The Greeks with their heavily armored phalanges (plural of phalanx) are attributed by some to have invented their own style of warfare know as this “Western Way of War” sometime between 700 BC and 450 BC. Some authors such as Victor Davis Hanson believe that the Greeks indeed invented a new style of warfare completely unique to the west that followed a strict code of principles. The topic is heavily debated, however, and others such as Peter Krentz disagree and think the theory of this “Western Way of War” does not hold up under further investigation. The question is: did the Greeks truly invent a way of war, unique to the west, that survives today?
The Criterea for this ‘Western Way of War’
The Greeks developed words such as ‘agon’ (rules and conventions) to specifically reference land warfare fought by hoplite battle and the necessary procedures that should be followed in each battle (Hanson V. War and Violence in Ancient Greece 202). These procedures included the drawing of both sides down to a prearranged location, typically flat land, for a single, decisive, and agreed upon battle fought by only these heavily armed hoplites. Light troops, slingers, archers, cavalry, and other such troops were not included in the battles as the use of such troops was often criticized and seen as winning without giving a true fight (Hanson 203). Hand-to-hand pitched battle was the only type of battle that was seen as decisive, for it involves no unfair advantages, a pure skill match-up, and results in the destruction of the enemy spirit (Krentz P. War and Violence in Ancient Greece from Polybius, 168). Both sides proceed to charge and clash head on with the enemy in a single, magnificent collision and massive casualties generally ensue for both sides.
“When they [the Greeks] declare war on one another, they find the fairest and most level piece of ground, go down onto it, and fight, so that the winners come off with great losses; I say nothing at all about the losers, for they are utterly destroyed.” (Krentz P. 168) ~Mardonios (The Persian)
Less important, but still relevant procedures that follow the battle are the postmortem viewing of the dead, the exchange of bodies, and the erection of the battlefield trophy. Also characteristic of ‘Western’ battles is the lack of organized pursuit and further slaughter which, Hanson argues, demonstrates the Greek desire to limit, and not glorify, the destruction of lives as well as the desire of each side to prove themselves and their honor. Following each battle, there is a mutual agreement to abide by the decision determined in combat-typically a border dispute (Hanson V. The western Way of War 223).
Hanson’s Western Way of War also points out that the lifestyle of the typical citizen-soldier hoplite in Ancient Greece is another reason for the decisiveness of the battles the Greeks always preferred. The average hoplite was a farmer and while willing to go to war, preferred that war not to last an extended period of time because he had a farm to manage and didn’t want to lose out on any standard of living he would otherwise reap (Hanson V. War and Violence in Ancient Greece 213). This strategy of fighting would not have been sustainable if the other side had different economic values (ie. were a professional army like Philip II’s and didn’t have to return ASAP) (Hanson 214).
Finally, Hanson states that the Greek style of fighting is adverse to deceitful tactics that result in one side gaining an upper hand in combat. Hanson deems the Greeks to be all about honor and willing to do anything (even go out of the way to lose the advantage) to make a fight as fair as possible (Krentz P. 168). Demosthenes criticized Philip of Macedonia for not honoring any of the rules of Hoplite Warfare (he utilized all light armed troops, archers, cavalry, and mercenaries) (Hanson 203).
Overall, the key factors in Hanson’s model include:
- A decisive prearranged and agreed upon battle
- A fair fight (level ground, hoplites only)
- No deceit (no ruses or ambushes)
- Outcome of the battle is honored by both sides involved
- The traditions continue today
Greek Deception (apaté)
Hanson argues that the Greeks followed this code strictly in the development of their style of warfare, but many others argue that the Greeks violated this code on several instances and didn’t actually have one style of warfare.
Exhibit A: The Battle of Syracuse (in Oct. 415 BC) told by Thucydides (Krentz P. 167-168)
In this particular battle between the Athenians (plus minimal allies) and the Syracusans, there is an apparent disparity between how balanced the fight is . Earlier, in 510 BC, the Athenians countered an invasion by the Lakedaimonians with a superior cavalry force protecting their beaches. Now, in 415 BC, Athens finds itself the invading power of Syracuse, but Syracuse holds the superior defensive cavalry force this time. The Athenians (currently hosted by the city of Katane) know this and thus stoop to tricking the Syracusans into abandoning Syracuse. They send a man from Katane ,whom the Syracusan general knows, to send the message that Katane plans on closing its gates on the Athenians and setting fire to their ships on a certain day. The man encourages the Syracusans to assault and capture the Athenian camp on that same day which they do (sending their full force). Athens uses this oppurtunity to send its own naval force to the abandoned Syracuse and capture it without any opposition whatsoever. Athens is able to sit tight with the best, most fortified defensive position available and await the Syracusans return for the battle. This battle narrative illustrates how both sides scorn Hanson’s Greek principle that:
‘No brave man thinks it right to kill his enemy in secret, but meets him face to face’ ~ Euripides Rhesos
Both sides clearly sought an unfair advantage in the fight. One instance of deceit like this is not enough proof to refute Hanson’s model, but there happen to be many instances of Greek deceit and allusions to the presence of recorded throughout history. In Agesilaos, Xenophon reports that the Spartan king severely reproached persons who were deceived by enemies (Krentz P. 170) and thus indicates that deceit between the Greeks happened on a somewhat regular basis. Many renowned Greeks have spoken on the topic of deceit in battle. Plato approved of lying to enemies, Isokrates deemed it appropriate for right-thinking men to gain an advantage over their enemies in any way possible during the war, and Lysisas complains how Adokides has deceived most of his friends, but not his enemies (and that this is the reverse of what a good man should do) (Krentz P. 170).
There’s a plethora of examples of deceit (Krentz P. 171), the gist of which are:
- Helieis was captured in 450 BC when leader Aneristos sailed on a merchant ship with his force disguised
- On two separate occasions, Epameinondas at Mantinea and Kleomenes at Sepeia both pretended to have concluded battle for the day and then proceeded to launch a surprise assault on their enemy
- Sometimes misleading agreements were struck up (Example: During the Kleitorian siege of Lakedaimonian commander Soös, the commander agreed to surrender all the lands he had obtained in the recent battles if all his men were allowed to drink from their spring. However, he alone refrained from drinking and therefore ALL had not drunk and he kept the land through this deceitful oath). (Krentz P. 175)
- The Lakedaimonians trained units of spies and warriors by encouraging young boys to stay up during the night to steal food, and practice setting ambushes during the day
- The Athenian Theseus disdained the Lakedaimonian use of trickery, but he himself is accountable for poking holes in the bottoms of Cretan ships to prevent them from giving chase, pretending to come in peace to Knossos and then launching a surprise attack, and using false information to capture the city of Eleusis
- Another Athenian, Melanthos, used trickery in one on one combat for rights to the throne by stabbing his opponent in the back after tricking him to turn around (by telling him someone was there who was not)
The list of historical Greeks known to have used deceptive tactics is long and is comprised of: Leonidas, Kleomenes, Leotychides, Aneristos, Kleandridas, Brasidas, Gylippos, Eteonikos, Lysandros, Klearchos, Thibron, Pharakidas, Antalkidas, and Agesilaos, to name but a few.
”To do wrong after making a treaty is impious, but to outwit the enemy is not only just and reputable, but also pleasant and profitable” ~Agesilaos (Krentz P. 175)
Opponents of these claims include writers W.K. Pritchett and Clausewitz who argues that craft, cunning, and cleverness ‘do not figure properly in the history of war.’ Pritchett backs this up by attempting to establish that the Greeks, more or less, tried to limit warfare to prearranged battles, as evident by the lack of any record of a hoplite night ambush (too risky meeting the enemy’s full force) and the rarity of ambushes at all (only one battle won by ambush in the Peloponnesian war). However, there clearly were a significant enough number of ambushes that their importance can’t be counted out. The most common ambushes were against phalanxes already in march, city defenders lured out of cities, and sneak attacks on entire cities (Krentz P. 171-172).
Overall, the norm in Ancient Greece is for many a leader to openly disdain trickery, but in practice, to not hesitate to use it to win a battle. Brasidas and the Lakedaimonians stressed so heavily how much deception is reason for absolute disgust to the Akanthians, but to his soldiers, Brasidas said “the most successful soldiers do not attack openly, but take advantage of the opportunities offered – and these ‘thefts’ (klemmata) have the most brilliant reputation in war (Krentz P. 174).” This was considered a theft of war and not a victory, but many Greeks thought it was better to win intellectually, then by strength. Basically, when a commander thought the likelihood of victory by the usual fair fights to be low, the idea of taking an unfair advantage became much more appealing and often was taken. The Greeks were no strangers to deceit, unlike what their protocols for war claimed.
Decisiveness of Battle
As can be seen in these short battles that are by no means decisive (as theaters of combat outside of pitched phalanx battle were not considered to decide anything) according to Greek standards, Hoplite Warfare differs much less from Homeric warfare than some might expect (Hanson 207). In Homer’s writings, the siege of Troy lasted about ten years and was not at all a prearranged battle on fair, flat ground. Over the ten years, there were plenty of ambushes (especially the one involving the Trojan horse) without any stigma associated with them and Homer never out-rightly stated a heroic code (Krentz P. 172-174). The ambushes were set by the best soldiers doing so was thought to demand great courage. The battles saw constant backing out of fighting which doesn’t fit in with the idea that they fought in the tightly organized phalanges and the soldiers in the writings took any opportunity they could to get the edge on the enemy and eliminate them (Krentz P. 172-174).
“I’ll damn’ well get another [shield] just as good” (Tritle L 49) ~ Archilochus of Paros (mid 7th century infantryman/poet)
The above quote illustrates the open order style fighting that is sometimes reflected in Homeric poetry that refutes the idea of a close order phalanx. A soldier would not be able to throw his shield away in anything close to the massive “pushes” we’ve heard of and it is indicative of a more individual combat.
As we have seen, not all battles consist of both sides equally matched in pitched phalanx combat. In addition to sneak attacks, many states solved quarrels through arbitration, sea battle, behind walls, or by capitulation as opposed to set battle (Hanson War and Violence in Ancient Greece 201). The Cretans and the Aetolians lived in far more mountainous landscapes and thus fought battles in a much different manner. They grew adept to ruse, ambush, and missile attacks and when it came to pitched battle, they were cowardly especially because they never adapted to the use of heavy armor (Hanson 209). Cleinas of Crete (5th century)explains how the mountainous terrain in Crete discourages the use of horses and encourages light infantry as well as archers (Tritle L 57). Cretans were referred to as the best archers in the Greek world and were also viewed as liars (Kern 106). Also the fields of Thessaly reported no hoplite army with its vast landscape that encouraged the use of cavalry, Thessaly stressed importance in battle elsewhere (Hanson 209).
Landscape played a major role in the type of battle that was developed on a regional scale. Mainland Greece mostly consisted of small valleys surrounded by hills perfect for protecting the flanks of the phalanges, however, the Greek islands lacked flat plains and thus promoted a different kind of warfare (Hanson 210). Also, the relatively small size of the islands meant they could be ruled by only on ruler and therefore not have any rivalries (Hanson 210). The economies of these islands were dependent on maritime resources and thus they were more invested into their navies than having large standing land armies (Hanson 210). Generally when invaded, islanders drew into their fortifications and issues were resolved through sieges (Hanson 210).
Other instances of Non-Western Warfare (Ferrill Origins 128-130):
- In 425 BC, during the Peloponesian War, the Athenians had trapped a Spartan group of 420 hoplites on the island of Sphacteria which in turn forced Spartan ambassadors to travel to Athens and sue for peace (a very un-Western thing to do). Athens agreed but set unreasonably high demands. Then, instead of sending their heavy troops for a decisive battle, the Athenians sent light troops to launch a hit-and-run campaign to harass the Spartan phalanx. The campaign included a screen of ash to block the Spartan’s senses out. The Spartans surrendered with 292 hoplites surviving and they were no longer seen as invincible on land.
- Most of the first phase of the Peloponesian War saw Athens with its 29,000 hoplites unwilling to meet Sparta’s 50,000 because Athens had invested so much more into its naval force.
- In 424 BC Spartans that had captured Amphipilos, hid inside when Athenian troops came near, and as the Athenians turned to leave the Spartans attacked the Athenian center from their exposed right side (used the element of surprise).
- Sieges (Kern Ancient Siege Warfare): Successful sieges were usually accomplished through treachery (convincing an insider to open the gates). The Spartans experimented with siege warfare, ramp building, and the use of battering rams. Greeks were not adept at siege warfare and so usually tried passive siege warfare (in the case of paid hoplite armies) by walling-in a city to starve them out. Aeneas Tacticus wrote “How to Survive Under Siege” which highlighted keeping morale high and exiling risk factors who may open the gates for the enemy
- Sieges Continued (Tritle L. 66-67): Aeneas Tacticus’ “How to Survive Under Siege” also highlights that when a region is under threat of invasion and the territory cannot fulfill its prime function of supplying resources, all crops and free persons are to be brought into the city and the infrastructure of the territory (chora) is to be destroyed to deny the invaders use. Aeneas also creates a system of rules to follow that state citizens are to be carefully integrated into the military machine (the fittest acting on commando missions, women disguised as men posted on the walls as guards, and guard dogs to alert of intrusion). Aeneas also outlines rules for mercenary interactions with soldiers and citizens during a siege, but just the existence of the siege tactic handbook shows that Greeks were in-fact involved in sieges, and not just pitched combat during the 5th century and perhaps prior.
Hoplite Warfare is thought to have developed out of a technological arms race of sorts somewhere around the 7th century in Ancient Greece and it was generally fought over tangible issues such as border disputes (Hanson 213). The rival states had similar cultures and terrains and as one state developed a superior type of warfare, the neighboring states were forced to adapt or be crushed (Hanson 213-214). But as the 5th and 4th centuries BC neared, Athens and other cities began to develop new armies of mixed troops (skirmishers, cavalries, and navies as well as hoplites)and thus this style became the dominant style of fighting while maintaining some former phalanx warfare practices (Hanson 214).
The West?
Finally, Hanson claims that the legacy of the classical Greeks has survived to this day and that this Western Way of War continues today, as in the Vietnam War when Americans attempted to lure the North Vietnamese into a decisive shootout, but lost the war because they were unsuccessful (Hanson 11). For sure aspects of Hellenic warfare can be easily seen in the legions of the Romans used in pitched land combat (Hanson The Western Way of War 225). However this exact style of warfare is never seen again in traditional use. As technology and tactics evolve, this Western Way of War deteriorates in appeal. Armies come to learn that diverse ranks of specialty soldiers coordinating together make the best fighting force as each rank complements the others. Hanson actually concludes his book by alluding to the continuation of the Western Way of War to modern potential nuclear warfare and connects how it stems from our desire for a decisive battle in which neither side can debate the outcome (Hanson 228).
Hanson may be right that there will always be similar traits visible in other soldiers that were visible for the Greeks, but outside a short span of time in the classical Greek age when hoplites were dominant, this Western Way of War has not stood the test of time. Even in that time-frame, it is clear that the Greeks did by no means abide by that specific code, it may have been the most predominant form of battle for mainland Greeks, but it was not the sole style of battle. Greeks participated in ambushes, sieges, cavalry warfare, missile warfare; everything that goes against the Western Way of War model. The Greeks did in-fact invent a Western Way of War, but it was followed for a very brief amount of time and was not strictly adhered to.