Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators

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Abstract

We study the influence of domestic political dissent and violence on incumbent dictators and their regimes. We argue that elites with an interest in preserving the regime hold dictators accountable when there is a significant increase in terrorism. To pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elites that are strongly invested in the current regime we make a novel theoretical distinction between coups that reshuffle the leadership but leave the regime intact, and regime change coups that completely change the set of elites atop the regime. Using a new data set that distinguishes between these two coup types, we provide robust evidence that terrorism is a consistent predictor of reshuffling coups, while forms of dissent that require broader public participation and support such as protests and insurgency are associated with regime change coup attempts. This is the first paper that shows how incumbent dictators are held accountable for terrorist campaigns that occur on their watch.

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Introduction

While recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have turned scholars’ attention to understanding when mass uprisings force dictators from power, the central threat most autocratic leaders face stems from regime insiders and not directly from popular revolutions (Haber, 2006). Svolik (2009, 487), for example, shows that nearly three-quarters of dictators that lose power do so in a coup. We examine how political accountability functions in a non-democratic setting by studying the influence of different forms of domestic political dissent on coup activity in dictatorships. To pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elites with an interest in preserving the regime, we introduce a new distinction between coups that *reshuffle* the leadership but leave the regime intact, and *regime change* coups that replace the group of elites atop the regime. The former, we argue, better capture whether elite supporters hold the dictator accountable because while reshuffling coups replace the leader, the core regime supporters still retain power.

A large literature examines the factors that lead to coups in dictatorships (Finer, 1988; Luttwak, 1968; Linz, 1978; Thompson, 1975; Decalo, 1990; Londregan and Poole, 1990). Numerous studies assess whether failed economic policies or losses in interstate conflicts influence coups. These studies show that dictators are often held accountable and punished for their failures by being physically removed from office with a coup (Nordlinger, 1977; Gasiorowski, 1995; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Weeks, 2008; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Kim, 2014). We find two main gaps in the existing literature. First, most studies examine issues where leaders have direct control over the timing of decisions that determine whether a policy succeeds or fails. For example, a dictators’ involvement in interstate conflict is usually the direct result of his or her own strategic decision. A leader may choose to initiate a diversionary conflict in an attempt to deflect an anticipated coup by “rallying around the flag”, as may have been the rationale for the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas by the military junta. When the leader has direct influence over the decision to engage a policy issue that may end in failure and thus result in punishment, it becomes difficult to demonstrate that she is in fact held accountable for this particular event.

Second, most of the research focuses on consequences of interstate conflicts and overlooks domestic political violence. Domestic political dissent and violence, such as terrorism, are among the
important yet understudied political events that often trigger coups. Recent research shows that
even though democracies are thought to be the most likely targets of terrorism, many dictator-
ships are targets of a substantial number of terrorist attacks (see Aksoy, Carter and Wright (2012)
or Wilson and Piazza (2013)). In fact, many dictatorships experience as much terrorist violence
as democracies (Aksoy, Carter and Wright, 2012). Moreover, we observe important cases where
autocratic leaders are forcibly removed from office following episodes of mass protest and political
violence, for example in Egypt in July 2013. However, neither the literature on political violence
nor studies of authoritarian politics provide much guidance for understanding how domestic polit-
cal dissent and violence influence incumbent dictators and their regimes. For example, the extant
literature on terrorism almost exclusively focuses on the consequences of violence for democratic
incumbents (e.g., Berrebi and Klor (2006) or Williams, Koch and Smith (2012)).

We build on existing research by providing a more direct test of domestic accountability in
dictatorships. To do so, we examine the political consequences of different forms of observable
political dissent and violence: terrorist attacks, large-scale protests, and civil wars. Our goals
are twofold. First, to understand whether and how episodes of observable political dissent and
violence influence coup activity in dictatorships. Second, to provide a more direct test of domestic
accountability in dictatorships and to understand whether dictators are in fact held accountable for
their failures in preventing violence. Observable episodes of dissent or violence may lead to coups by
either providing an opportunity for regime opponents to topple the regime, or by motivating regime
supporters to protect the regime by holding the leader accountable for his failure. To pinpoint the
accountability mechanism, we introduce a distinction between two types of coups: (1) those that
replace the autocratic leader but not the autocratic regime; and (2) those that upend the entire
autocratic regime by ousting the leader and his primary support coalition from power. We call the
former reshuffling coups and the latter regime change coups.

Reshuffling coups, we argue, are a mechanism for regime supporters to hold the leader ac-
countable while preserving the power of the regime. Such coups do not seek to overthrow the

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1 Following the large literature on terrorism and political violence, we define terrorism as “politically-motivated
violence against non-combatants.” The use of the tactic of terrorism by a group does not preclude the use of other
tactics (i.e., guerilla tactics or peaceful protest) as well. See Hoffman (2006), for a good discussion of these issues.
entire regime but simply replace the leader with another from within the same group of political elite and keep the core regime supporters in power. In contrast, regime change coups do more than simply hold a leader accountable; they entail sweeping changes to the political system that replace one group of ruling elite with another. Revolutions, for example the 1979 revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua, are not ostensibly about accountability within a particular government but entail the removal of the entire ruling group. Similarly, the coups that brought an end to dynastic rule in Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s did not just replace the king with another member of the royal family but rather upended monarchies to establish new republics. This distinction between reshuffling and regime change coups allows us to distinguish when political violence provides opportunities for regime opponents to change the regime or simply motivate regime insiders to hold the incumbent leader accountable. Accordingly, this distinction helps us assess the existence of accountability in dictatorships.

We argue that dictators are held accountable for their failures to prevent domestic political violence. Moreover, different forms of observable political dissent have distinct effects on coup activity in dictatorships. Terrorism, we posit, should be associated with reshuffling coups, while large-scale protests and civil wars are more likely to motivate regime change coups. Protests and civil war require support from a significant segment of society and accordingly reflect more broad-based opposition than terrorism. Thus, large-scale dissent sends a clear signal of weakness to regime opponents, increasing the opportunity for a regime change coup. Further, to suppress large-scale protests and especially to counter insurgencies, dictators often must mobilize their military forces. This mobilization provides a new opportunity for military officers discontented with the existing regime to coordinate their actions and attempt a regime change coup.

In contrast, terrorism is a tactic used by relatively small and weak groups, which are often on the fringe of broader public opinion (Richardson, 2006; Shugart, 2006). Unlike civil wars and large-scale protests, terrorism does not require broad-based opposition to the regime. Consequently, terrorist attacks do not necessarily signal to regime opponents that the regime is weak, and thus are unlikely to provide an opportunity for these opponents to attempt a coup. Moreover, dictators can usually counter terrorism without the mobilization of their military apparatus. Thus, terrorism does not
increase coup opportunities for discontented members of the military. However, terrorist violence is publicly observable evidence of a leader’s failure and can thus motivate regime supporters to hold the leader accountable and preserve the regime by replacing the leader in a reshuffling coup.

Using original data on coup attempts and successes in dictatorships since 1970 as well as data on terrorist attacks, anti-government protests, and civil wars, we show that terrorist violence is associated with a higher risk of reshuffling coups, but is unrelated to regime change coups. Protests and civil wars are unrelated to reshuffling coups, but influence the likelihood of regime change coups. In the following sections, we discuss the relevant literature on coups in dictatorships. We explain why we focus on coups, and the importance of distinguishing between reshuffling and regime change coups. Next, we develop a theory of when and how political violence is detrimental to incumbent dictators. Then we introduce the data, research design, present the empirical findings, and briefly outline several of the numerous robustness tests included in the appendix. We probe the mechanism that links dissent and violence to coups with a case study of Tunisia, and finally conclude.

**Autocratic Regimes and Their Leaders**

Much existing research on coups in dictatorships conflates autocratic leaders and the regimes they head. This leads researchers to overlook important conceptual distinctions across coups in dictatorships. Thus, before presenting our main argument, we clarify the definition of autocratic regime and explain the distinction between reshuffling coups and regime change coups.

Building on previous work, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) propose a definition of an autocratic regime as a set of formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies. Informal rules are included because in autocracies the rules that shape and constrain political choices are often hidden. Thus, in autocracies informal rules coexist along with some of the formal institutions seen in democracies. The informal rule central to distinguishing one autocratic regime from another is the rule that identifies the group from which leaders can be chosen and that determines who influences personnel choice and policy. Accordingly, one autocratic regime is distinguished from another by the groups of elites who hold power. Thus, autocratic regimes are not simply the identity of the person who nominally leads the regime; one autocratic regime can have multiple successive leaders,
and one autocratic regime can replace another. For example, from 1918 to 1962 Yemen was ruled as a kingdom, and the group from which leaders could be chosen was the al-Qasimi family. In 1962, military officers brought down the dynasty and replaced the monarchy with Colonel Abdullah al-Salla and the junior military officers who backed him. This was the beginning of a new autocratic regime in Yemen.

Autocratic regimes are distinguished from each other by the groups of elites who hold power. This definition of autocratic regime is consistent with the meaning of the word “regime” as it is used in numerous studies of comparative political transitions. For example, McFaul (2002, 213), in his essay on post-Communist transitions in the 1990s, outlines the “paths from ancien régime to new regime that can account for both outcomes – democracy and dictatorship.” The political change in post-Soviet states was not simply one leader replacing another or tinkering with the institutional setting of the “ancien régime”. Rather, these changes meant new groups took power and the set of formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies was altered. Similarly, Shirk (1993) and Roeder (1993) identify the group of elites in China and Soviet Russia, respectively, who controlled leadership selection and policy choices in each of these countries. These groups had the capacity to make executive leadership changes or establish a mechanism for rotating leadership.

**Two Types of Coups: Reshuffling and Regime Change**

Coups against democratic incumbents by definition constitute a regime change because the democratic rules for choosing leaders and making policy is interrupted and, at least for a period, a dictatorship replaces it. In democracies, therefore, successful coups replace the regime in power. Similarly, in autocracies it is possible for coups to lead to regime change. However, in many cases coups in autocracies only entail replacing the incumbent leader with another member of the ruling elite to which the leader belongs. Thus, political events that researchers code as successful coups in autocracies sometimes result in a regime change but many times only result in a leader change.

We refer to coups where the leader atop the regime changes but the group of elite in power remains the same as reshuffling coups. When the longtime dictator in Togo, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, died in a 2005 plane crash, the military swiftly installed his son in power – a move that international
observers labeled a coup. Though a son replaced his father as the leader, the autocratic regime remained intact. That is, the group from which the leader could be selected did not change, remaining as before, the Eyadéma family. The 2005 coup in Togo is not an isolated event as there are numerous examples of reshuffling coups in dictatorships. For instance, the coups in Argentina during the early 1970s were executed against incumbent military rulers and did not in themselves end military rule. Each coup replaced the junta leader, but did not replace the group – in this case the junta – that could select leaders and make key policy decisions. The 1980 and 1984 coups in Mauritania each sacked one member of a military junta, the Military Committee for National Salvation, and replaced him with another. In Sierra Leone in 1996, the military junta sent its leader to exile in the U.K. and selected a new member as head.² To sum, reshuffling coups are executed by the members of the ruling elite with an interest in replacing the incumbent leader but preserving the existing regime and their power in it.

However, coups in dictatorships can also lead to loss of power for the regime itself. That is, as a result of the coup, the group of elite who hold power and the way decisions are made changes. For example, military officers ousted monarchs in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen to bring down dynasties. During the 1962 coup in Yemen, for example, Colonel Abdullah al-Salla and his backers among junior officers not only replaced the incumbent rulers, but also abolished hereditary succession, confiscated the ruling coalition’s property, and even executed and exiled some of the supporters of Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the last king of the Mutawakilite Kingdom of Yemen (Burrowes, 1987, 22). The Algerian military ousted the National Liberation Front (FLN) regime in 1992, and in 1994 junior military officers in Gambia toppled the long-time ruling party of Dawda Jawara. These coups result in new autocratic regimes because the group with the power to select the leader and make key policy and personnel decisions changed.

Distinguishing between different types of coups helps us explain whether dictators are held accountable for their failures. Successful reshuffling coups and regime change coups are fundamentally different in their outcome. Reshuffling coups are most often conducted by regime insiders

²This coup replaced a military junta leader with another member of the ruling group who subsequently allowed multiparty elections. See Marinov and Goemans (2014) for why military coups are likely to lead to democratic elections in the post-Cold War period.
who are either members of the ruling elite or operating on their behalf. These coups do not oust the group that selects the leader; and are thus a method for regime insiders to replace the country’s leader while still preserving (or even enhancing) their own power and position within the regime. Oftentimes, reshuffling coups are attempts by elites to sanction the leader for reneging on the power-sharing agreement.³ As Svolik (2012, 58) notes “[u]nder dictatorship, the only effective deterrent against [the leader’s] opportunism is the ruling coalition’s threat to replace the leader.” Reshuffling coups are therefore a mechanism for regime elites to hold the leader accountable while keeping the regime itself intact.

Regime change coups, in contrast, entail replacing the group with the power to select the leader, and in doing so typically change the set of elites that control policy and personnel decisions. Thus, a regime change coup can, for example, oust a monarchy or despotic family and replace it with a military junta, or empower one group of ethnic elites at the expense of another. These coups are not primarily motivated by an interest in holding the leader accountable but rather an interest in changing the group with access to power and its attendant benefits.

This distinction among coups has implications for how researchers observe mechanisms of accountability in dictatorships. In most autocratic settings coups are the primary technology available to regime insiders for holding the leader accountable. Accountability in this scenario need not be solely linked to regime supporters’ perception of heightened chances of coup success. Rather, accountability entails a change in regime insiders’ assessment of leader competence or quality – often in response to an observed policy failure or reneging on a prior power-sharing arrangement. While accountability assumes there exists a technology for removing the leader, it does not necessarily entail a change in the likely success of such a move. In democracies, for example, where incumbents can be voted out of office, accountability does not mean changing the rules to increase the baseline odds that any incumbent will lose; rather accountability entails voters updating their beliefs about the quality of a specific incumbent in response to policy failures. Similarly, if we interpret coups as

³Power-sharing in an autocratic regime is an arrangement to split decision-making and spoils between the autocratic leader, or dictator, and the dictator’s ruling coalition, who together hold sufficient power to control the state (Geddes, 1999; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2009). Importantly, a change in the power-sharing agreement between the dictator and his elite supporters does not in itself constitute an end to the regime. That is, even if one actor or set of actors in the ruling coalition gains or loses power relative to the leader, the set of formal and informal rules for choosing leaders, and hence the group from which the leader can be chosen, does not change.
a mechanism for accountability in dictatorships, then we need to isolate the coup events that reflect
a change in the audience’s (i.e. ruling coalition’s) assessment of the incumbent dictator. Reshuff-
fling coups, we posit, reflect a change in the assessment of the leader and are thus a mechanism of
accountability. Regime change coups, in contrast, arise when opponents perceive a change in the
opportunity to grab power by replacing the ruling coalition.

How Does Violence Influence Coups?

Much of the extant literature on coups emphasizes two factors important to understanding when
and where coups are most likely: opportunity and motivation. Events, including domestic political
dissent and violence, that alter the opportunities and motivation of potential coup plotters to
attempt coups increase their likelihood. However, elites who support the regime and those who
prefer to replace it have different motivations and opportunities for attempting coups. This implies
that different forms of domestic political dissent can have distinct effects on these two groups of
potential coup plotters.

Elites who support the regime differ in their coup motivations from opponents because the
former have an interest in preserving the regime and their place within it, while latter seek to
overturn the existing regime. Thus, regime supporters plotting a coup must account for how a coup
attempt might adversely influence regime stability.\footnote{Regime supporters’ propensity to attempt reshuffling coups should not necessarily be increasing in the severity of political violence encountered by the state because higher levels of violence may not translate into more instability for the regime. For example, non-violent mass movements can be more successful in destabilizing incumbents than violent movements (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).} If supporters’ reshuffling attempts contribute
to the risk of regime collapse, such attempts bear an additional cost for them. Regime opponents,
in contrast, bear little direct cost if their coup activity contributes to regime collapse as this is
consistent with their goal.

Regime supporters and opponents also have different baseline coup opportunity structures be-
cause elite supporters are more likely to come from the privileged group from which new regime
leaders are chosen, often a specific family, ethnic group, or junta of high-ranking military officers.
Thus regime supporters who contemplate a coup have better information than opponents about
how the regime works and are more likely to be stationed in or near the capital city: better information and closer proximity increase the baseline opportunity for coups. In contrast, potential coup plotters who oppose the regime are less likely to be members of the group from which leaders are chosen and thus lack access to the same quality of information about how the regime functions. Moreover, potential regime opponents in the military are more likely to be based outside the capital city. For example, Iraqi President Hussein stationed many military officers – even some in the supposedly loyal Revolutionary Guard but who were not from his own tribe – outside of Baghdad (Al-Marashi, 2003; Hirst, 1993).5 With relatively poor information and little access to the capital city, regime opponents in the military have fewer opportunities to attempt a coup.

These points suggest three related conclusions. First, because regime supporters have better information and are closer to the seat of power, the baseline probability of success should be higher for supporters attempting a reshuffling coup relative to regime opponents attempting a regime change coup. Second, and more interestingly, because regime opponents have limited coup opportunities, triggering events and political shocks that increase coup opportunities by weakening the regime are more important for regime opponents than supporters. That is, triggering events that destabilize the regime should have a greater marginal effect on the probability of a coup attempt for regime opponents than for regime supporters. Thus, regime change coups depend more on large shocks that increase coup opportunities, while reshuffling coups are less dependent on such shocks. Third, because regime supporters are motivated to preserve the regime, political dissent that threatens to destabilize the regime should not be necessarily be associated with an increased propensity for reshuffling coups, while it should increase the propensity of regime change coups. In other words, while both elite supporters and opponents of the regime attempt coups in response to triggering events that alter their opportunity structure, we expect regime-destabilizing events to be associated with regime change coups but not with reshuffling coups. Accordingly, forms of political dissent and violence that entail broader public support and pose a greater threat to regime stability are likely to trigger regime change coups. In contrast, weaker but still costly

5The 1958 Iraqi coup that ousted the Hashemite monarchy was orchestrated by Colonel Aref, who only had access to Baghdad because he had been ordered by the king to move the 20th Brigade to Jordan via Baghdad in preparation for aiding the Lebanese against pro-Nasser rebels (Haddad, 1971, 94-95). Aref transformed this brigade into the elite Republican Guard after a failed coup bid by the National Guard in 1963 (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008, 97).
forms of dissent that do not rely on broad public support are less likely to destabilize the regime and thus do not increase the opportunity for regime opponents to attempt regime change coups. However, weak but costly dissent, even if it not destabilizing to the regime, can still motivate regime supporters to hold the leader accountable. The fact that organized groups, even if marginal, are able and willing to contest the regime in a costly manner signals discontent with current policies and motivates regime supporters to replace the leader. The fact that this dissent is not fundamentally destabilizing to the regime is a plus for regime supporters, as they are hesitant to “rock the boat” in the face of broad-based opposition when regime opponents have greater opportunity to topple the incumbent regime. Moreover, observable and costly dissent also provides needed justification to a broader audience. Thus, in the face of observable and costly dissent that is not broad-based or destabilizing to the regime, regime supporters find reason and justification to remove the leader and can do so without increasing coup opportunities for regime opponents.

Next, we distinguish among three forms of domestic dissent in dictatorships: mass protest, civil war and terrorism. We then articulate a logic for why broad-based forms of dissent, such as mass protest and insurgency, are more likely to motivate regime change coups, while more narrow but still costly dissent, such as terrorism, should be associated with reshuffling coups.

**Political dissent and coups**

**How terrorist threats differ from protest dissent and civil war**

Terrorism differs from other forms of opposition behavior, such as protest and civil war in two key ways. First, the groups that execute terrorist attacks do not need broad citizen support. Groups that primarily attack soft civilian targets tend to be small, and are often on the fringe of broader public opinion (Richardson, 2006; Shugart, 2006). In contrast, both mass protest and armed insurgencies require larger opposition organizations with significant support from citizens (Sambanis, 2008, 181). For instance, anti-regime protest movements in countries as diverse as Chile, Iran, Poland and Thailand all garnered the support of large segments of society (Garretón, 1988; Bernhard, 1993; Foran and Goodwin, 1993; Thabchumpon and Duncan, 2011). Similarly, violent groups that are large enough to engage in civil war with the state must field a large number
of fighters, and relatedly need the support of significant share of the population. For example, the Latin American insurgencies of sufficient size to effectively take on state forces all required mass peasant support (Wickham-Crowley, 2001, 143-145). The idea that insurgencies require a large number of fighters and considerable public support, either sincere or coerced, but that terrorism does not, is empirically accepted and reflected in recent theory (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita (2013)). The fact that violent groups that also control territory tend to attack state forces, while violent groups that do not control territory tend to carry out terrorist attacks (de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012) also suggests non-territorial groups have less public support and that the military would be less useful in countering them (Carter, 2015b). As Shugart (2006) notes, most terrorist campaigns after 1968 lacked any real public support and were on the fringe of public opinion.6

Second, combatting observed threats from mass protests and especially armed insurgencies requires the mobilization of military forces, which, to be effective, entails providing enhanced coordination capacity to well-placed individuals with guns. As Svolik (2012, 127) notes, the military – not the everyday foot soldiers of the internal security apparatus – is the regime’s last resort for countering “mass based, organized, and potentially violent” opposition groups.7 Mass protests can necessitate mobilization of the military, e.g., Egypt in 2011, and threats from organized insurgencies are even more likely to require military mobilization. Thus, shocks in the form of mass dissent lead to military mobilization, which in turn, increases the opportunity for coups.

In contrast, terrorist attacks, even large ones, rarely necessitate military mobilization by the dictator. Effectively combatting terrorist groups, which historically tend to be very small, may entail investing more in police forces or internal security and intelligence organizations but does not require augmenting the mobilization capacity of the military. For example, when the Pinochet regime faced the possibility of violent anti-regime attacks from armed leftist groups after the 1973 coup, the junta quickly abandoned the military as the key organization tasked with fighting these threats and instead created the National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia, or DINA) to pursue domestic repression. This was a strategic decision based on the fact that

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6 The only notable exceptions in the 20th century were pre-1968 anti-colonial groups such as the FLN in Algeria (Shugart, 2006).
7 Occasionally, a dictator, may not need to rely on the military for mass repression when foreign militaries are employed to fight domestic dissidents.
the military was incapable of pursuing the selective repression that the regime deemed necessary to counter domestic dissent (Policzer, 2009). Indeed, much of the literature on counter-terrorism emphasizes that fighting terrorist groups is best thought of in a law enforcement framework, rather than in a military framework. In fact, many states that consistently faced a threat from terrorist groups established special counterterrorism units that were not tied to their military, e.g., see Chalk (1993). In short, dictators do not respond to terrorist groups, which are generally small in size and do not control any territory, by mobilizing the military. Moreover, most terrorist campaigns are not large enough to threaten the stability of the regime itself, which also suggests military mobilization is unnecessary.

Thus terrorism differs from other forms of dissent both in the extent to which it threatens the regime and the level of popular support the dissenting group needs. These observations have implications for the opportunities and motivations of potential coup plotters – both regime supporters and opponents.

**Linking dissent to coups**

To explain how observable forms of political dissent such as protest, terrorism, and civil war influence coups, we build on the two prior observations: (1) regime opponents are more sensitive to changes in the coup opportunity structure than regime supporters; and (2) large-scale dissent requires military mobilization, while smaller forms of dissent do not.

Because dictators often mobilize the military to combat mass protests and insurgencies, these two forms of dissent increase the opportunity for opponents in the military to oust the regime and should therefore be associated with *regime change* coups. In contrast, while terrorism is observable and costly, it requires neither substantial public support nor military mobilization. Accordingly, terrorism should not be associated with regime change coups. Rather, we posit that terrorism should be associated with an increased risk of reshuffling coups.

Mass protest and insurgency in a dictatorship indicate widespread opposition to the regime.

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8This is especially true with domestic terrorist groups, as transnational groups sometimes elicit a military response against foreign states and bases (Schultz, 2010; Carter, 2012, 2015a). However, targeting foreign groups does not necessitate large-scale deployment of the military domestically, as fighting domestic insurgency usually does.
Both forms of opposition require a non-trivial number of individuals that openly and observably participate. In contrast, terrorist attacks require only a small cell of individuals who do not even necessarily publicly participate. Consequently, protest and insurgency are more likely than terrorism to weaken the regime and provide regime opponents with an enhanced opportunity for ousting the regime. For example, large scale protest campaigns reveal public dissatisfaction and can thus provide a coordinating signal for elites contemplating a coup (Galetovic and Sanhueza, 2000; Casper and Tyson, 2014). Terrorist attacks, which by definition target civilians, are rarely sufficiently widespread to weaken the regime and are often carried out by small clandestine groups. Thus, observed coups in times of regime crises that arise from mass opposition, e.g., insurgency or mass protests, likely reflect a change in the opportunity structure to the advantage of military elites who prefer to topple the regime. Moreover, if opposition movements with broad support pose a threat to regime stability and thus increase the opportunity for regime opponents to attempt a coup, this also implies that regime supporters have incentive to refrain from a potentially regime-destabilizing leadership change that “rocks the boat”. Thus, we expect civil wars and mass protests to increase the likelihood of regime change coups but not reshuffling coups.

In contrast, terrorism should increase the risk of reshuffling coups because organized groups willing to carry out costly attacks against a dictatorship signal to regime supporters that the dictator is unable to deter violent dissent – even if these groups are small and lack widespread public support.\footnote{Of course, the level of violence that constitutes a significant increase in terrorism varies across regimes. In other words, 10 terrorist attacks in a year in a country that has experienced little to no violence historically is qualitatively different than 25 terrorist attacks in a country that has on average experienced this level of violence. For example, it is important to compare levels of violence in Egypt in 2011 to average levels of violence in Egypt. Empirically, this suggests that it is essential to employ country fixed effects in our regression models.} Terrorism thus provides an observable justification for regime supporters to replace an incompetent leader whose continued rule may jeopardize regime stability. For example, in 1987 when former Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba was removed from power by a regime insider, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, following terrorist attacks by members of the Islamist Tendency Movement (MTI), the coup was widely credited to Bourguiba’s perceived lack of competence in dealing with opposition groups (Vandewalle, 1988, 603). Even though the terrorist attack in this case, which targeted a tourist hotel, highlighted the regime’s inability to provide security, it did not
fundamentally undermine regime stability in the short-term. Terrorism, we posit, should therefore increase the motivation of regime supporters to take action against the incumbent even if terrorism does little to alter the opportunity for regime opponents to oust the regime via coup. Regime supporters, beyond perhaps being ambitious and wanting to advance their own position by removing the leader, also worry that failing to remove a leader in the face of increasing terrorist dissent can transform the threat into a large-scale violent anti-regime campaign that ultimately leads to regime change – as occurred in Algeria in the 1990s when military opponents toppled the FLN-led regime in a coup.

Authoritarian leaders face a trade-off when they rely on the military to combat mass protest campaigns and insurgencies (Svolik, 2012): military forces are large enough to effectively counter large-scale threats but their mobilization entails providing them with coordination goods that increase the opportunity for coups. The vast majority of coups in dictatorships are organized by members of the military because these forces are more intensively organized and better able to coordinate action than other actors (Finer, 1988; Geddes, 1999). Dictators’ concerns about threats from the military are evident from their attempts to employ a variety of strategies – from buying acquiescence with increased military budgets to creating parallel security forces and purging top military officers – to reduce the risk soldiers will oust them (Huntington, 1957; Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011).

When dictators face mass protests and especially when they face organized insurgencies, they need to mobilize their military to quash rebellion and dissent. But in doing so, the dictator accepts the increased risk from potential coup-plotters in the military who now have enhanced coordination capacity, thus increasing the probability of coup success. The military officers’ augmented collective action capacity that follows from military mobilization increases the opportunity to oust the regime and put a new one in power. Accordingly, we expect mass protests and insurgencies to increase the likelihood of regime change coups. However, since dictators do not need to mobilize the military to counter terrorism, this form of political violence should be less likely to increase the opportunity for regime opponents in the military to attempt a regime change coup.

To sum, we argue that different forms of observable domestic dissent have distinct effects on
coup activity. Large-scale protests and civil wars are more likely to motivate regime change coups, while increased levels of terrorism should be associated with reshuffling coups. Widespread forms of opposition signal regime weakness to opponents, and dictators mobilize the military to counter protests and insurgencies and thus incur increased risk of regime change coups by discontented members of the military. In contrast, terrorism does not necessarily indicate regime fragility and thus is less likely to increase the opportunity for regime opponents to oust the regime. Terror attacks are, however, publicly observable evidence of the leader’s failure to quell organized groups from participating in costly dissent and can thus motivate regime supporters to hold the leader accountable by ousting him in a reshuffling coup.

Testing this argument has implications for assessing accountability mechanisms in dictatorships. Coup attempts that occur in response to mass dissent that in turn require the dictator to mobilize the military may reflect both a change in the opportunity structure (the dictator provides the military with more coordination goods) and a change in motivation (i.e. the military’s assessment of leader competence). In contrast, coup attempts in response to smaller-scale violent dissent that does not present an immediate threat to regime survival and also does not require mobilization of the military, i.e. terror attacks, are a cleaner test of accountability in dictatorships precisely because this type of dissent is unlikely to change the opportunity structure for potential coup plotters.

Data

We introduce new data that distinguishes among coups by whether they change the regime or simply its leader. We start with the list of attempted coups identified in Powell (2012). Similar to Powell (2012), we define a coup as *a concrete and observable action by at least one member of the regime’s current military or security apparatus to unseat the incumbent regime leader using unconstitutional means.*

We leverage several data sources to distinguish between reshuffling and regime change coups and gather information on both successful coups and failed attempts. Below,

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10 We examined each case Powell (2012), making minor changes in cases that do not fit our definition of a coup event. For example, when coding unsuccessful coup attempts, we exclude cases identified by Powell (2012) in which the regime leader, as identified by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), is not the target of the coup attempt. The data appendix contains the coding rules; lists all the coup events (failed and successful attempts) in the analysis; and provides a brief description of each event with an explanation for our coding.
we first describe our coding strategy for distinguishing among successful reshuffling and successful regime change coups and then discuss how we code failed coup attempts.

**Successful coups**  We use data on autocratic regimes to code successful regime change coups (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). This data provides a brief narrative of the historical political event used to identify the regime collapse as well as the calendar date on which that event occurred. For example, when an autocratic regime collapse event entailed a rebel group ousting the incumbent dictatorship, e.g., Zaire 1997, this data records the calendar date on which the rebels took control of the capital city from the incumbent regime. In instances when a military junta ousts a monarchy in a coup, e.g., Egypt 1952, the date of this coup is recorded as the regime collapse event. When an authoritarian incumbent loses a multiparty election to the opposition and steps down afterwards, e.g., Mali 1993, the date of the final round of the election marks the regime collapse event.

From this information, we match regime collapse events with the coup data from Powell (2012) to identify the subset of successful coups that entail regime change. We code coups that match the regime collapse event in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) as *regime change* coups. In contrast, coups that simply exchange one senior military officer with another or replace a President with one of his cabinet members do not typically alter the rules of the regime or the group of elites from which leaders are chosen. We call these events *reshuffling* coups. Most are easy to code, such as the Argentine coup of 1970 in which General Lanusse, the Army Commander, replaced General Onganía.

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11 The subset of all coups coded as *regime change* coups includes those coups that occur as part of the regime collapse event but are chronologically prior to the date used to mark the end of an autocratic regime, as coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). For example, while Powell (2012) mark two separate coups in Congo-Brazzaville in August 1968, we count both of them as part of the same regime collapse, which Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) date as occurring on September 4, 1968. A month prior to the regime collapse date (August 3) the military ousted President Massamba-Debat, only to reinstate him a day later. This altercation led his main military opponent, Marien Ngoubi, to create a rival ruling council, the National Revolutionary Council (See “Brazzaville Ousts Massamba-Debat.” *New York Times*, 4 September 1968). Later that month, after Massamba-Debat had been missing from the capital city for a couple of weeks, Cuban-trained paramilitary forces loyal to Massamba-Debat refused to submit arms to Ngoubi and fighting broke out between the two groups (Decalo, 1976, 155). Four days later, Ngoubi announced that Massamba-Debat had resigned the presidency. Massamba-Debat’s resignation and Ngoubi’s ascent marked a shift in power away from southerners to Ngoubi’s supporters in the north, which makes these events an autocratic regime collapse in which one dictatorship replaces another (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). Thus, even though there are two records in the Powell and Thyne data in which the military ousted the same leader within a month, we treat both as part of the same transition from one autocratic regime to another.

12 The coup leader in this case “acted as the spokesman for, and the with the support of, a broad spectrum of military opinion among both active and retired officers” (Potash, 1996, 307).
We also code as reshuffling coups those that occur under autocratic rule and in which one military officer replaces another – even when the coup leader calls for new elections. We do this because at the time of the coup and despite promising fresh elections, we do not know if and when the military will give up power and hold new elections. Some promised elections occur as scheduled. After a 1999 coup in Niger, for example, the coup leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Daouda Mallam Wanke, announced new elections eight months later (Ibrahim, 1999). While promising to allow a transition back to civilian rule, Wanke reappointed Mainassara’s Prime Minister and established an all-military ruling council, which allowed the military “to dictate the pace of this crucial period” (Ngubane, 1999, 54). New elections were held as promised later that year; and the opposition won, marking the end of the autocratic regime (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014).

However, not all coup leaders who promise fresh elections follow through. After a successful coup in Guinea in 2008, for example, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara promised new elections within a year and declared that he would not contest them. Later, though, he reversed course and announced that he would compete in the elections, which he then postponed. In the end, new elections were not held until Dadis Camara had been violently removed from office. Even though the 1999 coup in Niger was followed by a democratic election within a year, it was not possible to determine at the time of the coup whether election promises would be kept or if it would turn out more like the 2008 Guinean coup.

**Unsuccessful coups** Distinguishing failed regime change coup attempts from failed reshuffling coup attempts is more difficult than differentiating among successful coups because we do not observe the outcomes of the failed coups. We therefore develop coding rules to assess whether a

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13 In other cases when a coup leader promises fresh elections, the coup entails a transfer of power to a civilian group, marking regime collapse. We code these as *regime change* coups. For example, during the 1991 coup in Mali Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré not only ousted President Traoré but within three days he handed power to the civilian-dominated Transition Committee for the Well-Being of the People (CTSP), which named a new, civilian Prime Minister and made the decisions about the transition to democracy (Nzouankeu, 1993, 46). This case is different from the 1999 Nigerien coup because in Mali, a new civilian ruling council was established with an opposition Prime Minister to oversee the transition. In the Nigerien case, the new ruling council was entirely military, and even though civilian groups opposed to Mainassara backed the coup, military officers made decisions about the transition period and did not relinquish power until after new elections. Thus, even though election promises were fulfilled after both the 1991 Malian and the 1999 Nigerien coups, only the Malian coup entailed the direct transfer of power to civilians at the time of the coup. Thus we code the Malian event as a regime change coup, but the Nigerien ouster a reshuffling coup.

failed coup attempt – if it was successful – would have led to a reshuffling of elites within the regime or to the establishment of a new regime, as defined by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). To code regime change in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), the authors focus on whether a leadership change in a non-democratic setting entailed a change in the rules for selecting the leader and making key policy and personnel decisions. They do this by looking for evidence that, for example, the new leader empowered a previously excluded ethnic group; narrowed the group of people who could select key personnel to his family; or included a previously excluded political party in the ruling coalition. Accordingly, when we code failed coup attempts, we use objective information on this same set of factors to identify whether coup attempters would change the regime or not. This coding strategy also helps ensure consistency across our codings of coup attempts and successes.

To assess whether coup attempters would have overthrown the regime or simply reshuffled the leadership, we collect information from news reports, case studies, and historical encyclopedias about the main coup actors to record whether they were junior officers in the military; blood relatives of the regime leader; part of the same politically relevant ethnicity as the regime leader; or were affiliated with a political party that was not the regime leader’s party. The coding rules we developed translate this information on the coup plotters as well as contextual information about the circumstances surrounding the coup attempt into an assessment of whether the coup leader, had he been successful, would have changed the group in power.

For example, we code failed attempts where coup plotters’ aim is to restore military officers’ power vis-a-vis the regime leader as reshuffling coups, unless there is evidence the plotters would rule without members of the regime leader’s family (in cases of observed intra-family leadership

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15 The coding rules, a description of each case and how we coded it, and a list of sources used to code each case are provided in the supplemental appendix.

16 To code politically relevant ethnicity, we use the Ethnic Power Relations data set (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009), which focuses on ethnic inclusion in the executive branch. In cases where ethnicity is not relevant, such as intra-Sunni (Iraq) or intra-Arab (Libya) tribal cleavages, we follow the EPR logic of assessing whether coup plotters were from a junior allied tribe or the regime leader’s tribe.

17 We cannot use information from the coup plotters stated objectives or from statements by the regime leader who survived the coup attempt, for two reasons. First, this type of information is missing for many cases. Second, post-hoc assessments by (surviving) plotters or the leader are likely to be biased because they each have an incentive to misrepresent their motivations. For example, coup plotters have an incentive to publicly state as their motivation “ousting a corrupt regime” and “giving power to the people” even when they are primarily motivated to sanction the leader for renegoting a power-sharing agreement.

18 We interpret these types of failed coups as attempts by the military to deter the dictator’s opportunistic behavior, or to oust the leader in retaliation for revising the power-sharing arrangement.
succession) or without the regime leader’s ethnic supporters. Failed attempts where coup plotters come from an excluded (or junior partner) ethnic group, alternatively, are coded as regime change coup attempts, according to the logic that empowering a new ethnic group at the expense of the incumbent group entails change in the group with the power to select leaders and set policy. Other rules for recording failed regime change attempts include those where evidence indicates that post-coup leaders would rule: (a) with a newly elected civilian leader in cases where the incumbent regime leader nullified a prior election result; (b) with an opposition party leader in cases where the regime leader ruled without an executive from that opposition party; or (c) with a new group of ethnic elites who were previously excluded from (or junior partners in) the ruling coalition.

In the sample of autocratic countries from 1971 to 2006, there are 78 successful coups and 150 failed coup attempts. Of these 150 failed attempts, we code 77 as regime change attempts and 73 as reshuffling attempts. We identify 38 successful regime change coups and 40 successful reshuffling coups in autocratic regimes. We list all coup attempts and successes and describe their coding in detail in the appendix.

**Independent Variables**

We measure the number of terrorist attacks experienced by a country in a given year using data from the Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD) (START, 2008). The GTD is an event data set that purports to record each terrorist attack globally from 1970. The data distinguishes among attacks that are successfully carried out and those that failed in implementation; we focus exclusively on successful attacks as these are more relevant to assessing the leader’s inability to quell violence. Moreover, narrowing the focus to successful attacks alleviates concerns about the difficulty in consistently observing and measuring unsuccessful attacks across cases, as failed attacks are less likely to be documented in the media. We lag the number of attacks by one year, as coups in year $t$ are likely to be affected by the volume of terrorism that was observed over a number of months prior to the coup, i.e., year $t - 1$. Additionally, lagging attacks helps us avoid concluding that attacks that are

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19 The success rate is comparable in the population of post-WWII coups analyzed by Powell (2012).
20 The number of unsuccessful attacks is quite small and their inclusion does not affect our results.
perhaps a reaction to a coup affect the probability of a coup.\textsuperscript{21} The appendix contains results, which are very similar to what we report below, in which we include attacks in year $t$, but only if they occur prior to the coup in years where a coup is successful. Finally, we take the natural log of the lagged attacks variable, as it is highly right-skewed. Logging the attacks variable also accounts for the plausible idea that the effect of one additional attack after 150 prior attacks in a year is weaker than a first or second attack.\textsuperscript{22}

We measure protest with an indicator of the number of anti-government protests in a country in year $t - 1$. We employ data on general strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations from Banks and Wilson (2012) to create a measure of protests in a given country-year.\textsuperscript{23} We also take the natural log of protests as this variable is also highly right-skewed. While the terrorism variable measures violent attacks, the protest measures events that are mostly peaceful. Moreover, the protest data entails dissent that is public for the individuals involved, which usually suggests that the cause has some popularity among the public. In contrast, most of the terrorist attacks happen such that most of the individuals involved are not publicly visible around the time of the attack or even present at the time of the attack. Accordingly, the correlation between these two variables is a relatively low 0.30, as they measure very different phenomena. Furthermore, if we examine the top ten countries in terms of the number of terrorist attacks in a given year and the number of protests in a given year, there are only 2 countries in both lists.

We measure the presence of insurgency using civil war data from the UCDP/PRIO data project. Specifically, we create two mutually exclusive variables that indicate whether a country is involved in a civil war in year $t - 1$ that crosses the 25 battle deaths per year threshold but not the 1000 battle deaths threshold (Low Intensity Civil Conflict), or is involved in a civil war in year $t - 1$ that crosses the 1000 battle deaths threshold (High Intensity Civil Conflict) (Gleditsch et al., 2002). The reference category is all countries that did not experience civil war in year $t - 1$. We account

\textsuperscript{21}We provide additional robustness checks in the supplemental appendix that suggest lagging the attacks variable is effective in mitigating these sorts of concerns.
\textsuperscript{22}We find similar results with the unlogged variable. Model comparison statistics suggest that the logged variable is more appropriate.
\textsuperscript{23}A common critique of the Banks data is that it misses many smaller protest events that are not reported in the New York Times. This is unlikely to be problematic here as our theory identifies mass protests rather than more minor protest events.
for both high casualty and low casualty civil wars to ensure that our results are not dependent on which measure we prefer. The 1000 battle deaths threshold is better at picking up relatively severe civil wars, while the 25 death threshold accounts the numerous conflicts that involve organized insurgents but do not result in a high number of yearly casualties. The correlation between both of the civil war variables and our terrorism variable are similar to the correlation between terrorism and protests, i.e. around 0.30.

We control for several other factors that may influence coups. Most of the literature on military coups points to coups’ structural determinants, such as poverty, the history of coups, ethnicity, and even economic inequality (see e.g. Londregan and Poole (1990), Jenkins and Kposowa (1990), and Svolik (forthcoming)). It is well established that coups are more common in economically poorer countries (Londregan and Poole, 1990). To measure this, we include the natural log of a country’s GDP per capita from Maddison (2007), lagged by one year. We also include the one year lag of a country’s population from Maddison (2007). Thus, we account for the possibility that larger or smaller countries are more coup prone. To account for the possibility that coups are affected by ethnic divisions, we include a common fractionalization measure we obtain from Fearon and Laitin (2003) in models without country-fixed effects. In our supplemental appendix, we report a number of additional robustness checks. In terms of additional independent variables, we estimate models that also account for a country’s coup history with the logged number of past coups a country has experienced since 1950, as is typical in the coups literature. Additionally, we also assess the importance of the dictator’s per soldier spending on the military, as prior literature has found that keeping the military flush with funds lowers the risk of a coup. We obtain the military expenditures data from the Correlates of War composite index of capabilities data (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). Finally, we also include coup-proofing measures such as the number of effective organizations (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011; Powell, 2012). None of these factors consistently matters or changes our key findings. However, the coup-proofing measures do greatly diminish the size of our sample, so we report them in the appendix rather than the main text.

Finally, to further test our argument that domestic accountability from regime supporters drives the relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coups, we specify a theoretically relevant scope
condition that centers on personalist dictatorships. These regimes are those where the individual leader has concentrated power in his own hands, in the process subduing the independent mobilizing capacity of organizations – such as the military and the support party – that could hold him accountable. The coding rules used to identify personalist regimes, for example, include information on whether the regime leader has the power to select party leaders and appoint high-ranking military officers (Geddes, 2003).

A related feature of these dictatorships also weakens the incentive for regime insiders with the capacity to remove the leader to do so: strong personal and ethnic ties between the regime leader and powerful men in the security apparatus. Often times, this takes the form of creating new security organizations, led by members of the regime leader’s own family or ethnic/tribal group, to protect him from coups emanating from the military. Because elites in personalist dictatorships depend upon the leader himself for their positions, they have much to lose in unseating the leader. In other dictatorships, in contrast, the institutional autonomy of organizations such as the military and the support party means that regime elites’ power and resources are not solely dependent on the leader, making it less costly for elites to remove leader. Simply put, because personalist dictatorships are those where the leader has accumulated power at the expense regime elites, accountability should be much less prevalent. Indeed, the extant literature has shown that leaders of personalist regimes have relatively few constraints (e.g., Weeks (2008)). We therefore expect that terrorism should be unrelated to our measure of accountability – namely reshuffling coups – in personalist regimes.

Results

Before estimating regression models of coup attempts and successes, we summarize the raw data to assess the empirical plausibility of our arguments. Table 1 summarizes the levels of terrorism in the year prior to different types of coup attempts, as well as in all years in which a country does not subsequently experience any coup attempt. To ensure that we are not reporting numbers that also reflect civil war we exclude all cases in which a civil war is associated with a coup. The first column shows the mean number of terrorist attacks in the year prior to each type of coup attempt as well as in years in which a dictator does not subsequently experience coup activity. The raw data suggests
that reshuffling coups are preceded by much higher levels of terrorism than regime change coups, as the mean number of successful attacks is almost 17 in the year prior to a reshuffling coup and only a little higher than 2 a year before regime change coup. In fact, years in which there is no coup have a quite similar level of terrorism, with the mean just under 3 attacks. Our theory suggests that terrorism and civil war have very different effects on coup activity. Accordingly, to make this comparison we report the percentage of dictator-years that experience civil war prior to coup attempts in the second column. To ensure that the data reflect civil war and not terrorism, we focus on years in which the number of attacks in each dictatorship is below the within-country mean. The data suggest that there is a stronger association between civil war and regime change coup attempts than reshuffling coup attempts. Around 36% of regime change attempts were preceded by civil war and below average levels of terrorism, while this is true of only 22% of reshuffling coup attempts and 18% of years in which a dictator experiences no coup attempt.

To more precisely identify the effects of political violence and dissent on coup activity in dictatorships we now move to estimation of multivariate regression models that condition on additional variables that matter for understanding coup activity. Specifically, we estimate several logit models to analyze how different factors affect the likelihood of coup attempts and successful coups in dictatorships. For each of our dependent variables, we estimate models with country-fixed effects and country-random effects. Inclusion of country specific fixed or random effects allow us to focus on how within-country variation in terrorism affects the propensity of different types of coups. Since our theory identifies within-country variation, country-fixed effects make sense and ensure that our results do not simply reflect correlation between coup activity and cross-country variation in terrorism and instability. We estimate both fixed and random effects models to balance the tradeoffs between the two approaches. Fixed effects cannot be estimated for countries that never experience coups. Thus, countries with no coups are dropped in the country fixed effects models. A random effects logit provides a straightforward alternative that still captures unobserved het-

24 The numbers are similar if we either do not remove the civil war cases or focus on attacks in the same year as the coup, but prior to the coup.

25 As do all empirical models reported below, the summarized data in table 1 excludes civil wars that resulted from coups as identified by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). This helps guard against making incorrect inferences about the direction of the trend.

26 See the supplemental appendix for a number of additional robustness checks.
erogeneity among countries, but does so without removing observations with no variation in the dependent variable. However, a random effects model imposes additional assumptions, namely, that of exogeneity between the observed covariates and the country specific intercept. Given the tradeoffs, we present estimates from both models. We also include decade fixed effects in each model to capture any differences among decades in coup propensity, as well as any differences during the Cold War and after.\textsuperscript{27} We first present models of coup attempts, then proceed to focus on successful coups and the connection between attempts and success.\textsuperscript{28}

**Coup Attempt Models**

Table 2 presents the results of six models of coup attempts. We first focus on the models that pool all coup attempts without distinguishing between regime change and leadership reshuffling coup attempts. Both models I and IV show that when dictators experience higher levels of terrorism, the risk of experiencing any type of coup attempt increases. The logged number of terrorist attacks in the prior year has a positive and significant effect on the probability a dictator experiences any coup attempt, although the effect is only significant at the 0.10 level in the fixed effects model (i.e., model I).

Reshuffling and regime change coup attempts models show that the positive relation between terrorism and all coup attempts are driven by reshuffling coups. Both models II and V show that when a dictator experiences an increase in terrorist attacks relative to her country’s mean, the risk of a reshuffling coup attempt is significantly higher. This result is statistically and substantively significant in both the fixed effects and random effects models. Substantively, when a country experiences an increase from 7 attacks in the prior year to 20, the probability of a reshuffling coup attempt increases by about 60%. If the number of attacks in the prior year increases from 7 to 50, there is a roughly 150% increase in the probability of a reshuffling coup attempt. In contrast to

\textsuperscript{27}We also estimate models with year-fixed effects, and find very similar results. However, inclusion of year-fixed effects leads us to lose almost a third of our data, as all years in which no coup occurs are dropped. See the supplemental appendix for results with year fixed effects.

\textsuperscript{28}All models drop cases in which a civil war is the product of a coup. This ensures that we do not have cases in the data for which a coup is not possible because the opposition has already attempted one and is now fighting the state. We identify these cases using the data of Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this.
the findings for reshuffling coup attempts, we do not find that terrorism increases the probability of a regime change coup attempt. In fact, the relationship between terrorism and regime change coups is negative, although it is well below any conventional threshold of statistical significance. In sum, when dictators experience relatively high levels of terrorist activity, they are at increased risk of having figures within their regime attempt to remove them from power. However, the level of terrorist activity is unrelated to the probability of a coup attempt that seeks to oust the entire regime.

Our findings for both the volume of protest activity and the existence of a civil war contrast sharply with our findings for terrorist violence. In the random effects model of regime change coup attempt, we find that low intensity civil wars have positive and significant association with regime change coups, but have no significant relation to reshuffling coups. High intensity civil war, which is considerably more rare, has no significant relation to any type of coup attempt. This further shows the need to distinguish between reshuffling and regime change coups. The findings are similar, albeit a bit stronger, for dictators that experience an unusually high volume of protest activity. Protest activity is not related to reshuffling coup attempts in either model II or V, but is significantly related to regime change coups in model VI, which includes random effects. The relation between protests and regime change coup attempts is strong enough in the random effects specification to make the association with all coup attempts positive and significant in model IV. The connection between protests and regime change coups is not robust to country fixed effects, although the finding remains in the fixed effects model of all coup attempts.

To summarize, the findings in table 2 show that it is essential to distinguish between reshuffling and regime change coups as terrorism, protest, and civil war have distinct effects on different types of coups. Terrorism is consistently associated with coup attempts by regime supporters that will simply reshuffle the regime leader but keep the regime structure intact, while it has no systematic relation to transformative regime change coups. In contrast, we find that protests and low intensity civil wars are associated with regime change coup attempts, but have no systematic relation to reshuffling coup attempts. The findings suggest that the literatures on coups and authoritarianism need to pay more attention to terrorist violence, as the volume of terrorist attacks is the most
consistently important variable in our models of coup attempts.

The other variables included in the models generally conform to our expectations based on findings in the extant literature, or fail to consistently attain statistical significance across specifications. The log of GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient in all models except model II. Consistent with the extant literature, we find that as a country’s wealth increases it is less likely to experience coup attempts. Similarly, we find that in periods of stronger economic growth dictators are less likely to experience any coup attempts in general, and regime change coup attempts in particular. However, this finding is not robust to any of our fixed effects specifications. Interestingly, we find that when neighboring countries experience coup activity, dictators are less likely to experience an attempt by regime supporters to reshuffle the regime leader, i.e., models II and V. However, coups in neighboring countries have an insignificant and positive effect on regime change coup attempts. None of the other variables attain statistical significance in any specification.

Coup Attempts Against Personalist Dictators

In Table 3 we provide an additional test of our argument that accountability to regime supporters drives the relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coup attempts. Specifically, we interact the terrorism variable with an indicator of whether a regime is a personalist regime, as classified by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Personalist dictators, almost by definition, have marginalized and eliminated potential opponents who could hold them accountable via a reshuffling coup. A large literature shows that personalist leaders have relatively few constraints, e.g., Weeks (2008), and are resistant to change that is not transformational, e.g., Goldstone (2011, 2014). Thus, the accountability mechanism is not nearly as plausible in personalist regimes, and the positive relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coups should disappear when we focus on personalist regimes. Indeed, the models in table 3 show that the relationship between terrorism and reshuffling coups disappears in personalist regimes while it remains robust in non-personalist regimes.\footnote{In the supplemental appendix, we also report analogous results for coup successes as well as alternative dependent variables derived from the Archigos data that focus on irregular leadership failures.} These results provide a useful additional check on our explanation for why terrorism is associated with
reshuffling coups but not regime change coups.

**Coup Success Models**

Although our primary theoretical interest is coup attempts, we also examine whether coups are successful or not. This analysis allows us to explore whether the relations between terrorism and reshuffling coups and other forms of dissent and regime change coups are reflected in success rates. Theoretically, we expect regime supporters to be the most successful at implementing coups, as they presumably have better information, are better positioned to take power, and also are attempting to undertake a less transformational coup relative to regime opponents.

The models in table 4 suggest that the connection between terrorism and reshuffling coup attempts is robust to only examining successful reshuffling coups. The fixed effects model of successful reshuffling coups, i.e., model II, shows a positive and significant effect of terrorism on successful attempts, although the relationship is slightly weaker than for all reshuffling attempts. The relationship is stronger in the random effects specification of model V. In fact, we find a significant positive effect of terrorism on all coup successes in the random effects specification in model IV. This result shows the strength of the effect of terrorism for reshuffling coups as there is no effect of terrorism on successful regime change coups in any specification.

In sharp contrast to our models of coup attempts, we find no significant relation between successful regime change coups and either protests or civil war. Low intensity civil war, which had a positive significant effect on regime change coup attempts, has an insignificant effect on coup successes. Similarly, protests are not significant predictors of successful regime change coups in any of the specifications in table 4. Accordingly, an uptick in protest activity in the prior year is related to coup attempts by regime opponents but is not systematically related to successful regime change coups.\(^{30}\) Thus, although Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) show that peaceful resistance groups tend to be more successful than violent groups against dictators, the level of protest does not significantly increase the risk that a dictator is removed by a coup. However, in our context, a successful coup is not necessarily an indication of “success”, as resistance groups are often not aiming to help topple

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\(^{30}\)The results are very similar if we focus on the level of protest activity in year \(t\) rather than protest activity lagged by one year.
a dictator only to have a powerful regime supporter or opponent take power. In general, the fact
that low-level insurgency, and to a lesser extent mass protest, are better predictors of regime change
attempts than successes is consistent with our argument that regime change coups are harder to
execute than reshuffling coups.

Similar to our findings in the reshuffling coup attempts models, we find in model V that success-
ful reshuffling coups are less likely when there is coup activity in a neighboring country. Thus, when
dictators and regime supporters observe a coup in a neighboring country, the risk of a reshuffling
attempt and the risk of a successful coup is significantly lower. Given that this variable is also a
significant predictor of reshuffling coup attempts, this again suggests that the factors influencing
regime supporters to attempt coups are also closely related to the success of these attempts. Given
that this is not true of regime change coups, e.g., the different effect of civil war or protests on
attempts and successes, this again suggests that regime supporters’ attempts are made with better
information. Moreover, the effect of neighboring coups on regime change coups is always insignif-
icant, which further suggests that the underlying factors that drive reshuffling coups differ from
regime change coups.

None of the structural factors that we control for in our models are consistent predictors of coup
success. When dictatorships are wealthier they are less likely to experience any type of successful
coup, as the coefficients for GDP per capita are all negative. However, while GDP per capita is
significant in the random effects models, it is only significant in the fixed effects model of regime
change coups. Relatedly, we find no support for the idea that periods of higher economic growth
reduce the probability of a coup, which contrasts with our results for coup attempts. The coefficient
of population is only significant in model IV, and it suggests that population growth has a negative
effect on the probability of any successful coup. However, the coefficient does not have a consistent
sign across all specifications and is not significant in any of the remaining models. Finally, we also
include a measure of ethnic fractionalization used by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and an indicator
of whether a country had a coup before 1960 in the three random effects models.\footnote{We do not include this measure in the fixed effects models because it does not vary within country.} We find no
significant relationship between successful coups and either ethnic fractionalization or pre-1960 civil
The three models in table 5 take a different approach to modeling successful coups. Rather than assessing the effects of key variables with country-specific effects as in table 4, the models in table 5 analyze coup success only in the cases where an attempt is made. All three models are simple selection models, in the sense that they analyze the determinants of successful coups after potential coup-makers have selected themselves into the set of coup attempters.\footnote{We also estimated Heckman probit models that allow for correlation between the error terms of the coup attempt equations, i.e., models similar to those in table 2, but found that the error terms of the two equations were independent in all cases. Thus, we present the results of the simpler (and more efficient) models here.}

The relationship between terrorist attacks and successful reshuffling coups is robust to modeling successful coups as conditional on coup attempts. Although there are only 138 observations in which there is a coup attempt, the log of terrorist attacks in the prior year still has a positive and significant effect on the probability of a successful reshuffling coup. The effect of attacks on the probability of any successful coup is also still positive, although it is no longer statistically significant. Regime change coups are again unrelated to terrorist attacks. In sum, our key finding that high levels of terrorist activity is associated with successful reshuffling coups is robust.

\textbf{Robustness Checks}

We subject our results to a number of robustness checks and a simple “placebo test”. The most important robustness checks are briefly described here, and we report and discuss numerous additional tests in the supplemental appendix.\footnote{All results discussed here are available in the supplemental appendix.} One of our key arguments is that when dictators experience high levels of terrorism, regime supporters are much more likely to attempt a reshuffling coup. We lag attacks by a year to assess how the build-up of terrorism in the previous year influences the risk of coup attempts in the current year, as we expect the build-up over the prior year to influence regime supporters’ perceptions of the leader. If our argument is correct, we should not expect to find that terrorist attacks in the year subsequent to the coup, i.e., year $t + 1$, to have significant effect on the probability of a coup in the current year. Indeed, we do not find a significant relationship between coups in year $t$ and terrorist attacks in year $t + 1$, which increases confidence that our argument is correct. In fact, we do not even find a significant relationship
between all attacks in year \( t \) and coups in year \( t \). However, if we only measure attacks that occur prior to a coup in years in which a coup occurs, we find a very similar relationship to that reported in table 2. These tests suggest that the build up of terrorism in the prior year and prior to the coup influences regime supporters’ propensity to reshuffle the leadership in a given year.

We also try several different specifications of our terrorism variable to ensure that our measure is appropriate. The logged number of casualties that result from terrorist attacks carried out in \( t - 1 \) performs similarly for coup attempts, although the relationship between terrorism and coup success is weakened. This reflects the fact that the average terrorist attack does not produce a high number of casualties and that regime supporters in dictatorships are not typically very sensitive to casualties. Accordingly, we prefer our simpler measure of attack volume. Additionally, we try two measures of whether terrorism is increasing or decreasing in the years prior to coup activity. First, we include the difference between the number of attacks in years \( t - 2 \) and \( t - 1 \). This measure does not perform well, as it is not systematically associated with either coup attempts or successes. A 3-year moving average of terrorism performs similarly in that it is also a very poor measure of terrorism in our reshuffling coup models. These tests suggest our simple measure of the number of attacks in year \( t - 1 \) is better than these alternatives.

Second, we code an alternative dependent variable which measures whether irregular leadership failures of any type in dictatorships result from regime insiders or regime outsiders. If our theory of accountability is correct, we should find evidence that terrorists attacks only influence the risk of being deposed by insiders and not by outsiders, just as we found that terrorism influences reshuffling but not regime change coups. We start with all irregular exits of autocratic leaders that held power on January 1 in a given year in the Archigos data set.\(^{34}\) To identify when irregular leadership change occurs in autocracies, we combine the Archigos leader data with autocratic regime data.

\(^{34}\)This list excludes foreign ousters. Simply using the Archigos data to identify irregular leader exits stacks the results in favor of the hypothesized relationship because some irregular leader exits result from ousters by forces outside the incumbent regime, including in one case a terrorist attack that killed the leader (Sri Lanka 1993). Many irregular exits result from civil war or insurgencies that force the leader to flee the capital city or from anti-regime protesters forcing the leader to resign. Thus, inclusion of these events as instances of accountability would mean that the dependent variable might be endogenous by construction because these are cases in which anti-regime groups may use violent tactics that also target civilians. The main explanatory variable and the dependent variable would thus in some cases be capturing the same event, such as when the leader is assassinated by rebel bomb that also kills civilians.
from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Next, we code all irregular exits that are not part of a regime change event but which Svolik and Akcinaroglu (2007) codes as military coups constituting *insider irregular exits*. Of the remaining irregular exits – which Svolik and Akcinaroglu (2007) codes as missing, other, assassinations, revolts, and civil wars – we determine whether the leader was ousted by a regime *insider* or a regime *outsider*. The coding details for these cases are listed in the supplemental data appendix. Regime insiders include: family members of the leader; current military officers; body guards; government ministers; and other regime elite. Military officers who defect from the regime and start an insurgency at a prior date are coded as outsiders. We code situations where the military refuses to use violence against anti-regime protesters and the regime leader flees as ouster by outsiders, even if factions of the military are sympathetic to the protesters. We detail the coding of each case in the supplementary appendix. This dependent variable thus distinguishes between irregular exits where a regime outsider ousted the leader and irregular leader exits due to assassination or some other form of unconstitutional replacement by a regime insider. Consistent with the result reported above, we find that terrorism increases the risk of insider irregular exits but not outsider irregular exits. This alternative coding of our dependent variable provides a substantial robustness check for our argument and key findings.

Third, to ensure that our results are not dependent on the specific model specifications reported above, we estimate models without country specific fixed or random effects. Thus, while the models in table 2 show the effect of changing levels of terrorism within a country on coup success, the models with no country-specific fixed effects focus on variation across all countries. The finding that terrorism increases the probability of a reshuffling coup but not a regime change coup is robust to this specification. We hasten to note that we do not think the model without fixed effects is theoretically appropriate. However, this does help establish that our results are not overly model dependent. Similarly, we also estimate a model with year-fixed effects instead of decade-fixed effects, and a model with no temporal fixed effects. The finding that terrorism increases the risk of a reshuffling coup but not a regime change coup is unchanged. The relationship between terrorist attacks and reshuffling coup attempts is also robust to the simplest specifications, namely, a bivariate logit model with only the attacks variable as a regressor and a bivariate OLS model.
with or without fixed effects.

Fourth, we show that our finding for terrorism and reshuffling coups is not solely driven by either military regimes or an artifact of a few influential cases. To demonstrate that military regimes do not drive the result we interact an indicator of whether a dictatorship is a military regime according to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) with our terrorism variable in all models reported above. We find that military regimes that do not experience terrorism in the prior year are more likely to experience reshuffling coups. However, the interaction between terrorism and military regimes is negative and insignificant in all models of reshuffling coups. Finally, to demonstrate that influential cases do not drive our findings we reestimate our models of reshuffling coups after removing the three cases with the highest levels of terrorism in year $t - 1$ that also experienced reshuffling coup attempts the following year. We also report results where we jackknife standard errors by country, which are very similar to those reported in the main text.

**Terrorism and the 1987 coup in Tunisia**

In early August 1987, several bombs injured 14 people in Monastir, the hometown of Tunisia’s President, Habib Bourguiba. In response, the Tunisian regime arrested dozens of Islamists alleged to be behind the bombings. During the subsequent trial, evidence emerged that the main Islamic opposition group, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), was not responsible for the attacks, and the detainees were acquitted. Despite this ruling, President Bourguiba demanded a retrial and requested the death sentence for the main opposition leader, Rashid Ghannouchi. On November 7 Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the recently appointed Prime Minister, surrounded the Presidential palace with National Guard troops and forced Bourguiba from office. The bloodless coup took place in the context of growing conflict between Islamist groups and the government, recent cabinet reshuffles, as well as an emerging consensus that Bourguiba was failing as a leader. As one observer noted, “there is little doubt that Ben Ali was right in thinking that the President was becoming a liability for Tunisia” (Murphy, 1999, 77).

While terrorist attacks such as the bombing in Monastir were not uncommon in other countries in the region such as Turkey or Israel, Tunisia did not have a history of terrorism. Accordingly,
regime elites took these attacks and Bourguiba’s response as a strong signal of his growing incompetence as a leader. Moreover, while private observation of Bourguiba’s behavior likely led many regime supporters to at least question his competence prior to the attacks, the terrorist attacks were a publicly observable failure visible to a much wider audience. This is consistent with our argument that terrorism is a useful signal to regime supporters in part because it is publicly observable evidence of failure to rein in or deter regime opponents.

Our sketch of these events underscores three points. First, we demonstrate that the coup entailed a reshuffling of elites within the dominant-party dictatorship but did not upend the regime itself. Second, we show that Ben Ali’s power-grab was an attempt to rid the regime of an incompetent leader in a time of crisis. Finally, we establish that the regime did not deliberately influence the Monastir bombings in an attempt to breed “chaos” and set the stage for a coup. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the regime itself faced an existential threat as a result of the terrorist attacks.

The Tunisian regime dates from the independence movement in the 1950s, with Bourguiba as the first post-independence president ruling a clientelistic party-state with the aid of the dominant Neo-Destur party (later called Parti Socialiste Destourien, or PSD) (Vandewalle, 1988, 604). Perhaps the most powerful organization that could counter the PSD in the first decade of independence, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), was quickly co-opted into the regime. The military, while highly professionalized and dominated by officers with extensive foreign training, was small and largely isolated from politics (Ware, 1988, 37-38).

Bourguiba ruled Tunisia until the November coup. While some Bourguiba cronies were stripped of their positions and later detained under house arrest, Ben Ali’s new government did not change the role of the dominant party and his new cabinet was comprised almost exclusively of Bourguiba insiders (FBIS 1987, 23-24; Ware 1988 592-93; Murphy 1999, 166-67). Ben Ali retained the defense minister and his new Prime Minister was “one of the most senior of Bourguiba’s statesmen, Hedi Baccouche” (Murphy, 1999, 166). Even Bourguiba’s son resumed his position at a state-owned

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35 This point has clear connection to our estimation of fixed effects models in table 2, as the number of attacks in Tunisia in 1987 were a marked increase relative to what was typical in Tunisia. Thus, the meaningful comparison of Tunisia in 1987 is to the average level of violence for Tunisia, not the average level of violence in the sample of all countries.
bank after the coup. In short, Murphy (1999, 167) explains, “Ben Ali chose... to draw the old and new guards of the party together in a coalition... reassuring the party that its role was still intact.” Ben Ali’s coup therefore constitutes a reshuffling of elites atop a regime, not the collapse of the regime itself.

Prior to the coup, Tunisia was beset with growing conflicts that led regime supporters to worry about Bourguiba’s effectiveness as a leader. In November 1986, the main opposition parties boycotted Bourguiba’s election, raising political tensions and suggesting his inability to competently manage regime politics (Murphy, 1999, 75). In the spring of 1987, Bourguiba stepped up a repressive campaign against Islamist movements and arrested the MTI leader, Rashid Ghannouchi (Murphy, 1999, 76). Mounting pressure to effectively deal with Islamist dissent prompted Bourguiba to try to recast his own government; within a week of the August attack, Bourguiba named Ben Ali as Prime Minister, in the hopes of using a military man to pursue yet more repression against the Islamists.

Bourguiba was not able to effectively counter the Islamists, as they continued to operate in opposition to the state and even discussed a more serious challenge to the state if the re-trial of MTI leaders proceeded (Borowiec 1998, 40; Hamdi 1998, 57; Murphy 1999, 74). The attacks and Bourguiba’s inability to quell dissent from a marginalized group put Ben Ali in a position to act and gave regime supporters incentive to support Bourguiba’s removal. The military had been called upon to put down protests in 1978 and 1984, a risky action that many regime supporters wanted to avoid repeating. For instance, prior to the events of 1987, one observer emphasizes that the military feared “social disintegration” and would intervene in politics if “the cohesion of the officer corps is threatened” (Ware, 1985, 41-42). Vandewalle (1988, 604) notes that by 1987, Ben Ali stepped in because he was “wary of a possible breakdown in public order after the violent confrontations with the Islamists in the previous months.” Some analysts even go so far as to suggest that “Bourguiba’s struggle with the Islamists had pushed Tunisia to the brink of civil war” (Alexander, 2010, 52), although it is far from clear that civil war was around the corner.

It is important to note that despite the crisis situation and the unusual emergence of terrorism as part of the crisis, the terrorist attacks did not pose an existential threat to the regime. However,
the spate of terrorist attacks simply provided further evidence for a regime elite increasingly inclined to view Bourguiba as incompetent. Alexander (2010, 52) intimates that Bourguiba’s demand for a retrial of the Islamists “came amidst growing concerns about his senility.” Another observer noted that “while Ben Ali and the other ministers faced continual frustrations in dealing with the ailing and senile President, the last straw came... when Bourguiba suddenly insisted that new trials of Islamic fundamentalists should be carried out” (Boulby, 1988, 613). Citing his erratic behavior and growing senility, Ben Ali offered this explanation after ousting the long-time ruler:

I had the feeling... that Bourguiba was no longer in full possession of all his faculties...

Bourguiba, overtaken by age and illness, hostage to a disreputable entourage, had let himself adopt a political behavior which would menace the foundations of the modern state he had spent so long building up. Faced with many crises, the country was no longer governable. There was a need for change.\(^{36}\)

Ben Ali’s coup, therefore, can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve the Bourguiba regime – and the military’s power – by replacing an incompetent leader.

Finally, it is useful to note that the terrorist attacks in August 1987 were not even orchestrated by the largest Islamic opposition group, the MTI. Rather, the marginal and small group Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility (Foreign Broadcast Information Services, 1987a; Murphy 1999, 76). Even though a more extreme party line was adopted at the MTI convention in 1986, the main leadership of the group, including Ghannouchi, did not sanction the bombings at Monastir and did not favor future terrorist attacks (Murphy, 1999, 74). By demanding a retrial of the apparently innocent MTI defendants, Bourguiba revealed his incompetence and inability to defuse what should have been a minor threat. Further, there is little evidence that Ben Ali or members of the military welcomed the attacks. Instead, the military feared they would be called upon to once again intervene to defend Bourguiba and that this might lead to a turn of events that would actually threaten regime stability (Alexander, 2010, 52).

In short, the attacks at Monastir in August 1987 led directly to Bourguiba’s ouster. The subsequent trial of suspected Islamists, their acquittal, and, in particular, Bourguiba’s demand

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\(^{36}\)Quoted in Hopwood (1992, 102-3).
for a retrial underscored his ineffectiveness in dealing with the Islamists, thus serving as widely observable evidence of his incompetence. With support for Bourguiba waning, Ben Ali forced him from power to preserve the regime.

**Conclusion**

Even though the recent literature on terrorism and political violence demonstrates that some dictatorships experience significant amounts of terrorism, existing research does not examine the effects of political dissent and violence on dictators or the regimes they lead. Are dictators held accountable and punished for their failures to prevent domestic political violence? We study the political consequences of different forms of observable political dissent and violence: terrorist attacks, large-scale protests, and civil wars. To pinpoint the accountability of dictators to elites with an interest in preserving the regime, we introduce a new theoretical distinction between *reshuffling* coups and *regime change* coups. Reshuffling coups change the leadership but leave the regime intact, while regime change coups change the regime by completely removing the group of elites atop it. We argue that reshuffling coups are a mechanism for elite supporters to hold a dictator accountable as they are intended to preserve the regime while replacing the leader atop it.

Using newly collected data on attempted and successful regime change and reshuffling coups in all autocracies since 1970, we show that terrorism hurts dictators but does not fundamentally transform dictatorships. Dictators who experience significant increases in terrorist attacks are at increased risk of reshuffling coup attempts by regime supporters. However, regime change coup attempts that aim to transform the regime are not related to increases in terrorism. In general, regime change coup attempts follow episodes of political dissent and violence that require a sizable amount of public support and participation such as mass protest and insurgency.

Our findings and the distinction we introduce between reshuffling and regime change coups have at least two implications for the literatures on terrorism and authoritarianism. First, there is an accountability mechanism in dictatorships by which leaders are punished for “allowing” observable instances of organized political violence to take place under their watch. Even though the mechanism of removal from office in dictatorships is not as regular and institutionalized as losing an
election in democracies, dictators are held accountable by their ruling coalition for failures. Secondly, terrorism has significant repercussions for dictators despite not being associated with regime instability or transformational regime change coups. Thus, it is not correct to assume that terrorist attacks against civilians are insignificant for autocrats because they are not accountable to the public through elections. This implication is at odds with a common argument in the terrorism literature that suggests terrorism has more impact on democracies than autocratic regimes.\textsuperscript{37}

The relationship we observe between terrorism and reshuffling coups provides evidence that dictators are accountable to regime supporters for their performance. However, it is important to note that reshuffling coups do not necessarily imply that there is clear accountability to the larger public or an interest among regime supporters to protect the public from terrorism in dictatorships. Regime supporters intervene and remove the dictator to protect themselves and the regime in which they occupy a privileged place. Terrorism usually is not a regime destabilizing event; rather it indicates that a small but relatively well organized group is unhappy with the current regime. In fact, this is precisely why terrorism is associated with reshuffling coups as regime supporters have incentive to remove the leader when neither the risk of regime collapse nor the coup opportunities for regime opponents in the military are high. Accordingly, publics living under dictatorships are very unlikely to get a new regime as a result of high levels of terrorism absent broad-based movements of political dissent.

\textsuperscript{37}For prominent examples, see Li (2005) or Pape (2003).
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Table 1: Terrorism, Civil War and Coup Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Terrorist Attacks with No Civil War</th>
<th>Any Civil War with Low Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Coup</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Coup</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reshuffling Coup</td>
<td>16.79</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change Coup</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Reshuffling Versus Regime Change Coups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Log of Terrorist Attacks(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Log GDP per capita(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Log Population(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Low Intensity Civil War(t_{-1})</th>
<th>High Intensity Civil War(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Log of Protests(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Economic Growth(t_{-1})</th>
<th>Neighbor Coups</th>
<th>Pre-1960 Civil War</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model I</td>
<td>0.24* (0.13)</td>
<td>-1.51** (0.59)</td>
<td>0.64 (1.05)</td>
<td>0.29 (0.36)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.53)</td>
<td>0.31* (0.19)</td>
<td>-2.67 (1.92)</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.22)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.56)</td>
<td>4.86** (2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model II</td>
<td>0.43** (0.17)</td>
<td>-1.26 (0.83)</td>
<td>2.20 (1.55)</td>
<td>0.28 (0.52)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.77 (3.13)</td>
<td>-0.58* (0.31)</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.79)</td>
<td>2.16 (2.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model III</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.19)</td>
<td>-1.61* (0.85)</td>
<td>-0.70 (1.58)</td>
<td>0.25 (0.48)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.71)</td>
<td>0.28 (0.27)</td>
<td>-3.75 (2.45)</td>
<td>0.37 (0.30)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.53)</td>
<td>4.80** (2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model IV</td>
<td>0.25** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.89** (0.21)</td>
<td>-0.17 (0.15)</td>
<td>0.41 (0.32)</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.49)</td>
<td>0.35** (0.17)</td>
<td>-3.18* (1.77)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.21)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.79)</td>
<td>2.62 (2.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model V</td>
<td>0.47** (0.14)</td>
<td>-0.67** (0.28)</td>
<td>-0.12 (0.20)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.47)</td>
<td>-0.85 (0.74)</td>
<td>0.30 (0.23)</td>
<td>-1.13 (2.80)</td>
<td>-0.64** (0.31)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.25)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.79)</td>
<td>4.80** (2.26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Model VI</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.99** (0.24)</td>
<td>-0.18 (0.14)</td>
<td>0.68* (0.40)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.60)</td>
<td>0.46* (0.24)</td>
<td>-4.50** (2.08)</td>
<td>0.42 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.53)</td>
<td>4.80** (2.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: | Attempted Coup | Attempted Reshuffling Coup | Attempted Regime Change Coup | Attempted Coup | Attempted Reshuffling Coup | Attempted Regime Change Coup |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-296.76</td>
<td>-150.37</td>
<td>-166.32</td>
<td>-449.94</td>
<td>-260.10</td>
<td>-260.52</td>
</tr>
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<td>Decade Fixed Effects</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Random Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>2813</td>
<td>2813</td>
<td>2813</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

** p < .05; * p < .10
## Table 3: Terrorism and Coup Attempts: Personalist Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Log of Terrorist Attacks&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Personalist</th>
<th>Personalist x Log of Terrorist Attacks&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Log GDP per capita&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Log Population&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Low Intensity Civil War&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>High Intensity Civil War&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Log of Protests&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Economic Growth&lt;sub&gt;t-1&lt;/sub&gt;</th>
<th>Neighbor Coups</th>
<th>Pre-1960 Civil War</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-1.52**</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-2.32</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>4.72**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.82*</td>
<td>-2.12**</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.26</td>
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<td>-0.53*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(2.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.38*</td>
<td>-3.16</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(1.71)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(2.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
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Dependent Variable

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Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

** p < .05; * p < .10
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<th>Successful Reshuffling Coup</th>
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Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

** \( p < .05 \) ; * \( p < .10 \)
### Table 5: Terrorism and Coups: Simple Selection Models

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Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

** p < .05 ; * p < .10