After the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the subsequent death of 270 people perpetrated by Libyan nationals (also called the Lockerbie Bombing), the West imposed economic sanctions onto Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan regime. With the anger of the West in his face and sanctions weakening his economic foothold, Gaddafi turned to other possible allies in the 1990’s. A longtime advocate of the Pan-Arab movement, he found little support among other Arab nations. He then turned to some of his former African allies, but found very limited aid. With the United States a rising power in the Middle East come the turn of the century, Gaddafi needed to win back their support in the face of an economic crisis (Noack).
Gaddafi was beginning to realize that his burgeoning nuclear program was a major contributing factor to Libya’s growing isolation. His former foreign minister Abd al-Rahman Shalgam claims to have advised him in 2000 that the nuclear program would cause issues. As he continued to feel out for possible allies, he finally caught word of American sentiment: Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika told him of President George W. Bush’s conviction, “either you get rid of your weapons of mass destruction or [I] will personally destroy them and destroy everything with no discussion,” (Cigar).
Libya wanted American sanctions lifted, and now they knew of both sticking points: Pan Am Flight 103 and the nuclear program. Shalgam even said that Gaddafi’s ultimate decision to give up his nuclear program grew out of President Bush’s 2001 threat (Cigar). Thus, in 2003, Libya agreed to pay at least $5 million to the families of each of the 270 Lockerbie Bombing victims, paving the way for Gaddafi to voluntarily give up his nuclear program (Noack).
While he technically did this voluntarily, Gaddafi expected a fair amount in return. His son, Sayf al-Islam, said in an interview with Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper that the US “has committed itself to defend us” and expected that “agreements on military and security cooperation” would be soon to come. There was a firm understanding that following Libya’s steps in the right direction, America would respond kindly (Cigar).
At first, this agreement went so well that both sides touted it as an ideal example of nuclear disarmament. Americans pointed to the “Libyan model” when negotiating with North Korea, Iran, and Syria. Gaddafi gave speeches even into 2007 and 2008 urging North Korea and Iran to give up their nuclear programs as he did (Cigar).
However, not long after, Gaddafi became disillusioned with the results. Other Arab nations, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, disliked how easily he rolled over for parties so close to Israel, leaving the Arab world defenseless. An Egyptian political analyst equated Gaddafi’s nuclear concessions to “gains…for the Zionist side” and expressed concern that his actions emboldened the US to press other Arab states on issues specific to the Middle East (Cigar).
Gaddafi, feeling his domestic and international legitimacy slipping, began to complain about his compensation from the US, feeling it was less than expected or deserved. He said in 2005, “America should have rewarded Libya…America, as well as Britain, Japan, China, Russia, and the European Union, should help Libya with the use of the atom for peaceful purposes, so that there would be technology for its peaceful use in Libya, once Libya had relinquished its military program, for the use of that energy,” (Cigar).
We promised rewards in exchange for the relinquishment of his nuclear program, but he seems to have gotten almost nothing in return. Nations like North Korea and Iran can see this — why should they trust us?
In November 2009, Gaddafi suspended shipments of Libya’s enriched uranium, a provision of his 2003 disarmament agreement, in an attempt to find leverage. He was angry about the slow progress of normalizing relations between America and Libya and because the US was not pressuring Israel to denuclearize (Cigar).
By 2010, he saw the failure of the agreement. “Not rewarding this move by Libya … will make it difficult to convince Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear aspirations…the Libyan model is no longer attractive for the latter,” Gaddafi said (Cigar).
In 2011, following a UN resolution, the United States and NATO invaded Libya, aiding in rebel airstrikes on Gaddafi’s forces. He thought that voluntarily giving up his nuclear program would shield him from Western attacks, even saying “it’s a good lesson for anybody…you [can] never trust them” and writing to Congress pleading for the invasion to end because Libya had “cancelled its nuclear program voluntarily,” (Cigar).
He was killed on October 20, 2011 at the hands of US-backed rebel forces. Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program voluntarily, then we gave him nearly nothing in return and killed him. He regretted his agreement even when he was still alive, and then we killed him.
If I’m Kim Jong Un, why would I trust America in nuclear talks? Frankly, if I’m any other country, after what we did to Gaddafi, why should I trust the US? Gaddafi voluntarily agreed to give up his nuclear program, and we responded by ignoring our end of the bargain, toppling his regime, and killing him.
American diplomats brought up the Libya model again in nuclear talks in Pyongyang last year, and North Korean officials became irate. “As a person involved in the U.S. affairs, I cannot suppress my surprise at such ignorant and stupid remarks gushing out from the mouth of the U.S. vice president,” said Choe Son Hui, a North Korean vice foreign minister, in response to Vice President Pence mentioning Libya when talking of Kim Jong Un’s fate (Noack).
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In an age when nuclear weapons may decide the fate of humanity, I believe how we handled Muammar Gaddafi and Libya may have irreparably damaged the reputation and reliability of our foreign policy.
Citations:
Cigar, Norman. “Libya’s Nuclear Disarmament: Lessons and Implications for Nuclear Proliferation.” Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University, Jan. 2012, http://edocs.nps.edu/2014/May/MESM%202%20JAN%202012_lo.pdf.
Noack, Rick. “How Kim-Trump Tensions Escalated: The More the U.S. Said ‘Libya,’ the Angrier North Korea Got.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 24 May 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/05/24/the-more-pence-and-trump-say-libya-the-angrier-north-korea-gets/?utm_term=.b578f18bb624.
Featured Image: Segar, Mike. “Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi Gestures at the End of His First Ever Address to the United Nations General Assembly at the UN Headquarters in New York.” International Business Times, IBTimes Co. Ltd., 23 Sept. 2009, www.ibtimes.co.uk/former-libyan-leader-colonel-muammar-gaddafi-life-pictures-1587428.
I am not very familiar with the Lockerbie bombing, but I am not surprised at the US’s involvement. The US does tend to involve themselves in situations sometimes that does more harm than good and manipulates others in a way. I like how you put yourself in Kim Jong Un’s shoes and give us a different perspective.