

# PSUJIA

---



Pennsylvania State University  
Journal of International Affairs

Volume 2, Issue 1  
Fall 2012



# Penn State University Journal of International Affairs

Fall 2012  
Issue 2, Volume 1

PENNSSTATE

---





Dear Reader,

As the new Executive Editors of this publication, we are filled with pride in the journal which you are reading today. With the graduation of our founding Executive Editors it has been our great delight working to solidify the journal's place as a fixture in Penn State's proud tradition. Taking the Journal's reigns has been a tremendous experience as we continue to refine the Journal's mission – a mission dedicated to the scholarly vigor and the enthusiasm that we find unique to student-produced work. It is this commitment to finding and showcasing the voices of talented and nascent thinkers in the various fields of international affairs that makes this project so fulfilling. This fall we welcomed a new class of Associate Editors, including Marlow Bryant, Brian Gardner, Casey Hilland, Benjamin Rogers, Brian Shiue and Suzanne Zakaria. Their combined dedication and creativity have already contributed tremendously. We look forward to growing and maturing the Journal together in the coming semesters.

We are deeply indebted to those who have given of their own time, energy and resources, without which none of the following pages could be printed. Our sincere thanks go to our faculty reviewers from the Departments of Political Science, Geography, and within the Schreyer Honors College, whose expertise continues to impress, and to John Hodgson at the Strategic and Global Security Scholars Program and Jack Selzer of the Paterno Fellows Program for their generous funding and tireless support. Finally, we would like to thank Eleanor Skrzat, whose cover art exemplifies the global University to which we humbly contribute this work.

Our Fall 2012 issue demonstrates the insight and potential of four bright authors on a wide range of topics, from Sudanese oil disputes to global species conversation. We here at the *Penn State Journal of International Affairs* have strived to bring their work to you, the reader, and we hope the articles herein inform and excite your intellectual curiosities.

Sincerely,

Patrick Boynton, Peter Gorman, Harrison Rogers & Michelle Sarver  
Executive Editors, Fall 2012



# Contents

China's Oil Diplomacy and State-Backed Investments in the Partition of Sudan

*Ben Wang*, Tufts University

9

---

Network Centrality and Weapon Advocacy

*Emily Schirvar*, George Washington University

21

---

The Effect of International Trade Bans on the Population of Endangered Species

*Ryan Cole*, College of William and Mary

35

---

How Non-State Actors Evolve: Clausewitzian Lessons from Northern Ireland and  
Lebanon

*Paul Baumgarder*, Univeristy of Michigan

54

---

Staff

66



# China's Oil Diplomacy and State-Backed Investments in the Partition of Sudan

BEN WANG, TUFTS UNIVERSITY

## Abstract

*This paper examines the evolving role the People's Republic of China has played in breaking the oil deadlock between Sudan and South Sudan. By offering a historical overview of the Sudanese conflict in the context of China's oil development, this paper first outlines the conflicting nature of China's economic and political interests when conducting oil diplomacy between both states. Then, it details the options and strategies available to China's leaders as they mediate the deadlock, while finally providing a prediction as to how they might proceed in the years to come.*

## Introduction

Western countries often associate narratives of Sudan with the well-known humanitarian situation in Darfur: The genocide, poverty, and tragic history of civil wars and internal conflict that have plagued the region since its independence in 1956. However, from a Chinese perspective, Sudan is not a developmental backwater, but a significant strategic partner for increasing its presence in Africa, and the site of major projects to secure China's future energy security. As only the fourth country to recognize the legitimacy of Communist China, Sudan has generally maintained friendly relations ever since. The alliance was greatly strengthened when, in the mid-1990s, China invested around \$4 billion towards tapping Sudan's oil reserves. By 2008, it "import[ed] 60 percent of Sudan's oil output" (Taylor 2009, 50).

However, the Sino-Sudanese bilateral relationship has come at huge political and economic costs. Since 1995, China has been subject to intense international

---

*Ben Yunmo Wang* is a junior B.A. candidate at Tufts University, pursuing a double-major in International Relations and Political Science. Ben became interested in Sudan during his internship at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, a project that collects real-time satellite imagery and publishes reports on the conflicts and alleged mass atrocities during and after the partition of Sudan in 2011. In college, he has pursued coursework on violent conflicts in Africa with Sudanese expert Prof. Alex de Waal and issues surrounding China's political economy with Prof. Joseph Fewsmith at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In the spring of 2013, he will be interning for the Future of Peace Operations program at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington D.C. Born in China, Ben grew up in Canada but later returned to China to attend international school. His travels in Africa include Kenya and Algeria. He speaks fluent Mandarin Chinese and has limited proficiency in French and Japanese.

criticism pertaining to its complicity in Sudan's human rights records and failure to play a greater role in deterring the atrocities of Darfur. In addition, the discontinuation of Sudanese oil production resulting from the succession of South Sudan has jeopardized China's energy security within the region, drawing China into a larger conflict between North and South Sudan.

Chinese efforts to resume oil production have become increasingly difficult because its oil assets remain in the South while its traditional diplomatic ties are aligned with the North, forcing China to mediate the conflict while attempting to retain neutrality. However, the lack of progress among Chinese diplomats presents Beijing with the question of intervention: "Should China intervene on behalf of one party to resume oil production in the Sudan?" The answer lies between the trade-off of China's short-term and long-term energy security interest. While intervening would restart oil production in the short term, it would discredit China's "no-strings-attached" foreign investment policy, preventing China from gaining access in other developing nations in the future. Additionally, Sudan is gradually losing its significance in China's grand strategy for global energy security. By diversifying supply sources abroad, China can mitigate the effect of volatile oil production from Sudan and indirectly increase its soft power elsewhere – without the added costs of intervention.

To that end, this case study offers a historical overview of Chinese state oil investments in Sudan divided into three pivotal periods throughout the Sudanese conflict: China's initial oil investment from 1995-2005, Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement from 2005-2011, and South Sudan's independence after 2011. Then, it proceeds to analyse how the independence of South Sudan and evolving conflicts along the Sudan-South Sudan border will impact these investments and influence Chinese energy policy.

### **1995-2005: China Invests in Sudan**

China's interest in developing Sudan's reserves began in September 1995, when Sudan's President, Omar al-Bashir offered China oil concessions in exchange for access to credit at reduced interest rates (Large 2008, 278). After Chevron suspended oil development due to security concerns, the Sudanese government needed new partners to finance the country's oil development. Since Sudan at the time was sanctioned by the United States and hence closed off to Western companies, China proved an appealing alternative (Jakobson and Zha 2006, 65-66). Sudan's interest in foreign direct investment coincided with China's "Go Out" policy. Initiated at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this policy was intended to reinvest China's amassing foreign reserves in oil and gas assets abroad in order to meet the country's rapidly expanding energy consumption rates as domestic energy sources began to mature. The "Go Out" policy would not only provide future energy security for China's growing consumer base, but also indirectly improved

domestic products and enterprise, thereby extending Chinese soft power globally. In addition, Sudan's historical friendly relations with China, its political isolation, and "its economic potential" made Sudan "an attractive investment prospect" (Large 2008, 280).

With the encouragement of the Chinese government and financial support of several state-backed institutions, China's major national oil companies (NOC's) invested heavily in Sudan. Between 1995 and 1996, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began unilateral operations in block 6,<sup>1</sup> and purchased a 40 percent share in the newly formed the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which developed blocks 1, 2, and 4. In 2001, the CNPC increased its market share in Sudan by acquiring a 41% stake in PetroDar, a new consortium operating on blocks 3 and 7. Furthermore, CNPC helped construct two crucial pipelines operated by GNPOC and PetroDar, as well as an oil terminal at Port Sudan that "connect[ed] oil production with the international market" (Large 2008, 281). To that end, the CNPC's acquisitions in conjunction its unilateral actions played a major role in turning Sudan into a net oil exporter in 1999 (Downs 2007, 58). However, the CNPC's transformation of the Sudanese oil resources would later become the center of dispute, sabotage, and conflict leading up to the partition of Sudan.

### **2005-2011: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement**

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between North and South Sudan set the stage for China's entanglement in Sudan's broader civil war. Signed on January 9<sup>th</sup> 2005, the CPA formed a negotiated settlement between the Bashir administration representing Northern Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) representing Southern Sudan. This settlement reached an agreement to share oil revenues, and set a future referendum date for South Sudan independence in 2011. During this period of relative peace, China became Sudan's most important trade partner, accounting for a massive 75 percent of Sudan's total exports in 2006 (Large 2008, 285). The CNPC "shipped back home most of its Sudanese equity oil," although when oil prices were high they were also sold on the international market (Downs 2007, 47). In the same year, the combined production total of CNPC and the Chinese Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) in Sudan reached 81% of China's total NOC oil productions in Africa (Downs 2007, 46).

However, as the violent killings in Darfur drew increasing foreign media attention, Beijing's close ties with Bashir's regime in Khartoum became detrimental to China's reputation. Heavy international criticism was centered on

---

1 See Exhibit 1, noting that the map was compiled in 2007 before the independence of South Sudan

China's sale of small arms to Sudan, its opposition to anti-Darfur resolutions in the United Nations, and Beijing's general failure to leverage its influence on the Bashir administration to foster peace. Eventually, as the International Criminal Court indicted President al-Bashir for genocide, the Darfur advocacy campaign culminated in massive protests against the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Moreover, rebel forces within Sudan have also reacted to Beijing's role in Darfur. A senior leader in the northern opposition commented that while he welcomed China's ability "to balance Khartoum's relations with the West," he also criticized "that China is insensitive to human rights issues and the people of Darfur blame China for protecting the al-Bashir regime" (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, 254).

As the conflict in Darfur gradually drew to a close, media discourse and widespread criticism of China have softened correspondingly. Moreover, both the international community and domestic players in Sudan have come to appreciate the role China could play in mediating the Sudanese referendum. Nevertheless, the negative press these campaigns created during the Beijing Olympics and physical threats to Chinese investment in the region will certainly enter Chinese policymakers' calculations as they choose to consider whether the costs of its relationship with Sudan outweighs the benefits.

### **2011-today: South Sudan Independence and Onwards**

On July 9th, 2011, the security of China's Sudanese oil assets was further complicated when South Sudan passed a referendum in support of independence from the North, thereby splitting Sudan in half. This partition of Sudan created a dilemma for oil exploitation: "Roughly three quarters of the remaining oil now belong[ed] to the South, but the infrastructure to exploit it – pipelines, refineries and export terminals – [were] in the North" (International Crisis Group 2012, 26). As a result, the CNPC built pipelines that enabled Khartoum to extol high transit fees in order to compensate for its lost oil revenue. Following a series of disagreements over these fees, Khartoum began to block shipments of Southern oil by the end of 2011. Beijing was hard pressed by both sides to mediate the conflict, and sent a special envoy for African affairs to reconcile the deadlock. However, the engagement proved shallow as China was reluctant to take a side and simply "continued to appeal for restraint and dialogue." In January 2012, preferring "to fully exercise its economic sovereignty than be held financially hostage by Khartoum," Juba chose to completely shut down oil production (International Crisis Group 2012, 30).

On 26 March 2012, South Sudanese forces attacked a GNPOC operated oil field called Heglig. After occupying the field for 10 days in April, South Sudan's troops were defeated by the Sudanese Arm Forces, and control of the field returned to the north. The fighting caused a fire in the company's oil processing facilities and also damaged the crucial Greater Nile Oil Pipeline. These damages halted oil

production in the entire region, restricting “roughly half the national production, 50,000-55,000 barrels a day” (Timberlake 2012). The conflict between Sudan and South Sudan continued throughout the summer as negotiations took place in the background. The deadlock was finally broken on August 5 when Sudan and South Sudan both announced that they had reached a profit sharing agreement (“Sudan and South Sudan Oil Deal Applauded” 2012). Despite the signing of the agreement in September, Sudanese security concerns inhibited Heglig from resuming production. As the oil dispute between Sudan and South Sudan raged on, both economies slowed and by November, “Sudan’s currency fell to a historic low against the dollar” (Holland and Laessing 2012).

While headlines mostly cited the mediation efforts of an African Union task-force led by former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, the United States and China also played important roles in the negotiations. Diplomatic pressure from Beijing led South Sudan’s Foreign Minister, Nhial Deng, to comment: “We strongly believe that this deal would not have been possible without China in the background basically pushing for such an agreement” (Lynch 2012). While Deng refused to elaborate on what exactly Chinese officials did during the negotiations, they refused to take a political position. Acting solely on protecting its financial interests, China pressured both sides to move the agreement forward while showing disinterest in the resulting political implications.

### **Managing Security Risk: The Challenge for Chinese NOC’s**

The investment of Chinese oil companies into unstable regions provided access to additional African markets but also carried an obligation to manage much higher levels of security risk. Initially, resentment about China’s negligence in Darfur fuelled many of the violent attacks against Chinese NOC’s. In 2007, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur rebel group, “briefly seized Chinese oil facilities at Defra in [South] Kordofan Province,” and then “attacked the Heglig oil facility run by the Great Wall Drilling Company.” The violence escalated the following year, when JEM “kidnapped nine Chinese CNPC employees,” eventually “kill[ing]...four of them while security forces rescued four others and one went missing” (Shinn and Eisenman 2012, 253). More recently, NOC’s seem to have been drawn into the broader tug-of-war of the North-South civil war. In January 2012, 29 Chinese workers were kidnapped while working on a construction project along the North-South borders by, rebel remnants of the SPLM who remained in the North after secession. This incident represented “the third case of abduction of Chinese working in Sudan since 2004,” as Chinese workers became increasingly attractive targets for Sudanese rebels hoping to leverage China to put pressure on Bashir’s administration (Wee 2012).

In response to the additional violence caused by the North-South rift, the management of Chinese companies has been compelled to adjust accordingly.

Following its independence, the South Sudan government ordered major oil companies to move their headquarters from Khartoum to Juba, but Chinese companies, for fear of alienating Sudan, have only selectively implemented the order. Perhaps in response to perceived Chinese non-compliance, the South Sudan government ejected the Chinese chief of PetroDar on oil theft accusations on February 2012 (Bariyo 2012).

Prior to the Sudanese split, Chinese NOC's had relied on support from the Chinese state to manage these security risks. Taking lessons from prior companies like Chevron, which was forced to withdraw due to a lack of adequate security, the Chinese government ensured the protection of their workers through small arms agreements. As a result, military expenditure by Bashir's new Sudanese government increased dramatically after 1997 soon after oil began flowing out of Sudan (SIPRI 2012). However, this agreement collapsed following the partition of Sudan. While most of the oil fields in the partition went to South Sudan, the Chinese government remained politically aligned with the North. This created a problem as South Sudan's army was drastically underequipped to provide any kind of reliable security for these oil fields as China could not employ its prior method of simply arming the government forces without politically infuriating the North.

Facing increased interference from both Sudanese governments, security threats against company personnel and facilities, and even the possibility of war, China's NOC's must now re-weigh the current operational success with the spectre of future complications. CNPC's operation in Sudan has been regarded as "the single most outstanding success" of Chinese oil investments overseas (Jakobson and Zha 2006, 67). Divestment would not only cause the company to 'lose face,' but also cast doubt on the entire Chinese model of investing in resource-rich, but politically unstable regions. Moreover, the energy industry requires a large initial investment in both oilfield exploration and the construction of upstream and downstream infrastructure. Returns, on the other hand, come in much smaller portions over a longer trajectory as oil is gradually extracted, distributed, and exported out of the country. This business model, in effect, prevents companies from divesting their assets until they recoup the costs of their initial investments. While Chevron exited Sudan in the early stages of oil development, CNPC and Sinopec's prolonged investment in upstream and downstream assets may prevent them from divesting their assets without suffering heavy financial losses.

Nevertheless, Chinese NOC's enjoy many alternative investment options. While Sudan is an important oil producer, its proven reserves still constitute only 5% of the total in Africa (Downs 2007, 46). Financing new alternatives would allow China to diversify its investment portfolio and avoid reliance on a single country for energy security. Taking the first steps to do so, Sinopec purchased its "first...overseas upstream assets" from Angola for \$2.46 billion in 2010 (Lee

2010). Worldwide, Chinese NOC's have increased their acquisitions "from almost negligible in 2007 to 15% of the total [Asian NOC acquisition spending] in 2010," including ventures in Brazil, Canada, Australia, and , the United States (Atmakuri 2012). As these endeavors extend China's reputation and foster a more diversified energy supply, it may actually be a logical choice to abandon Sudan in search of more secure and reliable partners.

### **Political Manoeuvring: Should Beijing Continue Intervention?**

All else aside, the ultimate future of Chinese NOC investments in Sudan remains in the hands of the Chinese government. The international community retain high hopes that China will continue to use its trading partner status to mediate the conflict in Sudan and thus take on greater responsibilities in global governance. However, China's presence in Africa was welcomed by local governments precisely because of its "no strings attached" policy that was willing to overlook corruption, instability, and human rights violations, while helping the, "host country build up an entire chain of oil industry" (Jakobson and Zha 2006, 67-68). This has left China in a precarious position as it faces the dilemma of choosing between its historic political alliances with the North and protecting the commercial assets now in the South, while retaining neutrality.

The question of whether or not to forego the "non-intervention" strategy in pursuit of greater regional security will dictate China's future strategy in Sudan, and likely have significant implications on the country's presence all over Africa. In the short term, the benefits of Chinese intervention outweigh the costs of insecurity resulting from the status-quo. Long-term infrastructure investments from NOC's are already in place and complete shutdown of production in southern oilfields would be a financially catastrophic result for the Sudan operations of these state-funded companies. Additionally, Sudan's role as one of China's first and closest African allies also gives political significance for continued Chinese involvement, as Beijing needs to leverage this relationship to expand its influence, and its potential allies in Africa may look to the Beijing-Khartoum relationship as an indicator of China's credibility as a strategic partner.

However, China's ability to intervene is anchored down by its own strategy of "non-intervention" and *laissez-faire* relationships with local governments. Since the first signs of a deadlock in negotiations with the North, South Sudan has actively explored the possibility of constructing a new pipeline that would circumvent Port Sudan, thereby eliminating Khartoum's ability to extort the south for oil money. South Sudan President Salva Kiir visited China in April of 2012 to request funding for a new pipeline through Kenya and Ethiopia, but his trip was cut short when Beijing rejected his proposal. Observers suggest that the Chinese government fears the move would, "antagonise the [North] Sudanese government and further inflame an already incendiary situation" (Deng 2012).

While China's historic relationship with Khartoum has prevented China from backing the South, Southern control of Chinese oil investments means that Beijing must also avoid disenfranchising the Kiir administration. As such, Beijing promised to send humanitarian aid to South Sudan, and dispatched a new special envoy lead by China's top diplomat in the Africa province, Zhong Jianhua, to facilitate peace. Characterized by observers as "friendly, [and] media-canny," Zhong's appointment further testifies to Beijing's intention to urge restraint and end hostilities without explicitly taking a side (H.E. Zhong 2012).

Ultimately, China's question over intervention will become increasing insignificant in the long run as the divided Sudan's play a diminishing role in Beijing's core interests in energy security. While China remains the overwhelming principal trading partner to Sudan, the share of Sudanese oil in China's overall oil imports has declined after reaching "the high water mark of 2001-2" (Large 2008, 285). Chinese academics Jiang and Zhao contend that this trend is, "due to the overall effects of factors such as the mediocre quality of crude oil in Sudan, the emergence of more and more replacement oil suppliers in Africa, and the increasing attention towards oil reserves in Sudan domestically" (Jiang and Xiao 2011, 48). On average, Sudanese oil only accounted for merely 6% of China's total imports through 2008-09 (ChinaOilWeb 2012). After South Sudan's oil shutdown in the first quarter of 2012, the rate withered to a mere 3% (China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association 2012). Despite the decrease in Sudanese imports over this period, however, China has located effective alternatives, and its overall oil import actually increased by 11.35% relative to the previous year. The losses from both the Sudanese situation and a separate incident in Iran were supplanted by increased imports from alternative sources such as Russia and Venezuela ("2012 First Quarter" 2012). Meanwhile, analysts have suggested that China will benefit from the increasingly cheaper and widely available oil in Iraq, "90% of... [which] are going to go to Asia – mostly China" (Whelan 2012).

As Chinese NOC's gradually expand their assets further in Africa and other developing regions, it seems possible and even logical that they may choose to forfeit the politically unpredictable Sudan's. Awareness of this emerging trend may provide an alternative explanation as to why Beijing refused to fund the alternative pipeline for Juba, a costly investment that promises to entangle them further in Sudan and South Sudan's future.

\*\*\*

In the end, China's future strategy in Sudan faces two opposing directions. In the short term, Beijing will continue to advocate purely for its commercial interests and the physical security of its NOC's workers and oil assets. Yet, as China tries to establish its global reputation, maintaining ties with a notorious Khartoum may pose reputational risks increasingly difficult to ignore. On the other hand, it would

be equally difficult for China to shift their alliance entirely towards South Sudan, since the SPLM government in Juba remains unstable, and its relationship with Beijing lacks the same level of trust. Meanwhile, the commercial significance of Sudanese oil as a whole continues diminish as China better manages its energy security by diversifying its African oil interests with trading partners such as Angola, Uganda, and Nigeria.

Hence, the costs of continuing support for Khartoum and involvement in Sudan seem to outweigh the gains. In the long term, barring some dramatic improvement in the security and stability of the Sudan's, China may opt out of the North-South power struggle, and establish an exit strategy to withdraw from Sudan. This may be a sign that China is becoming more selective of its trading partners, thereby distancing itself from regimes with questionable records and unstable business environments. As Chinese foreign investments better represent this selectivity, Beijing's goals in maintaining both the profitability and security of its investment may successfully converge.

### References

- "2012 First Quarter Aggregate of China's Top Ten Crude Oil Source Countries [2012年一季度中国十大原油来源国汇总]." *China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association* [中国石油和化学工业联合会]. [www.cpcia.org.cn/html/45/20124/105421.html](http://www.cpcia.org.cn/html/45/20124/105421.html) (accessed April 27, 2012).
- Abrami, Regina, and Eunice Ajambo. "China in Africa: The Case of Sudan." *Harvard Business Review*. <http://www.hbr.org/product/china-in-africa-the-case-of-sudan/an/308060-PDF-ENG> (accessed April 27, 2012).
- Atmakuri, Tarun. "Chinese NOC's Continue Acquisitions; Deal Value for 2011 Below 2010 Levels." *Derrick Petroleum Services*. <http://www.derrickpetroleum.com/2012/01/19/chinese-noc's-continue-acquisitions-deal-value-for-2011-below-2010-levels/> (accessed April 27, 2012).
- Bariyo, Nicholas. "South Sudan Expels Petrodar Executive." *The Wall Street Journal*. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203960804577239561300273658.html> (accessed April 27, 2012).
- "China's Crude Oil Import Data." *ChinaOilWeb*. [http://data.chinaoilweb.com/crude-oil-import-data/index\\_1.html](http://data.chinaoilweb.com/crude-oil-import-data/index_1.html) (accessed April 27, 2012).
- "China's 'Going Out' Strategy." *The Economist*. [http://www.economist.com/hk/blogs/freeexchange/2009/07/chinas\\_going\\_out\\_strategy](http://www.economist.com/hk/blogs/freeexchange/2009/07/chinas_going_out_strategy) (accessed November 28, 2012).
- "China's New Courtship in South Sudan." *International Crisis Group*. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/south-sudan/186-chinas-new-courtship-in-south-sudan.aspx> (accessed April 22, 2012).

Deng, Luka Biong. "China non-committal on financing South Sudan pipeline as Kiir cuts short his visit." *Sudan Tribune*. <http://www.sudantribune.com/China-non-committal-on-financing,42395> (accessed April 27, 2012).

Downs, Erica S.. "The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations." *China Security* 3, no. 3 (2007): 42-68. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/articles/2007/6/summer%20china%20downs/downs20070913> (accessed April 22, 2012).

"H.E. Zhong Jianhua." Africa-Asia Confidential. <http://www.africa-asia-confidential.com/whos-who-profile/id/3072> (accessed April 27, 2012).

Holland, Hereward, and Ulf Laessing. "South Sudan says Sudan poses new obstacle to oil sales." *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/26/us-southsudan-sudan-oil-idUSBRE8AP0Q520121126> (accessed November 28, 2012).

Jakobson, Linda, and Daojiong Zha. "China and the Worldwide Search for Oil Security." *Asia Pacific Review* 13, no. 6 (2006): 60-73. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13439000601062601> (accessed April 24, 2012).

Jiang, Lu, and Jialing Xiao [江璐, 肖佳灵]. "China's Oil Diplomacy towards Sudan: the State-Enterprise Roles Analysis [中国对苏丹的石油外交：政企角色研究]." *Arab World Studies [阿拉伯世界研究]* 5 (2011): 40-53.

Large, Daniel. "From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations with Sudan." In *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and A Continent Embrace*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 275-94.

Lee, Yvonne. "Sinopec to Acquire Angolan Oil Assets." *The Wall Street Journal*. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303429804575149714050757630.html> (accessed April 27, 2012).

Lynch, Colum. "China brokers tentative oil agreement between the Sudans." *Foreign Policy Magazine*. [http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/14/china\\_brokers\\_tentative\\_oil\\_agreement\\_between\\_the\\_sudans](http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/14/china_brokers_tentative_oil_agreement_between_the_sudans) (accessed September 20, 2012).

Ma, Wayne. "OIL DATA: China Confirms October Crude-Oil Imports up 13.8% on Year." NASDAQ.com. [http://www.nasdaq.com/article/oil-data-china-confirms-october-crude-oil-imports-up-138-on-year-20121121-00022#.ULUfoCP\\_4Rs](http://www.nasdaq.com/article/oil-data-china-confirms-october-crude-oil-imports-up-138-on-year-20121121-00022#.ULUfoCP_4Rs) (accessed November 28, 2012).

Manson, Katrina, and Andrew England. "South Sudan seeks Beijing investment." *The Financial Times*. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e553b90a-8c93-11e1-9758-00144feab49a.html> (accessed April 22, 2012).

Martina, Michael. "China's Africa envoy says South Sudan oil may flow by November." *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/15/us-china-southsu>

dan-oil-idUSBRE88E03920120915 (accessed December 6, 2012).

"Military Expenditure of Sudan." SIPRI Publications. <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed April 26, 2012).

Schuetz, Marcus. "East of Africa (and West of China): Chinese Business in Africa." *Harvard Business Review*. <http://hbr.org/product/east-of-africa-and-west-of-china-chinese-business-/an/HKU897-PDF-ENG> (accessed April 15, 2012).

Shinn, David Hamilton, and Joshua Eisenman. *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012.

"Sudan and South Sudan oil deal applauded." *AlJazeera*. N.p., 5 Aug. 2012. Web. 15 Sept. 2012. <<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/08/201284234910884513.html>>.

Taylor, Ian. *China's New Role in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009. Print.

Timberlake, Ian. "Oil pours from Sudan's damaged pipeline." *The Associated Press*. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hKIE6S62bzEnnVEhmIRuwoTL-SOW?docId=CNG.a667c2f5c2ae88920e6404e109ae6992.a21> (accessed April 25, 2012).

Walker, Beth. "China's uncomfortable diplomacy keeps South Sudan's oil flowing." *China Dialogue*. <http://www.chinadialogue.net/books/5378/en> (accessed November 28, 2012).

Wee, Sui-Lee. "China to ask South Sudan for help on kidnapped workers." *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/02/us-china-sudan-workers-idUSTRE81108G20120202> (accessed April 26, 2012).

Whelan, Sean. "How China won the Iraq war." RTE News. [www.rte.ie/blogs/business/2012/12/04/how-china-won-the-iraq-war/](http://www.rte.ie/blogs/business/2012/12/04/how-china-won-the-iraq-war/) (accessed December 6, 2012).



# Network Centrality and Weapon Advocacy

EMILY SCHIRVAR, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

## Abstract

*Weapon ban activism typically focuses on the excessive destructiveness of the weapon under scrutiny, and highlights its departure from the commitment to “humane warfare”—a concept enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. However, a variety of weapons are still in use which, based on these qualifications, should likewise be prohibited. In addition, even weapons facing great public outcry and may still be widely used. How then, does the international community decide which devastating weapon is worthy of a ban? This paper tests the explanatory power of both the prevailing realist theory (Weapon Utility) and a constructivist theory by Charli Carpenter, which states that the centrality of a few significant NGOs secures their prominent roles and positions them to act as gatekeepers, giving them power to set or vet the advocacy agenda. The paper first establishes the “observable implications” anticipated by each theory, and then attempts to match them to the realities of historic ban efforts—using Chemical Weapons and Napalm as case studies. Although the strengths and weaknesses of both theories are addressed, the research finds strong evidence to support Carpenter’s theory, further contributing to the dialogue between Constructivist and Realist interpretations.*

## Introduction

Since the first of the Geneva Conventions in 1864, the international community has attempted to legitimize the prohibition of particular weapons through treaties and official bans. Typically, the decision to ban a weapon is based on “customary international humanitarian law,” as codified by the International Committee of the Red Cross into 161 “rules,” which are frequently updated (International Committee of the Red Cross 2007). Rules 70 and 71, in particular, have been widely accepted as norms of humane warfare. Rule 70 states: “The use of means and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.” Rule 71 is based off of Additional Protocol

---

*Emily Schirvar* is currently studying International Relations through the Elliot School at George Washington University. Her passion for global affairs began early on, and, at age thirteen, led her to serve as a Student Ambassador to France, Italy, and Greece. Since then, she has acquired a proficiency in the French language, traveled once more to Europe and once to Morocco, and worked to advocate human rights (her fundamental inspiration for global activism) across a variety of campaigns. Through her participation in Sigma Iota Rho Honors International Affairs Fraternity, and passion for research, Emily demonstrates her continued development as a global citizen.

I of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits weapons that are “of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians without distinction” (Additional Protocol I). However, contemporary scholars have pointed out that some types of weapons still remain in use, despite being “prohibited” under the aforementioned criteria (Carpenter 2011, Price 1998). Why is it that numerous countries successfully ban some weapons, while others—which may be equally devastating—remain unnoticed?

Before addressing the issue of weapon bans and the inconsistent implementation of such bans, I will provide some background on the issue. In order to do so, I hope to look at two cases in particular: Chemical Weapons—the object of a ban with widespread adoption—and Napalm—for which no official ban currently exists. I will then apply constructivist Charli Carpenter’s Theory of Network Centrality to explain why some weapons are successfully banned, while others remain in use. According to this theory, the centrality of a few significant NGOs—the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Human Rights Watch in particular—both gives them prominence *and* positions them to act as gatekeepers, permitting them to set or vet the advocacy agenda (Carpenter 2011). I will explore the history of the ban campaigns in both of these cases in order to identify the observable implications expected by Carpenter’s theory. Finally, I will address the primary alternative theory put forth by international relations scholars—one based in the realist paradigm—and briefly critique the Network Centrality theory.

### **Puzzle: Different Responses to Equally Destructive Weapons**

Chemical Weapons scholar Richard Price explores the primary question behind weapons prohibition:

At first glance, it may seem a platitude to state that the use of chemical weapons (CW) is a particularly reprehensible and morally unacceptable means of conducting armed conflict. Yet how is it that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry that have been used by humankind, CW almost alone have come to be stigmatized as morally illegitimate? (Price 1995)

In particular, the use of the incendiary Napalm has long been advocated against as inhumane, having come to represent the controversy of the Vietnam War. Consistently argued against by numerous humanitarian groups since that time, Napalm has nevertheless never been officially prohibited. Whereas a number of treaties forbidding the use of chemical weapons have been put into place since the late 1800s, Napalm remains untouched. This is not to say, however, that there is a lack of consensus on the atrocity of suffering caused by the use of Napalm

on human beings. It is mentioned in Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968, as one of many inhumane treatments that “erode human rights and engender counter-brutality” (Mirimanoff 1970). Additionally, the application of Rules 70 and 71 (above) should result in the ban of both weapons; the Human Rights Watch recognizes the destructive nature of incendiary weapons, and laments the failure of states to “to live up to [their] promise of protecting civilians from the effects of incendiary weapons, which cause horrific burns, permanent disfigurement, and death” (Human Rights Watch 2012). These weapons are equally devastating when deployed in the field, are equally in violation of established international norms, and have both been denounced by the public, as well as numerous prominent individuals. What causes one form of weapon to be successfully banned, while another equally horrific instrument of war remains within the arsenal of acceptable warfare?

### **Theoretical Basis: Network Centrality and Norm Generation**

Much of contemporary constructivist literature has focused on “[documenting] the power of transnational advocacy networks in ‘global civil society,’ ” writes Carpenter (2011). While the powerful role played by these TANs is becoming clearer, the research community has not yet delved significantly into seeking to explain why these increasingly consequential actors select certain issues to pay attention to while ignoring others. As Jefferey Legro asserts in his 1997 treatise on norms, it may be less a question of *which* norms matter, and more a question of *whose* norms matter (Legro 1997). Scholar Clifford Bob already established that certain “NGO superpowers” are responsible for agenda setting in the human rights arena; Carpenter’s work builds on this research by showing that the same is true for the weapons advocacy network (Carpenter 2011). Among these prominent network hubs, Carpenter lists “certain United Nations (UN) agencies, key states that championed the concept or are known for funding human security projects, academic institutions, and a few large, well-connected NGOs: International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).” According to Carpenter’s Network Centrality theory, two qualities determine the influence of a transnational actor: its *centrality*, “a measure of how prominent an organization is within a network, measured in the number of organizations who establish or attempt to establish links with that node”; and the extent to which it acts as a *gatekeeper* for other organizations, or “possesses exclusive ties to otherwise marginalized or weakly connected nodes or groups of nodes” (Carpenter 2011).

Carpenter borrows a metaphor from A.L. Barabasi to explain the relevancy of centrality:

Trans-national networks, in other words, are less like road systems with many pathways between nodes

and more like airlines, where the route between any two small cities generally depends on passing through a major hub; or like the World Wide Web, where hubs like Google and Yahoo are necessary to direct attention to the myriad yet largely invisible “nodes” (Web sites) online (Carpenter 2011).

Centrality allows a major node to easily access resources and information, and the variety and number of the organizations connected to the node also give it greater visibility to targets of influence. This feeds a cycle, which results in greater centrality as other actors attempt to connect themselves to the central node. Additionally, centrality grants a few key organizations greater legitimacy through name recognition by targets of influence (Brewington, Davis and Murdie 2009). The legitimizing effect of network centrality contributes to the extent to which a network node, or hub, is able to act as a gatekeeper for other, smaller organizations. Because a network hub may be the only access point through which smaller organizations can reach their target audience, that node receives disproportionate power in determining which items make it onto the advocacy agenda, and which are passed over by the targets of influence, be they states or UN agencies. In particular, organizations whose work tends to crosscut more than one “issue cluster” are often sought out by others for their ability to “frame” an issue in a variety of ways, or attract a broad coalition.

Repeating the process used above with the realist theory of weapon utility, it is important to establish the observable implications of a theory, and subsequently seek them out in specific case studies. When providing support for her theory, Carpenter establishes clear-cut expectations for the factors that would be present in a successful case, were her theory accurate. Assuming accuracy, the following responses may be expected if central nodes in the transnational community were responsible for garnering widespread acceptance of a weapon ban. First, one would expect to see engagement with the issue early on, by one of the most central organizations in the issue network. Second, it is likely that a sharp increase in the number of countries interested in a ban would be seen almost immediately once the organization becomes involved.

## **Application of Theory: Chemical Weapons**

### *I. Introduction*

Most weapon bans only seek to limit the use of specific weapons to certain “acceptable” situations in an effort to increase ratification; the chemical weapons ban, however, is unique both in terms of its widespread acceptance by sovereign states and the comprehensiveness of its coverage. International relations scholar

William O'Brien argues, "...chemical and biological warfare comes the closest to providing an example of totally outlawing a particular means of warfare" (Price 1995). The first chemical weapons ban, the Declaration of the Hague Convention of 1899 prohibiting "the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases," actually preceded the development of chemical weaponry (International Peace Conference 1899). As Richard Price, a scholar specializing in the laws of international conflict, explains, "Asphyxiating shells were discussed at The Hague even though they had yet to be developed" (Price 1995). Because the Declaration banned all future uses indiscriminately, however, it established precedence for a total ban in subsequent treaties based on its designation as "customary law" (UN Secretary-General Report 1969).

The unprecedented success of the chemical weapons ban is not surprising, given the advocacy of not one, but *two* central "nodes" on its behalf. Both prominent in the humanitarian advocacy arena, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) contributed greatly to efforts in favor of a total ban on chemical weapons. The historical records of the campaign to ban chemical weapons meet the observable implications expected by Carpenter. As expected, the organizations meet Carpenter's expectations for "centrality"—the ICRC and the WHO are listed as the two most central of the organizations in the arms control arena (Carpenter 2011). Furthermore, Carpenter expects that organizations "crosscutting" issue arenas will be more successful in achieving bans; this hypothesis is supported by characteristics of both the ICRC and the WHO, both which are involved in multiple areas of health, humanitarianism, and the laws of war. After showing that the actions of these organizations had a demonstrable effect on the success of the chemical weapons ban, it would also be necessary to show that their impact was due to one of the following characteristics of centrality: the organization's role as gatekeeper, the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the "target audience", or a "bandwagon affect". This section will demonstrate how the involvement of both organizations directly contributed to the widespread adoption of a succession of chemical weapon bans, supporting Carpenter's Network Centrality theory through an in-depth study of both primary and secondary sources addressing the Chemical Weapons ban.

## *II. History of the ban campaign.*

Consistent with expectations based on Carpenter's characteristics of successful bans, the ICRC became involved early on in the campaign to ban chemical weapons. The organization's first appeal to belligerents was published as early as 1918—less than twenty years after the Hague Convention met, and only five years after the first battlefield use of a CW—declaring their intention to:

Take a stand against a barbaric innovation which science is bringing to perfection, that is to say making

it more lethal and more subtly cruel. This innovation is the use of asphyxiating and poisonous gas, which will it seems [sic] increase to an extent so far undreamed of (Mirimanoff 1970).

A year later, after the end of the First World War, they addressed the newly formed League of Nations General Assembly, advocating—among other things—the “absolute prohibition of the use of asphyxiating gas, a cruel and barbarous weapon which inflicts terrible suffering upon its victims” (Letter addressed to the General Assembly of the League of Nations<sup>1920</sup>). This admonition was repeated a year later, and resulted in the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925, “for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare” (Mirimanoff 1970). As Price writes in his book, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*, “In the 1920s...gas weapons became an item of public and government concern in Europe and the United States as the result of activity at the international level by organizations such as the Red Cross” (Price 1997).

Despite fears that the battlefields of World War II would bring pervasive use of the most destructive weapons then in existence, there were few defections throughout the course of the war—even when the resulting advantage could have been decisive (Mirimanoff 1970). According to Price, “the politicization of CW also meant that the burden of proof of what counted as being ‘adequately prepared’ to wage chemical warfare was raised to inordinately high levels, well beyond the level of justification required for other weapons” (Price 1997). Both sides recognized that the German’s decision not to employ gas during the Allied invasion of Normandy cost them an advantage that could have changed the course of the war (Price 1997).

Following the Cold War, tensions surrounding the newly christened “Weapons of Mass Destruction”—as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons came to be called—spurred the reintroduction of efforts to proscribe the use of chemical weapons. Paralleling this renewed concern over destructive weapons, there was also an explosion of new international organizations as one result of an increasingly globalized world. However, the many interconnected networks may not have had the scientific foundation or legitimacy without the World Health Organization’s treatise on Chemical and Biological Weapons in 1970, which further established the ban on chemical weapons. The treatise, entitled “Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” became the premiere source of information on Chemical Weapons, and is referenced in nearly every text on the subject (Kaplan 1999). The utility of their support is expressed within the report itself, where the author writes:

Finally there is the possibility that WHO might be called upon by the United Nations to help deal with

allegations of use of chemical and biological weapons between nations and to assist in the limitation of chemical and biological weapons and disarmament. The technical resources of WHO could contribute greatly to the resolution of many of the difficulties that are associated with these problems and are now being discussed within the framework of the United Nations (World Health Organization 1970).

Additionally, the WHO acted as a gatekeeper for other, smaller organizations with similar goals. The success and legitimacy of the Pugwash conferences on Chemical Weapons may be attributed to the influence and recognized expertise of the scientists from the WHO. Martin M. Kaplan, the Secretary-General of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs from 1976 to 1988, writes of the WHO's involvement in creating a scientific foundation for the prohibition of chemical weapons:

With less than a year to organize the CBW meeting in August 1959 it was not easy to secure participation of scientists who could deal with the challenges involved in a subject to which few of them had given much thought. Nevertheless, the conference proved successful. The 26 participants from eight countries included foremost scientists in the fields of biology, epidemiology and chemistry. ... Several of these distinguished scientists were active participants in WHO Expert Committees and other WHO meetings (Kaplan 1999).

The incestuous nature of the Pugwash and WHO relationship meant that WHO scientists were often on hand at Pugwash conferences, and despite their unofficial status—they attended in their personal capacity, and not as representatives of WHO—it isn't difficult to imagine the exchange of ideas and information that passed between the two institutional bodies (Kaplan 1999). The value of this relationship was readily evident, as Kaplan writes: "The meeting in Pugwash was the first international gathering of scientists to assess CBW in depth, and its report was valuable in that it alerted and informed the general scientific community" (Kaplan 1999). Further elements of Kaplan's memoir also show that the WHO's respected status within the international community contributed to its viability with "target audiences," particularly nation-states. Kaplan relates how his relationship with the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United Kingdom resulted in the latter asking him whether the WHO could construct a detailed report on the technical aspects of Chemical Weapons, and CW's sister

issue, Biological Weapons (Kaplan 1999).

The work done by the WHO at this time was paralleled by the actions of the ICRC. As noted in the 1970 International Review of the Red Cross, the repeated insistence of the Red Cross on behalf of Chemical Weapon bans resulted in a number of resolutions adopted by the United Nations—"The effect [of which] was to induce a score of States to accede." Jean Mirimanoff, the review's author, declared this "an appreciable success, since before 1966 no more than 49 states were parties to the [Geneva] Protocol" (Mirimanoff 1970). ICRC's role in the efforts to ban CW, as well as the advantages of access provided by their unique position within the international community, are expressed by the 1970 review: "[The ICRC continue,] in keeping with their long traditions, to support with all their authority, in parallel with their efforts in the cause of peace, the struggle against biological and chemical warfare by negotiations with governments and by better informing public opinion" (Mirimanoff 1970). There are, however, certain understandings these NGOs must adhere to in order to maintain their privileged relationship with State governments. Consistent with the hypothesis outlined by Carpenter, much of the legitimacy of these two NGOs in the eyes of States comes from their acknowledgement of war's legality. As written in a chemical and air warfare compendium for the Conference for the reduction and limitation of weapons: "The ICRC is certainly convinced of the absolute need to replace war by the peaceful settlement of international difficulties, but so long as the possibility of recourse to armed force subsists, it is the Committee's duty to bear in mind the welfare of all war victims" (Mirimanoff 1970).

Although both international organizations played a pivotal role throughout the campaign to establish and strengthen the ban on Chemical Weapons, their success was best realized through the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, which created an international organization, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to act as its governing and enforcement body. In an address to the United States Senate, former President Bill Clinton declared the Convention "unprecedented in its scope," and described its functions:

The Convention will require States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities under the observation of international inspectors; subject States Parties' chemical industry to declarations and routine inspection; and subject any facility or location in the territory or any other place under jurisdiction or control of a State Party to international inspection to address other States Parties' compliance concerns (Clinton 1993).

Furthermore, the ICRC notes that the use of chemical weapons has become an international war crime:

It is significant that “employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices” is listed in the Statute of the International Criminal Court as a war crime over which the Court has jurisdiction, and that the crime is not limited to first use of such weapons (ICC Statute, Article 8).

### **Application of Theory: Napalm**

Napalm was frequently brought up at the United Nations, and multiple studies were requested to investigate its legality (Roach 1984). According to an extraction from a report on Napalm prepared for the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972, “Incendiary weapons are cruel weapons that cause great human suffering.” Additionally, the experts involved in constructing the report emphasized, “Their use is often indiscriminate as regards their targets...[and] because of this there is a need to consider measures for the clear-cut prohibition of incendiary weapons” (Alvermann, Doswald-Becks, and Henckaerts 1995). Despite this clear uncertainty regarding the validity of its use, activists have never succeeded in fully banning Napalm. Accounts of the brutalities forced upon Vietnamese civilians continued to shock American citizens, and provoked numerous war protests from students and full-time anti-war activists alike. Carpenter lists Napalm as highest in terms of “pro-ban transnational activism,” demonstrating the force behind ban advocacy (Carpenter 2011). A dispatch from Saigon in the *New York Times* on June 5, 1965 elucidated the horrors of the weapon, as well as the nondiscriminatory nature of its use:

As the Communists withdrew from Quangngai last Monday, United States jet bombers pounded the hills into which they were headed. Many Vietnamese—one estimate is as high as 500—were killed by the strikes. The American contention is that they were Vietcong soldiers. But three out of four patients seeking treatment in a Vietnamese hospital afterward for burns from napalm, or jellied gasoline, were village women (Zinn 2007).

Carpenter’s theory postulates that, while the use of Napalm is clearly a violation of humanitarian and international laws, the failure of activists to achieve a prohibition is due to the lack of interest from major hubs within the international organizations community. This hypothesis was strongly supported by the research

presented here. First, while Chemical Weapons are the fifth most salient item on the agenda of the major organizations involved with weapons advocacy—with a score of 12—Napalm is not salient at all to these major hubs, and received a score of 0 according to Carpenter's data (Carpenter 2011). According to corresponding research, it was never directly addressed by the top five most central organizations in the arms control arena, even though some of them—namely ICRC—addressed incendiary weapons while excluding Napalm. The 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, for example, introduced restrictions on incendiary weapons primarily due to concerns stemming from the use of Napalm during the Vietnam War; despite this introduction, however, incendiary weapons were only slightly restricted—battlefield use was not at all limited—and the use of Napalm itself remained intact (Sandoz).

The activists interested in banning the use of Napalm clearly lacked the legitimacy and connections of the more powerful international organizations involved in the ban campaign for chemical weapons.

### **Alternative Argument: Structural Realism and Weapon Utility**

The end of the Cold War also meant a major shift in the international relations paradigms. The supposition that states were rational actors, and made choices based on their understanding of relative gains in an international hierarchy of force, began changing as scholars strove to understand the role of norms, institutions and, increasingly, international and non-governmental actors. Nevertheless, realism is far from falling into obscurity, and it does provide a theory-based approach that is important to address.

International Relations scholar Avery Goldstein provides a straightforward explanation of structural realist thought when she writes, "Competition among states coexisting in a condition of insecurity...encourages each to exploit the most strategically effective forms of military power it is able to deploy." In other words, a state's decision to use a specific weapon should be based on that weapon's effectiveness, or military utility, rather than norms of ethical or moral foundation. Under the realist paradigm—which assumes an anarchic world where the security dilemma makes cooperation difficult—it appears logical that weapon use and non-use is based on utility.

In her report to the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, entitled "The Battlefield Use of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons from 1945 to 2008: Structural Realist versus Normative Explanations", international relations scholar Susan Martin lays out the case for structural realism. She argues that three factors determine battlefield utility: "Whether the weapon has a comparative advantage in a particular role; whether the effects of the weapon are predictable, and whether the destructive power of the weapon poses a significant

risk of undesired escalation.” However, in his paper “The Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,” Price shows that chemical weapons did in fact possess great utility for belligerents. In fact, he argues, much of the success of the ban may have been due to fears stemming from the belief “that asphyxiating bombs might be used against towns for the destruction of vast numbers of noncombatants, including women and children, while torpedoes at sea are used only against the military and naval forces of the enemy” (Price 1995). Far from discarding chemical weapons due to lack of utility, a belief in their strength actually provided ammunition for parties in favor of their prohibition.

Even when focusing solely on treaty dissenters, and assuming they refuse to sign out of value for the weapon’s utility, states’ actual behavior frequently does not match up with this theory’s expected results. For example, during World War II, Britain chose to adhere to the restriction of submarine warfare—even after Germany defected, and even after evidence showed the utility of submarines:

At the end of a 1939 exercise, a submarine officer accurately reported to a hall of one thousand sailors that torpedoes had hit 22 percent of their targets. Instead of the normal questions, Admiral Forbes, the commander of the Home Fleet, stood up, declared that the officer was clearly wrong and that 3 percent was the correct figure, and the session ended (Legro 1997).

Structural realism fails to explain why some states choose to initiate bans when realist scholars would expect a desire to maintain a variety of strategic options.

### **Weaknesses in Carpenter’s Theory**

As demonstrated above, the Network Centrality theory remains the best explanation for the discrepancy in success rates of similar weapons bans. However, as no theory can be perfectly tailored to fit all cases, there are some aspects of this theory that either require more research, or do not appear to be supported by the results from the cases. One concern with Carpenter’s theory is that it may be self-reinforcing. Carpenter states in her paper, “My model predicts a strong correlation between the agenda of these particular organizations [the ICRC and the Arms Division of the HRW] and the overall issue agenda in the broader area of weapons bans” (Carpenter 2011). It is possible that their connection to a large number of smaller organizations would cause them to pick up an issue already popularized throughout the network by another actor. It would then be difficult to tell—solely by looking at the timeline of issue adoption—whether this was a case of widespread interest, or whether the node was merely fulfilling its role as gatekeeper in adopting issues it found relevant or important from smaller organizations. However, these relatively minor inquiries could be easily cleared up by further research exploring

the timelines of minor, as well as major organizations, and are outweighed by the strength of evidence in favor of Carpenter's theory.

### Conclusions

It is important to consider that the penetrating influence of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization in the campaign to ban chemical weapons began even before international organizations became widespread in the post-Cold War era. Despite this fact, the interventions of the two organizations were clearly instrumental in the success of the ban, both in terms of its comprehensive coverage of all types of chemical weapons, and the number of countries which signed on to each of the increasingly stringent bans. When held in contrast to the failed attempts to ban an equally horrific weapon, Napalm, the power held by a small number of interconnected NGOs becomes even more evident. Research clearly supports Carpenter's theory, and opens the door to further exploration along this same path, exploring the role of international organizations in determining the advocacy agenda.

### References

- Additional Protocol I, Article 51(4) (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 3, §§ 206 and 251). Accessed at: International Committee of the Red Cross, "Rule 71. Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate." Last modified 2007. Accessed March 31, 2012.
- Alvermann, Carolin, Louise Doswald-Beck, and Jean-Marie Henckaerts. *Customary International Humanitarian Law*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Brewington, David, David Davis, and Amanda Murdie. "The Ties that Bind: A Network Analysis of Human Rights INGOs." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA, February, 2009.
- Carpenter, Charli. "Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms." *International Organization*. 65. no. 1 (2011): 69-102.
- Clinton, Bill. *Chemical Weapons Convention*. Text of a letter to the Senate. November 23, 1993. Source: U.S. Department of State Dispatch. [http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/dsptch9&div=203&g\\_sent=1&collection=journals](http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/dsptch9&div=203&g_sent=1&collection=journals)
- Human Rights Watch and the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. *Incendiary Weapons: Government Positions and Practices*. Memorandum to Convention on Conventional Weapons Delegates. April 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/17/incendiary-weapons-government-positions-and-practices>
- Goldstein, Avery, "Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China's National Experience," *Security Studies*. 2. No. 3 (1993), 215.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Miles Kahler, and Alex Montgomery. "Network Theory

- in International Relations." *International Organization*. 63. no. 3 (2009): 559-592.
- International Committee of the Red Cross. "Customary International Humanitarian Law database." Last modified 2007. Accessed March 31, 2012. <http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/home>.
- International Committee of the Red Cross, "Rule 74. Chemical Weapons." [http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1\\_cha\\_chapter24\\_rule74](http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter24_rule74)
- ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xviii) (cited in Vol. II, Ch. 24 § 15).
- International Peace Conference 1899. "Declaration (IV,2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases." *Proceedings of the First Peace Conference of The Hague*. The Hague, the Netherlands, July 29, 1899. <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/165?OpenDocument>.
- Kaplan, Martin M. "The efforts of WHO and Pugwash to eliminate chemical and biological weapons—a memoir." *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*. 77. no. 2 (1999): 149-155.
- Legro, Jeffery. "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism." *International Organization*. 51. no. 1 (1997): 31-63.
- Martin, Susan B. "The Battlefield Use of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons from 1945 to 2008: Structural Realist versus Normative Explanations." Paper presented at 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept 2-5, 2010. (Used with permission.)
- Mirimanoff, Jean. "The Red Cross and Biological and Chemical Weapons," *International Review of the Red Cross*. 111 (1970): 301-315.
- O'Brien, William V. "Biological/Chemical Warfare and the International Law of War," *The Georgetown Law Journal* 51 (1962), p 1-63
- Pilloud, C. "The Geneva Conventions—an important anniversary—1949-1969." *International Review of the Red Cross*, August 1969, p. 399
- Price, Richard. *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997.
- Price, Richard. "Reversing the Gun Sights." *International Organization*. 52. no. 3 (1998): 613-644.
- Price, Richard. "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo" *International Organization*. 49, vol. 1 (1995): 73-103.
- Roach, J. Ashley "Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?" 1984.
- Sandoz, Yves. "Convention of 10 October 1980 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Exces-

sively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)." *United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law*. [http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cprccc/cprccc\\_e.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cprccc/cprccc_e.pdf) (accessed ).

UN Secretary- General Report "Respect for Human Rights in Tim of Armed Conflict", A/7720, 20 Nov, 1969.

World Health Organization. Report of a WHO Group of Consultants. *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons*. Switzerland, 1970.

Zinn, Howard. *The Impossible Victory Vietnam. Against the Vietnam War*. Edited by Mary S. Robbins. Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

# The Effect of International Trade Bans on the Population of Endangered Species

RYAN COLE, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

## Abstract

*The international trade of endangered species is leading to greater amounts of biodiversity loss all across the globe. This paper examines the role of international species trade bans on the status of endangered species by comparing those listed on CITES Appendix I with their corresponding IUCN Red List status. The paper results indicate that species listed under trade bans for longer amounts of time tend to have more positive statuses. However, a variety of factors, including conflicting trade policies, state regime types, and species demand, do seem to have a significant impact on the success of trade bans on endangered species.*

## Introduction

In the past century, the subject of endangered species conservation has become an extremely contested topic in international politics. As debates intensify over international wildlife trade, deforestation, habit destruction, and over-exploitation of natural resources, the issue of how to protect the animals affected by these intrusive practices becomes more pertinent. In order to address the accelerating rate of biodiversity destruction, the global community has implemented several mechanisms to control for the wildlife trade, which represents a major cause of species endangerment. In addition to protective domestic policies and the construction of wildlife reserves, countries have recently coordinated efforts to create international regulations and sanctions governing the trade of endangered species. However, the legitimacy and effectiveness of these regulations have been placed under considerable scrutiny, to the point that states now question whether they are helping the situation or merely fueling the incentives for further species exploitation.

---

*Ryan Cole* is a 2012 graduate of the College of William and Mary with a Bachelor's of Arts in Government and a Minor in Hispanic Studies. Since completing his undergraduate education, he has served as an intern at Amazon Conservation Association, which is a non-profit organization advocating for species conservation in the Amazon basin, and is now employed as a conflict researcher at a large international law firm in Washington, DC. He plans to build a career in the environmental policy sector, and would like to ultimately have a job with which he can become more involved in biodiversity and species conservation initiatives.

One of the most prominent components of the wildlife regime is CITES, the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora, which includes a variety of mechanisms to both regulate trade through use of permits and impose complete bans on the trade of individual species. CITES places species in one of three different Appendices which range in degree of protection according to the status of the listed species. The Appendices are organized in the following order: Appendix III regulates species that show signs of possible endangerment, Appendix II regulates those that are currently endangered and whose status is observably (or possibly) negatively affected by continued trade, and Appendix I regulates species whose populations are at critical risk of extinction. In this way, Appendix I “provides the highest level of protection for listed species” and effectively criminalizes all trade of wildlife products (dead or alive) by implementing an international trade ban (Nagle 1996, 436). Since its inclusion in the convention, Appendix I has continuously evolved and become a widely publicized piece of the regime. Its importance is shown in the fact that of the approximate 33,600 species protected by CITES, 800 are listed under Appendix I, which represents a substantially greater amount than that of just a decade ago (Nature 2007, 529). Although the Appendix I category continues to grow, many scholars not only question its effectiveness as a protective agent, but they even label it as an antagonist of endangered species extinction. One source vehemently states that “no measurable evidence exists that CITES has benefitted any species at all”, and that there are in fact “no species whose numbers have increased so dramatically after being listed on the CITES appendices that the improvement is obvious” (Martin 2000, 30). Such bold accusations against the convention imply that stringent wildlife trade regulations, including blanket bans, have no place in the biodiversity regime. This leads us to question why Appendix I and other wildlife trade bans are still implemented, and should lead the international community to reassess what is actually known about the factors that contribute to losses in internationally traded species’ populations.

The rationale behind the widespread utilization of wildlife trade bans seems to be intuitive and stems from their seemingly simple, visible, and cheap means of implementation. For example, the reasons given for the blanket ban on wild bird imports imposed by the Wild Bird Declaration focused on the fact that it was a “simple, clear, and implementable legislation” that would be able to garner support from local governments and the general public (Cooney and Jepson 2006, 18). The logic behind such bans is the same as that repeatedly used to foster support for any other environmental catastrophe or dilemma. As shocking data demonstrating the rapid acceleration of species extinction is distributed worldwide, more individuals will rise to the call of conservation advocacy and demand immediate governmental action. Such manipulative ways of attracting support and donations are used by NGO’s and other actors, which consequently

create a massive demand for international action to combat endangered species loss. Although their success is still inconclusive, trade bans increasingly “represent an appealingly simple solution that resonates in the Northern public mind” simultaneously managing to “achieve a tangible conservation outcome” (Cooney and Jepson 2006, 22). However, trade bans may only be symbolic achievements that act to ease the public mind and make people *feel* as if they are contributing to the environmental movement. On the other hand, the biodiversity loss situation appears dire enough to merit the implementation of any measure that has some perceived success. Trade bans may represent a “quick fix” for an issue rapidly spiraling out of control and serve to temporarily postpone harm against certain species. The wildlife trade in China presents an excellent example of why such an immediate, all-encompassing action was taken. According to Nagle, “Chinese pharmaceutical companies use 1,400 pounds of rhino horns annually”, nearly every tiger part is used for some kind of medicine or dish, and the price of one rhino horn can soar to a staggering \$45,000 (Nagle 1996, 441). The implication of this widespread use and collection of animal parts in Chinese medicine is twofold. Firstly, it illustrates the perceived need for swift action, and secondly, it shows the extent to which wildlife products are ingrained in Chinese life and culture, which could ultimately lead to ineffectiveness in regulations. Thus, many might claim that trade bans serve only as a symbolic measure used to regulate raging public sentiment, but it is evident that the reasons for their implementation can be justified in many circumstances. With these instigating factors in mind, I propose that in most circumstances trade bans can ultimately aid in the population recovery of endangered species that are negatively affected by poaching activities and poorly regulated international trade.

### **Literature Review**

Having provided a brief explanation of the reasoning behind trade bans, I will now discuss the known effects that trade bans actually have on species populations, and where current scholarly knowledge is lacking in determining this relationship. A mass of evidence exists attesting to a harmful relationship between trade bans and endangered species recovery rates. As shown by several case examples, imposing blanket bans on a species does not necessarily eliminate demand for that species in the international market (Cooney and Jepson 2006, 19). The logic of this argument lies in the fact that banning species trade consequently pushes that trade underground to completely unregulated ‘black markets’. Due to the inability to legally acquire and trade banned species, individuals are willing to expend greater amounts of time and energy to capture and sell them, resulting in astronomically higher prices of the desired species. This newly limited supply of endangered species “increases their value” and creates “a lucrative business opportunity for illegal operators” (Cooney and Jepson 2006, 19). In addition,

this argument also supports the idea that imposing such trade bans effectively undermines the protection of species because the creation of black markets takes away all possibility of measuring and monitoring endangered populations. One study, by analyzing the populations of several species before and after transition from Appendix II to Appendix I between 1980 and 2003, corroborates this argument. The study demonstrated an astronomical peak in trade one year prior to the ban's enforcement, with an average increase in trade of all affected species of 135% compared with previous years (Rivalan 2007, 529). The results also showed that certain species could be affected more harshly than others; in fact, the price of rhino horn increased more than 400% within 2 years of its Appendix I listing (Rivalan 2007, 530). Even though the data show that trade tended to decrease in the majority of species after a couple of years on Appendix I, the giant 'peak' serves to illuminate the immediate dangers of imposing excessively harsh regulations. However, the study does not address the inconsistent effects among banned species, and why some were affected more than others. This represents one area of knowledge in which scholars are lacking. It also implies that other factors are related to species recovery from trade regulations.

Several case studies help to demonstrate the perceived detrimental effects that an Appendix I listing can have on endangered species populations. In regard to the Wild Bird Declaration, scholars determined that several bird species were harmed by imposition of the international blanket ban. For example, following the ban in Tanzania, exports of the parrot *Agapornis fischeri* from non-range states (states where the bird is not endemic) soared from around 11,000 in 1991 to about 95,000 in 1999, which "exceeded the peak exports recorded during a single year in Tanzania" (Roe 2006, 28). This case represents the widespread harm that trade bans can cause, as seen by the fact that restricting trade in one country led to a substitution effect, which more than doubled it in neighboring countries. This carryover to other countries may be due to the fact that trade bans are not, and in many cases cannot, be implemented in an equal fashion, leaving those countries with weaker governments and enforcement infrastructures without the means to address decreased trade in neighboring states. The case of the African black rhino exemplifies the unintended harm of trade bans. The black rhino population has rapidly declined following its listing on CITES Appendix I. According to historic data, the listing directly led to a significant increase in price of rhino horn, which rose from \$75 in 1976 to \$308 in 1978 in Japan and \$17 in 1977 to \$477 in 1980 in Taiwan (among other countries), and established a reinvigorated poaching market. Tanzania serves as just one examples of the dramatic plummeting of rhino populations, which went from a healthy 3795 specimens to a meager 275 within 7 years (Sas-Rolfes 2000, 71). Although these examples do imply a strong correlation between trade bans and increased poaching/black market activity, they still do not answer why these species had such terrible downturns as compared to

others which either were affected to a lesser degree, or actually recovered.

The amount that is known about the relationship between the imposition of international trade bans and consequent declines in species populations is matched by the amount still unknown. There seems to be a wide variety of factors that have been observed or questioned which relate to trade bans and could indirectly contribute to species extinction. For instance, due to the fact that international trade bans on species represent a fairly recent policy measure of the last few decades, scholars still do not know whether time is a factor in the success of trade bans. Many assumed that with “time and better training, enforcers of trade ban laws will become more effective”; yet this only represents a government presumption (Misra 2003, 84). Though it seems intuitive that laws would be stronger as time passes and the public has been able to adapt, the validity of this relationship has yet to be tested. In addition, many countries and conservation agencies acquire a substantial income from the sale of wildlife trading permits, which a trade ban can abruptly discontinue. This is significant because it not only leaves the country without “the capacity and political will to invest in newly required management and enforcement”, but also takes away their option to invest in their own well-managed and regulated systems” (Cooney and Jepson 2006, 20). The consequent inability and unwillingness to enforce the ban could exacerbate other factors at work in the decline of populations. There is further suggested evidence that imposition of bans can cause tensions with local populations and undermine their effectiveness. The case of the *Cacatua goffiniana*, otherwise known as Tanimbar Corella, explains this dilemma, in which the bird species was up-listed to Appendix I for faulty reasons; the Corella, though maintaining stable populations, became a pest, which then led to mistrust of conservationists among the native peoples doubting the convention really had their interests at heart (Jepson and Brickle 2006, 221). These discrepancies between the convention and the local communities who are responsible for respecting the regulations represent a valid factor in the overall effectiveness of trade bans. It appears that locals’ willingness to cooperate and the country’s willingness to cede the monetary benefits of trade permits could play a role in this relationship. Furthermore, the relationship between trade bans and the decline of related species has been observed. Studies have yet to determine specifically whether banning trade of one species exacerbates the decline of the most similar ‘substitute species’, but there is speculation that this is the case. According to Sand, this supposed “domino effect” represents a serious factor in the effectiveness of trade bans, as seen in the growing market for hippopotamus ivory since the Appendix I listing of the African elephant (Sand 1997, 26). Thus, the scholarly community still lacks finite research distinguishing the legitimacy and importance of these factors, but their continued and widespread appearance leads many to believe that they play a significant role.

On the opposite side of the debate, many cases attest to the actual effectiveness of trade bans. Although these successes could arguably be labeled as anomalies, there seem to be enough cases to prove the contrary. One such case deals with the chameleon genus *Brookesia* endemic to Madagascar, of which 25 species were added to CITES Appendix II and one species, *B. Perarmata*, was added to Appendix I. Following the ban on trade in *Perarmata*, trade levels to the USA (which constituted a major part of the prior trade) registered as the lowest on record, suggesting that the ban yielded a positive impact (Carpenter 2005, 379). Another successful case deals with the yellow-crested cockatoo of Indonesia, which was under zero-harvesting quotas (in effect, an almost complete trade ban) since 1994 and has recently been added to CITES Appendix I in 2004. According to data collected in a population comparison study of the years 1994 to 2002, export levels from Indonesia measured 712 birds and import levels from other countries measured 1,646; while inconsistent, these amounts still demonstrated lower trade levels than previous years, and therefore represented a “substantial reduction in international trade” in illegal markets (Cahill 2006, 162). However, while evident that trade bans can sometimes achieve their goal of promoting endangered species recovery, the data still leaves much to be desired. For example, like many other case studies (including the Tanimbar Corella discussed previously), the data for yellow cockatoos had to be gathered by population density estimates obtained through chance physical encounters and approximations. This presents an issue of internal validity because researchers cannot be absolutely certain that the populations of individual sites are actually growing, or if species are simply being re-allocated and conglomerated in more confined areas (Cahill 2006, 165).

The case of the African elephant serves as a perfect representation of the debate over the effect of international trade bans because it provides testimony for both sides. This species is crucial due to its ivory, which constitutes a huge part of the African wildlife trade, almost leading to the extinction of the African elephant in the past few decades. There is a plethora of data condemning the application of CITES Appendix I. Khanna states that in Zimbabwe alone, increased poaching led to 100 illegally killed elephants in 1990 as opposed to 10 the previous year (Khanna 1996, 149). He continues in stating that the price of illegal ivory in Japan has more than doubled since the ban's imposition, and in Hong Kong, worked ivory sold for a record \$20,000 per kilogram (Khanna 1996, 151). Such intense increases in poaching thus seem to validate the claim that trade bans can have negative repercussions on species recovery rates. However, similar research has found there was a varying effect in the 37 countries subject to the ban, and that the ivory markets were stimulated in some and even declined in others (Lemieux and Clarke 2009, 456). In their study, Lemieux and Clarke claim that the overall population of elephants in Africa has *increased* by 140,000, and that the full effect of the ban has not (and will not, in some countries) come to fruition. They claim

that the decline in elephant populations is disproportionate and focused only in a select few countries. In addition, their results uncover several intervening factors that may exacerbate the harm of trade bans, including the presence of already unregulated ivory markets, the lack of adequate ban enforcement, and incidences of civil war and corruption (Lemieux 2009, 455). Furthermore, even though they claim that the trade ban has generally led to positive recovery rates, their emphasis on the impact of not-well-understood miscellaneous (and circumstantial) factors shows that the current research on ban effectiveness is lacking. We have both positive and negative evidence, but are ultimately still left without a universal method to determine when and where such regulations will yield success. Research still needs to determine if there is indeed a key factor that leads to a dependable success rate of species recovery in conjunction with a trade ban.

### **Methodology**

In order to effectively determine the nature of the relationship between the imposition of trade bans and consequent trends in endangered species populations, I compared data from the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species and CITES Appendix I. The IUCN Red List works with the IUCN Species Survival Commission to compose a comprehensive listing of all endangered specimens. The list organizes species by taxonomic group, conservation status, threat source, location, habitat type, etc. and works to assess their conservation status in order to promote further global conservation efforts (IUCN). IUCN creates a catalog of endangered species each year, which includes updates on each species' history, population trend, and endangerment status. In order to efficiently categorize this status, IUCN created the following spectrum, ranging from Least Concern to Extinct: Least Concern, Lower Risk, Near Threatened, Vulnerable, Endangered, Critically Endangered, Extinct in the Wild, and Extinct. With such detailed and comprehensive documentation of species information, one can easily identify fluctuations in population trends from year to year and compare changes in individual species' conservation status. Thus, I used the most current IUCN catalog from 2011 (which includes the history of each species from their first IUCN listing), along with the species listed to date on CITES Appendix I, to identify whether inclusion on Appendix I had an effect on conservation status. Rather than comparing the thousands of species on the IUCN Red List to all those in CITES Appendix I, I narrowed my sample to include only mammals listed under the Biological Resource Use Threat category, which includes those affected by hunting, trapping, fishing, logging, and other wild gathering activities related to trade. I justified this exclusion of mammals not categorized under Biological Resource Use with the fact that 241 of the 282 CITES listed mammals appear in this list, which represents a significant majority. With these specified data sets, I could begin my data analysis using three sets of hypotheses described in detail

below.

### **Initial Data Analysis**

While my analysis took into account the known and unknown effects of trade bans, my initial hypotheses focused on the success of previous species (such as *B. perarmata* and the yellow-crested cockatoo), and it assumes that trade bans are structured in a way that should be conducive to achieving their inherent purpose. Thus, in order to identify the general relationship between trade bans and endangered species populations, I began by testing the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1a: If a species is listed under CITES Appendix I, then it should demonstrate an increasing trend in population size since its initial listing.*

*Hypothesis 1b: If a species is not included in CITES Appendix I, then it should demonstrate a decreasing trend in population size.*

In this way, I assumed that a CITES listing will have a positive effect on a species' population. In testing the proposed hypotheses, I created a spreadsheet using the information on the IUCN 2011 catalog that included all CITES and non-CITES listed mammals affected by Biological Resource Use, along with their current population trends and conservation statuses. My independent variable was CITES listing, and to distinguish this I employed a binary number system in which every CITES listed species was assigned a value of 1 and every non-CITES listed species a value of 0. To determine the dependent variable of population trend, I used the values of 0 and 1 to separate the two groups and calculate the amount of species within each one that registered a trend of decreasing, increasing, stable, and unknown, respectively. The calculations indicated that of the 241 species in Group 1 (CITES listed species) an overwhelming majority of 173 species were registered as decreasing, whereas only 14 registered as increasing. Of the remaining 51 species, 14 registered as stable, and 37 as unknown. These results produced the disturbing indication that 73.64% of CITES listed species were actually decreasing, with a mere 5.86% increasing. In contrast, of the 1754 species in Group 0 (non-CITES listed species), 991 registered as decreasing, 32 as increasing, 158 as stable, and 573 as unknown. These results indicated that 56.5% were decreasing, 1.8% were increasing, 9% were stable, and 32.6% were unknown.

To extrapolate on the significance of these percentages, I employed a chi-squared test to show if a statistical relationship existed between the variables of CITES listing and population trend. The chi-square test yielded a result of .000512916, which is sufficiently below the accepted p-value of .05 to corroborate a statistical significance. Therefore, the probability of having observed this data, if there was no relationship, is extremely low. Even though these calculations yield a general representation that a greater number of CITES listed species have decreasing populations, they still fail to prove that the imposition of trade bans

was the causal factor for the decline.

	G1	G2
<b>Increas- ing</b>	14	32
<b>Decreas- ing</b>	173	991
<b>Stable</b>	14	158

Frequency Table for Chi-squared Test: Hypotheses 1a and 1b

### Is Time a Legitimate Factor?

Having calculated the population trend percentages of both groups, it was evident that the exact effect of trade bans on species population was still quite unclear. Thus, I attempted to address one of the unknown factors mentioned in my literature review in order to identify whether the duration of time spent under the regulation of a trade ban contributed to the direction of a species' population trend. Taking into account the claim that trade bans aid the populations of endangered species, I expected to see a positive correlation between amounts of time under a trade ban with increasing populations. This also took into account the assumption that time should be related to more established norms against poaching, as well as a greater amount of similar conservation policies protecting a particular species. Thus, I attempted to test the following secondary hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2a: If a species has been listed on CITES Appendix I for a longer period of time, then it should demonstrate an increasing population trend, compared to others listed for shorter amounts of time.*

In order to determine this relationship, I referenced the Appendix I species listings and added the year of their listing to the data spreadsheet. These years ranged from 1975, when CITES was initially established, until 2007. In order to calculate my new independent variable of years listed under the CITES convention, I subtracted the year of listing from the current year (2012) to acquire amounts ranging from 5 to 37 years. These year amounts served as the new independent variable, and would be used to measure the effect on the population trend (operationalized as increasing, decreasing, and stable) which would once again represent the dependent variable. Rather than listing the independent variable by individual years, it was organized in groupings of ten year intervals, ranging from 0 to 40. The intervals were arranged in the following manner: Group 1 = 0, Group 2 = (1-10), Group 3 = (11-20), Group 4 = (21-30), and Group 5 = (31-40). In this manner, all species in Group 1 would be those not included on CITES Appendix I, whereas all those ranging from 1 to 40 would be CITES listed. Having established these variables, I proceeded to calculate the amount of species in each group that

corresponded to the population trend categories of increasing, decreasing, and stable. Group 1 exhibited 991 species decreasing, 32 increasing, and 158 stable. Groups 2 and 3 exhibited strikingly negative trends, with all 7 species in each group registering as decreasing, and 0 as increasing or stable. Group 4 exhibited 28 species decreasing, 1 increasing, and 4 stable, whereas Group 5 exhibited 131 species decreasing, 12 increasing, and 10 stable. In order to represent these values in a meaningful way, I converted the number amounts to percentages and created a bar graph. Thus, Table 2 effectively illustrates these percentages of species that are decreasing, increasing, and stable for each Group.




Table 2: Percentages of species with increasing, decreasing, and stable population trends depending on years listed under CITES Appendix I

Like in the initial data test, I employed a chi-squared test to determine the statistical significance of the relationship between years listed on CITES and population trend. The calculation yielded a value of .0063295, which is once again low enough to conclude that we can expect a statistical relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

	G1	G2	G3	G4	G5
<b>Increasing</b>	32 (39.3)	0 (.23)	0 (.23)	1 (1.1)	13 (5.1)
<b>Decreasing</b>	991 (994)	7	7	28	131
<b>Stable</b>	158	2 (.87)	2 (.87)	8 (4.1)	25 (19.1)

Frequency Table for Chi-Squared Test: Hypothesis 2

### Time Affecting Change in Status

Having established that some nature of relationship exists between years listed on CITES and species' population trend, I observed the extent to which time had an effect on a species threat status. In particular, this would demonstrate the amount of time necessary for a trade ban to have a significant enough effect on a species' population to cause a change in threat status. In order to accomplish this, I used the 2011 IUCN Red List Catalog to gather the history of each mammal species' IUCN conservation status throughout the past two decades. For each species, the Red List denotes which threat status that individual species was categorized under (Least Concern, Lower Risk, Near Threatened, Vulnerable, Endangered, Critically Endangered, Extinct in the Wild, Extinct), along with the year that in which the catalog and status were updated. With this information, I compared each species' current threat status with that listed in the year 1996; this date was chosen due to the fact that it was a year in which a majority of the species in question was assessed. In addition, the year 1996 allotted a 16 year time interval, which was short enough to allow me to test whether a trade ban actually requires a time period within which it can "activate" or have a measurable effect. Once again, the independent variable was the amount of time listed on CITES (grouped in 10 year intervals), and the dependent variable was change in status since 1996. This change was represented in one of three ways: a 1 for positively changing status, -1 for negatively changing status, and 0 for no change. In this way, I expected to observe that species having been listed under a trade ban longer would have changed to a larger and more positive degree within the 16 year time interval. I would expect that in this amount of time norms would be established de-incentivizing the illegal exploitation of regulated species, and that poachers would have had ample time to acquire cost-effective alternatives. Thus, I will test the following hypotheses.

*Hypothesis 3a: If a species has been listed under CITES Appendix I for a longer amount of time, then it should demonstrate a positive change in threat status in the period between 1996 and 2012.*

*Hypothesis 3b: If a species has been listed under CITES Appendix I for a longer period of time, then it should change more levels (compared to species listed for shorter periods of time) on the threat status spectrum from 1996 to 2012.*

The results demonstrated that 94 of the sample species listed under CITES had threat statuses in 2011 identical to that in 1996. Of the ones that changed, 42 had an improved status and 54 had a declined status. In addition, for 50, species there was either no history listed in the 2011 IUCN Catalog, or there was not sufficient data to determine the current threat status of the respective species. To provide a more in-depth analysis, I calculated the numbers of species in each ten year grouping whose status had remained the same or changed positively or negatively. The 4 species in Group I all registered as unchanged with a value of 0. In Group II, 3 species remained unchanged, while 2 registered a positive change with a value of 1, and 2 registered a negative change with a value of -1. Group III exhibited 13 species as unchanging, 8 with a positive change, and 10 with a negative change, whereas Group IV exhibited 74 with no change, 30 with a positive change, and 42 with a negative change. These amounts are represented in Table 3, which demonstrates the percentages of unchanged and changing species within each of the four Groups.




Table 3: Percentage of species whose threat status has seen no change, a positive change, or negative change since 1996 (Legend: red = no change, green = positive change, blue = negative change)

To test the statistical significance of this relationship, I again used a chi-squared test, which yielded a very high value of .565019. This value is substantially higher than the standard p-value of .05, signifying that there is a low probability that the proposed independent and dependent variables share a statistically significant relationship.

	G1	G2	G3	G4
1	0	2 (1.5)	8 (6.6)	30 (31.06)
0	4 (2)	3 (3.5)	13	74 (73)
-1	0	2 (2)	10 (8.9)	42 (41.9)

Frequency Table for Chi-squared test: Hypothesis 3a

In addition, in the event that a species demonstrated an improvement or decline in threat status since 1996, I calculated the direction and extent of that change. This simply entailed counting the number of levels that a species went up or down on the threat spectrum ranging from Least Concern to Extinct. Thus, the number of years listed served as the independent variable, and the levels changed (measured on a scale of -6 to 6) served as the dependent variable. The majority of species in all groups exhibited no change, with 100% unchanged in Group 1, 42% in Group 2, 42% in Group 3, and 51% in Group 4. The remaining 56% of species that did exhibit a change in Group 2 all did so by one level in either direction. However, species in Group 3 changed to greater levels: 44% changed 1 level in either direction, 3.6% changed 2 or more levels in a negative direction, and 3% changed 2 or more levels in a positive direction. Finally, Group 4 exhibited the most change, with 36% changing by 1 level in either direction, 8% changing 2 or more levels in a negative direction, and 1.5% changing 2 or more levels in a positive direction.

### Empirical Analysis of the Data

I then proceeded to determine the significance of the previously stated data in order to determine if a relationship does indeed exist between a CITES listing and endangered species threat status. I applied the findings in a more broad sense and determined whether trade bans in general have a negative effect on endangered species populations. The data of hypothesis 1, which attempted to prove that species under the regulation of CITES Appendix I led to an increasing population trend as compared to those not regulated, demonstrated that 73.64% of the CITES

listed species were actually decreasing in population sizes, whereas only 56.5% of the non-CITES listed species were decreasing. Unfortunately, a significant amount of species in both groups are categorized with unknown population trends, and thus provided somewhat of a problem accurately comparing them. However, I did not include unknown species in my empirical analysis and attempted to make conclusions solely applicable to the data available. We must also consider that species listed under CITES would probably already have populations that were more endangered and declining at higher rates (because they were endangered and thus needed to be regulated). However, this initial comparison between CITES and non-CITES listed species did not take into account the *rate* at which they were changing, but rather if they were changing at all. To summarize, the calculations from the two groups show a substantial difference of 17.14% in those decreasing. These unexpected results were further verified by the chi-squared test, which yielded a value much lower than the standard p-value of .05, indicating a statistically significant relationship. Furthermore, the high differences between the observed and expected values in the frequency table also verified the high probability of a relationship. Thus, although this proved both Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b false, it did demonstrate that a statistically significant relationship is present. In addition, although it only provided a general and simplified representation of the data, it implied that a more complex connection exists between trade bans and species populations. This led me to the justification of the next hypothesis, which more explicitly identified this relationship.

Hypothesis 2a tested whether the amount of years included in CITES Appendix I had a direct effect on the current population trend of a species. Like the previous test, those species with unknown and missing population trends were excluded from the analysis and were assumed to be distributed evenly throughout the possible categories in each group. Once again, this lack in data presented a problem because conclusions could only be made concerning the data available. Even though I was operating with limited data, I still witnessed comparable results in both the descriptive and statistical analyses. To begin, simply comparing the raw numbers and percentages of those species increasing and decreasing among all groups was very insightful. There is indeed a significant increase in the percentage of decreasing species between Group I, which has never been CITES listed, and Group II, which has only been listed for a maximum of ten years. In addition, the fact that 100% of all species in Groups II and III have decreasing populations is striking and yields marked implications; it either implies that an Appendix I listing harms populations or doesn't have an immediate effect in aiding their recovery. Though the evidence from the first hypothesis test might seem to attest to the former, I intend to justify the latter, in that CITES and trade bans in general require a certain amount of time to "activate" and have a measurable effect. The amount of species with increasing population trends serves to complement

this claim. For example, a miniscule 2.7% of species never listed under Appendix I are increasing in size, whereas 11.5% of species listed for twenty or more years are increasing. This difference represents that, although delayed for twenty or more years, population trends do tend to positively change under the regulation of a trade ban. In addition, the incremental difference between species with increasing trends in Groups IV and V corroborates this. In fact, 3% of those species listed for 21-30 years in Group IV registered as increasing, compared to the 8% of increasing species listed for 31-40 years in Group V. This growth of 5% would seem to demonstrate that more species are positively affected as their time listed under a trade ban increases. Furthermore, the legitimacy of these findings is justified by the chi-squared test, which again yielded a very low p-value. In examining the individual values in the frequency table used for this test, I observed that those cells for the first group (0 years) and fifth group (30-40 years) had high values compared to zero (determined from the difference between the observed and expected values). This led me to conclude that a high probability exists that being listed for 30-40 years would have a measurable effect on species population, and that the probability of observing these data if there were no relationship is low. Therefore, I conclude that a statistically significant relationship does exist between the amount of time listed under CITES and changes in species' population trends.

Having established the claim that population trend and amount of time regulated by a trade ban are inter-related, I will now attempt to identify the degree to which this effect is observed in the data. In order to test the hypothesis that species listed longer will exhibit more positive changes in threat status, I analyzed the percentages of positively and negatively changed species across all Groups. However, the extent to which I can apply my observations in a broader context is limited due to the lack of data on non-CITES listed species. There are no specific data included in this report for these species that have changed in either direction or remained the same since 1996. Thus, I am only able to make conclusions about CITES listed species.

Unlike the previous two tests, the chi-squared test employed here yielded a result much higher than the standard p-value of .05. In addition, the majority of the individual values in the frequency table registered very close to zero, with the highest difference from zero as 1.41. Unfortunately, this signals that the probability that this data would have been observed if no relationship existed is considerably high, meaning that there is most likely not a statistically significant relationship from which to make broader conclusions. However, analysis of the descriptive data from a strictly comparative perspective still proves quite useful. For example, the amounts of species exhibiting a positive or negative change are significantly higher in Group IV compared to Group I. Of the species listed for 31-40 years in Group IV, 20% exhibited a positive change and 28% a negative change, whereas

0% of species in Group I exhibited any kind of change. Although the percentages represented in Table 2 fail to demonstrate any consistent *incremental* change as the amount of years increased, there does seem to be an *absolute* difference between those recently listed and those listed for the maximum amount of time (40 years). In other words, we would expect to see more of a change (whether positive or negative) from a baseline comparison of species listed for 10 years or less with species listed for 31 to 40 years. In addition, the fact that 100% of the threat statuses of species listed for 10 years or less have remained unchanged since 1996 is very significant. This either signifies that the implementation of the trade ban has no effect, or that recently listed species have not been under its regulation long enough to have undergone an observable change. I propose that the latter argument holds more validity, both because a large percentage CITES listed species *have changed* in some way and the results from the previous test demonstrated that years listed is statistically significant. This echoes the claim previously stated that trade bans require a sufficient amount of time to have any kind of effect on endangered species population, whether it be positive or negative. However, based on the statistical findings, this leads me to partially reject Hypothesis 3a. The comparison of percentages from only two groups, though it does give some insight, only provides a simplistic image of the results. We can therefore only conclude that more time listed under a trade ban leads to *some* direction of change in threat status, and this change *could* be positive.

The results of the last hypothesis test, which attempted to identify the extent of this positive or negative change, appeared to corroborate this claim. Compared to 0 species changing in Group 1, more species are changing to greater extents as they are listed for longer periods of time. For example, Groups 3 and 4 (which include species listed for 21 or more years) are the only ones that exhibit species fluctuating in status by more than 2 levels. In fact, the only species with a registered change of 4 levels in either direction is in Group 4, and has been listed for 37 years. Although a large number remain unchanged in all groups, it is significant that those that *are* changing are doing so to a greater extent, and are coming closer to reaching the two extremes of extinct and least concern.

### **Conclusion and Broader Implications**

With the test results of these three sets of hypotheses, I demonstrated the existence of a relationship between an Appendix I CITES listing and the population/threat status of an endangered species. Although the first hypothesis test did conclude in general that more CITES listed species are decreasing, this does not take into account unknown species and leaves undetermined the rate at which the species' populations are changing. For example, from this test alone it cannot be determined whether CITES listed species are decreasing or increasing at slower or faster rates than those not listed. Thus, even though the data appears

to suggest that a CITES listing negatively affects a species' population, with the given information I cannot conclude that trade bans in general always have this effect (without knowing the rates at which the populations are changing).

This led me to the next test, which verified that there is a high probability that years listed under CITES would have a measurable effect on species population trends. With the descriptive analysis and statistical results, I concluded that more species would be increasing and stable if they were listed for thirty or more years (compared to those recently listed). To define these results in the context of real-world implications, we should expect to witness several possible factors contributing to this trend. First, we would expect to see lower demand for the species in the international market, and thus a more founded consensus among rural communities and traders against the species being traded. As species are regulated under an international trade ban for longer periods of time, the individuals prone to trading them will be less inclined to do so due to growing norms against it. Ideally, this general consensus against the poaching of endangered species would not be the product of more laws in place, but rather more effective and *accepted* laws. Thus, the incentive for poachers to ignore trade bans will diminish as they continue to live in societies where their actions are frowned upon and villainized. The weight of social pressure would thus play an increasingly vital role in the effectiveness of trade bans.

Secondly, species regulated under trade bans will most likely be included in other domestic, conservation-driven legislation; as a consensus accumulates in the international community to protect them, individual states and organizations should show more initiative. For example, if the population integrity of an endangered species was low enough to qualify for an Appendix I listing on CITES, we would expect to see other locally and internationally driven conservation organizations advocating for its protection. As the species gain more attention in the international community due to international trade ban legislation, they would most likely be protected under similar endeavors by the local governmental authorities.

Finally, we would expect to see traders substituting similar species for those listed under the trade ban. As mentioned in the literature review, it has been conjectured that poachers are increasingly willing to trade hippopotamus ivory instead of elephant ivory due to the African elephant's inclusion in CITES Appendix I. Thus, thirty years should represent sufficient time to find product alternatives and introduce them into the international species market. Furthermore, the fact that 0% of recently listed species represented a status threat status change since 1996 further corroborates this claim. We would not expect to see species with less than 10 years of listing to have been affected by a trade ban; it requires a certain amount of time to allow for norms to develop and alternative species to be

found. Therefore, I can safely justify the claim that trade bans are a more effective measure for long-term, rather than immediate, results. It is evident that, given enough time, they are ultimately capable of aiding the recovery of endangered species populations.

## References

- Carpenter, Angus I., and Onja Robson. "A Review of the Endemic Chameleon Genus *Brookesia* from Madagascar, and the Rationale for Its Listing on CITES Appendix I." *Oryx* 39.4 (2005): 375-80.
- Cahill, Alexis J., Jonathan S. Walker, and Stuart J. Marsden. "Recovery within a Population of the Critically Endangered Citron-crested Cockatoo *Cacatua Sulphurea Citrinocristata* in Indonesia after 10 Years of International Trade Control." *Oryx* 40.2 (2006): 161-67.
- CITES Appendices*. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. Accessed Mar. 2012. <<http://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php>>.
- Cooney, Rosie, and Paul Jepson. "The International Wild Bird Trade: What's Wrong with Blanket Bans?" *Oryx* 40.1 (2006): 18-23.
- Gilardi, James D. "To Ban or Not to Ban: A Reply to Jorge Rabinovich." *Oryx* 40.3 (2006): 264-65.
- Heltberg, Rasmus. "Impact of the Ivory Trade Ban on Poaching Incentives: A Numerical Example." *Ecological Economics* 36.2 (2001): 189-95.
- IUCN Red List of Threatened Species*. International Union for Conservation of Nature. Accessed Jan. 2012. <<http://www.iucnredlist.org/>>.
- Jepson, Paul, Nick Brickle, and Yusup Chayadin. "The Conservation Status of Tanimbar Corella and Blue-streaked Lory on the Tanimbar Islands, Indonesia: Results of a Rapid Contextual Survey." *Oryx* 35.3 (2001): 224-33.
- Khanna, Jyoti, and Jon Hartford. "The Ivory Trade: Is It Effective." *Ecological Economics* 19.2 (1996): 147-55. *Science Direct*. Google Scholar. Accessed 1 Mar. 2012. <<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0921800996000432>>.
- Lemieux, Andrew M., and Ronald V. Clarke. "The International Ban on Ivory Sales and Its Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa." *British Journal of Criminology* 49.4 (2009): 451-71. Print.
- Martin, R.B. "When CITES works and when it doesn't." *Endangered Species, Threatened Convention*. Edited by J.M. Hutton and Barnabas Dickson, 29-37. Earthscan Publications: London, 2000.

Misra, Manoj. "Evolution, Impact, and Effectiveness of Domestic Wildlife Trade Bans in India".

*The Trade in Wildlife: Regulation for Conservation*. Edited by Sara Oldfield, 78-85. Earthscan Publications, 2003.

Nagle, John C. "Why Chinese Wildlife Disappears as CITES Spreads." *Georgetown International Environmental Law Review* 9 (1996): 435-46.

Rabinovich, Jorge. "To Ban or Not to Ban, Seeking the Middle Path: A Response to Gilardi." *Oryx* 40.3 (2006): 263-64.

Rivalan, Philippe. "Can Bans Stimulate Wildlife Trade?" *Nature* 447 (2007): 529-30. Print.

Roe, Dilys. "Blanket Bans - Conservation or Imperialism? A Response to Cooney and Jepson." *Oryx* 40.1 (2006): 27-28.

Sand, Peter H. "Commodity or Taboo? International Regulation of Trade in Endangered Species." *Green Global Yearbook* (1997): 19-36.

Sas-Rolfes, Michael. "Assessing CITES: 4 Case Studies". *Endangered Species, Threatened Convention*. Edited by J.M. Hutton and Barnabus Dickson, 69-87. Earthscan Publications: London, 2000.

# How Non-State Actors Evolve: Clausewitzian Lessons from Northern Ireland and Lebanon

PAUL BAUMGARDER, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

## Abstract

In his 1832 masterwork *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz argued that successful warfare demands that state actors balance the public, governmental, and military arms of society. In modern warfare, national entities are not the sole beneficiaries of Clausewitz's theory of the Trinity. Using the Irish Republican Army and Hezbollah as case studies, we learn that non-state actors must evolve in order to attain a balanced relationship between public, governmental, and military forces. The Irish republican movement successfully shifted military resources into the political realm in order to achieve a balanced Trinity. Although Hezbollah has made significant organizational changes since the 1980s, the group has been unwilling to reorient its military and political arms, thus damaging Hezbollah's standing in the international community.

## Introduction

As the threat of Napoleonic power aggrandizement threatened Europe in the late nineteenth century, many nations dedicated their best minds to the task of repelling Napoleon's French forces. In response, Carl von Clausewitz published a piece on warfare that would affect the military landscape generations after Napoleon's death. In Clausewitz's groundbreaking text *On War*, Clausewitz argued that Europe needed thinking officers, who were capable of grappling with the different facets of warfare. Clausewitz's most important contribution to the understanding of war was his theory of the sociopolitical "Trinity." Clausewitz believed that a successful political agenda and war strategy depended upon the relationship of three entities: "The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third

---

*Paul Baumgardner* is a political science Ph.D. student at the University of Michigan. Paul graduated summa cum laude from Baylor University in 2012. His publications span the fields of constitutional law, political philosophy, and terrorism studies. Paul is currently the head graduate researcher on a Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative project that is researching the causes and consequences of terrorist group alliances. Paul was recently awarded a BIPI Research Fellowship, which provided him the opportunity to research how legal defeat affected religious practices in three northern Californian Native American communities. Current projects include a book chapter on American philosopher Robert Nozick and an article on Reynolds v. United States.

the government.” (Clausewitz 1873, 89) Although scholars debate the extent to which we should characterize the Trinity as a law of war, it cannot be denied that a successful warfare strategy depends on several factors, and Clausewitz’s rubric furnishes a valuable resource in evaluating the many facets of organizational decision-making. Moreover, although the conventions of war, and the global conceptions of sovereignty, shifted since the early nineteenth century, Clausewitz’s fundamental assertions about maintaining a balanced Trinity seem more applicable than ever to national actors.

However, the modern rise of non-state actors has provided a surprising twist to the history of conflict. Unlike state actors, who rely on institutionalized government and military structures to maintain equilibrium, non-state entities are less institutionalized and more likely to be held together by a central ideology or moral ideals. In this essay, I shall compare the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which successfully transitioned into a legitimate Clausewitzian government arm, with the Shiite group, Hezbollah. This juxtaposition will prove to contemporary non-state movements that only through a transmogrification of military objectives into political operations will a balanced Clausewitzian Trinity be achieved and sociopolitical gains realized.

### **Flexibility and Interdependence in the Trinity**

An understanding of the government branch of the Clausewitzian Trinity will inform the comparative relationship between the IRA and Hezbollah. Therefore, a proper assessment of these modern guerrilla actors first requires a thorough investigation into the broader, philosophical fabric of Clausewitz’s *On War*. Clausewitz does not posit an idealistic or noble conception of war, but a conception depicting the ugliness and unpredictability of conflict. It is this unpredictability that leads Clausewitz to argue that the three branches of the Trinity are “deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.” (Clausewitz, 1873, 89) Although this essay focuses on the political arm of Clausewitz’s Trinity theory, it is important to remember that a policy that ignores any one of the three branches, or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them, would be useless. A static model of the balanced Trinity cannot be offered. Warring actors must be able to oversee the empowerment of one branch, and the circumscription of another, if circumstances change. For this reason, the Trinity balance conceived by state entities must be different than the balance conceived by non-state entities.

The ways in which war’s friction affects the public branch of the Trinity differs depending on whether the actor retains the institutionalized support of a government. Additionally, the structural limitations placed upon state-sponsored armies are significantly different than the military limitations found in a guerrilla movement. In order to provide diversity and breadth to my comparative research, I selected two equally volatile non-state entities from different geographic regions,

including one that has recently accepted Trinity verities.

### **The Origin of Hezbollah**

Hezbollah, or the “Party of God,” is a militant organization that sprang into prominence after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. For historians, Israel’s invasion and lasting occupation within Lebanon became the most significant factor in the radicalization of the Lebanese Shiites under Hezbollah. Hezbollah leaders rationalize the use of military extremism by appealing to Israel’s creation of a context for Hezbollah’s birth and continued growth. The presence of a foreign occupying force—which imposes uncomfortable legal, economic, and political changes on the native population—has been the catalyst for many historic guerrilla movements. However, although Israel’s occupation of Lebanon provided the catalyst for Hezbollah’s emergence, the organization’s growth in membership, political acumen, and military capabilities can be attributed to other sources. In fact, if neighboring states had not provided aid to the early resistance movement, Lebanese contempt for the Israeli state may have fizzled out as a minor rebellion. Instead, it grew into a united populist ideology.

Over the past three decades, Syria and Iran significantly influenced the ideology and political growth of Hezbollah. Following a successful Islamic revolution over the secular shah, opportunistic Iranian mullahs turned their sights to the rest of the Middle East. Sandra Mackey, a prominent journalist specializing in Middle Eastern politics, helps explain Iran’s interest in the Lebanese rebels: “For Iran’s revolutionary leaders correctly saw in Lebanon a fertile opportunity to spread the Islamic revolution beyond the borders of Iran. With a large Shiite population historically and emotionally tied to Iran, Lebanon was chosen as the country in which Iran would demonstrate the power of its revolution.” (Mackey 1989, 206) By financing Hezbollah and providing arms and training to its guerrilla fighters, the Iranian government has been granted a powerful hand in shaping Hezbollah’s future. To this day, Iran’s blandishments have allowed the nation to hold substantial sway over the governing hierarchy of Hezbollah: “Iran has sponsored the creation of a Consultative Council for Lebanon. The council supervises the work of Hezbollah within Lebanon and serves as the nodal connection between Iran and Lebanon... There is also an extensive system for the payment of pensions to the families of individuals martyred in the cause of Hezbollah.” (Norton 1987, 102)

Whereas Iranian influence tends to use Southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah, as a second breeding ground for revolutionary Islamic political thought, Syria has been more strategic with its marionette strings. After suffering defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1973, Syrian foreign policy became keener to the holistic strategy of Arab-Israeli conflict. In this calculated chess match, Syria began utilizing Hezbollah’s resistance as an invaluable geographic and military weapon. Starting in the early 1980s, Syria pushed weaponry and money into the hands of the Hezbollah

campaign, and thereby placed great pressure on Israel, and its controversial control over the Golan. (Bickerton and Klausner 2010, 312) At times over the past twenty years, Syrian influence became so entwined with Hezbollah's political governance and military decision-making that some political commentators view Hezbollah simply as the radicalized alter ego of Syria, successfully offering leverage to Syrian interests. In the 1990s, Syria's strong military presence in southern Lebanon further complicated Hezbollah's political autonomy: "With 35,000 to 40,000 troops still in Lebanon, Syria was the real power broker in that country, and Hezbollah could not operate with impunity in Lebanon without Syrian assistance and acquiescence." (Bickerton and Klausner 2010, 279) Although surrounding Arab nations furnished startup capital and influenced Hezbollah during moments of warring regional interplay, Hezbollah's malleable political ideology gave the unique part-humanitarian/part-terroristic organization the independence necessary to stand on its own two feet in the Middle East.

### **The Evolution of Hezbollah Ideology**

The ideological foundation of Hezbollah arose from a conglomeration of Lebanese resistance efforts. The Israeli occupation, beginning in the 1980s, unified the divided Shiite population under several guiding principles. (Pintak 2003, 290) In the nascent years of Hezbollah, militarism and jihadist demands underlay the burgeoning group. The extremism sweeping Iran, northern Africa, and Palestine at that time also impacted Hezbollah's initial political ideology: "Among Hezbollah's demands- 'America, France, and their allies must leave Lebanon once and for all, and any imperial influence in the country must be terminated.' It sounded suspiciously like an Islamic Jihad communiqué. With good reason." (Pintak 2008, 228) The religious tinge connected to Hezbollah stood out in the Lebanese community, and became a polarizing factor as the group gained military and social clout. Hezbollah desired that southern Lebanon transition into an Islamic state, thereby coalescing into the broadening Iranian revolution. Although Hezbollah successfully grasped the loyalty of many hard-line Shiite clerics and politicians in the South, the group's founding platforms proved to be divisive within the whole of Lebanon, and Hezbollah was unable to cut across religious lines in the 1980s and early 1990s.

In 1992, Hasan Nasrallah was elected the secretary-general of Hezbollah. As the spokesman for Hezbollah, Nasrallah has played a key role in moving the ideology of the group toward Clausewitz's political arm. As the relationship between Syria, Lebanon, and Israel grew tense in the early 1990s, Nasrallah reevaluated the assertive platforms of Hezbollah, and began to strategically shift the group's interests: "Nasrallah noted that 'We are serious in our project to bring down the government, but we shall not resort to negative steps... because the country is passing through a delicate stage.'" (Harris 1997, 302) Although Nasrallah maintained

a strong link between his military and political ideology, the charismatic leader drew in a larger bloc of believers because of his willingness to moderate goals and galvanize the masses with a novel sense of Lebanese nationalism. Thanks to Nasrallah, Hezbollah began “putting its ‘Islamic state’ on the back burner so it could operate more flexibly in a multi-communal society.” (Harris 1997, 302) Social works programs and secular grassroots political efforts gave Hezbollah the opportunity to gradually deemphasize its religious platforms. These prudent organizational moves attracted a broader crowd of Lebanese citizens and led to a surge in non-Shiite Hezbollah membership. However, the greatest example of opportunistic ideological movement occurred in 2000:

On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet pledged a withdrawal from Lebanon by July. The Israeli decision surprised and alarmed the Lebanese government and disconcerted its neighboring Arab states. Having established itself as a Shiite resistance movement against the Israeli presence in South Lebanon, Hezbollah’s primary *raison d’être* would be removed. With Hezbollah’s need for arms reduced, the role of its patrons Syria and Iran would also presumably be diminished. (Bickerton and Klausner 2010, 318)

Hezbollah’s leadership became existentially trapped: the group was forced to either amend its ideological aims once again or to accept military victory, therein burying any political future. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hezbollah had accrued the political, military, and economic support of many Lebanese constituents, and Nasrallah was unwilling to sacrifice these political gifts for the sake of honestly confessing that Hezbollah’s original mission had been fulfilled. Instead of ceding its power, Nasrallah helped redirect the political objectives of Hezbollah toward two foci. By promising to rebuild the entire Lebanese state, Hezbollah turned its efforts to the whole Lebanese people, not just southern Lebanese Muslims. Externally, years of anti-Israeli sentiment morphed Hezbollah’s ideology into a trenchant support for the Palestinian cause; this “altruistic concern” allows Hezbollah to continue sporadic attacks against Israel, whenever the group believes that Palestinian interests are at risk. (Pintak 2003, 314) These recent ideological transformations, compounded by foreign influences, have shaped Hezbollah into a unique Middle Eastern group with a growing number of public supporters.

### **The Beginning of a Government Arm**

Hasan Nasrallah’s most important contribution to the group lies in his work to enter Hezbollah into Clausewitz’s government arm. By channeling Hezbollah’s popular support into the political sector, the group has been able to overcome some

of the disadvantages attributable to non-state entities. Although initially opposed to the creation of a political party, Hezbollah—under Nasrallah’s leadership—eventually saw the benefits of joining the political ranks, and the “Party of God” became an official Lebanese political party in 1992.

Non-state actors are prone to eschew unity and compromise, instead attempting to chip away at the government bureaucracy and undermine the political process. However, after the end of the Israeli occupation, Hezbollah was given the opportunity to put its abstract ideology into political practice: “Immediately following the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon... Hezbollah began systematically taking over Southern Lebanon and creating a state within a state. It worked towards deepening its control over the population by taking over the social and welfare arenas and managing the civilian services.” (Committee on International Relations 2006, 39) Understanding that the current Lebanese government and military were too weak to confront the emergence of a provisional government, the Hezbollah leadership began to legitimize the political arm of Clausewitz’s Trinity through the stimulation of a different branch of the Clausewitzian Trinity: the public arm.

Recognizing the vacuum of social and financial support after 2000 as a crucial opportunity, the group amplified its social works programs—creating thousands of jobs, schools, houses, and medical operations—in order to rebuild the entire Lebanese state. Complemented by an enriched propaganda movement, these efforts and ideological promises attracted the Lebanese people to the Hezbollah party, and gave political standing to a group once known only for its terrorist activities. This reprioritization of politics over militarism gave Hezbollah political standing in the Middle Eastern community. Former CBS News Middle East correspondent Lawrence Pintak writes that these protective group efforts, designed to mobilize the Lebanese people, produced an element of international recognition: “Hezbollah, once just an elusive trend, was now negotiating treaties.” (Pintak 2003, 292) By virtue of sitting down as a key actor in the Middle Eastern political process, Hezbollah acquired a *de facto* right to fight as well as legitimacy for its anti-Israel political platforms. Most importantly, because Hezbollah embraced the role of military, social, and governmental protector of the Lebanese people, this political party has become inextricably linked to the political stability of the nation. “As long as Hezbollah was part of the system, we knew there was a good chance for stability to take hold,” Lawrence Pintak observes, “but if something drove them out of the process, all bets were off.” (Pintak 2003, 318)

In an effort to protect the political integrity of the Lebanese government, the United States funneled hundreds of millions of dollars, and great quantities of military equipment, into Lebanon over the past decade, but Hezbollah continued to use its political power to safeguard its military operations and vitiate the work of Lebanon’s official government. (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007, 4)

Following the 2006 conflict with Israel, the international community pressured Hezbollah to disarm. (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2007, 11) Hezbollah resisted these persistent entreaties and became more antagonistic to the Lebanese, Israeli, and American governments. In this way, Hezbollah has not separated its military activities from its political leadership, but instead allowed for a terroristic, humanitarian, political amalgam to continue.

### **Hezbollah and the IRA: Comparative Analysis and Shared Characteristics**

Hezbollah achieved a successful *entrance* into the Lebanese political arena, and in so doing garnered a degree of international recognition and a current bloc of popular support. However, a succinct overview of the Northern Irish republican movement's transition into government shows that a non-state entity's sociopolitical gains will only sustainably exist through a developed political branch of the Clausewitzian Trinity. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) provides a reasonable case for comparative analysis with Hezbollah; the juxtaposition of these two groups is made possible by the fact that despite being politically, geographically, religiously, and culturally dissimilar, the IRA and Hezbollah display multiple shared characteristics.

Ideologically, both the IRA and Hezbollah allow religion to become tied to their respective resistance movements. Whereas Hezbollah maintains strong links to the Islamic faith, Irish republicans are overwhelmingly Catholic. Additionally, the presence of an occupying force and the imposition of a disagreeably foreign way of life created the ideological context buoying the two militant movements. For the southern Lebanese, Israel represented this occupying force; for the Northern Irish Catholic population, the British government and its privileged Protestant populace threatened Irish unity and led to unequal political and economic conditions.

In the political arena, the IRA and Hezbollah also share many commonalities. Like the Syrian and Iranian-backed Hezbollah group, the IRA has always attempted to expand its foreign relations, often benefiting from financial backers and arms suppliers in the Western world (which has included millions of dollars of support from American citizens). Most strikingly, the cardinal political demands of the Irish Republican Army parallel those of Hezbollah: the IRA demands the withdrawal of all British forces and the termination of all political intrusion into Northern Irish governance, as well as greater political autonomy and stronger ties with Ireland (which is geographically-linked to Northern Ireland). Although these important similarities exist, which make comparison between the two militant organizations possible, the Irish republican movement's political success presents a more successful Clausewitzian model.

### **The Troubles**

The Irish Republican Army of the late twentieth century arose out of grave

social, economic, and political inequalities in British-controlled Northern Ireland. In the late 1960s, non-violent political activists began campaigning in Northern Ireland against the “second-class status of Catholics with regards to voting rights, job opportunities, and housing;” sadly, this predominantly-Catholic movement was met with violent animosity by Protestant business owners and political heads. (de Breadun 2008, 2) Political commentator Deaglan de Breadun writes, “The political system in Northern Ireland, dominated by an inflexible unionist elite, was unable to accommodate the demands of the Catholics and integrate them into a pluralistic, inclusive society with opportunity for all. The fact is that Northern Ireland was set up to maintain Protestant supremacy.”(de Breadun 2008, 2) By the early 1970s, the Troubles had officially begun; the Troubles denote a period in Northern Ireland history that saw the rise of a largely Catholic paramilitary force—the IRA—confronting British soldiers and pro-British Protestant forces with the aim of removing British influence from the land and providing equality to the Catholic population. During the Troubles, the British government drained billions of dollars in military, intelligence, and business assets, not to mention the loss of thousands of pro-British Unionist lives. However, as the conflict progressed into the 1990s, the Irish Republican Army found itself in a similar quandary to what Hezbollah faces today: although the organization’s ideological foundations and popular support called for continued resistance, military means alone could not overcome enemy resources.

### **Reshaping the Arms of the Irish Republican Movement**

It was during this predicament that Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams helped to redirect the Irish republican movement. It was the work of Adams, and more broadly, the work of Sinn Fein, which helped Irish republicanism achieve lasting victories in the political branch of Clausewitz’s Trinitarian model. As the growing political arm of the Northern Irish republican movement, Sinn Fein held political objectives that had traditionally aligned with the sociopolitical goals of the Irish Republican Army. However, under Adams’s guidance, Sinn Fein aimed to move away from the Armalite and ballot box strategy, thus separating the military leadership of the republican movement from Sinn Fein’s political leadership. By distancing the political arm from the movement’s militaristic arm, Sinn Fein tacitly acknowledged that “the IRA’s activities were often counterproductive and hindered the growth of the republican movement’s political influence.”(de Breadun 2008, 4) The separation between the military and political arms led to numerous strategic benefits for the Irish republican movement. The distancing act empowered the republican government arm and opened the movement up to a broader popular base. The delicate balance between the arms of the Clausewitzian Trinity improved as the public sphere became more receptive to the republicans’ shift to honest politics: “While Sinn Fein continues to press to make partition

history, the more immediate and tangible gains of the agenda make the party's revisionist republicanism attractive to the nationalistic electorate for which armed struggle and militant paths to unity were always a minority taste."(Coulter and Murray 2008, 57)

Whereas the Irish republicans generally utilized the political arena in the service of military objectives, Sinn Fein reversed this paradigm. The military's presence was to be gradually tuned out, and in the rare instances when the military arm of the resistance was required, it became an instrument of republican political interests:

For the IRA, coercive bargaining will normally involve indicating to the adversary, through military action, that the costs of not acceding to its political demands will outweigh the costs of concession. In this sort of conflict the weaker party may not be able to achieve any tangible military objectives, such as securing a piece of territory. Instead, as Clausewitz observed, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in peace negotiations. (Smith 1995, 3)

Another important component of the military phase-out and political empowerment occurred when Sinn Fein sat down for international peace talks. As Sinn Fein strengthened its public and governmental resolve in the 1990s, the political party eventually began to negotiate a lasting peace treaty with the British, Irish, and Northern Irish governments. In order to access sustainable economic, political, and social gains for the Catholic community, the republican movement would have to concede considerable ground. Firstly, the Irish republicans had to actively renounce the use of terrorism, and gradually disarm their military wing. Secondly, the hard-line ideological goals set up during the 1970s had to be supplanted by limited gains within the state. As Gerry Adams pointed out, these gains would only actualize through political compromise and strategic coalition: "Irish republicans... simply do not possess the political strength to bring about these aims. [This truth] must continue to influence the political and strategic thinking of Irish republicans.' The focus of republican politics, according to Adams, should be on 'attempting to reconstruct a broader, deeper, sustainable Irish political consensus.'" (Smith 1995, 198) By the end of the 1990s, the Irish republicans' ability to politically adapt, compromise, and demilitarize led to the greatest advancement of Catholic legal and social equality in modern Northern Irish history: the Good Friday Agreements of 1998.

Ideologically, Sinn Fein discovered a path to sociopolitical success by embracing principles of moderation, humility, and secularism. The religious impetus of

the resistance movement, which unified the Catholic population under the IRA banner, was supplanted in the 1990s by secular political backing. Colin Coulter and Michael Murray assert, "The Catholic Church is now much less politicized than at the height of the Troubles when priests joined civil rights protests and visited hunger strikers. The politics of peace have meant that the Catholic Church is increasingly taking a political back seat... [especially] since the decline in violent conflict." (Coulter and Murray 2008, 143) The revised role of international influence also highlighted the humility and militaristic moderation of the 1990s Irish republican movement. Historically, the Irish republicans had turned to American citizens and other developed Western nations solely for financial backing and arms dealing. In the 1990s, however, Sinn Fein helped coordinate the Mitchell Review, which provided necessary multinational oversight to move the peace process along and to hold each party accountable for disarmament and political compromise. (Farrington 2008, 10) By turning to the international community for aid in humanitarian and political processes, the Irish republicans finally achieved their sociopolitical aims and gained lasting political legitimacy around the world.

### **Lessons**

The Irish republican movement's gradual evolution into a purely political existence offers many significant lessons to the modern Hezbollah campaign. In 2006, Hezbollah's rejection of international calls for disarmament highlighted the group's inability to successfully balance the political and military arms of Clausewitz's Trinity model. The group stubbornly continues to value brawn over brains, as it remains unwilling to acknowledge the futility of militarily upending the Israeli state. Instead of moderating its political stances and expanding its list of international allies, Hezbollah resumes its parochial vision and weak dedication to peaceful politics. As a result, the United States, Israel, and numerous other developed nations become emboldened in their aggression against the southern Lebanese group.

The Irish republican movement proved to non-state actors that the government arm of an organization must become distanced from the organization's military arm. Along with this distancing, political leaders must be willing to separate themselves from military leadership if they ever hope to strengthen the popular wing of the Trinity model. In order to make headway in the path to sociopolitical success, the Irish republican movement confirmed the need for arms reductions and became willing to enter into the peace process. By developing into a secular political entity capable of compromise with other parties, non-state entities gain international legitimacy and social acceptance from local governments.

In order for Hezbollah to see their ideological teloi come into fruition, the group must embrace significant changes. Many of these changes would be burdensome,

yet realizable. Hezbollah would have to alter their political aspirations, embrace international oversight, and decrease its military presence within the organization in order to transform itself into a sustainable force in the Middle East. Unfortunately, other crucial changes may be more challenging to implement. Deemphasizing religious differences and shifting to a secularized brand of party politics were key reasons that the Irish republican movement was able to broker peace and achieve political gains. Devout Shiites still comprise a prominent demographic within Hezbollah's political party, and it is unlikely that Iranian and Syrian clerical backers would allow Hezbollah to secularize. However, if the non-state Shiite entity is capable of making these significant revisions, every wing of the Clausewitzian Trinity will be strengthened and the Lebanese population may one day discover lasting political peace and social improvement.

### Conclusion

Although published in 1832, Clausewitz's *On War* still influences military theory in the twenty-first century. As we have seen, national entities are not the sole beneficiaries of Clausewitz's theory of the Trinity. Using the IRA and Hezbollah as case studies, we observe that non-state actors must evolve in order to attain a balanced relationship between political, military, and popular forces. The Irish republican movement learned to divert resources away from military objectives and into political operations in order to achieve a balanced Clausewitzian Trinity. Although Hezbollah has made great strides since the 1980s, the group is still wrestling with radical religious elements within its organization and powerful external forces. The world hopes that Hezbollah will adjust its military and political arms and embrace a more legitimate position in the Middle East.

### References

- Bickerton, Ian, and Carla Klausner. *A History of the Arab Israeli Conflict*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2010.
- Breadun, Deaglan. *The Far Side of Revenge: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*. West Link Park: The Collins Press, 2008.
- Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. London: N Trubner, 1873.
- Committee on International Relations, *Hezbollah's Global Reach*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.
- Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Political Situation in Lebanon*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007.
- Coulter, Colin, and Michael Murray. *Northern Ireland after the Troubles*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008.
- Farrington, Christopher. *Global Change, Civil Society, and the Northern Ireland*

HOW NON-STATE ACTORS EVOLVE: CLAUSEWITZIAN  
LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND AND LEBANON

*Peace Process*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

Harris, William . *Faces of Lebanon*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997.

Mackey, Sandra. *Lebanon: Death of a Nation*. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1989.

Norton, Augustus Richard. *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987.

Pintak, Lawrence. *Seeds of Hate*. Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2003.

Smith, M.L.R. *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*. London: Routledge, 1995.

## Staff

### *Executive Editors*

*Patrick Boynton* is a junior Schreyer Honors scholar and Paterno Fellow majoring in International Politics and Geography. In prior semesters, he has interned with the International Center for the Study of Terrorism and the US Army War College. Patrick has been studying E.U. Macroeconomic Policy in Geneva, Switzerland this fall, and he awaits his full-time return to the Journal staff in spring 2013. At any given time, you can find Patrick volunteering with Springfield THON, training for his second 26.2 miler, or catching up on his reading list. He hoards Apple products. His email address is [patrick@psujia.org](mailto:patrick@psujia.org).

*Peter Gorman* is a senior Schreyer Honors scholar and Paterno Fellow perusing degrees in Geography and Political Science with a minor in International Studies. While at Penn State he has done research on militarism's effect on local populations and spent Spring 2011 studying at the Center for European Studies in Maastricht, Netherlands. He has also tutored residents of Centre County and Penn State athletes through the Morgan Academic Support Center for Student-Athletes. After graduation Peter is interning with National Geographic in Washington, DC. He has an avid interest in backpacking, community building and travel and can be reached at [peter@psujia.org](mailto:peter@psujia.org)

*Harrison Rogers* is a senior majoring in Economics and International Politics. He has a profound interest in issues surrounding U.S. energy security, and recently spent a semester at the University of Oxford studying global oil and gas investment. Harrison has also built experience in government through his internships with State Senator Chuck McIlhinney (PA-10), Congressman Michael Fitzpatrick (PA-8), and the U.S. Department of State. This fall, Harrison is excited to join PriceWaterhouseCoopers working as a Federal Management Consultant in Washington D.C. In the future, Harrison would like to buy a boat and sail around the world. His email address is [harrison@psujia.org](mailto:harrison@psujia.org).

*Michelle Sarver* is a Master's student at the Penn State School of International Affairs. Her studies focus on the Middle East as well as peace and conflict studies. She complemented her studies with Arabic language immersion in Amman, Jordan during the summer of 2012. In addition, she works as a research assistant to SIA faculty member, Ambassador Richard Butler AC, Distinguished Scholar of International Peace and Security. Michelle graduated from Bloomsburg University with dual degrees in Political Science and Mass Communication (Journalism). She attended the Engalitcheff Institute on Comparative Political and Economic Systems at Georgetown University during the summer of 2009 and worked at the NAAEE as a legislative intern. His email address is [michelle@psujia.org](mailto:michelle@psujia.org).

### *Associate Editors*

*Marlow Bryant* is an undergraduate freshman in the Smeal College of Business majoring in Enterprise Risk Management with minors in Economics and International Business. Outside his contributions to the Penn State Journal of International Affairs, he serves as the Administrative Chair for the Professional Management Association, a Smeal interest group dedicated to promoting managerial and leadership skills through philanthropy and community outreach. His interests in international business and economics are reflected in his active participation with the Penn State Debate Society and with the International Affairs and Debate Association, competing at the undergraduate level in events such as Model UN and Parliamentary Debate. His email address is [marlow@psujia.org](mailto:marlow@psujia.org).

*Brian Gardner* is a Master of International Affairs candidate in the Penn State University School of International Affairs. His concentration focuses on areas of national security and intelligence, with additional emphasis on cultural and social psychology. After interning with the US Army War College in Spring 2012, he accepted a graduate assistantship with the Penn State College of Information Sciences and Technology where he works in the NC2IF Center. Brian also works within the Penn State Library System and as a research assistant for SIA faculty member Dr. Sophia McClennen. Besides these three positions, he spends the remainder of his time of school studies and Russian and Spanish language studies. Brian graduated from Penn State University in 2005 with a B.A. in Journalism. His email address is [briang@psujia.org](mailto:briang@psujia.org).

*Casey Hilland* is a second year Master's student at the Penn State School of International Affairs where he concentrates on security studies. He is also a research assistant at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism where he contributes to research focused on understanding the radicalization of terrorists. He has also interned for the US Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program. In his free time Casey enjoys watching the sports teams of his alma mater, the University of Oregon, and trying to read everything in his Google Reader. His email address is [casey@psujia.org](mailto:casey@psujia.org).

*Benjamin Rogers* is a sophomore majoring in International Politics and Economics, and minoring in Russian Area Studies. This past summer, Benjamin has interned on Capitol Hill with US Congressman Mike Fitzpatrick. There, he researched a wide variety of policy areas regarding agriculture, financial services, foreign affairs, and the environment. He looks forward to further studying the Russian language at the St. Petersburg State University in Russia next school year. He keeps himself busy by representing different interest groups and delegations with the University Model UN Team, and organizing its annual high school conference. His email address is [benjamin@psujia.org](mailto:benjamin@psujia.org).

*Brian Shiue* is a sophomore Schreyer Honors College scholar and Paterno Fellow double majoring in Political Science and History. At Penn State, Brian serves on the executive board of the PSU Mock Trial Association and the Globe SLO- a global affairs centered living options within Simmons Hall. His particular academic focus revolves around the American judiciary and is currently trying to find a part of the international relations world to focus on. This summer he plans to intern in Washington DC either in litigation or a think tank. In his free time, he enjoys listening to Taylor Swift, swimming, and participating in THON through Springfield. His email is [brian@psujia.org](mailto:brian@psujia.org).

*Suzanne Zakaria* is a junior Schreyer Honors Scholar studying International Politics. She has interned with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC where she researched the BRIC countries. In Fall 2012 she studied abroad in Spain and awaits returning to Penn State and this Journal in the Spring. She has a great interest in Middle East studies and has represented Penn State nationally through Mock Trial. Her email is [suzanne@psujia.org](mailto:suzanne@psujia.org).

#### ***Art Director***

*Ellie Skrzat* is a junior painting BFA candidate in the Schreyer Honors College. Ellie is the Vice President of and performer with Penn State's Full Ammo Improv Troupe. She also writes and illustrates for Onward State. Ellie enjoys breakfast, the New York Times daily crossword, and rap music. Sometimes all at once. You can view Ellie's art at [cargocollective.com/EllieSkrzat](http://cargocollective.com/EllieSkrzat) or reach her at [ejs5303@gmail.com](mailto:ejs5303@gmail.com).

PENNSSTATE

---

