Every student of social psychology is at some point introduced to the fundamental attribution error (FAE). The term was coined in 1977 by Lee Ross to explain common misattributions (Ross, 1977). Ross noted that participants tend to attribute motivation to mostly internal factors, ignoring potential external factors. Psychologists have no doubt that both internal and external factors influence our decision making, but attributions tend to favor the internal, creating a correspondence bias. If true, the relevance of the FAE cannot be questioned, as all research should strive to be as unbiased as possible. Yet, is the FAE itself a biased misconception?
We will come back to the question at hand, but first let’s get weird. The term “WEIRD” was originally used by Henrich and Heine, referring to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Their findings could radically shift the world of research, as it was found that 80% research participants are WEIRD, while representing only 12% of the human population (Azar, 2010). This finding means that the majority of research is only applicable to around an eighth of the world population. But what does this mean for the FAE?
Studies have shown the FAE is more common in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures (Mason & Morris, 2010). Western cultures tend to be more individualist, so on this front the FAE is WEIRD. Research using more diverse populations must be completed on the FAE to determine the effects of education, industrialization, wealth, and government structure on the concept. It is quite possible that the FAE is not “fundamental” at all. The concept of making errors in attribution might itself be incorrectly attributed to human nature rather than to WEIRD societies.
The WEIRD problem necessitates reflection on previously accepted psychological concepts. It brings forth the importance of something often all too ignored in research: diversity. Diversity across genders, races, and cultures is vital for any research study. The FAE becomes much more interesting if it is truly universal. Without universality of concepts, how are we to understand universal human nature?
References
Azar, B. (2010, May). Are your findings ‘WEIRD’? Monitor on Psychology, 41(5). http://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird
Mason, M. F., & Morris, M. W. (2010). Culture, attribution and automaticity: a social cognitive neuroscience view. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 5(2-3), 292–306. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsq034
Ross, L. D. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press.