Learning Protest: How national protest contexts Influence Adolescents' views of Unconventional Political Participation*

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Abstract

Political protest has become a normal form of engagement in many countries (Meyer and Tarrow 1997) although the degree to which protest is considered a legitimate form of civic engagement varies both across countries and across individuals within countries.   Using a sample of fourteen year olds from 20 countries surveyed by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) as part of the 1999 Civic Education (CivEd) and 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education (ICCS) surveys, we seek to understand how national political context – specifically the amount and form of protest in recent years influence young citizens' attitudes toward participating in protest behavior. We distinguish two different types of protest -- non-confrontational and confrontational -- and expect some factors to affect each of these differently. We also look at how a history of riots in a country influences youth's expected future activity. The project expands our understanding of how different forms of civic engagement are learned and contributes to the literature on the cross-national factors that produce protest.

Introduction

Political protest has become a normal form of political engagement in many countries (Meyer and Tarrow 1997). Peaceful protest serves as an important means for voicing political dissent in both democracies and autocracies, and can also be used as a way to check against violent responses from governments and other social groups. Yet, the degree to which citizens are socialized to accept such activity as a legitimate form of civic engagement varies across countries, over time, and among individuals within countries. In addition, some forms of protest activity -- like damage to private property -- are considered inappropriate forms of civic engagement and even potentially harmful to the functioning of democracy. Nonetheless, different countries often have very different traditions of political protest. For example, recently French union members set fire to tires, set off firecrackers and fought with riot police in front of a closing Goodyear tire plant (DiLorenzio 2013). In other labor cases, factory owners have been kidnapped by aggrieved workers. In response, elected officials in the French Senate introduced a bill which would grant amnesty to those who have "property damage, issued threats or defamed management during a labor or housing dispute over the last six years" (DiLorenzio 2013). On the other hand, British farmers and union members --while engaging the same issues -- are likely to choose much more peaceful forms of protest. Such differences raise important questions about how citizens view particular types of political protest.[1]

We focus here on the learning of different types of political protest that occurs in early adolescence. Social psychologists have long recognized that many attitudes towards politics develop during this period (Adelson and O'Neil 1966; Campbell 2008; Plutzer 2002). Using two separate samples of young adults surveyed by the International Educational Achievement (IEA) -- the 1999 Civic Education (CivEd) survey and the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education (ICCS) survey in 20 countries -- we seek to explain how students come to feel that they themselves might participate in different forms of protest. We focus on the acceptability of different forms of protest ranging from petitioning and peaceful demonstrations to the occupation of buildings, damage of property through spray painting, and barricading traffic. In addition to asking how individual level factors influence students' views of these different types of protest we also examine how a nation's political context – specifically the amount and form of riots – influences their views. Does the frequency of riots increase young people's acceptance of all types of protest as a legitimate form of civic engagement?

The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by discussing previous work on youth civic engagement and particularly protest behavior and use this to develop hypotheses about the youth acceptance of different forms of protest focusing particularly on the effects of national context. We then introduce our data and methods. Finally, we present our analyses and elaborate on the implications that our results have for civic engagement and participation in political protest.

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[1] For work examining different types of protest behavior see Dalton 2008; Barnes and Kaase 1979)

Literature Review

We draw on several research traditions within political science in exploring this research question: First, we begin with the literature on the political socialization into civic engagement and political participation looking specifically at how adolescents learn to participate[2] and the role of national contextual factors. We also bring additional insights from the area of social movement research that focuses on mobilization.

Civic Engagement and Political Participation

One major focus in recent years has been on the learning of civic engagement since citizen participation is a major factor in sustaining democracy (Putnam 2007; Skocpol 2004), as well as in transitions to and consolidation of new democracies. Interest in citizen's political engagement and the learning of civic engagement more generally has led to a scholarly focus on civic engagement cross nationally (Malak-Minkiewicz 2007; Sloam and Kisby 2009; Torney-Purta et al. 2005; Wiseman et al. 2010). Scholars have noted both the variation in civic engagement by nation as well as hypothesized about the different factors that might alter individuals' civic engagement.

On the *national* level, scholars have particularly noted the importance of national characteristics particularly economic development, the degree of democracy and the ethnic and linguistic differences among the populace (Alesina and La Ferrerra 2000; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Dalton et al. 2010; Banaszak and Karakoc n.d., Jenson 2011; Norris 2004 and Putnam 2007).

In the United States, research has also found that an individual citizens' social context can alter their civic participation. In many cases, the focus has been on how social networks might alter the relationship between associational life and political participation(Huckfeldt Mendez and Osborne 2004; McClurg 2006a, 2006b, Mutz 2002) . However, there is also a growing understanding that the political environment is a factor in the political socialization of civic engagement (Campbell 2006; Pacheco 2008; Wiseman et al. 2010). In looking at the United States for example, Campbell (2006) notes that the civic engagement of adolescents is affected by social norms inculcated by the political environment and argues those social norms are more clearly communicated in communities that are more politically homogeneous.

Most of this research however has focused on the individual themselves, noting that social characteristics and economic resources influence civic engagement. Perhaps most important in explaining that engagement are resources available to the individual. Thus, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) argue that resources accrued through income and experience play important

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[2] For extensive reviews see Jennings (2007), Sapiro (2004), and Sears and Levy (2003).

roles in determining how active citizens are. They also observe that parents' socio-economic status often influence their children's future activism with higher socio-economic status enabling civic engagement (p. 422). Many scholars have also found that socio-economic status has similar affects on protest activism (McAdam 1990; Sherkat and Blocker 1994). As we shall see in the discussion of the social movement literature below, socio-economic status may also have the opposite effect on mobilization through the creation of grievances among those with lower socio-economic status.

Access to information is also an important resource that encourages civic engagement. In particular, media consumption is likely to provide the information both about the political system and about protest movements generally that allow citizens to engage in protest. Therefore the consumption of news media is likely to increase the likelihood of citizens' engaging in political acts.

In addition to resources, political interest has consistently been important in explaining civic engagement. Interest in politics is the precursor to participation and suggests both a feeling of efficacy (Sherak and Blocker 1994) and serves as a motivator for civic engagement. Greater political interest leads individuals to choose to engage the political system.

Although little has been written on the civic engagement of immigrants generally. Work on their political attitudes suggest that they generally are more distrustful of political institutions (Doerschler and Jackson 2012). Because immigrants often work in lower status occupations for less pay, may not speak their host countries language and may maintain closer ties to the country from which they emigrated, they are less likely to be engaged in the politics of their host country (Doerschler 2006).

Women's civil engagement has shifted significantly over the years and continues to vary somewhat by country. Nonetheless, much of the research on the impact of gender on civic engagement suggests that there are little or no differences between men and women in political participation (Norris and Inglehart 2003) and that much of the differences, at least in the United States are attributable to differences in the socio-economic status and other resources available to women. (Schlozman. Burns and Verba 1994).

Social Movement Mobilization

While those interested in political participation and civic engagement tend to focus on voting or participation in civic associations, protest is also a form of political action (see for example Campbell 2006; Zukin et al. 2006). Many authors argue that the factors discussed above affect both conventional (e.g. voting and association membership) and unconventional (e.g. protest) forms of civic engagement in the same manner (Barnes et al. 1979 ; Dalton 2008). However, two significant differences occur in the literature.

First, for some authors grievances rather than resources are the primary motivator of protest activity[3]. Because low economic status can be associated with increased grievances particularly around economic issues, those with higher socio-economic status may have fewer grievances. Hence, if grievances derived from the economy drive protest behavior, we might expect lower socio-economic status to be associated with higher acceptance of protest activities .

Second, in talking about women's participation in Freedom Summer, McAdam (1992) notes that women participated at much lower levels than their male counterparts. The particular nature of this political activity-- unchaperoned work in the Southern black community that could result in arrests or beatings-- resulted in increased opposition to women's participation among those close to the women who had applied. While McAdam focuses only on those who have already applied and their decision to participate, he also notes great gender disparity in applications; only 41% of those who applied were women (1992:1217). Given that others who have studied gender in protest find little or no difference in participation (see for example Sherkat and Blocker 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003), we believe this suggests that because of gender role attitudes there may be greater gender disparities when the protest activity involves greater danger or the potential to be arrested.

While social movement scholars largely consider the factors that lead to adult protest participation (Opp and Gern 1993; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Javeline 2003) or the consequences of protest participation for continued civic engagement over the lifecourse (McAdam 1989; Jennings and Niemi 1981, chapt.11; Jennings 2002; Sherkat and Blocker 1994), this research focuses on examining the socialization processes of adolescents.

We follow those who suggest that highly visible political protest may affect the political behavior and attitudes of an entire generation (e.g., Caren et al. 2011; McAdam 1990, Chapt. 1; Whitter 1995). Adolescents -- whose participation is largely unformed at this stage -- learn civic engagement through observing and interacting with others. Research shows for example that parents and even teachers (Campbell; Niemi and Junn) play a large role in inculcating behavior. Few if any of the adults they come in contact with will, however, have participated directly in protest. Hence, most experience with protest will be experienced indirectly through other individuals and through the mass media.

Moreover, there is evidence of vast differences in the levels of protest among different countries. For example, Figure 1 uses data from Banks (2011) Cross National Time Series data archive to provide more detail about the number of riots in the 20 countries in the 1999 CivEd and 2009 ICCS IEA surveys. Figure 1 shows the number of riots in each of these countries in four years preceding the survey. Substantial cross-national variation exists in these countries, with some countries, like Greece, having large numbers of riots, and others exhibiting no riots at all.

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[3] This tradition has a long history starting with Gurr (1970). For more recent uses of grievance theories see Buechler 2004; Javeline 2003; and Van Dyke and Soule. 2002.

Moreover, countries that exhibited riots between 1995 and 1999 did not necessarily exhibit similar levels of protest 10 years later and vice versa.

Figure 1 about here**

Following the literature above, we have the following three expectations about national level contexts: First, following the civic learning approach which suggests that adolescents might learn the acceptability of such forms of civic engagement by their visibility within the political environment, we expect to see that youth acceptance of protest increases as there is greater protest in their national context. Thus we expect to find:

- H1: As the number of protests in the last four years increases, youth acceptance of protest should also increase.

Second, we expect that the observance of protest by adolescents will be mediated by the form of government of the country. In particular, we expect that in countries where fewer opportunities for other forms of civic engagement exist, such protest may have an even larger impact on adolescents view of protest. Protest that takes illegal forms may be interpreted as more legitimate where fewer opportunities exist for regularized civic engagement. This suggests that we should find that:

- H2: In more authoritarian countries, the impact of the number of protests in past years on youth acceptance of protest should be stronger than in countries that are less authoritarian.

Finally we also have several hypotheses related to differences between two different forms of protest. As the discussion above suggests the factors that lead these adolescent students to expect to participate in peaceful demonstrations and petitioning are likely to be considerably different from the factors that lead them to accept the forms of protest that involve engaging in illegal and potentially dangerous activity. Theory to date about the differences are likely to occur In the effect of a number of individual level factors. Previous literature points to a very specific hypothesis related to women's participation in such acts as damaging property and occupying buildings since these are quite different from peacefully protesting and petitioning. As a result, we expect that:

- H3: Female adolescents are less likely to participate in the more confrontational or dangerous forms of protest than men.

While we do not have specific hypotheses about the direction of change of other variables, we also look at several other factors in explaining adolescents' expectations that they will participate in certain types of protest in the future. We examine the effect of socio-economic status on protest propensity. The adolescents studied here have not yet acquired jobs and therefore we do not have information about their income levels or their educational attainment. However, we can

examine their background by examining their parents' socio-economic status, and we can also look at the adolescents' own aspirations for their future as a measure of expected socio-economic status.

We also explore the role of media consumption in understanding protest propensity by looking both at the effect of reading generally and of watching television. Because adolescent opinion might be related to the degree to which they care about political issues, we also examine the effect of political interest and knowledge on their protest propensity. Finally, we examine the effect of being an immigrant on protest propensity.

Data and Methods

In order to assess how national context help predict students' propensity to engage in different types of protest, we have combined national indicators of wealth, political rights and civil liberties, and the amount of protest activity within countries using data from the World Bank data, Freedom House, and Banks' Cross National Time Series data archive (CNTS) with data using from the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) 1999 Civic Education Study (CivEd) and the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), which include information on participants' backgrounds, political interests, political knowledge, and protest behavior collected at the individual level.

The nations included in our analysis are Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Italy, latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, and Switzerland. In order to draw a comparison across time, we purposely exclude those countries that are only present in one of the datasets.[4]

Dependent Variable

Our primary concern is with the contextual influence on adolescents' view of different forms of protests as well as factors leading to a willingness to engage in different forms of protest. The propensity towards conventional forms of protest and illegal forms of protest in both CivEd and ICCS datasets are measured creating two indices from the answers to five questions asked in both the CivEd and ICCS surveys. These questions asked the adolescents whether as an adult, they would: (1) collect signatures for a petition; (2) participate in a non-viol (peaceful) protest march or rally; (3) spray-paint protest slogans on walls; (4) block traffic as a form of protest; (5) occupy public buildings as a form of protest. They could respond using a four-point scale, ranging from one (I will certainly not do this) to four (I will certainly do this). We create two additive indices from these questions: an index of non-confrontational protest created from the questions about petitioning and participating in peaceful march and an index of confrontational

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[4] Additionally, we were forced to exclude a few countries due to missing data on some national measures.

or illegal protest created from the questions about spray-painting, blocking traffic, and occupying buildings. We normalize both indices so that each runs from 1 (I will certainly not do any of the activities) to 4 (I will certainly do all activities) by dividing by the number of questions.

For the 52,853 students who had valid scores on the non-confrontational protest scale and the 56,928 students who had valid scores on the confrontational protest scale in the CivEd data, the means were 2.41 (s.d. = 0.77) and 1.69 (s.d. = 0.75) respectively. For the 68,855 students who had valid scores on the non-confrontational protest scale and the 68,793 students who had valid scores on the confrontational protest scale in the ICCS data, the means were 2.62 (s.d. = 0.82) and 1.87 (s.d. = 0.82) respectively. Figure 2 illustrates the national averages for both the non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity indices.

****Figure 2 about here ****

The two additive measures of protest propensity generally can be considered reliable. The three-item scale of confrontational protest propensity has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.83 in both the CivEd data and the ICCS data set. The two-item scale of non-confrontational protest propensity has more moderate levels of internal consistency as demonstrated by Cronbach's alpha equal to 0.61 in the CivEd data and 0.69 in the ICCS data. Moreover, confirmatory factor analyses for each scale found that the items in both non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity indices represent a single dimension. Moreover, the two indices are only moderately correlated with each other (r= 0.32 in CivEd and r=0.24 in ICCS) suggesting that the two types of protests are not highly similar[5].

Table 1 about here

Individual Level Independent Variables

We employ a number of individual level indicators that may predict willingness to engage in protest including gender, immigration status, socio-economic status, media consumption, political knowledge and political interest. Socio-economic status is measured both by participants' plan to pursue further education beyond their current educational status as well as by their parents' educational background. Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in Table 1.

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[5] We also examined the correlations between the confrontational and non-confrontational protest indices by country. Here too, the correlations tend to be low. For example, in the CivEd data , the minimum correlation between confrontational protest index and non-confrontational protest index is 0.20 (the Slovak Republic) whereas the maximum correlation between the two indices occurs in Bulgaria (r=0.58). In the ICCS data, correlations between the confrontational protest index and the non-confrontational protest index remain low. For example, in Colombia, the correlation is at 0.05 whereas it is at 0.33 in Finland. In other words, an individual's tendency to have confrontational protest behavior does not necessarily equate to an individual's non-confrontational protest participation.

Gender, immigration status, and plan to pursue further education are all coded as dummy variables. Female, immigrants, and those who plan to continue their studies beyond the high school level are all coded as one. Immigration status is measured by whether or not the participant is born in the country in which the survey was administered. 95% of the participants of the CivEd survey are born in the country that the survey is administered and 5 % are not. Similarly, 95% of the students participants of the ICCS survey are born in the country that the survey is administered in whereas 5% of the participants are not.

In addition to students' aspiration for higher education, we also include an additional measure of the socio-economic status of the adolescents in the form of the amount of education each parent had received. We measure mother's and father's education using a six-category ordinal variable denoting the highest degree that the respondents' parents have attained. It is coded from 1, for not completing elementary school, to 6, for receiving a bachelor's degree and beyond.

In addition, we examine both media consumption and political interest and knowledge. There are two measures of media consumption: the number of books respondents have at home and the amount of TV they watch on a weekly basis. The number of books at home is measured by a four-category ordinal variable denoting the number of books respondents have at home. It is coded from 1, for 0 to 10 books, to 4, for more than 200 books. The frequency that the respondent watches TV is also measured by a four-category variable denoting the hours that respondents spend on watching television every week. It is coded from 1, for 0 hours, to 4, for more than two hours.

We employ a four point measure of how interested students are in politics. The question asks students whether they strongly agree (coded 4), agree (coded 3), disagree (coded 2), and strongly disagree (coded 1) with the statement "When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say. " In the CivEd data, students on average report to agreeing with having something to say about political issues (mean = 2.55; s.d. = 0.86). Similarly, in the ICCS data, students on average also report to agreeing with having something to say about political issues (mean = 2.45; s.d. = 0.83).

We also use two variables to measure students' political knowledge: (1) how much participants agree with the statement that "I know more about politics than most people at my age" and (2) how much participants agree with the statement that "I am able to understand political issues easily". The two questions are answered in a four-point scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to four (strongly agree). It is important to differentiate the two questions: one asks about students' perception of their own knowledge of politics in comparison with their peers and the other asks about students' perception of their own ability to understand politics. The two variables do not scale particularly well[6] and therefore, we choose to use each item separately in the analysis which follows. Interestingly, students who responded to the ICCS survey ten years

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[6] Cronbach's alpha suggests that a scale composed of the two items is not particularly internally consistent (alpha= 0.57 in the CivEd data and 0.64 in the ICCS data).

after the administration of CivEd self-report to having more knowledge about politics than those who responded to the CivEd survey. The means for both knowing about politics and understanding politics increased between 1999 and 2009. However, students surveyed in the ICCS data report to having less political interest and being less likely to contribute to a political discussion compared to their counterparts ten years previously.

Country Level Protest events measure

We use counts of riots from the Cross National Time Series (CNTS) database by Arthur Banks (2011) for the four years prior to each IEA survey (i.e. 1996-1999 for CivEd and 2006-2009 for ICCS) as a measure of the amount of protest activity within each country. These events are recorded as part of the domestic conflict section of the CNTS database. There are a total of eight types of events. These are assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, government crises, purges, riots, revolutions, anti-government demonstrations. CNTS codebook notes that these events are collected mostly through newspaper sources and come most commonly from The New York Times. In this study, we begin by specifically look at the events categorized as riots. Riots are defined as "any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force" by the CNTS database codebook. For each country, we use the total number of riots over the 4 years prior to the survey.

The total number of protest events during the time periods 1996-1999 and 2006-2009 in each country ranges from 0 to a maximum of 4. This highest number of riots belongs to Greece during the 2006-2009 period.

Preliminary visual investigation of these event counts also show that in 2006-2009, as compared to 1996-1999, while some countries experienced significantly fewer riots, others have seen a shift from no events to having some of the highest numbers of riot events. Figure 1 shows the number of riots in our sample during the two four-year periods we look at by country.

**** Figure 1 about here ****

Country Level control variables

Previous research suggests that two other country level variables that might influence the propensity to engage in protest: political regime context and level of development.

Political regime context

The political regime environment at the country level is measured by the Freedom Index from Freedom in the World report published by the Freedom House. This index combines ratings of countries in two major categories: political rights and civil liberties. The political rights rating is derived based on evaluations of countries in terms of electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. The civil liberties rating includes evaluations in terms of freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law,

and personal autonomy and individual rights. These scores range from one to seven with lower values representing higher levels of freedom. We use the average of the political rights and civil liberties scores for each country for 1999 and 2009 separately for each survey. This average for countries in our sample ranges from 1 (the "most free") to 5.5 ("partially free"). The resulting freedom rating is an average of counties' scores in these two broader categories and are used to classify countries in one of three groups: not free, partially free, and free.

Most of the countries in our sample are rated as free by the Freedom House indices except for Colombia and Russia. Colombia is rated partially free for both 1999 and 2009. Russia is rated partially free in 1999 and not free in 2009. However, the Freedom House measures that we average together to create a single index include more variation because they are based on the specific numerical values attached to countries' political rights and civil liberties scores every year.

Level of development

We use GDP per capita to measure the overall level of development in each country in the year that each survey is conducted (1999 for the CivEd survey and from 2009 for the ICCS). This variable is taken from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank.

Analyses

We employ multilevel modeling approach because of the grouped nature of our datasets--adolescents are sampled within countries. We model the intercept of individual-level variables as a function of the grouped national-level variables in order to account for the neste structure of the data. We allow the intercepts to vary randomly by country. We express our model as:

$$Protest\ Propensity = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ (Female_i) + \beta_2\ (Immigrant_i) + \beta_3\ (Further\ Education_i) +$$

$$\beta_4\ (Mother's\ Education_i) + \beta_5\ (Father's\ Education_i) + \beta_6\ (Books\ at\ Home_i) +$$

$$\beta_7\ (TV\ Watching_i) + \beta_8\ (Political\ Interest_i) + \beta_9\ (Knowing\ Politics_i) +$$

$$\beta_{10}\ (Understanding\ Politics_i) + e_j$$

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(GDP\ per\ Capita_j) + \gamma_{02}(Freedom_j)$$

$$+ \gamma_{03}(Riot_j) + \gamma_4(Freedom \times Riot_j) + \mu_{0j}$$

Results

We model the two surveys, CivEd and ICCS, separately using the multi-level modeling strategy outlined in the previous section. Table 2 shows the results of our analyses. Since we examine students' propensities towards confrontational and non-confrontational protest as separate dependent variables, we report four models: those for non-confrontational protest propensity in the CivEd (Model 1) and the ICCS (Model 3) datasets and those for confrontational and illegal protest propensity in the CivEd (Model 2) and ICCS (Model 4) datasets.

Table 2 about here

Individual Level Results

At the individual level, empirically significant relationships tend to persist over time from 1999 CivEd survey to 2009 ICCS survey. However, we find substantively important differences between the way individual level factors explain non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity.

Across both surveys, female students are found to be more likely to participate in non-confrontational protest but less likely to participate in confrontational protests compared to male students. In spite of being suggestive of a need to explore the impact of gender on youth's protest participation propensity, these effects are not substantively very large. For instance, the effect of being female, all else equal, on the non-confrontational protest propensity index is 0.07 of a point higher in 1999 and .13 of a point higher in 2009. Female students are .19 of a point *less* likely to anticipate participating in more confrontational protest in 1999 and .23 of a point less likely to participate in 2009. Given that the standard deviation of both the non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity indices for 1999 is around 0.76 and 0.82 for 2009, these differences are not very large in their magnitude. Yet, this finding does suggest that there we would expect to see differences in the form that men's and women's protest takes. Moreover, as the previous discussion of the literature suggests, such differences make sense theoretically considering the complexity of gender and the multiplicity of other individual attributes that intersect with it.

Students' expectation of further education --one of our indicators of socioeconomic status-- also has differential effects on the confrontational and non-confrontational protest propensity. While those who expect to continue their education beyond high school are more likely to gather petitions and participate in peaceful protest, these individuals are less likely to anticipate engaging in the illegal or more confrontational protest. Rather it is those who anticipate their education ending who anticipate participating in spray-painting slogans, occupying buildings or barricading streets. Expecting to get a further education increases students' propensity for non-confrontational protest participation by 0.05 points in 1999 and 0.09 points in 2009. Conversely, we observe a decrease of 0.11 and 0.12 points on confrontational protest propensity index in 1999 and 2009, respectively.

Students' exposure to television also has the opposite effects on our two measures of the propensity for protest. While having more books at home increases non-confrontational protest propensity, watching TV more frequently reduces non-confrontational protest propensity. Going from having the minimal amount of books to its maximum creates an increase of 0.06 in 1999 and 0.15 in 2009 on our non-confrontational protest propensity index. Similar change in the frequency of watching TV results in a decrease of 0.06 in 1999 and 0.03 in 2009. On the other hand, spending more time watching TV increases propensity for *confrontational* protest participation by about 0.09 points. In contrast, having books at home has no significant effect on confrontational activity in 1999 but significantly reduces confrontational protest propensity in 2009 by 0.15 points.

Not all variables have opposite effects on the propensity for confrontational and non-confrontational protest. Across both surveys, students' self assessment of political knowledge increases their propensity to participate in both non-confrontational and confrontational protests.

National Level Results

Turning to the national level factors, we focus on two variables: the degree of political rights and civil liberties in the political regime and number of riots within the four years before the surveys were conducted. Since we argue that these two factors would have a conditional impact on protest propensity, we also include the interaction between these two variables in our models.

In order to interpret these interaction terms, we need to first recognize that the constitutive variables of the interactive effect can no longer be interpreted in the way they would be if there was not an interaction term included. That is, we have to think of the results for these variables in conditional terms (William et al 2012). To do this efficiently, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the marginal impact of riots on both types of protest propensity at all values of freedom ratings. Since the number of riots observed in the 20 countries in our sample contain only 4 unique values, we plot the marginal effect of riots separately for each value. Each point plotted on these graphs represent the impact of moving from no riots (i.e. the base level) to the respective number of riots as noted in the legend for each graph. These are calculated as the difference in the impact of the variable riot holding other values constant. Around each point, we also present the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated marginal effects.

<center>***Figures 3 and 4 about here***</center>

With one exception the presence of riots have an increasing positive marginal effect on the protest indices as the level of freedom in a country decreases (i.e. Freedom House score increases numerically[7]). For both confrontational and non-confrontational protest propensity in 1999 and for confrontational protest propensity in 2009, the presence of riots increases students'

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[7] Note that, the higher freedom scores coincide with lower levels of freedom based on the coding structure of the variable.

protest participation propensity. And the increase related to the presence of riots is greater in countries that are less free. On the other hand, in 2009 the marginal effect of having riots on non-confrontational protest propensity is increasingly negative over the range of freedom ratings. In other words, experiencing several riots from 2006 to 2009 makes students less willing to participate in non-confrontational protests compared to their counterparts in countries that experienced no riots. As we move towards lower levels of freedom, this decrease in students' willingness to participate in non-confrontational protest events grows even larger.

Moreover, these effects are much larger than the effects of the individual level variables. For instance, in 1999, for a country where the Banks data reported two riots in the past four years, we would expect the non-confrontational protest propensity index to be two points higher (on a four point scale) than would be otherwise predicted if the country had a freedom score of 5.5 (i.e. the least free country in our sample). On the other hand, in completely free countries (freedom score of 1), the marginal impact of having riots on non-confrontational protest propensity is essentially zero and statistically insignificant. In 2009, experiencing riots still has no significant effect on the non-confrontational protest propensity index for completely free countries. However, in a country with the lowest freedom score (5.5), the presence of riots would *decrease* non-confrontational protest index by about 2 points (again on a four point scale). In real terms, changing either protest propensity index translates into changing the student's response from stating that they are likely to do the actions to stating they are unlikely to do the actions (or vice versa). Thus, the national level variables have very strong effects on student responses -- much stronger than the individual level variables.

Discussion

These initial analyses suggest that there are considerable differences in the factors which influence non-confrontational and confrontational protest. These differences exist among our individual level variables but also among the national level variables.

At the individual level, we found confirmation that women's participation in the two forms of protest differed significantly. Women were more likely to participate in peaceful protest or gather signatures on a petition but they were less likely to spraypaint slogans, occupy buildings or barricade streets. This result may help us understand to make sense of what have been conflicting findings in previous research on the connection between protest and gender. Our results suggest that the context of the particular protest or the specific wording of the survey question may influence the result. In particular, for studies that revolve around a specific protest (like McAdam's work on Freedom summer) are focused on protest that might involve illegal or confrontational protest we might expect women to participate less. But for peaceful protest and petitioning women's level of participation is more likely to resemble other forms of political participation like voting or party work.

The role of television media consumption in explaining students' protest propensity is particularly interesting since its effects contrast with the effect of having information in the form of books available in the home. Television decreases petitioning and peaceful demonstrating. but increases the likelihood that students say they will engage in more confrontational activity in the future. This is true over both time periods. There are several possible explanations for this. Since confrontational protest is more likely to appear in news broadcasts, one possibility is that gaining information largely from this source may increase the likelihood that students view such activities as acceptable. Since we also do not know what types of programs the students are watching and there is reason to believe that their viewing habits are unlikely to concentrate on news programs, it is also possible that violence on fictional and reality tv shows somehow foster approval of these more illegal forms of activity. Alternatively, it may be that television watching itself is an indicator of alienation and that students who watch the most television (as opposed to engaging in other acts) are the most alienated from the system, leading them to approve of more confrontational protest forms.

The results connected to the students' anticipated future education would seem to support the latter idea. Those who see themselves as not continuing their education are more likely to say they will engage in these confrontational activities in the future while those who anticipate further education beyond high school are more likely to anticipate participating in the non-confrontational forms of protest. For non-confrontational protest activities like petitioning or peaceful demonstrations the effect runs the other way. This suggests that those who are unlikely to continue in school may experience grievances or be alientated from the political system even at the young age of the respondents surveyed.

Finally, one of the major implications of the country level results is that being in a country that is less free significantly increases the effect of previous protest (in the form of riots) on students' willingness to engage in future protest actions. However, the direction of the effect for our non-confrontational protest index changes from 1999 to 2009 when being in a country where protest events are taking place actually reduce students' willingness to participate in non-confrontational protest with the negative effect becoming even more negative with decreasing levels of freedom. Given that this impact remained positive for confrontational protest propensity (albeit insignificant in 2009) , we may be seeing youth becoming more inclined over time to choose confrontational protests in contexts with lower levels of freedom. Alternatively, there may be other characteristics associated with the national-level variable which explain the outcome. While we have at this stage are only speculating, we believe one possibility might be the length of the time that countries have been not free. In 1999, many of the countries were newly democratized and so had experienced transitions to some level of greater political rights or civil liberties. By 2009, the countries in the non-free categories had been in those categories a decade longer, and some such as Russia had even lost political rights and civil liberties over the ensuing decade. In these countries, non-confrontational protest activity could perhaps be judeged

ineffectual or even dangerous, which might lead youth to favor more confrontational protest propensity if they supported such activity at all. This argument certainly warrants future study.

Conclusion

Scholars have in recent years turned their focus to the national level effects that influence protest, examining the role of development, regime type and ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. In all of these cases, the focus has been on how the national level factors influence respondents' grievances that might make protest more likely. Here we focus on national level factors that might teach individuals about protest as a form of civic engagement. In our view, while national institutions no doubt influence citizens' participation, citizens also learn about appropriate types of political participation from the events that occur around them. In this paper, we examine that idea by focusing on adolescents at a stage when they have not yet engaged in civic engagement but are at that point where they are acquiring their own habits and interests.

We find that indeed the level of riots in a country influence students acceptance of both non-confrontational and confrontational types of protest although that effect is mediated by the level of freedom in the country. This effect is one of the largest in the analysis suggesting the power that national context may have in understanding cross-national differences in civic engagement.

We also show that the root causes of students' views of whether they will engage in protest acts in the future are significantly different depending on the type of protest. In particular, gender, television media consumption, and anticipated future socio-economic status all have very different effects on more acceptable forms of protest such as petitioning and participating in peaceful protest than on illegal acts of protest. This suggests that we need to develop more nuanced indices of protest and explore the difference between those forms of protest that are now accepted by many political institutions -- like peaceful demonstrations and petition-signing -- from other less institutionalized forms of protest.

Yet, the work here is at best suggestive. In future iterations of the paper, we plan to utilize stronger measures of past protest taken from the Banks Cross National Time Series Data Archive. More importantly, we hope to explore the different mechanisms that might explain some of the findings presented here. In particular, the different effects of riots between 1999 and 2009 suggest that we have not captured all of the significant variation on the national level. Nor can our current analyses distinguish among the many mechanisms by which the significant factors influence protest propensity.

Nonetheless, our results do seem to buck the general trend noted by many scholars that participation among all age groups especially among the young is declining. The means for both of our dependent variables increase over this decade. While scholars of civic engagement will more likely be buoyed by the expansions in the support for the non-confrontational forms of

protest, both forms suggest that the adolescents of today might still be marching in the streets tomorrow.

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Figure 1 Number of riots by country for 1995-1999 and 2005-2009 time periods

Note: Countries included in this graph are the 20 countries in our sample. Data Source: Banks, Arthur. 2011. The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS)

Figure 2 Students' propensity to participate in non-confrontational and confrontational protest events (CivEd-1999 and ICCS- 2009)

Figure 3 Marginal effect of freedom score conditional on number of riots, CivEd survey respondents 1999

Note: Impact on non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity are shown separately in the left and right panel, respectively.

Figure 4 Marginal effect of freedom score conditional on number of riots, ICCS survey respondents 2009

Marginal effect of riots on protest propensity indices

Note: Impact on non-confrontational and confrontational protest propensity are shown separately in the left and right panel, respectively.

Data	CivEd				ICCS			
Variable	Mean	Std	Min	Max	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Female	0.52	0.5	0	1	0.51	0.5	0	1
Immigrant	0.05	0.22	0	1	0.04	0.2	0	1
Further Education	0.66	0.47	0	1	0.68	0.46	0	1
Mother's Education	4.1	1.43	1	6	4.45	1.19	1	6
Father's Education	4.16	1.44	1	6	4.4	1.18	1	6
Books at Home	2.6	0.96	1	4	2.53	0.91	1	4
TV Watching Frequency	3.21	0.8	1	4	2.69	0.83	1	4
Political Interest	2.55	0.86	1	4	2.46	0.83	1	4
Knowing Politics	2.05	0.8	1	4	2.11	0.78	1	4
Understanding Politics	2.44	0.82	1	4	2.49	0.8	1	4
GDP per Capita	12.8	12.58	0.7	37.54	26.06	19.97	5.17	77.61
Freedom House Score	1.63	0.67	1	4.5	1.59	1.21	1	5.5
Number of Riots	0.38	0.75	0	2	0.47	0.88	0	4
Freedom X Riot	0.7	1.51	0	5	0.84	1.72	0	6
Non-violent Protest Index	2.41	0.77	1	4	2.62	0.82	1	4
Violent Protest Index	1.69	0.75	1	4	1.87	0.82	1	4

Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics of Variables

Table 2: Individual and National level determinants of students' Non-confrontational and Confrontational Protest Propensity

	CivEd (1999)		ICCS (2009)	
	Non-Confr.	Confront.	Non-confr.	Confront.
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intercept	1.66	1.43	1.61	2.12
	(0.13)***	(0.11)***	(0.11)***	(0.12)***
Individual-level Variables				
Female	0.07	-0.19	0.13	-0.23
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
Immigrant	0.02	0.06	-0.04	0.01
	-0.02	(0.02)***	(0.02)**	-0.02
Further Education	0.05	-0.11	0.09	-0.12
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.01)***
Mother's Education	0	0	0	-0.01
	0	0	0	(0.00)*
Father's Education	0	-0.01	0	-0.02
	0	(0.00)**	0	(0.00)***
Books at Home	0.02	0	0.05	-0.01
	(0.00)***	0	(0.00)***	(0.00)*
TV Watching Frequency	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.04
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.00)***	(0.00)***
Political Interest	0.13	0.04	0.16	0
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	0.00***	0
Knowing Politics	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.05
	(0.01)***	(0.01)***	(0.00)***	(0.01)***
Understanding Politics	0.06	0.01	0.09	0
	(0.01)***	(0.01)**	(0.00)***	0
National-level Variables				
GDP per Capita	0	0	0	0
	0	0	(0.00)**	(0.00)**
Freedom House Score	0.01	0.06	0.16	-0.05
	-0.06	-0.05	(0.06)**	-0.06
Number of Riots	-0.29	-0.28	0.37	0.1
	-0.21	-0.18	(0.10)***	-0.11
Freedom X Riot	0.23	0.15	-0.24	0
	(0.10)**	(0.09)*	(0.06)***	-0.07
N	31,362	32,967	61,554	61,516
Nations	20	20	20	20
Variance Explained	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

	GDP (2009)	Freedom House (2009)	Riots (2009)	GDP (1999)	Freedom House (1999)	Riots (1999)
Table 3: Correlation coefficients for the country level variables (N=18)						
GDP (2009)	1					
Freedom House (2009)	-0.3792	1				
Riots (2009)	-0.0667	0.112	1			
GDP (1999)	0.9459	-0.3391	-0.0589	1		
Freedom House (1999)	-0.5132	0.8447	0.1914	-0.498	1	
Riots (1999)	0.0094	0.1058	-0.0373	0.1277	0.1127	1