The Macedonians of the early 4th century did not look like a people who would conquer the known world. Macedonia was always an ally of whatever state was the most inclined to help it. Following the Theban’s devastating victory against the Spartans, the Macedonian king allied with them and sent a group of young hostages, including the future King Philip II, to show good face. Philip spent his time in Thebes with both Pammenes and Epaminondas, two of the greatest Theban generals (Plut. Pelop. 26.4-5). Green says, “He learnt the importance of professional training in drill and tactics, of close cooperation between cavalry and infantry, of meticulous staff planning combined with speed in attack” (Green 1991 15-16). Philip learned how to lead an army in Thebes and now free from being a hostage he decided to recreate the Macedonian army into a force to be reckoned with.
Map_Macedonia_336_BC-en“Syntagma phalangis” by Alessandro Gelsumini – Own work. Licensed under CC0 via Wikimedia Commons – http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Syntagma_phalangis.jpg#/media/File:Syntagma_phalangis.jpg
He had at his disposal the Hetairoi a heavy cavalry arm that even back in Thucydides’ day were described as “good horsemen” and “where they charged, none was able to resist them” (Thuc. 2.10). The weakness in the Macedonian military lied not with the cavalry but with the Pezetairoi, the infantry. The infantry was made up of tribal levies, peasants, and shepherds much like the infantry of Persia itself. Philip reorganized the infantry into a highly trained phalanx which wielded the sarissa, a spear over double the length of those commonly used (Green 1991 18-19). Philip’s training was exhausting and he would make his men march three hundred stades, thirty four miles, in full arms frequently (Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.10). The nobles were not safe from his discipline either. He beat one for leaving rank to find water and executed one for taking his arms off against orders (Aelian VH. 14.49).
This new army was first pitted against the Illyrians. The Macedonian phalanx stood firm and Philip sent his cavalry around the side to flank the enemy. After the infantry bloodied itself, the cavalry wheeled around and smashed the Illyrians. The fleeing Illyrians were chased and cut down leaving seven thousand dead (Diod. 16.4). Green examines the battle and sees proof of Philip applying the lessons he learned under Epaminondas. The oblique echelon was Epaminondas’ specialty. The Macedonian formation caused the Illyrian wing to stretch and once there was a gap, the Hetairoi were able to charge into it driving a great wedge (Green 1991 23-25).
The victory against the Illyrians ushered in an age of Macedonian expansion. Philip led his army around the Greek world establishing his dominance. According to Demosthenes, “he seized Amphipolis, next Pydna, then Potidaea, after that Methone, lastly he invaded Thessaly” (Olynth 1.12-13). His victories started to attract foreigners and before long he had an officer corps containing mercenaries from every part of Greece until it numbered about eight hundred (Green. 1991. 39). Philip continuously trained his soldiers and tried to improve them. He forbade the use of wagons due to their slow pace, limited the number of servants that could accompany the army, and refused to allow any women to stay at camp (Engels. 1978. 12-13). Philip’s reforms created an army that could appear so quick his enemies wouldn’t even expect him. His fastest rate was 18.9 miles in a day with his entire army, but while traveling with smaller forces he could double that (Engels. 1978. 20-23).
“Battle of Chaeronea, 338 BC”. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Battle_of_Chaeronea,_338_BC.png#/media/File:Battle_of_Chaeronea,_338_BC.png
Philip continued to wage warfare against his neighbors until an alliance was formed against him. The Athenians chose to ask their old enemies, Thebes, to join them in the war against Philip (Diod. 16.85.1). On a plain north of Chaeronea, the two sides met. The Greek force was made up of twelve thousand Boeotians, led by the Theban Sacred Band, ten thousand Athenian hoplites, and five thousand mercenaries, according to Green (Green 1991 73). The Athenians made up a large percentage of the force and took the whole left wing but they were “impetuous and inexperienced” (Polyaenus. Strat. 4.2.7). In contrast, The Macedonian front line was full of experienced soldiers and the right wing, facing the Athenians, was led by Philip and he had a trick in mind. While Philip would command the infantry he put his son, Alexander, in charge of the cavalry. Alexander was to wheel around the flank and hammer into the Greeks, similar to the battle-plan used against the Illyrians (Green 1991 74-75). Philip’s well-trained phalanx was able to maneuver in a way a citizen militia couldn’t. He engaged the Athenians and then, keeping formation, slowly retreated causing the Athenians to push forward. Once they lost the advantageous high ground he brought his troops forward and attacked them with all his might (Polyaenus. Strat.4.2.2). The Macedonians were now on the high ground and a fatal flaw appeared in the Greek line. A gap was now opened between the Thebans and the rest of the line (Green 1991 75). Alexander took advantage of the situation and charged. What followed was a bloody fight that didn’t end until a thousand Athenians lay dead and the Theban Sacred Band was annihilated (Diod. 16.86.3-6).
The Battle of Chaeronea proved that Philip’s professional military was too experienced and could easily outmaneuver a citizen militia. The oblique echelon formation could create gaps in untrained enemy lines and a cavalry charge in the flank could shatter all but the bravest men. His surroundings pacified, Philip cast his eyes towards Persia.
Unfortunately, Philip was assassinated before he could leave to fight for the riches of Asia. What he left behind for his son was a military that could take on anyone. Years of warfare had created a core group of soldiers that would fight to the ends of the earth and an officer corps that had fought in multiple different situations. In particular, Parmenion, was Philip’s greatest officer and someone Alexander would make use of. Philip began allowing him to operate on his own by conquering the Illyrians (Plut. Alexander. 3.8). Parmenion was even sent to create a secure area in the Asian Hellespont to allow for the military to resupply and continue its way down the coast when it crossed into Persian territory (Diod. 17.2.4). Officers like Parmenion were capable of acting competently without oversight and that allowed Alexander to quickly stomp out rebellion when he took the throne without having to delay the war against Persia. This experienced military proved itself against heavily armored opponents and it was prepared for the light archers and light cavalry that made up most of the Persian drafted forces.
Plutarch. The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans.
Green, Peter. Alexander of Macedon. Berkley, CA: U of California, 1991. Print.
Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War.
Polyaenus. Stratagems.
Aelian. Various Histories.
Diodorus Siculus. Bibliotheca Historica.
Demosthenes. Olynthaics
Engels, Donald W. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley: U of California, 1978. Print.