With every technological paradigm shift, there are residual fears that some facet of the innovation will be abused by malicious entities. This certainly applies to quantum computing in spite of the potential for myriad benefits. Interestingly, there are two aspects of the technology that are supposed to work in opposition with one another but may both constitute a widespread sentiment of mistrust in societal institutions.

Quantum cryptanalysis, or code-breaking, poses a threat to all sensitive and classified data in world, which is currently encoded with RSA Encryption. Due to the nature of superposition qubits—the defining features of quantum computers—an efficient quantum algorithm could instantly undermine RSA Encryption through fast large-number prime factorization, an operation now proven to be mathematically difficult with classical techniques. One such algorithm with the potential for RSA compromise is Shor’s Algorithm, which applies Fourier series to quantum mechanical principles. Because the conceptualization of Shor’s Algorithm is nontrivial, no current quantum devices have been able to run it effectively, but researchers declare that it is only a matter of time before it is realized. Upon such realization, entire populations would lose trust in digital transactions, nearly the entire foundation of the modern global economy. Moreover, there would be a large-scale sentiment interpersonal mistrust when Shor-capable quantum computers become practical devices. In Professor Jon Lindsay’s words, quantum cryptanalysis would constitute a “cryptocalypse.”

The main effort to thwart the induction of perfect quantum cryptanalysis is the even more perfect quantum cryptography, referred to as post-quantum cryptography. Institutions such as the National Security Agency and the Internet Engineering Task Force have already begun investing resources in post-quantum cryptography, reflecting the increasing abandonment of the traditional conceptions of security. They and other research groups seek to render penetration impossible by the laws of physics rather than merely inconvenient by mathematical difficulty, the latter of which is the premise of classical security algorithms. Despite such optimism, many fear that cryptographic methods which originate in the hands of intelligence agencies will inevitably stay in the hands of such agencies, who are in societal positions of leverage to abuse the methods, specifically in “going dark” with their activities to the citizens’ oblivion. “Going dark,” a fear repudiated by Lindsay but conveyed by others, would contribute even more negatively to the already high level of citizen mistrust of government, particularly as all evidence of power abuse and corruption would remain forever obscured.

It can be said of quantum computing that—despite the wealth of potential benefits—its practical implementation could bestow power to those in the darkness (hackers) AND incentivize those in power (intelligence bureaucrats) to go dark.