Any hour now, many including the United States government and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), expect Russian President Vladimir Putin to invade the neighboring country of Ukraine (Shaw, 2022). Putin believes that culturally and politically Ukraine is a part of Russia, and he views NATO’s expansion in the East and the idea of Ukraine joining the NATO military alliance a hostile act of aggression toward Russia (Mackintosh, 2022). This situation has been created and orchestrated by Putin’s hands and how it ends, will depend on his ability to effectively match his leadership style with the situation. This situation threatens the stability of Europe and the involvement of the United States in yet another, foreign war (Mackintosh, 2022). Currently, there are more than 150,000 Russian troops positioned around three sides of Ukraine-a military force which has been modernized under Putin’s leadership and one which severely outmatches the military forces of Ukraine (Mackintosh, 2022). This is the situation in which Putin is leading his country, and his effectiveness will be contingent on matching his leader style to this situation.
Contingency theory suggests that there are two types of leadership styles, task motivated, and relationship motived (Northouse, 2007, p. 114). Much political success is based on leveraging relationships to achieve one’s goals (relationship motivated) however, it has become clear in this situation that Putin is utilizing the task motivated leadership style. Northouse (2007) explains that task motivated leaders are primarily focused on reaching a goal (p. 114). With diplomatic talks failing, it underscores Putin’s sole focus on the task of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and preventing the nation from strengthening its ties with the alliance; regardless of relationships, he will do whatever is necessary to achieve his goal. Had Putin’s motivations been primarily relationship oriented, he would have been receptive to negotiations and the concerns discussed during diplomatic talks. Rather than developing relationships with neighboring and NATO countries, he is willing to damage relationships and willingly excepts the consequences for pursuing his goal. On Fiedler’s Least Preferred Coworker (LPC) scale for measuring leadership styles, and given Putin’s intense task motivation, he would score low on the scale (Northouse, 2007, p. 114).
Contingency theory is formulated on the premise that certain leadership styles are effective in certain situations (Northouse, 2007, p. 115). Should Putin invade Ukraine, there are three variables to that situation which must be understood: leader-member relations, task structure, and position power (Northouse, 2007, p. 114). Northouse (2007) defines leader-member relations as the atmosphere and degree of confidence, loyalty, and attraction a leader can instill in his followers (p.114). While the world has differing views of Putin as a leader, it is generally understood that he is an authoritative leader who uses that authority for decision-making, regardless of whether or not his employees agree with him (Maniei, 2016). Despite this, Putin’s staff and military remain motivated by him as evidenced by his popular, competent, yet merciless government (Szakonyi, 2017). Even in hard times, no one has broken ranks and his staff have reinforced their commitment to him by attacking perceived enemies on Putin’s behest (Szakonyi, 2017).
Task structure, the second variable, describes the clarity and detail with which tasks are given (Northouse, 2007, p. 114). Putin has provided his followers with a highly structured task. The requirements of the task are clear and understood by the people required to perform them (Northouse, 2007, p. 114). He has positioned his team in strategic locations and upon Putin’s command, they understand they will begin invading Ukraine. Each task of the initial invasion has been meticulously spelled out and practiced through military exercises. These military exercises, some of which are occurring jointly with the country of Belarus, are both a show of force and way for Putin to ensure his followers understand their tasks (Ellyatt, 2022).
The third situational variable under contingency theory is that of position power. There is little question as to Putin’s authority as a leader or his ability to reward or punish followers (Northouse, 2002, p. 115). Vladimir Putin’s role as the President of Russia establishes his legitimate power over the country, its military and its people. His followers understand success will be met with reward and failure or disloyalty will be met with punishment. For example, Putin’s involvement is long suspected in the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny (Roache, 2020). There is little doubt that if Putin wants to invade Ukraine, his position power is strong and is followers will respond to his commands.
Based on this analysis, Russian President Vladimir Putin is using task oriented leadership style in a political standoff that is seemingly spiraling out of control and headed towards war. As such, contingency theory indicates that people who receive low LPC scores (task motivated) will be effective in both favorable and very unfavorable situations (Northouse, 2007, p. 115). The situation with Ukraine is considered unfavorable for all involved. Further, Putin has good leader-member relations, provides high task structure and has strong position power. The situation with Ukraine is highly volatile but given Putin’s [assumed] low LPC score and his measures on the three situational variables, he should perform well in this situation. One of the strengths of contingency theory is that it is supported by a large volume of empirical research (Northouse, 2007, p. 117.) Additionally, Northouse (2007) finds that contingency theory is predictive in its ability to inform what type of leadership is likely to be effective in certain situations (p. 117).
Finally, as the situation between Russia and Ukraine evolves, Putin’s style of leadership may no longer match. Should that become the case, Putin may be faced with a situation in which his leadership style will be ineffective. As a low LPC, Putin would be ineffective when the situation is neither completely in his control as it is now, nor out of his control (Northouse, 2007, p. 115). In this mismatched situation, Putin would be expected to experience stress and anxiety. This could cause him to revert to less mature ways of coping and lash out or result in poor decision making (Northouse, 2007, p. 116). Either way, should this situation change to no longer match Putin’s leadership style, the consequences could be felt world-wide.
References
Ellyatt, H. (2022, February 10). Russia begins massive military drills with Belarus; U.S. slams ‘escalatory’ action. CNBC. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/10/russia-set-to-begin-massive-military-drills-with-belarus.html
Mackintosh, E. (2022, February 19). What does Putin Want in Ukraine? the conflict explained. CNN. Retrieved from https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/18/europe/ukraine-russia-conflict-explainer-cmd-intl/index.html
Maniei, A. (2016, March 10). Leadership analysis of Vladimir Putin. Academia.edu. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://www.academia.edu/23088968/Leadership_analysis_of_Vladimir_Putin
Northouse, P.G. (2007). Contingency Theory. In Leadership: Theory and Practice (pp. 113-126). 4th Edition. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. ISBN 10-141294161X.
Roache, M. (2020, September 4). Alexei Navalny poisoning allegations: Putin under pressure. Time. Retrieved February 20, 2022, from https://time.com/5886151/alexei-navalny-poisoning-allegations/
Shaw, A. (2022, February 19). Kamala Harris meets with Ukraine’s Zelenskyy, pledges unified action if Russia invades: ‘a decisive moment’. Fox News. Retrieved from https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kamala-harris-ukraines-zelenskyy-russia
Szakonyi, D. (2017, December 01). Why Russian oligarchs remain loyal to Putin (op-ed). The Moscow Times. Retrieved from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/12/01/centrifugal-forces-why-russian-oligarchs-remain-loyal-to-the-putin-government-op-ed-a59760
Hi Mark,
I just wanted to drop a quick comment to let you know that I really appreciate and enjoyed your response to my post. Regarding Putin, you provided an extremely interesting angle to further explore, that of the followership of destructive leaders. Sadly, Putin has such an intimidating strangle-hold on the activities of Russian society, his followers are too suppressed or fearful to speak up. I would argue there is a significant number that feel harmed by his rule. Further, I completely agree with what you said; although I can’t condone his actions, Putin and others like him provide countless angles of research to pursue, both from a leadership perspective and from a behavioral and neurological psychology perspective.
Erin
Your approach to profiling Vladimir Putin through contingency theory was creative and engaging. Putin’s task-motivated behavior seems to be the catalyst for accomplishing what he wants. Rather than switching between situational or path-goal theory approaches, he makes his task the center of everyone’s priority. From the outside, it seems like he has ultimate unity of effort over his country’s objectives and how to achieve them on a military front; the rest of the country entities, well, I am not so sure.
Since we are talking about Putin and his dictator role, I am curious if you considered the followership of destructive leaders’ assessment of Putin? The followership of destructive leaders includes an assessment of Putin through his followers’ and their need for reassuring authority figures, security and certainty, feeling special, membership in the community, fear of seclusion, and powerlessness to challenge (Northouse, 2021, p.373). I see a series of blog potential here where you write about the leader in one segment and the follower in the second segment. Other than fear, intimidation, and riding shirtless on a pony, what do you think it is about Putin that keeps his followers following him?
There is something to be said about studying the leaders we consider destructive and outside the norms. Although I don’t condone the acts of Putin, or others similar to him, I do find the appeal he has on his followers and his control of the country to be of significant importance to research outlining how and what tip the scales to the power and control for these leaders. Perhaps one day we may the data to foresee the potential of a destructive leader through a bad outcomes analysis of prior bad leaders and mitigate their impact before we are faced with analyzing an invasion.
Mark
References
Northouse, P. G. (2021). Leadership (9th Edition). SAGE Publications, Inc. (US). https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781071834473