The Chinese Expressions and Conceptions of the Self:
A Cognitive Semantic Study

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Starting from Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) insights into the concept of "self" based on the analysis of English data, this paper presents a preliminary study of the conceptualization of "self" in Chinese culture as manifested in the Chinese language. The findings show that the basic SUBJECT-SELF metaphoric schema, outlined by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) for English, exists in Chinese as well. What is specific to Chinese culture and language is the fact that the concept of *xin* 'heart' takes a prominent position in the Chinese understanding of the self. As is already shown elsewhere (Yu 2009), the Chinese heart is understood as the locus of one's "inner self", in contrast with the body, or some external part of it such as the face, as one's "outer self". Thus, people are distinguished by the essence and physical characteristics of their heart, in which their innermost being, personal disposition, moral character, etc. are localized. This paper analyzes the Chinese conceptualization of the self, in comparison with that in English, to contribute to the understanding of the person from a cross-linguistic perspective.

Key words: conceptualization of self, expression of self, concept of *xin* 'heart', Chinese

1. Introduction

Lakoff and Johnson (1999:267) point out that the study of the Self concerns "the structure of our inner lives, who we really are, and how these questions arise every day in important ways" and that what we call "inner lives" concerns various kinds of experience that are consequences of living in a social world with the kinds of brains and bodies that we have". Having conducted a thorough semantic analysis of the linguistic data in English, they note that in English there exists a system of different metaphorical conceptions of the self, which conceptualize our inner life in ways that are inconsistent with each other within the system. This metaphoric system of conceptions, however, draws upon only a small number of source domains such as space, possession, force, and social relationships. What Lakoff and Johnson find most surprising and striking is the fact that the same system of metaphors can occur in a very different culture such as Japanese. "Given the radical differences between American and Japanese cultures, this raises the question of just how universal are experiences of inner life and the metaphors used to reason about them" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:284). A recent study of the Arabic metaphor system for conceptualizing the Self, also based on Lakoff and Johnson

(1999), shows that Arabs seem to conceptualize their inner lives in a way similar or at least comparable to that of English speakers (Domaradzki 2011). The similarity between the two on the conceptual level is hypothesized as reflecting "some fundamental and presumably universal human experiences and cognitive abilities" (p.535).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999:284) also suggest that "Although we have no access to the inner lives of those in radically different cultures, we do have access to their metaphor systems and the way they reason using those metaphor systems." This means that through systematic analysis of the metaphor systems of various cultures, based on close studies of the linguistic evidence that manifest them in their respective languages, it is possible to gain some insights into the inner lives of those cultures in terms of their similarities and differences. However, as Lakoff and Johnson (1999:284) point out, very little research has been done on the metaphoric systems of inner lives in languages other than English: "That research needs to be done before we can even think of drawing serious empirically based conclusions about whether there are universal experiences of inner life."

In this paper I attempt a preliminary study of Chinese conceptions and expressions of the self on the basis of and in comparison with Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) study in English. Section 2 summarizes Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) study of English conceptualizations of the self, setting up a comparative point of view for my study in Chinese, which will be presented in §3, followed by a discussion in §4 of the relationship between the concept of heart and that of self in Chinese and a major difference between Chinese and English. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.

2. The Self in English

Lakoff and Johnson (1999:267-289) present a most comprehensive and detailed study of conceptions of the Self in English from a cognitive semantic point of view. As they point out, what is philosophically important is the finding that there is no unified, consistent or literal conception of our inner lives. Instead, the understanding of the self resides in a metaphorical system of many Subject-Self distinctions. That is, this system is based on a fundamental distinction between the Subject and one or more Selves. The Subject is the locus of experiencing consciousness, thought, reason, will, judgment, and our "essence", everything that makes us who we uniquely are; in contrast, the Selves consist of everything else about us—our bodies, our social roles, our past states, our actions in the world, and so on. Metaphorically, the Subject is always conceptualized as a person, with an existence independent of the body, whereas the Self can be either a person, an object, or a location.

The metaphorical conceptions of inner life have a hierarchical structure. At the highest level is the general Subject-Self metaphor, which conceptualizes a person as "bifurcated" or "split": Namely, a person is divided into a Subject and one or more Selves. At the next level down, the exact nature of this bifurcation is specified more precisely by five specific

instantiations of the general metaphor. Of these five special cases, four are grounded in four types of everyday experience—(1) manipulating objects, (2) being located in space, (3) entering into social relations, and (4) empathetic projection—and the fifth special case stems from the Folk Theory of Essences:

> Each person is seen as having an Essence that is part of the Subject. The person may have more than one Self, but only one of those Selves is compatible with that Essence. This is called the "real" or "true" Self. (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:269)

Each of the above five special cases of the general Subject-Self metaphor has further special cases at a lower, or the third, level of specificity, which manifest the real richness of metaphorical conceptions of Subject and Self. "It is not a trivial fact", Lakoff and Johnson point out, "that every metaphor we have for our inner life is a special case of a single general metaphor schema" (p.269). This general metaphor consists of the following mappings:[1]

(1) The Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema

SOURCE		TARGET
A PERSON	→	THE SUBJECT
A PERSON, OBJECT, OR LOCATION	→	A SELF
A SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP	→	THE SUBJECT-SELF RELATIONSHIP

This general metaphor schema has quite a number of special cases, each of them conceptualizing a/the Self as a person, an object, or a location while specifying the Subject-Self relationship as a particular kind of relationship. These special cases are provided in the following.[2]

First, the Self is conceptualized as a physical object and the Subject-Self relationship is specified as a relationship of control, i.e. the control of the Self by the Subject. The primary metaphor, therefore, is SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL. This primary metaphor can evolve into more complex cases when combined with other primary metaphors such as ACTION IS MOVEMENT and CAUSES ARE FORCES. Thus, we have CAUSING THE SELF TO ACT IS GETTING AN OBJECT TO MOVE or KEEPING THE SELF FROM ACTING IS KEEPING AN OBJECT FROM MOVING. For instance, *I dragged myself out of bed. I've got to get myself moving on this project. You're pushing yourself too hard. I held myself back from hitting him*. Another way of SELF CONTROL is OBJECT POSSESSION, and the metaphor so derived is CONTROLLING THE SELF IS POSSESSING

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[1] The Basic Subject-Self Metaphor Schema here is slightly modified from the one in Lakoff & Johnson (1999: 270). In this one, "LOCATION" is added as one of the source domain concepts for the target of the "Self", since "each Self is conceptualized metaphorically as either a person, an object, or a location" (p.269).

[2] In presenting the more special cases of the SELF CONTROL IS OBJECT CONTROL metaphor, I depart from Lakoff and Johnson somewhat.

AN OBJECT. For instance, when people are *carried away* by something, they have *lost themselves*. Similarly, people may lose control of themselves when they are affected by negative emotions, such as *seized by anxiety* or *in the grip of fear*.

The second special case of the basic Subject-Self metaphor schema is one in which the Self is conceptualized as a location or a container. The control of Subject over Self is conceptualized as the Subject being in a normal location (e.g. home, place of business). On the other hand, the Subject's being out of control is conceptualized as its being out of the container, or out of the part of the Self where it is normally understood as residing, namely, "the body, the head, the mind, or the skull" (p. 274). The linguistic examples of this kind include *I was beside myself. He's out to lunch. Are you out of your mind* (or *head*, *skull*)?

It is worth noting in passing that POSSESSION and LOCATION are two dual metaphors for self-control. In both cases, control is conceptualized as Subject and Self being in the same place while lack of control as them being in different places (pp.275-276). If, however, the Self is scattered, like a fragmented container, it will be impossible for the Subject to stay inside it, which means lack of normal attentional control over the Self. The linguistic instances of this kind include: *He's pretty scattered. She hasn't got it together yet. Pull yourself together. He's real together*. Moreover, the LOCATION or CONTAINER metaphor has an important entailment given the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING. That is, the Subject's vision from the inside of the container, the Self, is "subjective knowledge" whereas its vision from the outside is "objective knowledge". This means that one sometimes should "get outside of oneself" in order to obtain an "objective standpoint". Therefore, we would say *You need to step outside yourself. You should take a good look at yourself. You should watch what you do*.

The third special case of the basic Subject-Self metaphor schema is the one where the Self is conceptualized as another person in contrast with the Subject as a person. Thus, the Subject and Self form various "social relationships"—master-servant, parent-child, friends, lovers, adversaries, interlocutors, etc.—projected onto our inner lives. The metaphorical "social relationships" between Subject and Self are manifested in a large number of linguistic expressions in English. For instance, *Why do you torture yourself? Stop being so mean to yourself. I think you coddle yourself a bit too much. You need to give yourself some more discipline. We all need to nurture ourselves. I'm going to treat myself to some ice cream. I need to be a better friend to myself. I was debating with myself whether to leave. I talk things over with myself before I do anything important*.

Sometimes, the Subject is conceptualized metaphorically as simultaneously having multiple "social relationships" with multiple Selves, with each Self representing a particular value conceptualized as the "social role" of that Self. Since different values, metaphorically conceptualized as different social roles of the Selves, are in conflict with each other, the Subject is then faced with difficult choices as to which Self to agree or associate with. As a result, the Subject may be indecisive over which value or Self to go with. For example: *I keep going back and forth between my scientific self and my religious self. I keep returning to my spiritual self*.

The next central metaphor in the Subject-Self system is based on the ability to make empathetic projection. Human beings are able to feel as someone else feels. That is, when people say "If I were you, …" in a hypothetical situation, they are metaphorically conceptualizing their Subject, their subjective consciousness, as inhabiting the Self of someone else. For instance: *If I were you, I'd punch him in the nose. You're a cruel person with no conscience*; *if I were you, I'd hate myself. I feel your pain.*

As mentioned previously, a general metaphor, the Essential Self metaphor, in our conceptual systems arises from the Folk Theory of Essences. That is, in addition to the universal essence of rationality shared with others, humans all have an Essence that makes each of them unique and behave in a way distinct from others. This Essence is part of our Subject. Thus, who we essentially are determines how we think, what judgments we make, and how we choose to act. In the Essential Self metaphor, however, there are two Selves. One Self—the "real" or "true" Self—is compatible with one's Essence and is always conceptualized as a person whereas the other Self is incompatible with one's Essence and is conceptualized as either a person or a container in which the first Self hides. The two Selves are also known as the Inner Self and the Outer Self. However, people can also claim that their external Self is their "Real Me". For example: *She's sweet on the outside and mean on the inside. She rarely shows her inner self. His petty self came out. He's still searching for his true self.*

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) conclude that the rich range of metaphorical concepts for our inner life arises from the Folk Theory of Essences and four basic correlations in our everyday experience since early childhood, namely the correlations between body control and physical object control, between being one's normal surroundings and experiencing a sense of control, between others' evaluations and our own actions of our actions, and between our own experience and our imagination of ourselves projected onto others (p.287). The fact that this metaphoric system is grounded in some basic experiences "provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of the same metaphors in a language and culture so different from ours as Japanese" (p.288). "It also raises the question of just how widespread around the world this metaphor system is" (p.288).

3. The Self in Chinese

In this section I turn to the Chinese concept of "self", which is expressed by at least two compound words in present-day Chinese: 自己 *ziji* and 自我 *ziwo*. Most of the Chinese expressions discussed herein are taken from a Chinese linguistic corpus, the Academia Sinica Balanced Corpus of Modern Chinese (ASBCMC), with some of them slightly adapted for simplicity, and the rest are expressions extracted also from natural discourse of other sources. A preliminary study shows that, at a level of abstraction, there is indeed a great deal of similarity between Chinese and English in terms of how the conceptions of "self" are expressed. Fundamentally, the basic Subject-Self metaphor schema in (1), which summarizes

a general metaphorical system at the level of abstraction, also exists in Chinese. Specifically, the Subject is always understood as a person but the Self can be understood as a person, an object, or a location. That a person consists of two parts, the Subject and the Self, is well illustrated by the following example:[3]

(2) 你在生活和工作，同時又超越地在欣賞、讚美和觀察自己投入其中。你是生活的主體，又是客觀的客體。你既是演員，又是觀眾。

You are living and working, and at the same time you are transcendentally appreciating, complimenting, and *observing yourself thrown into your life and work*. You are a *subject* of life, and also an *object* in objective reality. You are both a *performer* and an *audience*.

As we can see, the person being addressed is both a "performer" and a "viewer" in the life-play. As the Self, he or she is performing on the stage of life; as the Subject, however, he or she is simultaneously enjoying watching, off-stage, his or her own Self performing in the play of life. The dual nature of the person as both a subject in life and an object in reality is what we refer to as the Subject-Self distinction. The Subject is the experiencing consciousness that is the locus of judgment and will, etc. whereas the Self is the rest of the person, including the body and the actions this person performs in the world. Metaphorically, this distinction is expressed in terms of a "viewer" and a "performer".

While the Self is mainly conceptualized as a person, this is not the sole conception in Chinese. It is understood as a physical object and a location, as we will see in the following.

3.1 The Self as a physical object

In our life we deal with physical objects everyday. The basic experience of dealing with physical objects, i.e. controlling and manipulating them, is mapped onto our metaphorical conceptualization of the Subject-Self relationship. Look at the following group of examples:

(3) a. 舊景物容易喚起他心中的記憶，就讓自己置身在書本之中，就讓過去成爲過眼雲煙。

The scenes and things from the past were likely to evoke the memories of the past in his heart. He therefore *placed himself in the midst of books*, thus making the past transient as fleeting clouds.

b. 我總是把自己隱藏在不受傷害的地方，如此的自我保護。

I always *hide myself in a safe place* in order *to protect myself*.

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[3] To save space, I omit the Romanization of Chinese examples and the word-for-word gloss. Instead, I use the original version in Chinese characters (for those who can read them) followed by a more literal English translation, in which italics is added for emphasis.

c. 有人以標榜自己養珍稀動物為榮，以此炫耀、展現自己。
   Some people enjoy advertising themselves as rare animal raisers, and *showing off and displaying themselves* as such.

d. 在現代職場要講究競爭優勢、競相促銷自己。
   On the modern job market, one needs to give full play to one's advantages in competition, vying to *promote sales of oneself*.

e. 自己肯定自己，最後往往變成自我膨脹。
   Keeping affirming oneself will eventually *cause one's self to swell*.

In (3a), in order to free himself from the unhappy memories of the past, the Subject manipulated the Self by placing it in the midst of books, i.e. he "buried" himself in the reading of books so that he would forget the unhappy past. In (3b), in order to protect "myself", "I" always "hide my self" in a place that is not vulnerable to any potential harm. Here, the Self is a "valuable possession" hidden in a safe place so that it will not be damaged or stolen. In (3c) the Self is still a "valuable possession", but this time the person's Subject holds a completely different attitude toward it. Since he likes to "reveal himself" (顯露自己), he treats his Self as a "valuable exhibit on display" to attract others' attention. In (3d) the Subject treats the Self as a "product" or "commodity". In order to "sell themselves", people need to play up their strengths on the job market. However, if one keeps "affirming oneself", it will likely "cause one's self to swell". That is, it will cause one's self to appear "bigger" than it actually is. This makes it necessary for people to "examine themselves" (檢點自己) and to "adjust themselves" (調整自己) often.

(4) a. 我們學習別人的最終目的是要建立自己。
       Our ultimate purpose of learning from others is to *construct ourselves*.

   b. 重建自己就要由自己著手。當你改變自己時，世界會隨著你的改變而改變。
       Reconstructing yourself, you need to start on yourself. When you *change yourself*, the world will change with your own change.

In the two examples in (4), the two verbs, *jianli* 'build; construct' and *chongjian* 'rebuild; reconstruct', when used in a physical domain, usually take on an object that may be large in size and/or complex in internal structure (e.g. 建立一座紀念碑 'erect a monument', 建立一個實驗室 'build a lab', 建立新的工業基地 'build a new industrial base'). Thus, it is an entity that is "built" through design and construction, and that is changed through redesign and reconstruction. Once constructed, the entity will remain more or less the same unless a reconstruction or renovation takes place. The change of the entity itself will also change the environment in which it stands.

Since the Self is a physical object, a possession, it is always possible for people to "lose it" and, after it does happen, to "recover it", as the examples in (5) exemplify.

(5) a. 所以人們一定要走向街頭，去找尋朋友、發展事業，希望能讓自己脫穎而出，在人潮中顯現自己的光跟熱。然而最有可能的是，你會在人潮中淹沒，而失去了自我。

Therefore, people must walk onto the street, to look for friends and develop a career, in hopes of making themselves rise into prominence, emitting light and heat in the tides of people. However, it is most likely that you will be submerged in the tides of people and *lose yourself*.

b. 人人都需要重新拾回自己、重新肯定自己，這也是人性尊嚴的來源。

Everyone needs to *pick up one's lost self* again, and affirm oneself again. That is also the source of human dignity.

Although people may not "give up themselves" (放棄自己) willingly, they may, however, "lose themselves" unwillingly. As in (5a), a person who wants to rise into prominence in the tides of people may end up being submerged in them and losing one's own self. Everyone has the risk of losing one's self under certain circumstances. When that happens, one just needs to search for it and, after recovering it, "pick it up" again. As (5b) shows, affirming oneself is the "source of human dignity".

(6) a. 從小到大的人生歷程，我們一直是背著自己走在人生艱苦的道路上。

On the life journey from childhood to adulthood, we have always been walking on the tough road of life, *carrying ourselves on the back*.

b. 人生的關卡來自人的自己，過關的是我自己，卡住的也是我自己。人會把自己卡住，所以，人生的希望是人的自己，人生的難題也是人的自己，我們其實是背負自己走天涯。

The checkpoints along humans' life journey come from humans themselves. The one who gets passed is one's self; the one who gets checked is also one's self. Humans may have themselves blocked. Therefore, the hope of human life is the human being itself, and the difficulty of human life is also the human being itself. We are actually *carrying ourselves on the back* while trudging to the end of the world.

The two examples in (6) both instantiate the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, where the person living his or her life is conceptualized as a "traveler trudging on a long journey". Given the common-sense knowledge that people traveling long-distance on foot usually carry on the back their personal belongings including, for instance, food, clothing, and other necessities, these two examples hence instantiate the conceptual metaphor THE SELF IS A POSSESSION. On the one hand, one's Self is a "valuable possession" that one must have on such a "long journey"; on the other hand, this material possession can be a heavy burden, too, along the tough life-journey. That is to say, it is not good to "lose one's self", but the self can be too heavy to carry on one's back, especially because one has to go through many

"checkpoints" along the life-journey.

3.2 The Self as a location

As has already been pointed out (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:275-276), the OBJECT and LOCATION are two dual versions of conceptual metaphors for self-control. Either one is in possession of the Self or one is located where the Self is. Both cases conceptualize self-control as the Subject and Self being in the same place, and lack of self-control as the Subject and Self being in different places. Interestingly, the two duals of metaphors have opposite Figure-Ground orientations (Talmy 2000: Ch. 5). In the (object) possession metaphor, the Subject is Ground whereas the Self, as the possession which may or may not be where the Subject is, is Figure. In the location metaphor, however, the Self is Ground (a normal location) and the Subject is Figure located there or not. That is to say, the duals of OBJECT/POSSESSION and LOCATION metaphors are not consistent with each other, but this kind of inconsistency is not uncommon, and is also manifested in the linguistic contrast between the two English sentences that form a synonymous pair: *I have trouble* (the OBJECT/POSSESSION dual) vs. *I am in trouble* (the LOCATION dual).[4] The contrast between THE SELF IS A POSSESSION and THE SELF IS A LOCATION is well exemplified in the following examples:

(7) a. 他說：「我曾經失落了自己，但是我並不把它看做失敗，因爲，從失落中我重新回歸我自己。」
         He said, "I once *lost my self*, but I don't see it as a failure because, in the loss, I *returned to my self* again."
     b. 我們都誤以爲是沒有趕上時代，沒有走上社會的尖端，事實上卻就是失落了我自己。
         We all thought that we had failed to catch the time, or failed to reach the tip of society; the fact, however, is that we had *lost ourselves*.
     c. 不要在競爭中迷失了自己，反成爲社會的負擔。
         Don't *lose your self* in competition, thus becoming a burden to society.

The example in (7a) exemplifies the opposite Figure-Ground orientation within one sentence: the *loss* of the Self as Figure *from* the Subject as Ground (cf. 失落身分證 'lose one's ID card'), and the *return* of the Subject as Figure *to* the Self as Ground (cf. 回歸祖國 'return to the motherland'). In (7b) and (7c), although both are translated as "lose oneself", the Chinese phrases 失落了自己 *shiluo le ziji* and 迷失了自己 *mishi le ziji* represent the contrast in the

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[4] In English, apparently, one can *get* trouble and *get rid of* trouble, and one can *get into* trouble and *get out of* trouble. Readers are referred to Lakoff (1993) for a detailed discussion of this pair of English examples and the issue of dual metaphors in OBJECT/POSSESSION and LOCATION in the Event Structure Metaphor system.

Figure-Ground orientation discussed above: *shiluo* means "lose" something as Figure (e.g. 失落了手錶 'lose one's watch') whereas *mishi* means "lose" one's way to a place as Ground (cf. 迷失方向 'lose one's bearings/directions', 迷失歸路 'unable to find one's way back').

The location metaphor is usually based on a CONTAINER image schema. In fact, the Self is very often conceptualized as a three-dimensional space, namely a location that is itself a kind of a container. Look at the following two examples:

(8) a. 人活在社會上，有一個使命感。沒有充實自己之前，怎麼發揮自己的使命感？
A person living in a society should have a sense of mission. Before one can *substantiate* (lit. fill up and consolidate) *oneself*, however, how can one develop one's sense of mission?

   b. 他「跨過反省的門檻」，產生自我意識，可以知道自己。
He "has crossed over the threshold of self-examination"; therefore, having gained self-consciousness, he can *know his self*.

   c. 這位董事長又重新找尋到了自己，他跳出了原來的窠臼，理出了一道能看到自己的距離，重新審視自己，擁抱自我。
This chairman of the board of directors has *recovered his self*. He has jumped out of his original nest, figured out a distance from which he can *see himself*, and started *observing himself* and *embracing himself*.

In (8a), the verb 充實 *chongshi* literally means "to fill up (a container) so as to make (it) solid". Usually, it means "to substantiate or enrich (with, e.g. more knowledge, etc.)", but this meaning is based on the CONTAINER schema: After a container, a hollow space, is filled up with a substance, it will become more solid and stronger. In (8b), the container is a "house", with a "threshold" at its entrance or exit, the door. "Crossing over the threshold" means either "entering or exiting the house", which is the Self. The Subject is conceptualized as normally staying within the Self. That is why it can gain an objective evaluation of other things but not of the Self in which it stays. By definition, the Subject, or subjective consciousness, can only obtain subjective knowledge of the Self. In order to be able to examine the Self, or to acquire self-consciousness, the Subject has to "step outside the Self". By stepping out of the Self, to get an "objective standpoint", the Subject then can observe and examine the Self, objectively, as it does other things (see Lakoff & Johnson 1999:277). The example in (8c) also illustrates this metaphorical reasoning. In this example, the chairman found his self again. How? First, he "jumped out of his original nest", which should be his original Self. Then, he was able to "see himself" from a right distance. At last, he could "examine and embrace himself" (see §3.3 for discussion of the Self as a person).

Below are some other examples:

(9) a. 在愛人的過程中，我們本無法保證自己不受傷害，因爲愛需要開放自己。

In the process of loving others, we cannot guarantee that we ourselves are not harmed, because loving others entails *opening oneself*.

b. 她很難和別人談到核心的問題，也無法對別人開放內在的自我。

She finds it difficult to talk about core issues with others, and impossible *to open her inner self* to others.

c. 自卑的人經常用逃避來防衛自己，以避免再度碰傷自尊心，於是把自己孤立起來。

Self-abased people often choose to *defend themselves* by running away so that their self-esteem will not get bruised again. As a result, they will *isolate themselves*.

d. 美國一些教育程度很高的人們，常常自我封閉，對公眾事務漠不關心，原因何在？

Some highly educated people in the U.S. often *close themselves up*, utterly indifferent to public affairs. What is the reason for that?

e. 他們將自己封鎖起來。

They *blockaded themselves*.

In all these examples, most of the verbs collocating with *ziji* 'self' or *ziwo* 'self' originally take a place noun in collocation. Thus, originally, 開放 *kaifang* in (9a) and (9b) means "to open (a closed place)"; 防衛 *fangwei* in (9c) means "to defend (a place against an invasion)"; and 封閉 *fengbi* in (9d) and 封鎖 *fengsuo* in (9e) respectively mean "to close (a place to stop traffic from entering or exiting it)" and "to blockade (a place through military or other compulsory means)". All these examples can be seen as linguistic instantiations of the conceptual metaphor THE SELF IS A LOCATION. Given in (10) below are some more examples:

(10) a. 人要能感恩，感恩他人就是美化自己。

People should feel grateful. Feeling grateful to others is *beautifying oneself*.

b. 你感受過多麼深層的自我？

How *deep of your self* have you ever felt?

c. 不要常以自我爲中心。

Don't often *take yourself as the center*.

d. 也就是說，這只是一部探索自己的紀錄。

That is to say, this is a record of *exploring myself*.

e. 面臨的挑戰是：你開發了自己嗎？

The challenge faced is: Have you *opened up yourself*?

Of course, some of these examples are more marginal than others as instances of the LOCATION metaphor. Some of them can be interpreted as instances of both LOCATION and OBJECT metaphors. For instance, we usually "beautify" a place, but we can also "beautify" an

object (10a). An object can have "depth" just as a place can (10b). In a similar vein, an object can have a "center" just as a place can (10c). As in (10d) and (10e), we usually "explore" (探索 *tansuo*) an unknown place and "open up" (開發 *kaifa*) an undeveloped or unexploited place, but we can also imagine a situation where we say "exploring" or "opening up" an object. For instance, we can say something like "exploring" and "opening up" the moon as a place, but the moon is an object, too. That is, the distinction between a place and an object is sometimes fuzzy or relative. Here is another example. When we say "I put the book on the desk", we consider the top surface of the desk as a place, but the desk itself is also an object. It is our construal of the situation that counts.

3.3 The Self as a person

The vast majority of the linguistic examples demonstrate that the Self is often understood as a person. When the Self is conceptualized as another person in contrast to the Subject, the Subject and Self form a relationship on a par with interpersonal or social relationships. This is illustrated by the following sentence:

(11)　在我和別人的關係、我和社會的關係、我和自己的關係上，在每一次新的機會來臨時，可以透過抉擇而改變。
I can make a change, by making a choice, *in my relations* with other people, with society, and *with myself*, whenever a new opportunity comes up.

As shown in this sentence, one's relationship with the self is just as important, if not more, as one's relationship with other people and with the whole society.

In the Subject-Self metaphor system, when the Subject and Self are conceptualized as two separate persons, they form various kinds of interpersonal relationships. First, look at the following group of examples:

(12)　a.　張振宇試圖揭開人類虛僞的面紗，以真實的心面對自己、面對群眾，面對世界。
Attempting to take off the veil of human hypocrisy, Zhang Zhenyu *faces himself*, faces the masses, and faces the world, with his true heart.
　　　b.　第一先認識自我，第二再給自己定位。
First, you *get to know yourself*; second, you *position yourself*.
　　　c.　我覺得，我似乎並不瞭解自己，不清楚自己是誰。
As I feel it, I don't seem to *understand myself*, nor am I sure *who my self is*.
　　　d.　大部分的人之所以不能信賴別人，是因爲他們對自己也不夠信賴。
The reason why most people cannot trust other people is that they don't *trust themselves* enough.

e. 內斂不只是想成就大事業者所必須的條件，更是保護自己免於傷痛的原則。

Being reserved is not only a necessary condition for those who would want to accomplish a great undertaking, but is more than anything the principle for *protecting oneself* from being harmed.

Since the Subject and Self are understood as two separate persons, it is therefore possible for people to "face" themselves, just as they can face other people and the whole world (12a). At first, the Self may be a "stranger" to the Subject. That is why one needs to "get to know one's self" before one can "position", or evaluate, oneself (12b). To "position oneself", or self-evaluation, is necessary for people to "understand" themselves better and to know "who" their Self is (12c). As in (12d), people have to fully "trust" themselves before they can trust others. Otherwise, they would feel the need to "protect" themselves (12e). These examples exemplify varying degrees of interpersonal relationship between the Subject and Self.

(13) a. 所以有人說思考是自己跟自己說話，自己跟自己討論。

Therefore, people say that thinking is one *talking to oneself* and one *discussing with oneself.*

b. 如果我們現在面臨轉型期的挑戰，就應該告訴自己：我們既是人，就可以活下去。

If we are faced with the challenges of a period of transformation, we should *tell ourselves*: Since we are humans, we can keep on living.

c. 震憾內傷之餘，我都還是要忍不住問自己：為什麼會是這樣呢？

After being shocked and suffering internal injury, I still cannot help *asking myself*: Why should it have been so?

d. 在他的作品裡，張振宇毫不退縮地質問自己：「什麼是人性的真相？」

In his literary works, Zhang Zhenyu *interrogated himself* with no fear or reservation: "What is the truth of human nature?"

e. 所以我就不斷提醒自己，我是認真的。

Therefore, I constantly *remind myself* that I am serious.

f. 她就常常警示自己不要自滿。

She often *warns herself* against self-satisfaction.

g. 我覺得，我連自己也說服不了。

I feel that I can't even *convince myself.*

h. 我明明騙了自己，卻覺得很得意，不是太笨了嗎？

I have clearly *deceived myself*, but I still feel complacent. Am I stupid?

The examples in (13), in one way or another, illustrate that the Subject and Self are interlocutors who carry on communication between them. However, it is interesting to note that, with the exception of (13a), where the Subject "discusses" with the Self, all the examples

show that the communication between the Subject and Self is one-way traffic, namely, only the Subject communicates ideas and thoughts to the Self, but not vice versa. This difference reveals the different roles that Subject and Self each plays: The Subject is the experiencing consciousness and the locus of thought, judgment, and will while the Self exists in the body and represents the actions that the body takes. The Subject has authority over the Self.

(14) a. 適應期兩人經過一段時間的相處，發現了對方的缺點，因此強迫自己去適應對方，或者要求對方改變以符合探索期所產生的幻想。
During the period of adaptation, the two of them, having been dating for some time, discovered the shortcomings of each other. They therefore *compelled themselves* to adapt to each other, or demanded that the other side change to meet the illusions arising from the period of exploration.

b. 我自己命令我自己，與別人不相干。
I *ordered myself*, and it has nothing to do with others.

c. 我常常督促自己上課要聽得很仔細，並將重點記錄下來，務求完全聽懂。
I often *urged myself* to be attentive in class, taking notes of important points and trying to achieve a thorough understanding.

d. 在人生每個當下，你把自己推出來，並且靈活對應那個機遇，就會受到歡迎。
At every juncture of life, you *push yourself out*, dealing with the opportunity with flexibility, and you will be welcomed.

The examples in (14) all show that the Subject acts as a supervisor, forcing or urging the Self into action. The "interpersonal relationship" between Subject and Self is thus not an equal one: The Subject controls the Self. The sentence in (14d) also illustrates the participation of two other primary metaphors: CAUSES ARE FORCES and ACTIONS ARE MOVEMENTS. The following examples exemplify a much tighter control over the Self by the Subject.

(15) a. 人類具有限制自己、規範自己的能力和傾向。
Humans have the ability and tendency to *restrict themselves* and to *set standards for themselves*.

b. 如此就較容易約束自己。當然，也要先保護自己。
This way it will be easier to *restrain yourself*. Of course, you should also *protect yourself* first.

c. 你經常壓制自己，希望自己成為另外一種人。
You often *suppress yourself* in the hope that you will become a different kind of person.

d. 我們也不應該讓它來束縛自己。
We should not let it *bind ourselves* either.

e. 這樣喜怒形於色的好處是跟自己過得去，心裡頭沒有包袱沒有負擔沒有
委屈。
The advantage of showing one's joy and anger on one's face is that it is *easy on one's self*, with no burden, load or grievance weighing in one's heart (i.e. on one's mind).

As is shown, the Subject can "restrain", "restrict", "suppress", or even "bind" the Self in order to control the latter. There are various reasons for which the Subject wants to control the Self. It wants the Self to improve according to the standards or disciplines that it sets, or wants the Self to change according to its hope or wish. On the other hand, the Self wants to act or behave according to its own will, and its will to act has to be restricted by force. We can imagine much conflict and struggle between the two. Of course, the Subject sometimes can, by choice or not, let the Self act of its own free will. This happens either because the Self is too strong, and for that matter too hard, to control, or because the Subject believes that loosening up the control over the Self (i.e. "not be so hard on oneself") is a desired thing for it to do, as in (15e).

(16) a. 承認自己的現狀，然後開始跟過去「所有的病」交好，成爲自己的「朋友」。
One needs to admit one's status quo, then be nice to "all the diseases" of one's past, and *became a "friend" of oneself*.

b. 要先對自己微笑，因爲「微笑」代表了一絲絲的人生積極態度。
One should first *smile to oneself*, because "smiling" represents traces of a positive attitude towards life.

c. 如果寂寞，也坐下來擁抱自己的寂寞。沒有人抱，就好好地抱抱自己嘛！
If you feel lonely, you can sit down and embrace your own loneliness. When you don't have anyone else to hug, then *hug yourself* to your heart's content.

d. 我內心的失望和難過您知道嗎！或許懷抱別人容易，擁抱自己卻很困難。
Do you ever know the disappointment and bad feeling in my heart? Perhaps it's easy to hold someone else in my arms, but it's very hard to *hug myself*.

As (16a) shows, one can become "a friend of one's self". To do so, one should first "smile to oneself" since smiling represents a positive attitude towards life (16b). Even if one is lonely and has no one else to hug, one can still "hug oneself", which should make one feel better (16c). Nevertheless, this is not a mentality that one can acquire with ease because it is really difficult to "embrace oneself" as a loved one (16d). Very often, people would find their Subject at odds with their Self, as the following examples illustrate:

(17) a. 如果你挑剔自己、不滿意自己，甚至憎恨自己，那麼你的人生就變得痛苦煩惱了。

If you *are picky with yourself*, *unsatisfied with yourself*, or even *hate yourself*, then your life will become painful and annoying.

b. 因此，千萬不能見錢貪心，把自己拖垮。

Therefore, one should never be greedy at the sight of money and *wear oneself down*.

c. 越是這樣想便越折磨自己，我開始回想從前的種種。

The more I thought like this, the more I was *torturing myself*. I started recalling various things in the past.

d. 我不太理解，為什麼一個藝術家要以這種方式來戕害自己？

I don't quite understand it: Why should an artist *harm himself* this way?

Indeed, it is very common for people to be "picky or unsatisfied with themselves", or even "hate themselves" (17a). One way people can become "angry with themselves" (生自己的氣), "indignant with themselves" (惱怒自己), or "disgusted with themselves" (厭惡自己) is that they have too much greed to sate. Having too much greed to sate will eventually "wear oneself down" (17b). As in (17c) and (17d), people can "punish themselves" (懲罰自己) or "hurt themselves" (傷害自己) in various ways. That is, they have become "enemies" of themselves.

(18) a. 他卻向他們，也向自己挑戰了。

He however challenged them, and *challenged himself* as well.

b. 太多的讚美，只會將自己打倒而已。

Too many praises will do nothing but *knock oneself out*.

c. 難道我就註定這樣混混沌沌的「最後被自己打敗」

Am I doomed to "be finally *defeated by myself*" in such a thoughtless way?

d. 我已經有原則地在生活了，自己已經能夠對自己負責，自己已經可以打敗自己了。

I am already living with principles. I am already able to be *responsible for myself*, and I am already *capable of defeating myself*.

In the examples in (18), one's Self is an opponent of one's Subject. Thus, the Subject can "challenge" and "knock out" the Self (18a-b). The examples (18c) and (18d) respectively show that the Self can "defeat" the Subject, and vice versa.

All the examples discussed above demonstrate that the Subject and Self are often conceptualized metaphorically as two different persons. As discussed previously, when the Self is conceptualized as a physical object, and as a material possession, the normal situation is where the Subject is in possession of the Self and both of them are therefore in the same place. Unfortunately, however, it is not uncommon for the Subject to "lose" the Self. When

that happens, the Subject should start a search for the Self in order to "recover" it. The exact logic of this dual nature of a person also applies to the case in which the Self is conceptualized as a person, as the following examples illustrate:

(19)　a.　所以我覺得我們會活不好就是因爲我們自己不見了。我們的寂寞就是沒有自己，我們的悲苦就是我們不是自己。

　　　　I think, therefore, that if we don't feel we are living a good life, it's simply because *our selves are missing*. If we feel lonely, it's simply because we don't have our *selves*, and if we feel miserable, it's simply because we are no longer *our selves*.

　　　b.　今天自我的重新探索，恐怕就得在大眾街頭重新找到自己。

　　　　Today, a renewed self-exploration is, perhaps, to *find our selves again* amidst large crowds of people in the streets.

As we can see in (19a), if people's selves are missing, they cannot live a happy life. People should not really feel lonely unless their selves are not with them. People will certainly feel miserable when they are not themselves, and that is probably when we can say that they are "alienated". That is when they need to "search for themselves" and "find themselves again" in the crowds of people.

In sum, we can say that, when the Subject and Self are in a harmonious relationship and in unity, the person who is composed of them enjoys the best inner life.

4. The heart (*xin*) and self in Chinese

In Chinese culture, which holds a holistic view of mind and body, the concept of *xin* 'heart' takes a central position in the understanding of "mind" and "body" in the Western sense. The Chinese "heart" is traditionally conceptualized as the central faculty of cognition and, therefore, as the locus of "mind", in addition to being a crucial internal organ of the body (see Yu 2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2009). That is, on the one hand, the heart is conceptualized as the subject of cognition since it is regarded as the locus of thought, intellect, reason, intent, judgment, and will. On the other hand, the heart is also conceptualized as the locus of one's inner self, in contrast to one's body, or some external part of it such as the face, as one's "outer self". It contains one's innermost being, or "real" or "true" self, and one's personal disposition, or the essence that distinguishes one person from another (Yu 2008, 2009).

As already mentioned previously, in Chinese the heart is conceptualized as the locus of mind and subjective consciousness. This conceptualization is consistent with the cultural characterization inherent in ancient Chinese philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine that "the heart governs the spiritual light" (心主神明), where the "spiritual light" commonly refers to the totality of mental aspects of a person, including subjective consciousness. That is why,

in Chinese, the word *xin* 'heart' is often used in contrast with *shen* 'body' or *ren* 'person'. Thus, 身心 *shenxin* (lit. body and heart) means "body and mind"; 身心健康 *shenxin jiankang* means either "physically and mentally healthy" or "physical and mental health". Similarly, in the sentence 你是人累還是心累？'Are you tired physically or mentally?', 人 *ren* 'person' actually refers to the physical body of the person, in contrast to 心 *xin* 'heart', which refers to the "mind" of the person.[5]

In the remainder of this section, I want to make two points. The first point is that, while the Subject in English is conceptualized as independent of the body (although it may be thought of as residing in the head), the Subject in Chinese is explicitly localized in the heart, an internal organ of the body. In (20) are just a few examples:

(20) a. 她學習起來，什麼事也不能使她分心。
          Nothing can divert her attention (lit. divide her heart) once she starts studying.
      b. 一心不可二用。
          One heart cannot be applied to two tasks at the same time.
      c. 最後判斷標準何在？在於內心。
          Where are the ultimate criteria for judgment? Inside the heart (lit. the inner heart).
      d. 你還在內心裡跟自己的罪惡感掙扎。
          You are still struggling with a sense of evil about your self inside your heart (lit. your inner heart).

Example (20a) shows that one's consciousness or "Subject", with which one studies or works, is located in, or conceptualized as, one's heart. One has to concentrate one's "whole heart" on the study or work to do it well. Example (20b) is a proverbial saying that expresses the same conception. Note that the "divided heart" (i.e. a "divided Subject") in Chinese, is very different from the "scattered Self" (or a "fragmented container" for the Subject) in English (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:276). In Chinese it is the experiencing consciousness, the Subject, that is "divided", whereas in English it is the Self, conceptualized as the container of the Subject, that is "scattered". Example (20c) shows that the "inner heart" is the locus of judgment in Chinese. Thus, as in (20d), when one is trying to make a judgment on one's own behavior, it is "inside the inner heart" that the Subject is feeling a guilty sense of evil about the Self.

The second point that I want to make is that, in Chinese, one's Inner Self is also localized inside the heart, which is again different from English, where the Inner Self is usually inside one's body (see Lakoff & Johnson 1999).

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[5] The "cultural conceptualization" (Sharifian 2003) of a person as consisting of a "body" and a "heart (*kokoro*)" is also found in Japanese, as noted by Wierzbicka (2005), which shares many cultural roots with Chinese.

(21) a. 我們從出生開始就一直在向外看，習慣看外面世界而無法看自己、瞭解
          自己內心世界之偉大。
          Starting from our births, we have been looking externally. We are used to
          seeing the external world, but are unable to *see our selves*, or to understand
          how great *the world of our inner heart* is.

      b. 禪家認爲，透過淨化自己，把心中的煩惱、貪婪、嗔恨、愚癡等等加以
          清理，可以使自己生活得更有活力，更加清醒。
          Buddhism believes that, through *purifying one's self* and *clearing one's heart*
          of worry, greed, hatred, stupidity, etc., one can *give oneself* a more vigorous
          life and *make oneself* more sober-minded.

      c. 自我成長是自己在內心裡努力的過程。
          Self-growth is the process in which one makes efforts *inside the heart* (lit. the
          inner heart).

      d. 他就完全接受別人對自己的設定，在心中替自己樹立了不少道牆。
          He completely accepted others' configurations of his *self*, and built many
          walls around his *self inside the heart*.

One's self, as in (21a), is in one's "inner heart". That is why people are usually unable to see
their own inner selves. In (21b), "purifying one's self" is clearing bad things from inside one's
heart. In (21c), self-growth is a process inside one's heart. As in (21d), the person built up
many walls to confine his self, which exists in his heart. In these examples, the self localized
in the heart is one's Inner Self, in contrast with one's Outer Self. In Chinese the Outer Self
may be the body itself, or the face, an external body part that is metonymic for the Outer and
Social Self (see Yu 2001). For instance, the Chinese idiom 面善心惡 *mian-shan xin-e* (lit.
face-kind heart-wicked) means that a person has "a kind face but a wicked heart". In this
idiom, the face stands metonymically for this person's Outer Self whereas the heart represents
his Inner Self. The Inner Self is one's "real" or "true" Self. Thus, the Chinese idiom 革面洗心
ge-mian xi-xin (lit. change-face wash-heart) means that people want to reform themselves
thoroughly, into a new person.

    Finally, we look at a few examples in which the "inner heart" (內心) refers to the Inner
Self, i.e. the "real" or "true" Self.

(22) a. 你沒有正視你的內心。
          You are *not looking straight at your inner heart*.

      b. 其實，我應該承認我自己的內心。
          Actually, I should *admit my own inner heart*.

      c. 我不想傷害你，可是我不能不面對我的內心。
          I don't want to hurt you, but I cannot but *face my inner heart*.

These examples are taken from a TV drama series. As the story goes, a girl and her boyfriend have been dating for many years, and they are at the point of getting married. However, her boyfriend has come to realize that she actually has another man in her life who occupies a very special place deep in her heart. After struggling with this fact for some time, the boyfriend finally points this fact out to his girlfriend when he says example (22a) to her. Here, "inner heart" refers to the Inner Self, where one's inmost feelings and thoughts are stored. With example (22b) the girl admits that she indeed loves another man in her heart, where her "real" or "true" Self is located. This is something that she has not wanted to admit, and even wanted to deny, even to herself. Now that it has been pointed out, she decides to "face", rather than avoid, her Inner Self, as she suggests in (22c).

In sum, the Chinese "heart" is traditionally conceptualized as the locus of "mind". It is conceived of as the center of thought as well as feelings, where reason, intellect, intention, and volition are located (see Yu 2008, 2009). The heart is, therefore, the locus of experiencing consciousness or the Subject of a person in the Chinese cultural tradition. This tradition, however, also holds that one's disposition, temperament, and character are ascribed to the physical nature of one's heart (see Yu 2008, 2009). Since the kind of heart determines the "nature" of a person, it is then the locus of the "true" or "real" Self of that person. Note that the real or true Self is fully compatible with the Subject, and in Chinese they both are localized together in the heart. The Chinese conceptualization of Subject and Self in relation to "heart" and "body" is illustrated below:

Heart-Subject ↔ Body-Self
Heart-Inner Self ↔ Body-Outer Self

That is, "body" and "heart" in Chinese hold a dual relationship with respect to the distinction between Subject and Self. The "heart" as the locus of the Subject contrasts with the "body" as the Self, and at the same time it is also the locus of the Inner Self in contrast with the rest of the "body" as the Outer Self. This Chinese cultural conceptualization differs sharply from the one in English, which can be expressed as follows:

(Head-)Subject ↔ Body-Self (Outer Self + Inner Self)

Just like the concept of "mind", the Subject in English "has an existence independent of the body" (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:268), although it is generally thought of as residing in the head (and "Head" is thus put in the parenthesis). The Subject is in contrast with the body as the Self, which consists of both the Outer and the Inner Self. This conceptualization is consistent with the Cartesian dualism dominant in the West for hundreds of years. According to Descartes, a person consists of a mind and a body. The mind, which is independent of the body, interacts with the body in the brain, or the pineal gland inside the brain, which merely serves as the site for interaction between mind and body (see, e.g. Damasio 1994).

5. Conclusion

The concept of self has drawn much attention from anthropologists, linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and researchers in other disciplines (see, e.g. Bracken 1996; Hattie 1992; Hormuth 1990; Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Neisser & Jopling 1997; Prescott 2006a, 2006b). Research has suggested that there are various forms of self-knowledge or self-concept: for instance, the "private self" derived from inner experience, the "ecological self" situated in the physical environment, the "interpersonal self" established by social interaction, the "temporally extended self" available through memory, the "conceptual self" through language and culture (Neisser 1997).

In this paper, I have studied the concept of "self" in Chinese language and culture. I separately surveyed two systems for the basic Subject-Self metaphor schema and the linguistic data that manifest them in two different languages, English and Chinese. In §2, I summarized Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) study of the English self. In §3, I presented my own study of the Chinese self. The most striking finding is that, at a certain level of abstraction, the two metaphor systems for the Subject-Self relationship are surprisingly identical. The overlap between the two is summarized in (1). That is, (a) the Subject is always conceptualized as a person; (b) the Self is alternatively conceptualized as a person, an object, or a location; and (c) the Subject and Self form various kinds of relationship depending on whether the Self is conceptualized as a person, an object, or a location. This finding seems to confirm Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) speculation, based on the available Japanese data, that the basic Subject-Self metaphor schema might be widespread (or even universal). The Chinese data involving *ziji* 'self' and *ziwo* 'self', as discussed in §3, largely conform to that metaphor schema. Nonetheless, if we look deeper into the cultural models for the understanding of person and self, we see some fundamental differences between Chinese and English. In §4, I showed that what is specific to Chinese culture and language is the concept of *xin* 'heart' that takes a prominent position in the Chinese understanding of person and self.

Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that the general Subject-Self metaphor in English conceptualizes a person as "bifurcated" or "split". The Subject, which "has an existence independent of the body" (p.268), is the locus of consciousness, subjective experience, thought, reason, judgment, and will. The Self, in contrast, includes the body, social roles, past states, actions in the world, etc. This distinction, apparently, follows from the Cartesian dualism between mind and body of a person, which has dominated the Western thought for the last few hundred years. In this Western sense, human thought and reason have nothing to do with the body, and therefore the mind is disembodied. With regard to the distinction between Subject and Self, it seems, the former is associated with the mind and the latter with the body.

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