



# Crises and Crisis Generations: Defeat and Military Political Power\*



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# Question

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- ▶ How do international threats affect military involvement in politics?



# The problem: Chronic vs. acute threat environment

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- ▶ With many theories we get a good sense for why State A has a military involved in politics and State B does not (cross-sectional).
- ▶ But with slow-moving variables (e.g., rivalry, geography) we can't really explain why in State A, military involvement in politics was much higher in year  $t$  than in year  $t+5$ . (time-series)



# A way forward: Crises

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- ▶ Need to move from *chronic threat environment* to *acute threat environment*
- ▶ Important findings that crises/conflicts can reduce coups
  - ▶ E.g., Talmadge and Piplani 2015; Powell 2014; Belkin and Schoffer 2005
- ▶ But coups are rare, extreme outcomes—there is a lot of variation in the “0s.”
- ▶ Military political participation outside of coups?



# Theory I: Poor outcomes in crises

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- ▶ International crises create a functional imperative for the military to effectively defend the state.
- ▶ Poor outcomes engender soul-searching and learning in the military.
- ▶ A politicized military is a “jack of all trades but a master of none.”
- ▶ A poor outcome in a crisis leads to military withdrawal from politics.
- ▶ Short- and long-term effects




# Theory II: Long-term effect

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- ▶ The effect of a crisis with a poor outcome will persist years later.
- ▶ Threat persistence, but also *generational shifts*.
- ▶ When the “Crisis Generation” becomes generals, military preferences are shifted again towards professionalism and abstention from politics.

*Officer cohort k at t...*



*And t+20*



# New data : Military Participation in Government (MPG)


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- ▶ Country-year data: 165 countries, 1964-2008.
- ▶ Human coders consult *Europa World Yearbook* for rosters of national cabinets and state councils.
- ▶ Number and type of positions held by military officers.




# Comparing MPG with regime-type data

Proportion of countries with at least one active military officer in cabinet/state council from 1964-2008



# Comparing MPG with regime-type data II

Proportion of countries with at least one active military officer in a *non-security* role in cabinet/state council from 1964-2008



# Research Design

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- ▶ DV: Military Government Share: the proportion of cabinet/state-council level positions that are active military officers.
- ▶ IV: Poor outcome in severe international crisis (ICB/COW): 1918-2007
  - ▶ Defeat/stalemate
  - ▶ Inter-state war (COW), “major clashes” (ICB)
  - ▶ “Grave” or “existential threat” (ICB)
- ▶ IVs: Binary indicators for crisis-history
  - ▶ Coded at 5 year intervals
    - ▶ E.g., defeat/stalemate 1-5 years ago, 6-10 years ago....46-50 years ago.



# Research Design

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- ▶ OLS with country-level fixed-effects
- ▶ 1964-2008
- ▶ One-year lag of DV
- ▶ Cluster standard errors by country
- ▶ Controls:
  - ▶ Ongoing crisis/war (ICB/COW)
  - ▶ Cumulative count of defeats/stalemates (ICB/COW)
  - ▶ Minor int'l crises (ICB)
  - ▶ Int'l rivalry (Thompson and Dreyer)
  - ▶ Domestic conflict (UCDP/PRIO, NAVCO)
  - ▶ GDP per capita (log)
  - ▶ Democracy (Polity/Gleditsch)
  - ▶ New leader (Archigos)
  - ▶ Cold War




# Results preview

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
- ▶ Strong evidence that defeat or stalemate in a crisis reduces military participation in government in both the short- and long-term.
- ▶ Long-term effect persists more than 20 years after the end of the crisis.



# Results: Effect of a crisis over time



# Including other outcomes (e.g., ties, victories)



# Robustness checks


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- ▶ **Control for other time-trends**
  - ▶ Year dummies
  - ▶ State age
  - ▶ Regime age
- ▶ **Different constructions of IV**
  - ▶ 4- and 6-year indicators
  - ▶ Include crisis-history indicators for other types of outcomes
- ▶ **Other controls and samples**
  - ▶ Exclude consolidated democracies, major powers, WW2 combatants
  - ▶ Control for coups; non-democratic regime-type.
  - ▶ Long-term impact of internal conflict
- ▶ **Count models**



# Count models (conditional FE)

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# Conclusion


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- ▶ Poor outcomes in crises exert a negative effect on military participation in government in both the short- and long-term.
- ▶ The timing of the long-term effect supports the generational hypothesis.
- ▶ Implications for SSR?
- ▶ Ongoing work related to security/non-security positions, domestic conflict, unpack “other outcomes.”




# Four-year intervals

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


# Six-year intervals

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


# Count models (unconditional FE)



# Outcomes aggregated

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# Military Government Share (2005)

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