianism focuses on fear tactics. Soper (1985) acknowledges that the secret police of absolute regimes is not only institutionalized, but is “an organization that demands respect, if for no other reason than the legitimate fear it inspires in the subject peoples.” Terror tactics are efficient because they isolate individuals on a person-to-person level. On a human level, authoritarian police states are instruments of individual paranoia. Sharp (2003) argues that one of the primary reasons dictators maintain power is because they are able to isolate. Examples of this kind of atmosphere are present in Robespierre’s Reign of Terror and the police state erected by the Bolshevik Party in Soviet Russia. In such states, Sharp’s (2003) evaluation of oppressed peoples as “weak, lack[ing] self-confidence … incapable of resistance … [and] too frightened to share their hatred of the dictatorship and their hunger for democracy with family or friends” is certainly accurate. In such a situation, states are able to isolate people from one another and render resistance almost impossible. When individuals have a genuine fear of both the people around them and the state itself, interpersonal trust is almost nonexistent. When that bond of trust is broken, they are not able to communicate plans against the regime.

In history, the most notorious example of fear culture can be seen in Hitler’s Germany. Hitler’s secret police created and maintained a climate of fear among the German people (Shirer, 1990). Since the German people were left relatively unaware of who belonged to the Reich and who was in support of the opposition, they kept quiet so as to not attract the attention of the regime. This secured Hitler’s rule by minimalizing domestic security issues and making revolt nearly impossible. This sort of strategy is seen most vividly in the Reich’s approach to Poland; as Shirer (1990) puts it, “[Hans] Frank’s [the Governor-General of Poland] job, besides squeezing food and supplies…out of Poland, was to liquidate the intelligentsia. The Nazis had a beautiful code name for this operation: ‘Extraordinary Pacification Action.’” The isolation becomes clear when the primary goal of Polish occupation was to make the Poles (to use Hans Frank’s terminology) “slaves of the German Reich.” The secret police gave Hitler unparalleled maneuverability in both his ability to enforce a climate of fear in Poland (as well as Germany) and his ability to skirt responsibility for its actions. Since the secret police was (by default) secret and an apparatus of the Nazi party rather than the German state, Hitler could claim that he never sanctioned any SS action. Therefore, Hitler’s secret police, like any secret police, granted him the ability to create absolute terror with none of the repercussions.

As a general rule, a secret police allows for a condition of servitude to exist because it constructs a culture of fear. That is, it creates a situation in which people have no idea who supports the regime and who opposes its rule. As a result, people rarely communicate their desires for freedom beyond their most trusted accomplices. Once again, the cost-benefit model is disrupted. Since people are so isolated from one another, a new cost-benefit model is established. Now, people need to first evaluate the costs and benefits of revealing their feelings to friends and family before ever analyzing the costs and benefits of supporting or opposing the regime. Here, the prisoner’s dilemma is appropriate. While all citizens would likely benefit from the action of overthrowing the government (the citizen’s Pareto optimality), because they do not have knowledge of who they can and cannot trust, the safest option is to trust no one, and thereby accept the status quo (the citizen’s Nash equilibrium). By adding another step to the revolutionary process, regimes safeguard themselves against overthrow.
Soper’s (1985) final argument holds that the last component of an authoritarian regime is “systematic lying.” Soper (1985) argues that a systematic framework of lies establishes a culture in which no one knows anything for certain about the government. In a situation where information is scarce and uncertain, people are unlikely to deviate from the status quo, as they cannot make a solid argument for an alternative.

Take for example the modern day Chinese state. Despite the fact that China has a history of cracking down on human rights, migrants, and democracy activists, the government maintains firm control over state functions (Human Rights Watch, 2012a). This is because, by and large, the Chinese government intentionally misleads its people. The power of Chinese propaganda can be observed in both the Zhejiang train crash and the Sichuan earthquake. In both events, the Chinese government conducted cover-ups (Branigan, 2011; Coonan, 2009) to convince the Chinese people of state control. As the people have little idea of the full nature of the Chinese government’s deception, they are content with its existence. So long as the people are given positive propaganda, they have no reason to revolt, for (as far as Chinese citizens can tell) the state benefits them more so than not. Essentially, the state has isolated them from the facts, and as a result, the people cannot strike back at the Chinese government. Given the opaque nature of China’s public economic disclosures, as far as the average Chinese citizen can tell, the Chinese economy continues to grow and unemployment remains stable (Roberts, 2013).

Despite the abuses of the state, China can claim to offer tangible benefits to its people. When contrary evidence is scarce and can be deemed “unreliable,” the government can point to (or at least lie about) a set of benefits that the state provides to the average Chinese citizen. Ultimately, the way in which the Chinese government controls information means the citizen will have no evidence to indicate otherwise. As a result, their cost-benefit analysis will weigh in the favor of the Chinese government. Without all the facts, the average Chinese citizen faces a skewed cost-benefit model wherein costs cannot be properly evaluated. Stuck in a round of a prisoner’s dilemma game, the Chinese people (or on a broader level, oppressed people in general) are in a state of asymmetric information, which makes sticking with the status quo their dominant strategy. Without more information about the future a post-Communist Party China might bring, the people will not all act together to bring the state down. Instead, they will act individually and choose to “enjoy” the “benefits” the state claims to provide. On a more theoretical level, so long as the state can mislead the people and isolate them from information, it can continue to exist as a state—for the people cannot make an accurate cost-benefit analysis.

International Isolation

Bremmer (2006) opens The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall with an explanation of American-North Korean foreign policy: “If North Korea submits to the complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear program, Washington will end North Korea’s [international] isolation.” Essentially, the end goal of American policy towards North Korea is North Korean submission to American will. “Isolation” refers to a number of policies that the United States pursues. Specific to North Korea, isolation includes, but is not limited to, an embargo on North Korean goods as well as a ban on travelling to North Korea (Office of Foreign Asset Control [OFAC], 2011). While all of these policies have the same final
hope in mind (North Korean disarmament), Bremmer’s (2006) *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall* explains why we are barking up the wrong tree.

**The J-Curve and International Isolation**

Bremmer’s (2006) “J curve” is a simple enough concept; it is just a graph. The x-axis represents openness and the y-axis represents stability. To form the graph, “each nation whose level of stability and openness we want to measure appears as a data point on the graph. These data points, taken together, produce a J shape” (Bremmer, 2006). The authoritarian regimes, which are located on the left side of the graph, are both very closed and modestly stable. The mature democracies on the right side of the graph are very open and very stable. At the bottom of the graph are the transitioning regimes, which are modestly open and not stable at all. By sheer nature, authoritarian regimes are more stable than states undergoing democratic transition. Noting this issue, Bremmer (2006) asks a crucial question: “If consolidated authoritarian regimes tend to be more stable than democracies in transition, and if stability is critical to averting disaster in today’s world, why not drop the whole question of reform and bolster those closed authoritarian regimes?”

While Bremmer (2006) goes on to explain the implications of such a policy decision, it is clear that the international community has displayed some degree of preference for stable authoritarian rule rather than unstable transition. Even if the international community does not intend to support totalitarian regimes, its policies do just that. Authoritarian regimes thrive in international isolation. In a similar fashion to internal isolation, external isolation sustains authoritarian states because it deprives citizens living in those states of the information necessary to revolt. Bremmer (2006) writes:

> if half the people of North Korea saw twenty minutes of CNN, they would realize how egregiously their government lies to them about life beyond the walls…. The slightest improvement in the ability of a country’s citizens to communicate with one another … can likewise undermine the state’s monopoly on information.

Isolation from the international community in the form of embargoes and a general blacklisting of totalitarian states only aggravates the cost-benefit and prisoner’s dilemma problems experienced by citizens in an authoritarian state. When isolation is so crucial to the facilitation of authoritarian states, international players use the strategy that best plays into the totalitarian’s hand.

**Implications and Policy Alternatives**

Imagine what North Korea might be like if it was opened to international commerce; China, transformed into a transparent state; Syria, freed from fear. All of these states have been, for a time, exposed to physical, international, and informational isolation. International policy has been directly contradictory to the goals of both establishing open states in the place of closed governments like China, Syria, and North Korea and ensuring long-term global stability.

On an international level, this imbalance has enormous and terrifying implications for global security. In 1968, Organski penned his theory of power transition for his textbook, *World Politics*. It holds that before any great reordering of the world, there is a rising and falling power.
During the time period that the rising power begins to cross the economic or military threshold of the falling power, the global community is left in a precarious position. If the rising power is satisfied with the international climate it inherits, it will opt for a more peaceful takeover of the global community. If the rising power is not satisfied, its takeover will be violent (Organski, 1968). While most authoritarian states could not make a strong case that they are the “rising power,” the underlying theory of international satisfaction/dissatisfaction still holds true. If a state is profiting from the international community, they are likely to strive for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Furthermore, as both internal and external isolation serve to strengthen an authoritarian regime, it is essentially freed from the processes of political survival and thereby experiences a global bargaining model that lowers the costs of war. This is because of both the nature of the authoritarian state and the nature of internal isolation. Since the authoritarian state renders people powerless over their government, it does not need to worry about the general population ever knowing about or complying with the decision to go to war. Further isolation constructed by the state only amplifies this powerlessness and eliminates the government’s fear for its own survival. These two factors combined allow states to operate far more freely than they otherwise would and allow states to disregard the concerns of citizens regarding war.

So what policies should the global community take when squaring off against authoritarian rule? Clearly the status quo is not the answer we are looking for. In fact, we may want to consider a complete about-face when it comes to international policy towards totalitarian states. Instead of isolating countries that disagree with Western values, we should work to incorporate them into the global system. Organski’s (1968) idea that states that enjoy the global system often maintain peace holds value as a guiding principle of “counter-totalitarianism” in the future. Furthermore, greater interaction in the global community helps alleviate both external and internal isolation in totalitarian states. Bremmer (2006) writes: “If text messaging had been as readily available in the spring of 1989, the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square might well have ended differently.” By developing global infrastructure and including totalitarian states as international players instead of pariahs, the imbalance of the bargaining model might also be resolved. If citizens in those countries are given cell phones, computers, internet access, and more, they reset their ability to communicate with others in a more anonymous, and thereby safer, realm. If states are given more powerful roles in international organizations as opposed to being left by the wayside, they might be more satisfied with the international system and as a result more easily placated.

Criticism

As with any set of theories relating to international affairs, both the J curve and cost-benefit-based analysis have their respective limitations. The primary concern with cost-benefit analysis is the weight such a theory places on human rationality and self-interest as a driver of change. As Arkes and Ayton (1999) write, economic actions such as the sunk cost effect—making an economic decision and failing to cash in on it (such as buying tickets to a play and then never actually going)—reflect that humans are not always as rational as we would like to think. In response, it is important to realize that while human rationality may be up for debate in individual situations, it is relatively undeniable that in situations of life or death (such as the choice to revolt against an oppressive state), humans will rarely act against their best interest. As the J curve is a relatively new theory, it has received significantly less critical review than prisoner’s dilemma-based game theory or cost-benefit analysis. In fact, as the Telegraph’s
review of Bremmer’s (2006) work indicates, “some of America’s most heavyweight pundits—Francis Fukuyama, Strobe Talbott, Daniel Burnstein—have warmly endorsed the book” (Thompson, 2006). Yet, not all of the criticism has been favorable. Bill Emmott argues that the curve implies a “smooth and even inevitable path that countries follow from dictatorship to democracy” and overstates a J-shaped trend line that is less smooth than Bremmer makes it appear (Emmott, 2006). While this concern is certainly valid, it deals with more cosmetic details of the theory rather than with the ideas that underlie the theory itself.

**Conclusion**

As a paradigm of governance, totalitarian rule represents the clash of two natural human tendencies: a human fear of violent death (as well documented by Thomas Hobbes) and a desire for personal freedom. While totalitarian rule makes logical sense when states pledge to protect the lives and rights of their citizens, once a totalitarian state restricts the rights of those citizens, it has violated its founding social contract. I argue that the oppressive totalitarian states are able to stand because of their ability to enforce human isolation. The causes of this isolation are both internal and external. While totalitarian states enforce internal isolation, the global community encourages isolation on an external, international level. Therefore, in order to encourage isolated, authoritarian states to adopt a more democratic form of government, states should consider encouraging greater integration in the international community. Through greater integration, the international community may assure long-standing peace as well as long-term stability in these states.

**References**


ADDRESSING THE USE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS A STRATEGIC WEAPON OF WAR

By Joshua A. Jones*
American Military University

Sexual violence has been employed as a strategic weapon of war for at least as long as historians have been documenting conflicts. Indeed, members of nearly every standing army in history have participated in some form of rape warfare (Vikman, 2005). Consequently, the international community has implemented various forms of legislation which criminalize the deliberate targeting of civilians during armed conflict (Bergoffen, 2006; Haddad, 2011). Nonetheless, rape remains one of the most underreported and inadequately prosecuted of all war crimes (Falcon, 2001). Certainly, a lack of discipline exhibited by inexperienced and nonprofessional warriors in tribal conflicts can explain a fraction of these occurrences. However, it would be disingenuous to assign such justifications to those instances which were deliberately calculated by the professional warfighters and commanders of comparably advanced armies (Valenius, 2004). Moreover, the sheer prevalence of its use precludes the validity of the “bad apple” argument, wherein a deviant minority becomes the scapegoat which suffers for the sins of an apathetic organization (Whitmer, 2006). Indeed, sexual deprivation and base desire cannot explain why even educated military strategists would advocate the use of sexual violence in warfare—unless, of course, they regard it as an invaluable weapon which strategically targets the psychological well-being and social cohesion of civilian populations as well as the morale of enemy units (Clifford, 2008).

In order to address the resultant social problems associated with sexual violence in conflict, it is necessary to understand the motivations and intent of groups that have sanctioned its use. Those who have used rape as a weapon perceive it to be an effective, complementary method to achieve their goals and are drawn to its symbolic message of dominance (Baaz & Stern, 2009). Accordingly, those who wish to remedy its negative consequences and reduce future occurrences must understand why it works in the first place (Mukamana & Brysiewicz, 2008). Most importantly, careful study of the underlying justifications for its use may reveal avenues by which these motivations can be arrested or removed (Dwyer, 2009). If such inclinations cannot be combated, viable deterrence measures may be implemented which will raise the cost to the perpetrators of rape warfare beyond its potential benefit to their cause (Castillo, 2007). Recent landmark rulings represent small steps toward resolution via the adjudication of wartime rapists. Regardless, victims’ advocates remain largely unimpressed; many have become even more vocal in their demands for justice (Bergoffen, 2006; Hargreaves, 2001). Therefore, the need for a victim-focused humanitarian response is axiomatic. Even when copiously applied, the law alone cannot cure the social plights which disproportionately affect women and children in the wake of wartime atrocity (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003).

---

* Joshua A. Jones is a senior criminal justice major at American Military University and intends to pursue graduate studies in sociology. His research interests include critical criminology, state crime, and obedience to authority.
The History and State of Rape Warfare

The prevalence of sexual violence in warfare is well documented and permeates world history. According to Gottschall (2004), its use was illustrated in ancient texts such as Homer’s *Iliad* and the Old Testament of the Bible (e.g., Zechariah 14:2). In the 13th century, Genghis Khan established specific policies which encouraged the use of rape warfare as he expanded his empire. Khan infamously proclaimed that one of the greatest pleasures in life was to ravage the daughters and wives of one’s enemies (Clifford, 2008). Rape was later employed as a strategic weapon by members of both the Allied and Axis armies during World War II as a means to terrorize civilian populations and demoralize their respective enemies (Epp, 1997; Ferraro, 2008). The most atrocious example within this era was the infamous Japanese campaign, which became known as the “Rape of Nanking.” After killing about half of the city’s approximated 600,000 residents, Imperial Japanese Army soldiers gang-raped between 20,000 and 80,000 Chinese women and girls of various ages (Sedgwick, 2009). Fathers were forced to rape their daughters and sons their mothers, generally under threat of death, while other family members watched (Zimbardo, 2007). Ostensibly, this was a calculated employment of psychological warfare aimed at reducing the cohesion of family units and the community as a whole so that Japanese authority would not be resisted (MacDonald, 2005; Sedgwick, 2009).

More recently, sexual violence has become a component of civil warfare in developing nations such as Afghanistan and Guatemala as well as in the state-sponsored genocide—which has resulted in a purported 400,000 deaths—in the Darfur region of Sudan (Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, & Parker, 2005). Though rape warfare has endured into the modern era, sexual violence is still perceived by many to be an inherent byproduct of war itself, perpetuated by such factors as the sexual deprivation of mobilized troops, a lack of military discipline, and the biological drive to produce offspring (Clifford, 2008; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000; Vandermassen, 2011). This “acceptance” of the ubiquitousness of rape warfare only perpetuates its use and lessens the likelihood that perpetrators will face justice for their transgressions. Moreover, such callous attitudes are void of empirical evidence and cannot explain the rampant and coordinated use of sexual violence (Buss, 2009; Clifford, 2008). Rape warfare is as old as written human history, having been employed by uneducated tribesman and military tacticians alike (Clifford, 2008; Gottschall, 2004). However, advancements in military technology seem to have replaced or improved upon virtually every aspect of armed conflict, save for two of humankind’s baser desires: sex and violence.

The Efficacy of Sexual Violence as a Weapon

Sexual violence is a common thread in modern conflicts and genocidal operations in the developing nations (Clifford, 2008). Two contemporary examples of state-sponsored, coordinated use of rape warfare were perpetrated against “out groups” in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 and in Rwanda in the spring of 1994 (Haddad, 2011; Staub, 1999; Weitsman, 2008). In addition to being a psychological weapon, rape warfare was used in these cases with the deliberate intention of significantly diminishing particular ethnic populations. In both instances, governmental approval offered a license for sadistic innovation against the targeted populations (Jamieson, 1999). Such was the nature of its employment during a tribal conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi communities of Rwanda. Amid an estimated 800,000 to one million
deaths—roughly three-quarters of the entire Tutsi population—was eradicated (Leitenberg, 1994; Mukamana & Brysiewicz, 2008).

This state-sponsored genocide operation armed the Hutu populations and encouraged them to use rape as a tactic of terror and spiritual annihilation. One Hutu leader, Mayor Silvester Cacumbibi, is rumored to have told one of his victims, “We won’t waste bullets on you; we will rape you and that will be worse for you” (Zimbardo, 2007). One of the most significant occurrences of mass rape and murder of a Tutsi population during this conflict was orchestrated by Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a former social worker, minister, and lecturer on female empowerment who was herself a Tutsi (Hogg, 2010). Nyiramasuhuko created a ruse wherein she convinced the Tutsi people within the village of Butare to gather for a humanitarian aid drop, whereupon they were cut down by automatic weapons, grenades, and machetes. She ordered the Hutu aggressors to rape all of the women before killing them (Durkham & O’Byrne, 2010; Zimbardo, 2007). When the men became fatigued, she provided gasoline from her own vehicle so that the remaining women could be burned to death. One young Tutsi woman, Rose, was raped by Nyiramasuhuko’s son who had received “permission” from his mother. After being forced to watch the rape of her own mother and the murders of several of her relatives, Rose was allowed to live so that she could “deliver a progress report” as a witness to the massacre (Zimbardo, 2007).

Incidents such as this were not uncommon during the Rwandan tribal conflict. Researchers estimate that approximately 350,000 Tutsi women and girls were raped within this three-month period (Bijleveld, Morssinkhof, & Smeulers, 2009). Military strategists may regard this activity as a waste of valuable resources and manpower. Moreover, troops would be potentially exposing themselves to sexually transmitted infections while commanders run the risk of losing control of their men, making their combat units ineffective (Donovan, 2002; Meini, 2008). However, the Hutu leaders and sponsoring government understood the power of the message. To them, it was not counterproductive to kill women immediately after they were raped, so long as a select few—women like Rose—lived to tell the story. Therefore, rape warfare exemplifies intimidation in its most malevolent form (Parfitt, 2004).

The efficacy of rape warfare has been substantiated through its implementation as a weapon by which warring factions have facilitated their goals (Clifford, 2008). However, the same could be said of concentration camps and the mass exterminations organized by the Nazi Party during the World War II. One notable difference, though, is that many of the perpetrators of the Holocaust were adjudicated at the Nuremberg trials (Hoffman, 1999). In contrast, those who have sanctioned and committed rape warfare have historically evaded justice (Falcon, 2001). For example, following a 36-year civil war in Guatemala, rape victims and their families maintained that absolute blame rested upon the state-sponsored soldiers who had perpetuated the barbarity. Nonetheless, they believed that their only available recourse was through legitimate state agents, whose power rivaled or superseded that of the offenders. Paradoxically, their demands for justice could only be heard by members of the same government that had initially mobilized the soldier-rapists (Hastings, 2002; Ross, 2004).

Similarly, sexual violence amid armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been labeled by the United Nations (UN) as a strategic weapon of war and a gross violation of human rights. Regardless, and in spite of the Goma peace agreement (which promised to end the region’s warfare), the atrocities persisted unabated. Both state and non-state armed groups have been identified as perpetrators of rape warfare by the UN and declared to be in violation of various international laws, including the Nuremberg Code. Nonetheless, the study of mass rape
during armed conflict is largely done retrospectively, with significant intervention rarely taking place while it is occurring (Maedl, 2011). These contemporary examples demonstrate that the perpetrators of rape warfare are largely immune from judicial proceedings. Indeed, even when an international body as powerful as the UN condemns their actions, offenders can be reasonably certain that they will never answer for their transgressions, which only buttresses their perceived entitlement to the “spoils” of war (Falcon, 2001; Mukamana & Brysiewicz, 2008). In the absence of cogent deterrence measures, rape warfare has become an omnipresent consequence of armed conflict (Clifford, 2008).

**Injustice and underreporting.**

Among many populations, rape is the most underreported of all violent crimes, even during peacetime (Clay-Warner & McMahon-Howard, 2009; Falcon, 2001). Many rapes are not reported due to the victims’ lack of understanding of what legally constitutes a sexual assault. Ignorance of the law thus breeds trepidation. Moreover, survivors often perceive that they will be somehow further victimized by law enforcement personnel or the judicial system (Clay-Warner & McMahon-Howard, 2009). This preconception has been reinforced by numerous historical examples and will require significant action to remedy. Additionally, victims often feel embarrassed and wish to keep the incidents private, as they question their own culpability (Clay-Warner & McMahon-Howard, 2009; Holmes & Holmes, 2009). In roughly 10 percent of cases, this embarrassment eventually manifests as shame, largely due to fear of public scrutiny and cultural ideologies which tend to at least partially blame the victim for the assault (Weiss, 2010). Victims must first understand that they have suffered from a crime that is punishable by law and that the perpetrators bear the full burden of guilt. More importantly, they must have access to justice (Allen, 2007). Ergo, an effective counterstrategy must incorporate the application of human rights law and humanitarian advocacy.

**Framework of international law.**

The practice of rape warfare is diametrically opposed to the principles conveyed in customary international law. According to Kauzlarich & Kramer (1998), the first of these has been upheld since the 1907 Hague Conventions, in that both combatants and noncombatants are protected from unnecessary and aggravated suffering. Secondly, distinction must always be made between combatants and civilians. Subsequently, the 1948 Genocide Convention prohibited the conspiracy, attempt, complicity, incitement, and/or actual execution of genocide or “ethnic cleansing.” Moreover, the 1949 Geneva Conventions (I-IV) specifically condemned violence directed against and mutilation of life or person as well as the cruel treatment and torture of combatants and civilians. Perhaps even more importantly, the Nuremberg Charter explicitly demonized crimes against humanity, such as inhumane acts committed against civilians, regardless of whether or not the violation is considered a crime according to the law of the nation wherein it was perpetrated. Such humanitarian principles were intentionally applied to armed conflicts as expressed in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 244 (XXIII) of 1965. Accordingly, there is a significant legal framework within which to prosecute war criminals who have condoned or practiced rape warfare. However, history has shown that the deficiency lies in enforcement (Clifford, 2008). The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been repeatedly criticized by feminist scholars as being virtually impotent in the prosecution of rape warfare.
perpetrators. Only recently has the ICC begun to investigate and indict, though most cases rarely evolve beyond the investigation phase (Halley, 2008). Fortunately, recent cases have demonstrated an improving trend in prosecution (Haddad, 2011; Malone, 2008).

The sheer heinousness of violent sex crime is a sufficient catalyst to conjure public demand for the persecution of offenders from victims, advocates, and concerned citizens (Winnick, 2008). Provided there is sufficient pressure, this inevitably translates into political necessity for those who wish to maintain their station (Barker, 2007). For example, though sex offenders comprised an insignificant portion of overall arrests in the United States, their rate of incarceration has increased some 15 percent since 1980—higher than the rate for any other contemporary violent crime. Public demand is almost entirely responsible for this trend, and so can it be in the case of rape warfare (Holmes & Holmes, 2009).

Relevant international human rights and criminal laws are already in place (Kauzlarich & Kramer, 1998). However, the need for adequate awareness, education, and access remains. A victim who understands that he or she has suffered a sexual assault as defined under international law is comparably more likely to report the crime (Allen, 2007; Spohn & Horney, 1996). However, this will only happen if policy makers and legislators can convey through judicious action that these laws are taken seriously and properly enforced.

The Hague hosted the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, which specifically investigated the use of rape and sexual slavery as a means of ethnic cleansing during the 1992 to 1995 Bosnian war (Thornberry, 1996). Therein, in accordance with the aforementioned customary principles, a judge sentenced three soldier-rapists to a combined term of 60 years for what he regarded as acts of utter disrespect for the victims’ dignity and violations of fundamental human rights (Hargreaves, 2001). This demonstrates that crimes against humanity, such as rape warfare, transcend local and even national jurisdictions. Moreover, they are no longer regarded as mere violations of international war rules. Rather, they are to be individually assessed as crimes under human rights law (Askin, 1999; Haddad, 2011). Rulings such as this offer hope to the countless survivors who have suffered sexual assaults amid the turmoil of armed conflict. However, many feminists and victims’ advocates condemned the Yugoslav decision as being far too lenient (Hargreaves, 2001). In reality, the recent International Criminal Tribunal rulings have produced equitable sentences under notoriously vague and misleading international humanitarian laws (Askin, 1999). What these advocates are truly expressing is discontent with the resultant “justice” brought forth by the enforcement of these codes. Indeed, a victim remains victimized whether or not his or her attacker is adjudicated. They are asking for something more.

The Humanitarian Approach

The international community must continue to enforce human rights law lest its authority be undermined. This is the first step toward implementing deterrence measures which may prevent future abuses (Askin, 1999; Haddad, 2011). As it is virtually impossible to avert all instances of rape warfare, abuses must be immediately recognized when they occur. Unlike the judicial process, such a strategy focuses on victims and potential victims rather than solely on perpetrators (Shanks & Schull, 2000). It is unlikely that any powerful nation or coalition will readily intervene in a tribal conflict in the absence of economic or strategic interests. Therefore, combating the social consequences of rape warfare on the ground remains primarily within the realm of humanitarian agencies and their healthcare professionals (Bristol, 2006).
The cogent humanitarian response necessitates a comprehensive intervention protocol. The immediate physical effects of sexual assault must be treated medically. Beyond simple triage, this includes the administration of antibiotics, screening for sexually transmitted infections, and emergency contraception (Shanks & Schull, 2000). Moreover, psychological support and counseling should be accessible to victims, since emotional distress often manifests in the aftermath of sexual assault. Medical first responders should issue referrals for these services (Koss, 1993). This is especially important given that the two-year period following the attack is often the most traumatic time for victims (Holmes & Holmes, 2009). It is paramount that proper documentation be maintained and that avenues for reporting are accessible—not just in the immediate aftermath, but in the event that a victim may decide to report at a later date. Accordingly, rape kits are an effective method by which physical evidence can be gathered and preserved. In combination with victim and eyewitness statements, a sufficient amount of evidence may be collected in order to facilitate criminal charges (Feldberg, 1997; Johnson, Peterson, Sommers, & Baskin, 2012). The appropriate humanitarian response thereby fulfills the basic requirements needed to pursue criminal prosecution.

Conclusion

Beyond the immediate physical effects, victims of rape experience intense emotional and psychological suffering long after the commission of the crime, often feeling ashamed, humiliated, and dehumanized. These intangible byproducts of sexual victimization impede the recovery process while simultaneously deterring victims from reporting (Allen, 2007; Koss, 1993). In addition to being rendered helpless during the encounter, victims of sexual violence are often left with no available avenues by which to bring their aggressors to justice (Hastings, 2002). Consequently, rape remains one of the most underreported and subsequently underprosecuted war crimes. The decision not to report in such instances may be due to a lack of accessibility rather than a conscious choice (Falcon, 2001; Weiss, 2010). Indeed, a “fortunate” few may live to recount their stories to psychologists, criminologists, and other scholars so that their narratives may be added to the compendium of existing research. However, it remains unlikely that they or their attackers will ever see the inside of a courtroom, as these crimes have historically been unaddressed in any meaningful way by the international community. The oft-repeated trend in most cases is that the innocent suffer while the trespasses of the guilty go unpunished (Clifford, 2008; Halley, 2008). These dire circumstances necessitate the simultaneous application of international law and humanitarian aid. Through these measures, a preponderance of evidence and vocal advocacy will provide impetus for the movement that will bring rape warfare forever out of the shadows, where it can no longer be ignored.

References


