

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‘Before the Colonel Arrived’: Hoover, Donovan, Roosevelt, and the Origins of American Central Intelligence, 1940–41

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Credit for the origins of American central intelligence are commonly placed solely with Colonel William Donovan who visited Great Britain in 1940–41 and, based upon these experiences, subsequently reported to the Roosevelt White House on the need for a centralized American intelligence organization. Yet evidence indicates that prior to Donovan’s overseas visit and report to the White House, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation traveled to Britain, surveyed its intelligence apparatus, and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover submitted a report to President Roosevelt pre-dating Donovan’s. Historians, therefore, must reconsider the origins of American central intelligence as not influenced by any one individual but by multiple individuals with bureaucratic interests.

The origins of modern American central intelligence, which is identified in the organization dubbed Coordinator of Information (COI) – the body that evolved into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) then, obliquely, the Central Intelligence Agency – is a contentious issue. Whether the British were responsible for convincing the US government to establish centralized intelligence or the Americans brought it into existence themselves, historical interpretations abound.[1] The dominant view on the origins of American central intelligence focuses on Colonel William Donovan, who headed the COI and OSS during the Second World War. Most intelligence historians accept the notion that Donovan was responsible for convincing President Franklin Roosevelt that a centralized intelligence apparatus – the aforementioned COI – was vital to American national security interests. Donovan came to his view by traveling to Britain in 1940–41 (with the help of British officials) where he surveyed the state of British intelligence. While there he met high-ranking members of British intelligence organizations and then used this information in

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written reports and a meeting successfully to convince Roosevelt of the need to establish an American version of the same.

Historical truth, however, is hardly ever this neatly packaged, laying credit on one individual's exploits only. What is missing from this story is the role played by Donovan's chief rival in the intelligence field, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Both Donovan and Hoover fought a sometimes bitter bureaucratic battle to seek to control for themselves the responsibility for American foreign intelligence and to protect their own particular turfs. Both men were well suited for the job, and, more importantly, both Donovan and Hoover had the ear of President Roosevelt. And both had demonstrated their usefulness by offering Roosevelt intelligence reports.[2] More importantly, however, representatives of the FBI visited Great Britain in 1940–41 (before Donovan's trip), where they surveyed British intelligence, met high-ranking intelligence officials, and reported back to Hoover. The FBI director subsequently submitted a report to Roosevelt, pre-dating any of Donovan's, that outlined the organization and methods of both the Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Given this fact, we must thereby reconsider the origins of American central intelligence as not the responsibility of any one person, but originating from multiple persons all with bureaucratic designs.

An analysis of the FBI's role, however, must begin with its long relationship with British intelligence. This inter-agency relationship dates at least to the First World War when the Bureau of Investigation (it was renamed Federal Bureau of Investigation only in 1935) liaised with Sir William Wiseman, the British intelligence representative in America.[3] During the Second World War, the FBI maintained limited and unofficial contact with Captain Sir James Paget, the British Passport Control Officer, who from 1937 was the representative for British intelligence in America.[4] The FBI also maintained limited contact with the British Purchasing Commission. By 1940 a more influential man replaced Paget as passport control officer, the Canadian William Stephenson who, unlike his predecessors, established an intimate and official relationship with FBI Director Hoover to build his British Security Coordination (BSC) organization in New York City.[5]

William Stephenson was born and raised in western Canada. When the First World War commenced in August 1914, he was a student in Winnipeg and joined the military where he eventually became an officer and pilot. Stephenson distinguished himself in this regard and won various British and French commendations. Stephenson also distinguished himself at this time by winning the world amateur-lightweight boxing championship. After the war, Stephenson became a successful businessman who retained a variety of high-level contacts, especially in the steel industry and notably in Germany, which

made him an invaluable asset to the British government. He was able to provide Lieutenant Colonel Claude Dansey of SIS, who regularly sought out businessmen for intelligence purposes, and the out-of-power Winston Churchill information on German war preparations and munitions. After Churchill became prime minister in 1940, the SIS recruited Stephenson and, given his intimate contacts in America – such as with the wealthy Astor family of New York who were also friends of the Roosevelts – he was selected as Britain's new intelligence representative there.[6]

Stephenson made two trips to the United States in 1940. It was during the second trip that he formally established himself as Britain's intelligence representative under the guise of the British passport control officer. His first voyage to America, however, occurred in April 1940 after efforts by Hamish Mitchell, of the British Purchasing Commission, failed to establish liaison with the FBI. Mitchell had sought FBI assistance to protect British war materials from saboteurs through FBI plant-protection surveys and employee name checks. The FBI and the State Department, the latter represented by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, head of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, reacted coolly to Mitchell's proposal and no liaison was effected. (Interestingly, Berle later looked unfavorably upon Stephenson's intelligence operations in the United States.)[7]

It was Sir Stewart Menzies, head of SIS, who had recruited Stephenson to travel to the United States, following Mitchell's failure, to establish 'a high-level liaison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation'.[8] Stephenson made contact with Hoover through a mutual friend, the boxer Gene Tunney.[9] Yet before Hoover would establish formal ties with a foreign intelligence organization that was to operate on American soil, he demanded authorization from President Roosevelt. Throughout, Berle opposed liaison with British intelligence while Hoover sought to monopolize it, resulting in Hoover bypassing State Department channels to win authorization. Stephenson and Hoover, given this situation, obtained Roosevelt's imprimatur through Vincent Astor, who was an intimate friend of both Roosevelt and Stephenson. (Later, Astor served as an intelligence coordinator in New York for the White House.) Roosevelt, it appears, happily endorsed Stephenson's desire for FBI liaison directing that: 'There should be the closest possible marriage between the FBI and British Intelligence.' Roosevelt's approval of liaison between the FBI and BSC is confirmed by Robert E. Sherwood, former Roosevelt speechwriter and chief of the Office of War Information, who wrote in 1948: 'There was, by Roosevelt's order and despite State Department qualms, effectively close co-operation between J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI and British security services under the direction of a quiet Canadian, William Stephenson.'[10]

Stephenson, official CIA historian Thomas Troy has ascertained, had at least one 14-hour meeting with Hoover to work out the details.[11] He then returned to Great Britain and reported on his mission to establish close cooperation with the FBI. On 21 June 1940, Stephenson returned to New York City as passport control officer aboard the SS *Britannic* to formally establish the BSC. Since no meaningful British intelligence organization existed in America, Stephenson had to build one.[12] He had already made contact with Hoover, which was imperative for him to operate on American soil, but Stephenson also maintained a number of high-level contacts in America and Canada. These individuals included William Donovan, who headed the COI and later the OSS, and British Ambassador Lord Lothian among others. Locating his organization in the Rockefeller Center on Fifth Avenue, Stephenson was assisted by 15 security officers and 45 support personnel. Stephenson sought three goals for BSC: to monitor enemy activity, to prevent enemy sabotage of British property, and to promote the interventionist political position in America.[13]

Most important to Stephenson at this early juncture was his liaison with Hoover. The official BSC history's characterization of Hoover is accurate and confirmed by the most recent studies of the FBI director. The BSC history describes Hoover as 'in no way anti-British, but in every way pro-FBI. His job is at once his pride and his vanity. These facts are emphasized because they are fundamental to an understanding of the course of BSC's relationship with the FBI, which did not run smoothly throughout.'[14]

According to the otherwise self-congratulating official history of the BSC, FBI Director Hoover was central to establishing British intelligence's presence in America, and it was not until just before Pearl Harbor that the FBI–BSC relationship deteriorated. The BSC history states that 'Hoover could hardly have been more cooperative' in assisting Stephenson's organization from 1940. Indeed, Hoover is credited for giving British Security Coordination its name. Hoover also had invited one of Stephenson's lieutenants, H. Montgomery Hyde, to tour FBI headquarters to learn about FBI methods. The BSC history states that Hoover permitted the BSC to use an FBI radio channel to communicate with SIS headquarters in Great Britain, and by early 1941 BSC approached the FBI about establishing an independent radio transmitter. Hoover, reportedly, also ordered his agents to cooperate with BSC in every way.[15]

Undoubtedly, there were many interactions between the FBI and BSC. But the precise nature and scope of this relationship cannot be determined until records are released in both America and Britain. The British government has released nothing relating to BSC operations in America or its cooperation with the FBI, and only fragmentary evidence, indeed, proves that liaison was

effected. The FBI also has not released any unredacted FBI files on the two organizations' relationship, and will not release files without British approval. Historian Francis MacDonnell, author of *Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front* (1995), for example, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the FBI requesting access to correspondence between FBI officials and senior Roosevelt administration officials regarding BSC and Stephenson. He also requested access to correspondence between FBI officials and Stephenson. MacDonnell received hundreds of pages of documents, all of which were heavily redacted, leaving only one or two words undeleted. But the FBI has also withheld hundreds of pages of documents in their entirety. Irrespective of the redactions, the FOIA request confirms that a large base of documentation exists – in this case merely reflecting inter-government correspondence – in FBI files about Stephenson and the BSC.[16]

Some interaction between the FBI and British intelligence can be documented. In a personal and confidential letter of 28 May 1941 to the White House, Hoover reported that 'the British Intelligence Service has advised that … nationwide attempts at sabotage may be expected during the Decoration Day week end'.[17] The FBI's close interaction with British intelligence, moreover, suggests that Hoover may have played a part in convincing President Roosevelt of the necessity for establishing a centralized American foreign intelligence organization; a function that Hoover had hoped to secure for the FBI and the subject of bitter rivalry with Donovan. Previously, credit was given solely to William Donovan, who had made two trips to Great Britain and had submitted a report to the administration based on his experiences as well as one on the value of centralized intelligence.[18] But the FBI's mission in the winter of 1940–41 to Great Britain where officials surveyed its intelligence apparatus and Hoover subsequently submitted a report (in March) to President Roosevelt that pre-dated both Donovan's reports to Knox and Roosevelt (in April and June, respectively), must be considered.

The Anglophile BSC history states that Stephenson 'afforded him [Hoover] opportunity for studying the organizational prerequisites of secret intelligence work'. Stephenson had supposedly 'made arrangements in the autumn of 1940 for two of Hoover's senior officers to visit SIS headquarters'.[19] Two representatives of the FBI indeed traveled to Great Britain in the autumn of 1940, but only one was a senior FBI official, Hugh H. Clegg – assistant director of the Training and Inspection Division. The other, Lawrence Hince, was an FBI agent who had volunteered to serve as Clegg's assistant. Whether Stephenson alone had arranged for the trip, as the BSC history suggests, cannot be confirmed, but it is conceivable that he had some hand in the arrangements. FBI records indicate that the mission was 'to

make a survey not only of intelligence matters but all matters dealing with functions of police in times of national emergency'.[20]

On 30 October 1940 Assistant Secretary of State Berle, Roosevelt's interdepartmental intelligence coordinator, approved the FBI mission to Great Britain.[21] Then, early in November, the State Department issued passports to the two FBI men and at 01:00 on 23 November they left Washington for Jersey City. In New Jersey, as no space was available on the clipper ships to London, they boarded the American Export Line ship *Excalibur* for Lisbon, Portugal, whence they traveled to London. Arriving in London on 1 December 1940, Clegg and Hince proceeded, in the words of Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, 'to study methods of handling intelligence and internal security'.[22]

Clegg and Hince studied British intelligence for two months, leaving London at the end of January 1941. The two FBI representatives had access to high-level British intelligence officials, permitting them to study the organization and methods of the Secret Intelligence Service, Security Service, and Government Code and Cypher School. In making periodic reports to Hoover, Clegg used the State Department's confidential code, and one particular decoded cable to Hoover outlined the broad survey of Clegg's and Hince's inquiry. They had examined in detail British intelligence and counterintelligence, censorship, evacuation, air-raid defense, policing methods, handling of foreign nationals, industrial and plant protection, the communication of intelligence, conscription investigations, emergency custodial detention, Fifth Column investigations, and various civilian defense and emergency procedures.[23]

The official history of British intelligence during the Second World War indicates that Clegg and Hince (who are unnamed in the history) studied British cryptography and foreign intelligence: 'In February 1941 [*sic*] two FBI officers were received as pupils at SIS's London office.' There, they were able to scrutinize the British effort in deciphering Axis codes.[24] Dating from October 1939, FBI officials had sought to enter the field of crytanalysis and this particular mission led to a closer relationship between the FBI and SIS, resulting in FBI agents being permanently attached to SIS. This relationship, however, according to historian Bradley Smith, resulted not in an increased understanding between American and British cryptanalytic officials but to further misunderstandings such as had plagued the early cryptanalytic intelligence relationship between the two allies. But whatever the effects the mission had on cryptography, it nevertheless confirms the increasingly intimate relationship established between the FBI and various elements of British intelligence.[25]

In addition to having contact with high-level British intelligence officials, Clegg and Hince were present when in January 1941 President Roosevelt

despatched Harry Hopkins, an intimate advisor, to Great Britain in an effort to cement British and American relations. The president and Churchill had been at odds inasmuch as the prime minister did not know, in the days just prior to the formulation of the lend–lease policy, what Roosevelt's precise intentions were. Hopkins spent five weeks in Great Britain helping to foster intimate relations between Roosevelt and Churchill, a task he succeeded in accomplishing. In London, Hopkins met with a variety of government officials, many times dining with them, and it was at a dinner that the British minister of aircraft production, Lord Beaverbrook, hosted at the Claridge Hotel that Hopkins came into contact with Clegg and Hince. The two FBI representatives observed the success with which Hopkins presented himself and charmed his hosts and reported this information to Hoover. The FBI director, in turn, forwarded a report to the White House regarding Hopkins' success at this particular dinner party.[26]

Before their return to Washington, Clegg and Hince cabled a preliminary report to Hoover on the results of their inquiry. In their opinion, the FBI representatives reported:

> Examination and observation in detail here demonstrate that your [Hoover's] investigation for national defense covering sabotage, plant survey, espionage, and methods of dealing with suspects, are far superior [than British efforts], and follow effective programs and policies, as successful results show here. Nevertheless, the authorities here would consider it absolutely necessary that the Bureau should have control of the border and port examination stations which control the arrival of suspects and aliens.[27]

Clegg and Hince might have regarded the FBI's work in domestic national security cases as superior to that in Great Britain, but their mission had led to greater liaison and cooperation between American and British intelligence organizations. Moreover, Clegg and Hince had learned much about the organization and operations of MI5, SIS, and British cryptography. Upon their return to the United States, Hoover collected this information in two memoranda and forwarded them to the White House.

Hoover sent the first report on 5 March 1941 and the second the following day. In the first document, Hoover outlined information 'obtained from high ranking officials of the British intelligence services' regarding economic warfare and readjustment. The memorandum described British plans to disrupt Axis lines of supply, steel production, foodstuffs, fuel supplies, and other vital war materials. The British had hoped, Hoover continued, to effect economic disruption through legislative, diplomatic, and military means. Their ultimate goal, however, according to Hoover (insightful in historical

hindsight), was 'to be in a position at the end of the war to organize the world, particularly Europe, on an economic basis for the purposes of rehabilitation, profit, and the prevention of the spread of Communism'.[28]

Hoover's second memorandum to the White House outlined for the president 'the intelligence organizations and methods of the British'. Hoover's report critically examined, in particular, the British Security Service. He noted the size of the service and its primary weakness: MI5 had no supervision over the police organizations that conducted their investigations. Hoover praised the service's duplication of its files which, he noted, had already ensured their survival when the London office had been bombed. But, he reported, Clegg and Hince had discovered 'while reviewing the files of the Security Service' that the organization's lack of control over the police had led to many delayed and inadequate investigations. Plant security surveys also proved inadequate to Hoover, who cited the British devotion of three hours to a survey whereas FBI agents conducted them over days or weeks. Hoover also described the Security Service's use of agents, both undercover and official, to monitor suspicious groups and individuals as well as its maintenance of watch lists. Lastly, Hoover surveyed the organization's use of wiretaps, mail covers, hidden cameras, and other means to monitor foreign diplomatic agents.[29]

The second half of this memorandum outlined the organization and general activity of the British foreign intelligence organization, the Secret Intelligence Service. Hoover noted that British officials believed that if the Security Service and SIS were combined, a more effective organization would result. As a separate organization, however, Hoover outlined for Roosevelt the SIS's nature. The British government did not officially acknowledge the existence of the SIS, Hoover wrote, yet its appropriation was $14,000,000. Hoover then described the intelligence role of station chiefs, contacts with foreign police forces, military observers, the role of wireless stations, and the cover of passport control officers (the cover Stephenson employed). Then, Hoover outlined the general counterespionage tactics SIS used in foreign countries from surveillance to microphones. Lastly, Hoover noted the ease, as compared to the US, with which the SIS employed sensitive investigative techniques such as mail covers, the interception of wireless transmissions, wiretaps, and the interception of telegrams or cables.[30]

Clegg's and Hince's survey mission to Great Britain and Hoover's report to the White House on British intelligence predated the better-known William Donovan mission to London and subsequent report to Roosevelt that is generally credited with convincing the president to create a central foreign intelligence organization. Donovan had made two trips to London, the first in July 1940 at the behest of the White House to survey the Fifth Column

situation and the state of British defenses. He again traveled to London as part of a wider tour of Europe and the Middle East from December 1940 to March 1941. Donovan's mission was to ascertain the economic, military, and political situation in the Mediterranean region. In London, at the conclusion of his tour, and before returning to the United States, Donovan made a survey of British intelligence – in particular the SIS and Special Operations Executive – and consulted with the British intelligence chiefs. This is commonly cited as the experience that rooted Donovan's argument for centralizing American intelligence.[31]

Back in Washington, Donovan wrote a four-page memorandum in April 1941 describing for his friend and administration confidant Navy Secretary Frank Knox 'the instrumentality through which the British Government gathers its intelligence'.[32] (It should be noted that Knox was key to Donovan's influence in the White House.) He wrote that the United States should create a foreign intelligence organization using the British system as a guide, and he suggested that it should be controlled by the president, be secretly funded, and be the only organization to collect foreign intelligence. According to CIA historian Thomas Troy, Donovan 'had laid down basic principles which should guide in the establishment and operation of such an organization in the United States'. Later, in June, Donovan authored a memorandum for Roosevelt and visited the White House to advocate personally the creation of such an agency, to which Roosevelt eventually acceded in July 1941 creating the Office of Coordinator of Information and placing Donovan at its charge. The COI was directly responsible to the president and served to coordinate foreign intelligence, but in June 1942 the organization was reconfigured to become the Office of Strategic Services, whose mission was widened to the collection of foreign intelligence and special operations.[33]

Hoover's report to the White House, dated 6 March 1941, had outlined the organization and methods of both the Security Service and Secret Intelligence Service. Donovan's memorandum to Knox arrived a month later and, in essence, reflected the same information as Hoover's memorandum but it is credited with making Donovan an authority on intelligence and thereby the one who single-handedly convinced Roosevelt of the need for a centralized intelligence organization. It is conceivable that the Clegg and Hince mission to Great Britain in 1940–41 – pre-dating Donovan's second and most recognized trip to London to survey British intelligence – and Hoover's report to the White House on their activities may have *contributed* to convincing Roosevelt to establish an American foreign intelligence apparatus, the COI. Additionally, Hoover's report to Roosevelt on British war plans and post-war goals suggests that Hoover was trying to demonstrate to the president his capacity to report valuable foreign intelligence.

Hoover, it should be noted, in addition to establishing the FBI successfully as the sole American domestic-intelligence organization, had an interest in expanding the FBI's role to include foreign intelligence and operations. At the president's request, Hoover had already created in the FBI a Special Intelligence Service that operated in Central and South America to fight German espionage and to collect economic and political intelligence that was reportedly 'encyclopedic in scope',[34] and he had hoped to enlarge this role.[35] Hoover failed in this bid, but not for want of trying. Even after Donovan's appointment as COI chief, Hoover closely monitored his performance by having subordinates collect critical media commentary concerning the administration of the COI and Donovan's 'careless' personnel choices. Moreover, Hoover sought to promote his own credentials, over Donovan's, with senior administration officials. He persuaded a contact to stress to these officials that the 'FBI is manned with professional investigators with years of experience and proper background in the handling of intelligence work'. One of Hoover's assistant directors even had this contact relate that 'it would be a mistake to … assign [the new intelligence functions] to untried and untested agencies which are manned for the most part with inexperienced personnel'.[36]

In 1944, as the Second World War was in its final stages, Donovan submitted to Roosevelt a proposal for a post-war intelligence organization that he had hoped to oversee. Through one of his many contacts, Hoover was provided with a copy of this document and immediately set his aides to the task of crafting a detailed critique of it. To undercut Donovan's plans, Hoover then leaked the contents of the document to the *Chicago Tribune*. The negative publicity generated from the story, which jibed with American fears of a Gestapo-like secret intelligence organization, prevented Roosevelt from acceding to Donovan's plan. Hoover continued his lobbying during the subsequent Truman administration to prevent the imposition of an over-arching intelligence organization, but the FBI director failed ever to win for himself a role in post-war foreign intelligence. President Harry Truman in October 1945, moreover, disbanded the OSS and Hoover's Latin America SIS disbanded.[37]

Hoover may have been a master bureaucrat but Donovan, who had ties to Roosevelt's social circle, had influential friends in high government position (significantly Knox), and the support of British intelligence was better positioned to influence his own role in central intelligence during the Second World War. It is also significant that the FBI–BSC relationship reportedly had deteriorated by late 1941 (due to Hoover's seeking to monopolize liaison with them), leaving the FBI without a strong international intelligence ally.[38] It is also significant that Donovan was able to publicize his trips to London (especially the first, which was reported in the *New York Times*[39]), in general

terms without revealing his secret connections, whereas the FBI mission was conducted in the greatest of secrecy. FBI Director Hoover, who was monitoring Roosevelt's anti-interventionist foreign policy critics and sharing the fruits of his political surveillance with administration officials, could not risk publicizing his representatives' mission to Great Britain.

The important point to be made, however, is that convincing Roosevelt to establish a central foreign intelligence apparatus (COI) resulted not from one man's mission to London and subsequent report but from multiple sources, high-level lobbying, and bureaucratic infighting for the role of central intelligence overseer. The issue, which involved much inter-agency and personal competition, is encapsulated in an FBI memorandum dated 29 November 1941. According to the document, Donovan had a meeting with Clegg in 1941 where he mentioned his last encounter with him over Christmas day breakfast in London in 1940. Donovan told Clegg that he was proud of having helped 'to pave the way in England for FBI representatives to obtain valuable information concerning most confidential matters'. On the bottom of the memorandum Hoover penned: 'If I recall correctly I think we were there before the Colonel arrived.'[40]

NOTES

1 See Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, 'The Role of British Intelligence in the Mythologies Underpinning the OSS and Early CIA', in David Stafford and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (eds.) *American–British–Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939–2000* (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass 2000) pp.5–19; Douglas M. Charles, 'American, British and Canadian Intelligence Links: A Critical Annotated Bibliography', in ibid., pp.259–69. See also Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, 'The Stirrings of a New Revisionism?', in Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Andrew Lownie (eds.) *North American Spies: New Revisionist Essays* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP 1991); B. Nelson MacPherson, 'CIA Origins as Reviewed from Within', *Intelligence and National Security* 10 (April 1995) pp.353–9; and John Ferris, 'Coming in From the Cold War: The Historiography of American Intelligence, 1945–1990', *Diplomatic History* 19 (Winter 1995) pp.87–115.

2 See Douglas M. Charles, 'The FBI, Franklin Roosevelt, and the Anti-interventionist Movement, 1939–1945' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh 2002); idem, 'Informing FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Foreign Policy Debate, 1939–45', *Diplomatic History* 24 (Spring 2000) pp.211–32.

3 See W.B. Fowler, *British-American Relations, 1917–1918: The Role of Sir William Wiseman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1969).

4 Letter, Vincent Astor to Franklin Roosevelt, 18 April 1940, President's Secretary's File – Vincent Astor, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library [FDRL], Hyde Park, New York. British intelligence officials at this point preferred that Paget coordinate with the State Department and not the FBI.

5 Nigel West, 'Introduction', in *British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Americas, 1940–45* (London: St Ermin's Press 1998); Thomas Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996) p.36.

6 Biographical information on Stephenson can be found in H. Montgomery Hyde, *Room 3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York during World War II* (New York: Farrar Strauss 1963) pp.5–24. See also J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, *Spy Wars:*

Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990) pp.77–8.

7 Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid* (note 5) pp.36–7.

8 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) p.xxv.

9 Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid* (note 5) p.39; H. Montgomery Hyde, *Secret Intelligent Agent: British Espionage in America and the Creation of the OSS* (New York: St Martin's 1982), p.82.

10 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) p.xxv. The official BSC history does not identify Astor by name. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper's 1948) p.270. Hyde borrowed the phrase 'quiet Canadian' from Sherwood. On the Roosevelt–Astor intelligence relationship see Jeffrey M. Dorwart, 'The Roosevelt–Astor Espionage Ring', *New York History* (July 1981) pp.307–22.

11 Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid* (note 5) p.34.

12 Letter, British Ambassador to US Secretary of State, 15 June 1940, State Department Central Files, Record Group 59, 702.4111/1608, National Archives and Records Administration [NARA], College Park, Maryland; letter, assistant to the treasury secretary to secretary of state, 19 June 1940, RG 59, 702.4111/1608, NARA.

13 Memorandum, Winthrop Crane to Adolf Berle, 29 November 1941, RG 59, 800.01B11 registration/1140, NARA; letter and list of BSC employees, Crane to Gordon, 12 February 1941, RG 59, 800.01B11 registration/1209, NARA; letter, R.L. Bannerman to Clark, 6 February 1941, RG 59, 841.01B11/191, NARA; letter, Berle to Sumner Welles, 31 March 1941, RG 59, 841.20211/23, NARA; *British Security Coordination* (note 5) pp.xxvi–xxviii.

14 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) p.3. For Hoover's character see Athan Theoharis and John Cox, *The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1988); Athan Theoharis, *J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 1995); Richard Gid Powers, *Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover* (New York: The Free Press 1987); Curt Gentry, *J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets* (New York: Norton 1991).

15 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) pp.3–4; memorandum for file, Adolf A. Berle, 3 September 1941, Adolf Berle diary, 2:110 (microfilm ed., reel 3); Hyde, *Secret Intelligence Agent* (note 9) pp.82–84, 184, 203. On the writing of the BSC history see David Stafford, *Camp X: SOE and the American Connection* (London: Viking 1986) pp.251–57.

16 Email, Francis MacDonnell to Douglas M. Charles, 4 July 1999; email, Francis MacDonnell to Douglas M. Charles, 2 August 1999.

17 Personal and confidential letter, Hoover to Watson, 28 May 1941, Official File 10-B, FDRL.

18 See Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (London: Harper Collins 1995) p.100; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence* (New Haven: Yale University Press 2002) pp.140–42; Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA* (New York: Basic Books 1983) pp.63–5; Arthur Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950* (University Park: Penn State Press 1990); Thomas F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA* (Frederick, MD: University Press of America 1981) p.40; Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, *Sub Rosa: The OSS and American Espionage,* 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press 1962) pp.9–17; Allen W. Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (New York: Harper and Row 1966) pp.4–9; Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, *The Real CIA* (New York: Macmillan 1968) pp.14–17.

19 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) p.4.

20 Memorandum, Hoover to Tolson, Clegg, and Tamm, 12 November 1940, FBI 66-HQ-2047; memorandum, Hince to Hoover, 6 November 1940, FBI 67-11757-264.

21 Letter, Justice Department to Adolf A. Berle, 30 October 1940, RG 59, 102.31/168, NARA. This document is missing in the State Department Decimal File, but see summary in RG 59 Purport List, reel 973-436.

22 Letter, Hoover to Ruth Shipley, Chief of Passport Division, State Department, 13 November 1940, FBI 67-6524-435; letter, Hoover to Shipley, 8 November 1940, FBI 67-11757-265; memorandum, Clegg to Hoover 18 November 1940, FBI 66-2047-1449; memorandum, Clegg

to Hoover, 22 November 1940, FBI 66-2047-1450; Strictly confidential telegram, Sumner Welles to American Legation, Lisbon, 20 November 1940, RG 59, 102.31/178A, NARA.

23 Telegram, Clegg and Hince to Hoover, 20 January 1941, RG 59, 102.31/191, NARA; memorandum, S.J. Tracy to Hoover, 14 January 1941, FBI 66-2047-1459.

24 F.H. Hinsley, *et al*., *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office 1979) p.313.

25 Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1992) p.55; David Alvarez, *Secret Messages: Codebreaking and American Diplomacy, 1930–1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2000) p.73.

26 David Stafford, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets* (London: Little, Brown, and Co. 1999) pp.48–50; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (note 10) pp.248–50.

27 Letter and paraphrase of Clegg and Hince telegram, Berle to Hoover, 21 January 1940, FBI 66-2047-1458; telegram, Clegg and Hince to Hoover, 20 January 1940, RG 59, 102.31/192, NARA.

28 Personal and confidential letter, Hoover to Watson, 5 March 1941, Official File 10-B, FDRL; blind memorandum, 3 March 1941, Official File 10-B, FDRL.

29 Personal and confidential letter and memorandum, Hoover to Watson, 6 March 1941, Official File 10-B, FDRL.

30 Ibid.

31 Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid* (note 5) pp.48–61, 77–92; Jeffreys-Jones, *Cloak and Dollar* (note 18) p.140.

32 As quoted in Troy, *Wild Bill and Intrepid* (note 5) p.115.

33 Ibid., pp.115–33.

34 Memorandum, Sherman Miles, head of MID, to Hoover, 23 July 1940, War Department files, Records of the Special and General Staffs, RG 165, 9794-186B/3, NARA; personal and confidential letter, Hoover to Miles, 3 August 1940, RG 165, 9794-186B/4, NARA.

35 See also John Bratzel and Leslie Rout, *The Shadow War: German Espionage and U.S. Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II* (Frederick: University Publications of America 1989).

36 As quoted in Theoharis and Cox, *The Boss* (note 14) p.188. (From FBI file 63-116758.)

37 Theoharis, *The Boss* (note 14) pp.189–90.

38 *British Security Coordination* (note 5) pp.3–4.

39 *New York Times*, 20, 23 August 1940.

40 Memorandum for the director, 29 November 1941, FBI 62-64427-76.