Congolese Cobalt: A Growing Human Rights Catastrophe

By Rayna Alexander

Introduction

In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), one of the world’s poorest countries, an increase in mass violence and internal displacement is the result of militia infighting over mineral reserves (M23 rebel group, for example) [1]. Since October 2023, 6.9 million Congolese people have been displaced due to violence and rebel attacks–400,000 the result of forced evictions from cobalt mining [2]. The blue-green mineral, cobalt, is at the forefront of the green revolution. Used in electric vehicles and lithium-ion batteries, global demand for the mineral is anticipated to double by 2030 [3]. More than sixty percent of the world’s cobalt is produced in the DRC [4]. The mineral is primarily extracted from the southern province of Lualaba near the country’s cobalt capital Kolwezi. Ironically, as global industries move towards “clean” and “green” electric technologies, the rush for cobalt amounts to a growing human rights catastrophe.

Background

Cobalt mining in the DRC is divided into two sectors: the formal industrial mining sector and the informal artisanal mining sector (an estimated fifteen to thirty percent of the artisanal mining sector is informal) [5]. Upwards of 200,000 artisanal miners, known as creuseurs, work in cobalt mines in the country, and more than a million others–including young children–are economically dependent on industries within the informal sector (marketing, sales, washing, etc.) [6]. Regardless of efforts to monitor the industry, artisanal cobalt is bought by roving traders, oftentimes through bribes, and distributed to maisons d’achats, or small shacks meant to be owned by Congolese nationals. However, many are managed by Chinese business operatives who circumvent the law through bribes and sell the ore to processing facilities that blend the mineral with industrial-mined cobalt. One anti-slavery activist noted, “There is no such thing as a clean supply chain of cobalt from the Congo” [7].

Analysis

Artisanal cobalt mines are often haphazardly dug, lack structural support, and are at risk of collapse. Frequent collapses suffocate the creuseurs trapped inside. The government agency, Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining, is responsible for regulating artisanal mining in Zones d’Exploitation Artisanale or artisanal mining zones in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, the bureaucratic process of establishing official artisanal zones is both lengthy and costly [8]. Currently, not enough zones exist to accommodate the network of miners in the region. As a result, creuseurs often mine in unregulated areas or trespass in industrial mines. In the DRC, a lack of state government authority makes local, legal enforcement difficult outside of the capital of Kinshasa [9]. Often, military personnel respond to local sources of authority, as opposed to national ones. One analyst aptly noted President Felix Tshisekedi acts more as the mayor of Kinshasa, than as president of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

According to the International Labor Organization’s Minimum Age Convention (1973), the minimum age for hazardous work is eighteen years [10]. The DRC set its minimum working age to fourteen when it ratified the Convention in 2001 [11]. In Kolwezi, however, children as young as three aid in extracting the ore from mined rock slabs [12]. Artisanal mining supplements poor families’ incomes; 40,000 children (some as young as seven) work in cobalt mines for less than $2 a day [13]. Young miners are exposed to harmful byproducts, grueling physical labor, unsafe conditions, and exploitation. Some are even drugged to suppress hunger during extensive mining shifts [14]. Compared to the first six months of 2022, the increase in grave violations against children increased by forty-one percent in the first half of 2023 [15].

Children are among the most vulnerable of the Congolese people trapped in the mining industry [16]. Militias kidnap many children to work in cobalt mines. To make matters worse, the minimal compensation children receive for mining is funneled into the militia’s accounts. Congolese people are pressured not only by the lack of economic alternatives but also by armed militias forcing the poor to mine. Daily, parents deal with the horrific decision: “Do I send my child to school, or do we eat today?”[17]. The latter choice means grueling hours in toxic pits to earn fifty cents or a dollar that day. Given the scale of degradation, exploitation, and the lack of livelihood alternatives, one National Public Radio report claimed, “In the 21st century, this is modern-day slavery” [18].

Conclusion

For human rights abuses to be adequately addressed, holistic action must take place. Consumers of technology must demand publicized supply chains and further efforts to source cobalt ethically (including “fair trade” markings). Federal and international mandates requiring companies like Apple and Tesla to disclose supply chains and contracts would provide more transparency. Multinational corporations must demand more from suppliers, specifically Chinese corporations that are quickly monopolizing the industry. In addition, international investment must target domestic battery plants, lithium iron phosphate substitutes, and efficient cobalt recycling schemes. The failure of the Congolese government to provide ethical economic opportunities to the Congolese people must also be noted, and international aid agencies working in-country should support diverse economies.

One community leader noted, “Never have people of the Congo benefited from the mines of Congo. We only become poorer”[19]. Without strengthening domestic institutions, violence and exploitation will only continue, with the largest burden on the poorest Congolese. Realistically, however, the DRC has a long way to go to hold international actors accountable and establish authority over its territory. International investment must holistically address these issues; the wellbeing of hundreds of thousands of Congolese children depends on it.

  1. Victoria Audu, The Back End of Genocide: How the Rush for Congo’s Cobalt is Killing Thousands, THE REPUBLIC (November 19, 2023), https://republic.com.ng/october-november-2023/congo-cobalt-genocide/?mc_cid=43f1099cf0&mc_eid=71fabbd389&utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email.
  2.  Id.
  3. Andy Home, Cobalt, Congo and a Mass Artisanal Mining Experiment, REUTERS (May 31, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/cobalt-congo-mass-artisanal-mining-experiment-andy-home-2021-05-13/.
  4. John Campbell, Why Cobalt Mining in the DRC Needs Urgent Attention, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (October 29, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-cobalt-mining-drc-needs-urgent-attention.
  5. Michael Posner, To Meet Global Cobalt Demand, Companies Must Reform Mining Practices in the Congo, FORBES (February 9, 2023), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelposner/2023/02/09/as-demand-soars-for-cobalt-used-in-electric-car-batteries-heres-what-companies-need-to-do-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/?sh=50e84aab6471.
  6. Home, supra note 3.
  7. UNICEF, DR Congo: Children Killed, Injured, Abducted, and Face Sexual Violence in Conflict at Record Levels for Third Consecutive Year, (September 28, 2023), https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/dr-congo-children-killed-injured-abducted-and-face-sexual-violence-conflict-record.
  8. Democratic Republic of Congo: “This is what we die for”: Human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo power the global trade in cobalt, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (January 19, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/3183/2016/en/.
  9.  Id.
  10. Minimum Age Convention, 26 June 1973, No. 198 (entered into force 19 June 1976) [ILO].
  11. Id.
  12. Nicolas Niarchos, The Dark Side of Congo’s Cobalt Rush, THE NEW YORKER (May 24, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/05/31/the-dark-side-of-congos-cobalt-rush.
  13. Sasha Rose, Cobalt Mining in the DRC, UNA-NCA (November 17, 2021), https://www.unanca.org/our-impact/news/coverage-cobalt-mining.
  14. Niarchos, supra note 12.
  15. UNICEF, supra note 7.
  16. Terry Gross, How ‘Modern-Day Slavery’ in the Congo Powers the Rechargeable Battery Economy, NPR (February 1, 2023), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2023/02/01/1152893248/red-cobalt-congo-drc-mining-siddharth-kara.
  17.  Id.
  18.  Id.
  19. UNICEF, supra note 7.

The Struggles Facing Women Asylum Seekers

By Allison Zajac

Introduction

Migrating to the United States (U.S.) poses special challenges for the women who undertake the task. Not only do these women face the same dangerous conditions that male migrants face, but they are also frequently the targets of sexual violence. A survey conducted by Amnesty International in 2010 found that approximately “six out of ten Central American migrant women and girls were raped while on the move in Mexico” [1]. Sexual violence is so pervasive that many women have sought to obtain emergency contraception in anticipation of being sexually assaulted, whether for survival or for “payment” for their passage [2]. For women who do successfully make it to the United States, the challenges are far from over. The immigration process is woefully unable to address the specific problems that female migrants face once they arrive [3]. Migrant women who may need obstetric or gynecological care have the added difficulty of locating services and maintaining contact with their physicians [4] or even face continued exposure to dangerous conditions while in the custody of U.S. officials [5].

New York City’s Roosevelt Hotel: Ellis Island 2.0 [6]

For the approximately 100,000 migrants who have arrived in New York City over the last year, Manhattan’s Roosevelt Hotel is a jumping point where service providers make contact [7]. Women migrants in need of prenatal care are referred to The Women’s Health Center at Bellevue Hospital, where the medical staff does their best to treat these women and their babies [8]. The vast majority of these women have had little-to-no prenatal care over the course of their journey to the U.S., which causes major concern for the health of the women and their children [9].

Additionally, many women who were sexually assaulted may have become pregnant from the incident and are re-traumatized by carrying the child of someone who assaulted them [10]. If the patient is under twenty-four weeks pregnant, the patient and their doctors discuss terminating the pregnancy [11]. However, in a post-Roe America, this option is not available to a lot of migrant women in the United States [12]. It is unknown how many women migrants who are sexually assaulted become pregnant, and further, how many are able to, if they choose to, terminate their pregnancies [13]. The United Nations advocates for more research to be done in this area, but most studies on migrants do not address the issues specifically facing women, nor do they capture many demographics that would be helpful in addressing these issues [14].

Despite all of the challenges, about 300 babies have been successfully born to migrant women in New York City over the last year or so [15]. However, some problems remain, such as how to maintain contact with these women – and their babies – when they do not have stable housing or even a way to be contacted [16].

What Happens Next?

The Biden Administration has recently extended Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to certain migrants arriving from Central America: namely, those migrants from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua [17]. Venezuela is also included in the countries which are currently eligible for Temporary Protected Status, but its application period was not extended by the Department of Homeland Security [18].

TPS is an immigration status granted by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to certain individuals already in the U.S. who come from countries where conditions in the country prevent the individual from returning safely [19]. Being granted TPS allows an individual to work and live legally in the United States but is not a guarantee that the individual will be allowed to permanently stay [20]. However, applying for or being granted TPS does not preclude someone from obtaining nonimmigrant status or another immigrant benefit or protection [21].

The New York State Department of Labor is launching a program to help connect eligible migrants with jobs in industries facing labor shortages, like food service and health care [22]. This program may also help to address a problem that specifically drives women to migrate from Central and South America to the U.S.: currently, labor shortages in the U.S. align with types of labor that are attractive to women migrants, which serves as an extra incentive to brave the jungles – and face potential sexual assault – to make it to the United States [23]. The sexualized division of labor which exists in most of the world drives women into jobs as domestic and care workers [24]. These two problems may actually be able to collide in a way which may be advantageous to the domestic economy by placing women migrant workers, who often already have experience in areas of the U.S. workforce which are currently understaffed, in positions where they have an opportunity to thrive.  

Conclusion

While they are beneficial, domestic programs like the Biden Administration’s expansion of TPS to certain migrant groups or New York’s programs which help migrants seek jobs and health care can only go so far to tackle the problems facing women migrants. The reality is that much more research needs to be done on the conditions women migrants face as they come to the United States, and the challenges they face once they arrive. While sexual assault is most common while migrant women are traveling to the U.S., the threat does not end once they reach their destination. Many migrant women are assaulted while in the custody of U.S. immigration officials, often by other migrants [25]. More needs to be done to protect these especially vulnerable women who have already been through so much.

[1] Amnesty International, Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico. Amnesty International London, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (April 28, 2010).

[2] Id.

[3] UN Women, How migration is a gender equality issue, (2020). https://interactive.unwomen.org/multimedia/explainer/migration/en/index.html.

[4] Jasmine Garsd, Migrant mothers arriving in New York find support, hope – and lots of challenges, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (October 10, 2023). https://www.npr.org/2023/10/10/1204273159/migrant-mothers-new-york-bellevue-womens-health-pregnancy#:~:text=In%20the%20last%20year%2C%20NYC,mothers%20returning%20with%20their%20newborns.

[5] Amnesty International, supra note 1.

[6] Garsd, supra note 4.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But see Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, 597 U.S. __ (2022), which overturned Roe and permitted individual states to decide their own restrictions on abortion.

[13] The State of New York allows abortion up to 24 weeks gestation. Center for Reproductive Rights, After Roe Fell: Abortion Laws by State: New York, CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, (2023). https://reproductiverights.org/maps/state/new-york/#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20New%20York%20enacted,York%20access%20abortion%20via%20telemedicine.

[14] UN Women, supra note 3.

[15] Garsd, supra note 4.

[16] Id.

[17] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Temporary Protected Status, (2023). https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id.

[22] New York State, Governor Hochul Announces 18,000 Jobs Available to Asylum Seekers and Migrants as Part of Statewide Initiative to Move Individuals Out of Shelter and Into Independent Living, NEW YORK STATE, (October 2, 2023). https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-announces-18000-jobs-available-asylum-seekers-and-migrants-part-statewide.

[23] See UN Women, supra note 3.

[24] Id.

[25] Amnesty International, supra note 1.

Delayed ETIAS Implementation: Balancing Security vs. Data Privacy

By Megan Bozzer

Introduction

The European Travel Information and Authorization System (ETIAS) was proposed in 2016 to strengthen security measures for travelers entering Schengen countries and other neighboring European regions [1]. This comprehensive system collects a range of personal details, encompassing demographic information and travel history. This necessitates a balance between the need for enhanced security and the protection of individual data privacy. This article will explore various aspects of ETIAS, including its operational framework, data privacy concerns, and a comparison with a similar system, the United States’ (U.S.) Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA).

Background

In response to growing security concerns, ETIAS, proposed in 2016 and initially expected to take effect in 2022, is now set to be implemented in 2025 [2]. This system is designed to enhance security measures for travelers entering Schengen countries, those in the European Free Trade Association, and open-bordered European microstates. ETIAS is essentially a visa system, targeting individuals currently traveling visa-free to the European Union (EU) to identify security concerns before entry [3].

Any traveler from a non-EU country that is currently exempt from visa requirements for short-term stays in the EU will require ETIAS for entry, including current passport holders [4]. To achieve its security goals, the system collects various personal information, including name, birthdate, birthplace, sex, address, parents’ names (if known), education, employment details, EU destination, and information on past convictions or travel to conflict zones [5]. A valid passport and a seven Euro fee are also required to be approved [6]. The approval period for ETIAS ranges from minutes to thirty days, depending on the necessity for additional information or interviews [7]. In cases of refusal, an appeals process is in place [8]. Once granted, ETIAS approval is valid for three years of travel [9]. Further, information is retained for five years [10].

ETIAS provides an outline of its proposed framework and strategy for processing and managing information [11]. Upon submission, applications undergo cross-checks across multiple information systems [12] to evaluate “security, irregular migration or high epidemic risks” [13]. Applications raising concerns are directed to designated ETIAS Central and National Units for a final decision [14]. The Central Units, managed by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, are responsible for overseeing and storing system information [15]. The collaboration with various agencies and the restriction of access to authorized personnel underscore the meticulous operational framework through which ETIAS aims to ensure the security of its data and decision-making process [16].

Analysis

Data Privacy Concerns

The data privacy concerns are not hard to imagine. Questions like “How will my data be protected?”, “What happens if my data gets lost or into the wrong hands?”, “Who will my data be shared with?”, and more come quickly to mind. Luckily, data security is a priority for the EU, and Europe has some of the “toughest privacy and security laws in the world” [17]. It could be of comfort to think that if this new requirement is implemented, it has been thoroughly vetted. However, it is a lofty system with many moving parts, thus, skepticism is not unwarranted.  

Compliance with the EU’s data privacy laws and regulations is a necessary hurdle for ETIAS to move forward. This hurdle has been one of the major blocks in setting this project back from 2022 to 2025 [18]. To address concerns, the ETIAS regulations detail its procedures surrounding the processing of personal data, compensation if protection rules are broken, data sharing, data retention, and more [19]. These procedures are analyzed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), as well as European laws [20]. The GDPR ensures that this data is handled with the highest standards of privacy and security [21]. It establishes clear guidelines on obtaining informed consent, grants individuals rights over their data, and mandates stringent measures for data breach notification [22]. The GDPR’s emphasis on accountability, transparency, and individual control aligns with the goals of ETIAS in maintaining the balance between enhanced security measures and safeguarding the fundamental rights of individuals.  

Another major data concern and hurdle for ETIAS implementation is that of fundamental rights [23]. The system flags individuals based on certain traits, attempting to identify those ‘likely’ to commit an offense [24]. While this aims to bolster security, the manual review of flagged traits [25] raises potential issues related to fundamental rights, profiling, and discrimination [26]. To address this, ETIAS has established the Fundamental Rights Guidance Board (FRGB) [27]. Comprising members from various agencies, including a Fundamental Rights Officer of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, a representative of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, and a representative of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the FRGB serves to regularly advise, evaluate, and recommend on matters concerning privacy, data protection, and non-discrimination practices [28]. Despite this establishment, fundamental rights concerns have not fully been addressed and without an impact assessment or deep analysis, the project will likely continue to face challenges and remain at a stalemate. This Board plays an important role in ensuring that ETIAS effectively balances its commitment to enhance security measures and the protection of personal privacy rights. The complexity of implementing a system that must navigate the line between collective security and individual liberties is highlighted in these challenges related to individual’s fundamental rights.  

ESTA

ETIAS is noted to be similar to the system used in the U.S., the ESTA [29]. The ESTA was developed and introduced after the events of September 11, 2001 [30]. The ESTA is for considered “lower risk” countries [31]. It is a shorter form than a full visa and is good for up to ninety days [32]. The ESTA system uses a list of forty countries that are eligible for approval whereas the ETIAS lists sixty countries [33]. The application processes are very similar for both systems [34]. However, a notable difference is that the ESTA is known to be much harder to acquire [35]. ESTA flags ‘smaller’ issues, especially if one has any type of criminal record, whereas ETIAS is easier to acquire with a criminal record [36]. The goal of both of these systems is the same; to be able to strengthen their border control and keep track of international travelers [37].

There are no clear answers to why there is a perceived difference in the strictness between the two systems. Reasons to explain this difference could be attributed to the differing security experiences, politics, and history. ESTA was developed on the heels of 9/11, and post-9/11 securities measures are notoriously heightened surrounding the historic events [38]. However, ETIAS was also proposed in response to terrorist attacks in France and Belgium [39]. The U.S.’s national security and immigration policies also have a very strict political history. The EU might have different diverse political and legal frameworks. The Schengen Area specifically operates on the principle of free movement and open borders. The aim of ETIAS is to enhance collective security while maintaining travel. Overall, many subjective factors may influence the differing perceptions of these two systems.  

Conclusion

ETIAS is designed to advance border management and bolster security. Striking a delicate balance between this commitment and ensuring data privacy security is crucial. As we delve into the intricacies of ETIAS, the reasons behind its delayed implementation become evident, reflecting adherence to the stringent requirements of the European Union’s data privacy laws, especially the GDPR. ETIAS faces various challenges, including the task of upholding fundamental rights, a task addressed through regulations and the establishment of its FRGB. While the concept of such a system is not novel, exemplified by the existing ESTA system, it emphasizes the ongoing need to consistently balance collective security with the protection of individual rights, especially in the context of modern travel. 

[1] This includes counties such as: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, Starting in 2023 Travel to Europe Will Require an Extra Step, INTEREXCHANGE (May 20, 2021), https://www.interexchange.org/blog/us-residents/europe-travel-requiresextrastep#:~:text=ETIAS%20authorization%20will%20be%20needed,%E2%80%9CHome%20ETIAS%20Countries%E2%80%9D.

[2] It was initially meant to start in 2021, then every year until 2025. All you need to know about ETIAS, ETIAS.COM (2016), https://etias.com/what-is-etias/etias-key-facts.

[3] European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/smart-borders/european-travel-information-authorisation-system_en.

[4] This includes countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Japan, Ukraine, and more. ETIAS: Who should apply, EU, https://travel-europe.europa.eu/etias/who-should-apply_en.

[5] Ronan O’Connell, What is ETIAS? The European visa waiver system explained, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, (October 26, 2023), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/article/europe-visa-system-etias.

[6] Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, 2018 O.J. (L 236) 1

[7] Sofia Andrade, ETIAS applications for 2024 Europe travel open this year, THE WASHINGTON POST, (July 25, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/travel/2023/07/25/etias-applications-2024-europe-travel/.

[8] Id. Reasons for refusal and directions on how to appeal will be found in the application refusal notification.

[9] All you need to know about ETIAS, ETIAS.COM (2016), https://etias.com/what-is-etias/etias-key-facts.

[10] The data can be kept for the length of the authorization, with consent for 3 years after authorization, or 5 years from ETIAS refusal, revocation, or annulment, Data protection: How ETIAS handles personal information, ETIAS, (January 1, 2023), https://www.etiasvisa.com/etias-news/etias-data-protection-personal-information.

[11]. Id.

[12] “An EU press release from 2016 identifies ‘the Visa Information System (VIS), Europol data, the Schengen Information System (SIS), Eurodac and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)’ as databases to be used in the ETIAS verification process” as well as checked against border entry documents upon arrival. Ellen Ioanes, ETIAS: The new travel program you need to know about before planning your next vacation, VOX, (July 30, 2023), https://www.vox.com/2023/7/30/23813137/etias-travel-program-vacation-us-eu.

[13] European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/smart-borders/european-travel-information-authorisation-system_en.

[14] Those applications not automatically approved (3%) will be manually reviewed, ETIAS, FRONTEX, https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/etias/about-etias/.

[15] Id.

[16] Frequently Asked Questions, ETIAS.COM, https://etias.com/etias-frequently-asked-questions.

[17] Referring to GDPR, What is GDPR?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/.

[18] ETIAS Implementation Likely Delayed to 2025, ETIAS.COM, https://etias.com/articles/etias-implementation-likely-delayed-to-2025.

[19] 19 Regulation (EU) 2018/1240, 2018 O.J. (L 236) 1

[20] ETIAS Data Protection: Personal Information, ETIAS VISA, https://www.etiasvisa.com/etias-news/etias-data-protection-personal-information.

[21] What is GDPR?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/.

[22] Id.

[23] The right to privacy as well as right to non-discriminatory practices, Study on the ETIAS Regulation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583148/IPOL_STU(2017)583148_EN.pdf.

[24] Id.

[25] A concern noted surrounding the idea of manual decision making is “This appears to constitute human intervention. But it is really unclear to what extent such human intervention will be meaningful in practice. In ETIAS, the human is ‘looped in’ at the end of the decision-making chain, where their judgment is already mediated by the ‘risk score’”, Timo Zandstra and Evelien Brouwer, Digital Border, VERFASSUNGSBLOG, (June 24, 2022), https://verfassungsblog.de/digital-border/.

[26] Study on the ETIAS Regulation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583148/IPOL_STU(2017)583148_EN.pdf.

[27] ETIAS Fundamental Rights Guidance Board, FRONTEX, https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/etias/etias-fundamental-rights-guidance-board/.

[28] Id.

[29] ETIAS and ESTA: Similarities and Differences, ETIAS.INFO, https://www.etias.info/etias-esta-similarities-differences/.

[30] Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) Fee Adjustment, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 87 Fed. Reg. 14,970 (Mar. 24, 2022), https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2022-06366.

[31] Travelers from many European countries are required to have a valid ESTA, Visa Waiver Program (VWP), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE – BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiver-program.html.

[32] ETIAS and ESTA: Similarities and Differences, ETIAS.INFO, https://www.etias.info/etias-esta-similarities-differences/.

[33] Id.

[34] Id.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Enhancements to ESTA FAQs, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/esta/enhancements-to-esta-faqs.

[39] Frequently Asked Questions, ETIAS.COM, https://etias.com/etias-frequently-asked-questions.

 

 

Ethnic Divisions in the Balkans Create a Serious Crisis for the United States

By Zacheray William Womer

What was Yugoslavia?

The former Yugoslavia is proving to be a failed experiment of foreign intervention, and its current status may have large implications across the world as less powerful populations continue to deal with the post-imperial power vacuum. Yugoslavia was a socialist federation of nations, as the successor state of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [1]. Within the federation were the modern countries of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro, as well as the autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo [2]. These countries have immense ethnic, theological, and economic divisions between one another [3]. The federation is where the West, East, and Middle East converge. The federation bordered the Soviet Client States of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania, was situated quite close to Turkey, and had been invaded many times by its predecessor the Ottoman Empire, while also bordering Italy and Austria [4]. Yugoslavia existed as a proverbial hornet’s nest that could rage at any moment, but was routinely pacified by its strong leader Josip Broz Tito.

Further keeping divisions at bay was the foreign aid plied into the federation by both the United States and the Soviet Union, aid which was provided because Yugoslavia was formally not aligned with the West or East, providing them immense economic benefits, and thus an incentive to stay united [5]. After the death of Tito and the downfall of the Soviet Union, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia rose just as foreign aid plummeted [6]. This resulted in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the autonomous Kosovo voting overwhelmingly for independence from Yugoslavia [7].

War and peace in Yugoslavia

Upon talks of independence, Serbia utilized the Yugoslav military to wage war against Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia, wherein the latter three genocide and ethnic cleansing were committed against Croats, Bosniaks, and the Albanians of Kosovo to advance Serbia’s goal of creating a “greater Serbia.” [8]. Conflict in the region was ended due to a series of foreign interventions and agreements headed by the United States [9]. The most notable is The Dayton Agreement, which created the current issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina [10]. The agreement created a continuing partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two states, the Serbia Republika Srpska (“RS”), and the Bosnian-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) [11]. This left the country with two legislatures and three Presidents.

Further exacerbating divisions was the “two schools under one roof” policy of the agreement which created ethnically partitioned schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina [12]. Ironically the United States Supreme Court found such a policy was an egregious violation of human rights in its nation [13]. The Office of the High Representative (“OHR”) remains the most controversial provision of The Dayton Agreement, as it continues to plague the nation’s politics. The High Representative (“HR”), which is the head of the OHR, is an externally appointed figure that can impose legislative authority by adopting its resolutions without the input of the county’s elected leaders and the OHR can remove officials at will [14]. These great powers, wielded by a bureaucrat sent to the Balkans by the West, continue to cause the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks alike to demonstrate against the OHR [15].

The end of peace?

In the summer of 2021, the RS and its leader, Milorad Dodik, defied the outgoing HR Valentin Inzko, who imposed a sweeping set of laws requiring citizens not to celebrate, or deny the 1995 Srebrenica massacre [16]. In response, the RS passed laws of the opposite decree [17]. The RS has no power to oppose the OHR, but since the newly appointed Christian Schmidt took the position, they have completely ignored the HR’s existence and the RS is preparing to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina [18].

The Croats and Bosniaks are at odds as well. A dispute over election law and Croatian representation has been waged for some time [19]. On election night the Croats won out as Christian Schmidt modified the election law that night [20]. Now the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Croatian ethnic political party representing Croats in BiH known as “HDZ BiH”) can no longer block the forming of a government as they have in the past [21]. The change also elevates the Croat HDZ BiH’s influence in the region in the form of more seats in parliament enraging Bosniaks [22]. Although this move perturbed the Bosniaks, it allowed the BiH to form a government and appoint a President for the first time since 2018 [23].

Russia, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovenia’s future

While there is established influence from the West in the region, Russia also plays in the sandbox of the Balkans [24]. Russia has no military in the region so rather than using direct force, the Russians support nationalist extremists in Serbia and RS, hoping to upend the western status quo in the Balkans [25]. Russia also leverages its influence over the energy sector in the Balkans to influence political actors [26]. The potential of Balkan nations joining NATO is of great interest to Russia. Russia had previously tried a coup d’etat in Montenegro to prevent them from joining NATO [27]. And after they invaded Ukraine, the Russian Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Igor Kalbukhov, made a veiled threat, “Ukraine’s example shows what we expect. Should there be any threat, we will respond.” [28]. In 2023, emboldened by the actions taken by the Russian Federation, RS President, Milorad Dodik, has threatened to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, has banned the OHR from entering RS, and plans to meet with the leaders of Russia, Hungary, and China this month to discuss the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two ethnic states [29]. If Dodik were to go ahead with what he was threatening, it would present an international crisis. Not simply because a sovereign would be dismantled, but because this would be a crisis as it would pit the United States’s international power directly against the Russian Federation. For RS to leave, they would be defying international authority laid down by the most powerful country in the world, and the United States had shown no sign of flinching. The only reasonable way that Dodik could even hope to succeed would be through the help of the Russian Federation, after all, they refused to approve Christian Schmidt as the new HR, which led Dodik to believe he was illegitimate [30]. This situation should cause all international observers to feel perturbed. WWI started because a Bosnian Serb assassinated a Western monarch in Sarajevo, causing Russia to come to the aid of Serbia and into war with Germany. The only major difference in this potential conflict, the region’s hegemon is not Germany, but the United States.

[1] Ivo Banac, Yugoslavia, 97 The Am. Hist. Rev. 1085-1104 (1992) https://doi.org/10.2307/2165494.
[2] J. Cushman Laurent & Thomas Melady, The Seven States of the Former Yugoslavia: An Evaluation, Institute of World Politics (Oct. 20, 2011), https://www.iwp.edu/articles/2011/10/20/the-seven-states-of-the-former-yugoslavia-an-evaluation/.
[3] Lenard J. Cohen, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 91 Current History 369-371 (1992) https://www.jstor.org/stable/45316718.
[4] Richard J, Crampton & Loring Danforth, The Ottomans of the Balkans, Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans/Formation-of-nation-states.
[5] Vincent Lagendijk & Frank Schipper, East, West, Home’s Best: The Material Links of Cold War Yugoslavia, 1948-1980, 22 Icon 28-54 (2016) https://www.jstor.org/stable/44242740.
[6] Ljubisa S. Adamovich, Nations of the Former Yugoslavia: Consequences of Economic Breakdown, 9 Int’l J. of Pol., Culture, and Soc’y 149-167 (1995) https://www.jstor.org/stable/20007229.
[7] Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 The Am. J. of Int’l L. 569-607 (1992) https://doi.org/10.2307/2203972.
[8] Susan L. Woodward, The Yugoslav Wars, 10 The Brookings Rev. 54; Sonja Biserko, The Srebrenica Genocide: Serbia in Denial, 65 Pakistan Horizon 1-6 (2012) https://www.jstor.org/stable/24711409.
[9] Jutta Paczulla, The Long, Difficult Road to Dayton: Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 60 Int’l J. 255-272 (2004) https://doi.org/10.2307/40204032.
[10] Id.
[11] Karsten Dümmel, POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES: DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT 20 YEARS ON, Kas Int’l Rep. 40-54 (2015) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10110.6.
[12] Pilvi Torsti, SEGREGATED EDUCATION AND TEXTS: A CHALLENGE TO PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 26 Int’l J. on World Peace 65-82 (2009) https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752886.
[13] Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[14] Tim Banning, The ‘Bonn Powers’ of the High Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina: Tracing a Legal Figment, 6 Goettingen J. of Int’l L. 260-301 (2014) doi:10.3249/1868-1581-6-2-banning.; Crisis Group Europe, Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia: Unfinished Business, Managing the Risks of Instability in the W. Balkans 15-25 (Jul. 7, 2022) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep41959.7.
[15] Crisis Group Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Hot Summer, Int’l Crisis Grp. 1-20 (Sep. 26, 2022) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep43573.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Denitsa Koseva, Bosnian Serb leader plans new push to break country up as Balkan tensions rise, Intellinews (Oct. 12, 2023) https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/bosnian-serb-leader-plans-new-push-to-break-country-up-as-balkan-tensions-rise/ar-AA1hyagE.
[19] Supra, note 15, at 3.
[20] RFE/RL Balkan Service, Schmidt Says Bosnian Election-Night Decrees Have Country ‘On Right Track’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Oct. 6, 2022) https://www.rferl.org/a/bosnia-schmidt-interview-intervention/32068059.html.
[21] Azem Kurtic, Bosnia Finally Forms State-Level Government, Balkan Insight (Jan. 25, 2023) https://balkaninsight.com/2023/01/25/bosnia-finally-forms-state-level-government.
[22] Supra, note 15, at 6.
[23] Supra, note 21.
[24] Wouter Zweers, Niels Drost, & Baptiste Henry, Executive Summary, Little Substance, considerable impact: Russian Influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro 1-3 (Aug. 1, 2023) https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep52775.3.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Heather A. Conley & Matthew Melino, Russian Malign Influence in Montenegro: The Weaponization and Exploitation of History, Religion, and Economics, CSIS (May 14, 2019) https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-malign-influence-montenegro-weaponization-and-exploitation-history-religion-and.
[28] Hina, Russia ambassador: Bosnia can join NATO, but Moscow will react to threat, N1 (Mar. 16, 2022) https://n1info.hr/english/news/russia-ambassador-bosnia-can-join-nato-but-moscow-will-react-to-threat/.
[29] Supra, note 18; AFP, Bosnia’s Dodik Vows To Ban International Peace Envoy From Entering Republika Srpska, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Sep. 6, 2023) https://bit.ly/3QqeKYqt.
[30] TASS, Russia does not recognize Schmidt as representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina — diplomat, TASS (Dec. 15, 2021) https://tass.com/politics/1376097.; AP, Separatist Bosnian Serb leader refuses to enter a plea on charges that he defied the top peace envoy, AP (Oct. 16, 2023) https://apnews.com/article/bosnia-dodik-separatist-court-charges-45a1740737672be3885d006a681d6f09.

 

Reasonable Use of Criminal Law Interpretation- An Example of DUI in China and the U.S.

By Jiahang Ding

I. Introduction

Globally, drunk driving is the biggest risk factor for traffic accidents. For people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-nine in Europe, drunk driving is one of the leading causes of death. [1] According to statistics from the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, driving under the influence (DUI) -related car accidents cause about $37 billion in damages each year. [2] According to Chinese official statistics, in just the first half of 2019, there were 1,525 fatal traffic accidents in China due to DUIs, resulting in 1,674 deaths, and 7,512 non-fatal traffic accidents due to DUIs. So, drunk driving-related car accidents are very important to the field of criminal law due to their connection with the protection of personal safety and social public safety.”

II. The legal barriers in criminal law interpretations between China and the U.S.

The main controversy in criminal law interpretations revolves around the principle of legality in crime and punishment. The classic expression of this principle is that acts are not considered criminal and cannot be punished if they are not clearly defined by the law. However, the realization of this wording is based on two assumptions: (1) the law’s provisions are already very clear, with no ambiguity, and the general public can understand the explicit provisions of the Criminal Law, and (2) the law’s provisions are highly perfect, and the entire logical system itself consistent. Based solely on the explicit provisions of relevant legal articles, a fair and reasonable outcome can be achieved for the facts to be applied to the law. For proponents of the omnipotent code theory, this is a self-evident truth. However, through the historical development of human legal civilization, it is known that these two assumptions represent an ideal scenario for describing the law and are challenging to establish in practice due to numerous legal limitations.

Therefore, there is a need for tools that break the limitations of the law, and one of these tools is the principle. Its function is to grant judges discretionary power, thereby narrowing legal loopholes and resolving contradictions.

III. Analysis of the Interpretation of Criminal Law

In U.S. criminal law, the determination of each crime involves three elements: (1) the act (actus reus); (2) the individual’s mental state at the time of the act (mens rea); and (3) the causal relationship between the act and the result. In case law, there are numerous considerations regarding the individuals and their actual circumstances. The principle of legality in criminal law states that “there is no crime without law” and “there is no punishment without law.” The fundamental meaning of this principle is that criminal acts, their types, and elements must be defined in advance by legal provisions. Acts that are not expressly defined as crimes in criminal law cannot result in conviction and punishment. Legal interpretation should be restricted, primarily in two aspects: (1) it should be limited to the definitive meanings specified in legal texts, and (2) it should be constrained by the mainstream understanding of the application of the law. These limitations form a progressive relationship, meaning that in legal concepts, we should first understand them based on their literal meanings.

Furthermore, we should not solely rely on a literal interpretation but also consider the specific context for a comprehensive understanding. [3] Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates: “No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.”

IV. Overcoming Legal Interpretation Issues

Firstly, language itself is inherently ambiguous and vague, leading to uncertainty and diversity in the patterns it expresses. The same sentence, with different punctuation, or even different pauses, can convey completely distinct meanings. Secondly, the ambiguous terms in the law are not necessarily legislative errors but rather reflections of the legislator’s intent. They make “ambiguity” a tool of legislation, enabling a legal provision to adapt to various real-life situations. This is a strategy employed by legislative bodies to cope with unexpected events.

Thirdly, humans differ from machines; anyone’s rationality is limited. Law, as a combination of human rationality, cannot be perfect. Being a human-made creation, it can have deficiencies in legislative technique and might even make errors in value choices. Coupled with the relative certainty of the law and the complexity of real-life situations, the law demands judicial authorities to interpret the law. The judges’ discretionary power acts as a safety net clause, allowing the law to be interpreted broadly to fill in the gaps, and to a certain extent, eliminate the drawbacks inherent in written laws. According to the principles of interpretation, judicial authorities should: (1) if the Criminal law contains explicit provisions, have no right to expand them to situations decided by the legislative body, but the court can interpret the provisions favorably to the defendant in a rough and broad manner; (2) if the Criminal Law is unclear or can be interpreted in certain aspects, judges should deeply understand the true meaning of the law and strive to apply it in those areas; and (3) if there is “doubt” in the law, not obligated to choose the “most favorable restrictive interpretation for the defendant.” The real meaning of the law must be found through general interpretative methods.

Additionally, a crucial role of the law is to maintain social public order, which requires something stable to uphold the order. The stability of the law is its advantage. Modifying legal provisions requires extensive time and careful consideration. The speed of legal modification can never keep up with the pace of social development. Changes in social life will inevitably push the law’s lagging issue to the forefront. Excessive and frequent amendments to the law might not be beneficial since incessant legislative changes contradict the law’s function of maintaining order. If the law itself lacks stability, how can it maintain order?

V. The different determinations of DUI in China and the U.S.

Laws on drunk driving vary from country to country and from region to region, which mainly include three points: (1) different blood alcohol content for recognizing driving; (2) different specific facts for recognizing drunk driving; and (3) different penalties. There are two main aspects to the determination of drunk driving in China: Firstly, in terms of the object of the crime, drunk driving violates the safety of highway transportation as well as the safety of pedestrians, vehicles, and other public facilities, which is usually referred to as “traffic safety”. [4] “Traffic safety” involves the transportation process that puts the lives of many people at risk, including significant health and property concerns. In addition, according to the regulations issued by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the People’s Republic of China titled “Thresholds and Testing for Blood Alcohol andBreath Alcohol Concentration for Vehicle Drivers,” drunk driving refers to the behavior of vehicle drivers with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or greater than20mg/100ml but less than 80mg/100ml. [5] Drinking and driving refers to the driving behavior where the blood alcohol content of the vehicle driver is greater than or equal to 80mg/100ml. It can be seen here that DUI in China only considers alcohol but not other situations such as drug use.

States in the U.S. have different laws regarding drunk driving, and this article is mainly based on the laws of Pennsylvania. According to specific cases, it is not difficult to see, even if there are no personal injury traffic accidents, once the police find that the driver’s alcohol content is higher than the legal standard, the driver will be detained in custody and then sentenced by the criminal judge. The drivers with the lowest alcohol content can be sentenced to one week of imprisonment, while the drivers with the heaviest alcohol content can be sentenced to one year of imprisonment. In Pennsylvania, however, the rules regarding DUI mean that it is illegal to operate a vehicle after consuming alcohol, drugs, or other controlled substances. Driving while intoxicated (DWI) is very similar to DUI. However, DWI simply means that someone is operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. DUI means that the operator of the vehicle is under the influence of illegal drugs, prescription drugs, or alcohol. DUI is commonly used in Pennsylvania to describe this type of offense, so when charged in this state, the charge may not be DWI. Penalties also vary in Pennsylvania depending on the alcohol
content.

VI. U.S. Controversy in DUI – Actual Physical Control

Reasonable grounds for a DUI offense in the U.S. include: a person is guilty of DUI if he or she operates a vehicle while intoxicated. This includes two things: (1) intoxication and (2) driving or operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The first aspect can be determined by many factors, for example, Missouri police will decide if a person is intoxicated based on a variety of signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, odor of alcohol, difficulty walking, and refusal to take a sobriety test. The criteria for a DUI offense may vary from state to state, but in general, U.S. law defines a DUI as a Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC), which is a unit of measurement expressed as the amount of alcohol per liter of blood. In most U.S. states, the legal standard for drunk driving is usually: Adults Twenty-one years of age and older: Typically, the legal standard for drunk driving is a BAC of 0.08%. If a driver’s BAC exceeds this standard, he or she is considered to be driving while intoxicated. Minors under the age of Twenty-one: For minors, the legal standard for drunk driving is usually stricter. Many states require that a minor’s BAC cannot exceed 0.02% or 0.00%.

The second point, however, is more difficult to argue; it is not necessary to witness the suspect driving while intoxicated, and circumstantial evidence can be relied upon, but it must be proven by sufficient circumstantial evidence. But what kind of circumstantial evidence can adequately prove that the suspect was driving the vehicle in an intoxicated state is controversial. In many cases, even if the suspect is in the car and the vehicle is not moving, that still does not adequately prove the suspect drove the car in a drunken state.

I conclude that the following are the main types of circumstantial evidence as to whether the suspect was operating the automobile: engine running, vehicle location, and other evidence proving that the defendant was driving the vehicle. Engine running is a prerequisite to the actual physical operation of the vehicle, and vehicle location is what helps us reason when and how the vehicle was moving. When an officer finds an unconscious or sleeping person in a stationary vehicle, the officer has probable cause to believe that the person is operating the vehicle. If the person is seated behind the steering wheel and the keys are in the ignition, that person is considered operating the vehicle. And the engine is running if the person is seated behind the steering wheel, the keys are in the ignition, and the person is operating the vehicle. [6]

The following are examples of relevant case law: Finding the defendant had actual control of the vehicle when found parked in an alley on the way home to pull over with engine running, [7] finding the defendant asleep in a parked car with headlights on and engine running, found the defendant had actual control, [8] when the defendant was found sleeping on side of the highway with three-quarters of his car protruding from the highway, headlights on and engine running, found actual control, [9] finding the defendant in actual control of automobile when found sleeping in his automobile, which at that time was not moving but was parked in the middle of the road. [10] Even if the motorist was found asleep behind the wheel of a moving car, there was no actual control because the car was not removed from the parking lot of the bar where the motorist was intoxicated. [11]

VII. China’s Controversy in DUI – Roads

Similar to DUI in the U.S., the offense of drunk driving does not concern itself with whether or not a person is killed or injured or financial damage occurs; as long as the act of driving while intoxicated occurs, the suspect can be punished. However, compared to the U.S., where the minimum sentence for DUI is one week in jail and the maximum sentence is one year in jail, China’s penalties are lighter, with the maximum sentence being a custodial sentence because other crimes can be punished when a DUI causes a serious danger to public safety. In China, the situation of the crime must meet the following four points: “road,” “driving,” “motor vehicle,” and “drunkenness.”

However, the determination of what qualifies as a “road” leaves a lot more room for interpretation. [12] But with the development of scientific information technology and transportation, there is no way to specifically exclude through the qualification of which places or roads are not the possibility of public access. At present, the concept of “road” is more controversial than the parking lot of drunken dangerous driving behavior, A sampling of China’s adjudication documents network several cases found in the vast majority of cases show that drunk driving in parking lots is still punished. However, a few drunk drivers were exempted from criminal penalties, and analysis of the judgments found that these cases of drunk driving in parking lots without criminal penalties need to meet the following two points: (1) special occasions: special parking lots should not be recognized as “roads;” and (2) specific time: late at night or early in the morning in the parking lot. Due to the scarcity of
people in and out of the parking lot, it does not have the quality of being used for
public transportation. Moving a car for a short distance after being drunk should be the same as the wilderness road, which does not have the abstract danger, and thus is not considered to be the type of drunkenness.

VIII. Conclusion

The fundamental purpose of the offense of drunken driving is to protect personal safety as well as the public safety of society. Nowadays, with the development of highway transportation, we should minimize the occurrence of personal injury and property damage caused by drunken driving. The role of the law is not to focus on the level of punishment, but to act as more of a warning and education. Combined with the U.S. and China for the determination of the crime of drunk driving and penalties, the incriminating aspects of the appropriate expansion of the scope of the road, even in the parking lot for a short period of time should also be recognized as drunk driving. Whether there is drunkenness or actual physical operation, should be examined more strictly, combined with the state of the engine, vehicle location and other circumstances to be analyzed. In principle, drunk driving should not be criminalized for people who do not drive under the influence of alcohol, nor should ordinary people be discouraged from driving under the influence of alcohol.

[1] Francisco, et. al., Driving under the influence of alcohol: frequency, reasons, perceived risk and punishment, 10 Substance Abuse, Treatment, Prevention &Pol’y 1 (2015).
[2] NHTSA, Drug-Impaired Driving, United States Department of Transportation, (2018), https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drug-impaired-driving#:~:text=Overview, prescribed%20or%20over%20the%20counter.
[3] See Zhou Shaohua, The Fate of Legality Principle in Criminal Justice—Legal ReflectionsTriggered by a Case.J.Law Research, (2) 2003.
[4] YIN Zhihua. Analysis of the constituent elements of “drunken driving offense”.J. Theory, 128, 129- 16 (2011).
[5] LI Tao, LI Xinyu. In the Era of Misdemeanor, the Judicial Dilemma and Governance of Drunk Dangerous Driving Crime in China.J. Journal of Yunnan PoliceCollege, 122,128- 03 (2023).
[6] Cox v. Dir. of Revenue, 98 S.W.3d 548 (Mo. banc. Ct. 2003).
[7] Commonwealth v. Bobotas, 588 A.2d 518 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
[8] Commonwealth v. Crum, 523 A.2d 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
[9] Commonwealth v. Kloch, 327 A.2d 375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
[10] Commonwealth v. Leib, 588 A.2d 922 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
[11] Commonwealth v. Byers, 650 A.2d 468 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
[12] Wang Yaming. Substantive Exoneration Feasibility Study of Intoxicated Dangerous Driving – A Sample of 160 Judgments of Intoxicated Dangerous Driving Parking Lots.J. Jiangsu Social Science, 121, 129- 05 (2021).