Self-constitution and its paradoxes
Some claims about self-constitution and its paradox:
1. There is a paradox on any view of selfhood
Endorsement of commitments: how can the faculty that endorses be free enough from non-endorsed commitments to make its endorsement authoritative?
Recognition of some inclinations as reasons: how can reasons be distinguished from mere inclinations without there already existing some reasoned grounds for distinction?
Wholeheartedness: how can comprehensive devotion, a quantitative notion, amount to selfhood, a qualitative notion?
2. The paradox is not avoided by bringing other people or ‘external’ things into the process
Conversation: my friends gives me a good idea, so at least I didn’t have to come up with it myself; but how do I make the idea my own?
Model: how do I recognize some model as the best one to imitate, for if I already see that it is good, then I must already have the qualities it would encourage me to develop, in which case imitating would not help me, and if I have not yet developed those qualities, I would seem unable to see that it is good. (B. Mitchell, Morality: Religious and Secular, 148-9, 153-4, discusses the paradox in the context of taking Jesus as a model; but he does not resolve it.)
Model of aspiration: some models are worth imitating because of aspirations–for example, Socrates may aspire to divine wisdom, Nietzsche may aspire to artistic creativity; but then for us “imitating a model” does no more effective work than “aspiring to some norm.” (This is a form of the claim made by Nehamas, The Art of Living, that we are to imitate Socrates, Nietzsche, etc., only to the extent that we are to make ourselves different even from them.)
3. The paradox is treated as such because we do (seem to) mature to adulthood and autonomy
Not inevitable: some people seem not to mature very well or completely; others may be physiologically hindered.
Yet likely: many people feel such a (or any) degree of autonomy and authoritativeness in their judgments as to justify calling themselves (imperfectly) mature and self-constituted, especially in contrast to themselves when younger and activated more unthinkingly by impulse.
Not obviously conscious: indeed, we often do not think of self-constituting ourselves–whether in those terms or in other terms–especially not when we are young, or confident, or busy; and yet we presumably do, and maybe even despite ourselves aspire to do so.
But the ‘seeming’!: well, perhaps there are in fact changes in our thoughts, changes brought by spans of experience, overlaid reflections, adopted aspirations, new vocabulary; but a richer perspective on the world, and the proclivity to explain in with higher-level language, may not alone count as have coming (even partway) into selfhood.
4. The paradox suggests that we shall never obtain ideal selfhood
Incremental improvements: one resolution to the paradox is that we self-constitute through increasing consistency; but this is always imperfect because we have at any moment to leave one belief unquestioned, and thus at any moment at least one belief cannot be endorsed for being consistent; it is, after all, that with which the other beliefs may or may not be consistent.
Auditing authority: we make authoritative judgments with some faculty; but this faculty must go without authorization.
Some further questions:
Does the language of self-knowledge or self-love (epistemic and affective/evaluative) go further to resolving the paradox, or alleviating its bite, or presenting its charge, more effectively than other language?
Does Socratic questioning — Socrates’ unifying love of philosophy (where philosophy is the committed discussion group depicted in the Charmides, and what he calls, more simply and austerely, examining himself and others in the Apology) — have a peculiar power of resolution to this paradox?
What are the images of selfhood we take up that occasion a desire that self-constitution be possible?
Is it only in the Socratic/Platonic–Aristotelian–Kantian perspective that “becoming a person” (a metaphysical program?) is identical with “becoming good” (an ethical program?)?
In what respect might the key philosophical question for this tradition be: “What does it mean to make something one’s own?”
Does constituting yourself follow essentially the same lines as constituting someone you love? (I claim that knowing oneself follows essentially the same lines as knowing someone you love — you come to know about their powers, preferences, and aspirations through talking, being with, thinking through, etc. — and this is what one does for oneself.) And if so, what part of ethics is constituting another? (Loving a person and respecting the dignity of a person are both essential parts of ethics, and would seem, if anything contributes to that person’s constitution, to contribute to it.)
