Deterrence or Destruction: Nuclear Weapon Policy Amidst Current Conflict

“The possibility of a nuclear strike, once inconceivable in modern conflict, is more likely now than at any other time since the Cold War.” (Hennigan) With the Russo-Ukrainian conflict appearing less and less in media since its onset, America’s perception of the risk posed by the conflict is slowly fading. But this risk is greater than ever. Although Russian doctrine previously posed the possibility of use of nuclear weapons in the war, in late February of this year Vladimir Putin openly threatened nuclear conflict should NATO increase its involvement in Ukraine.  

Preparations 

The Russian nuclear threat, though unnoticed by the majority of the public, has been a topic of concern for US officials since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. The Biden administration has established a team of nuclear experts and strategists to revisit Cold-War era plans for contingency plan and responses to a nuclear strike.  

As some of this preemptive planning, in fall of 2022 the US supplied over 1,000 radiation detectors to Ukraine which have been set up around cities and power plants throughout the country. Ukraine has also now designated 200 hospitals as “go-to facilities” for treatment following a nuclear attack, with thousands of doctors and nurses being trained to treat radiation exposure (Hennigan). 

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 

When one thinks of nuclear weapons, the typical thought is a large mushroom cloud consuming an entire civilian target, like a city. These weapons are referred to as strategic nuclear weapons and represent the most drastic and destructive stage of nuclear warfare. Likely, Putin’s nuclear strike would not be of this variety, but would rather come with the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons – small explosives around half the strength of the Hiroshima bomb, used on a battlefield against military targets.  

While non-strategic nuclear weapons can possibly be seen as less barbaric than the bombing of a civilian target, it is important to note that even uses of these smaller weapons would cause thousands of casualties to both military forces in a bombed region, making the use of this weapon unique to a military like Russia’s which can “absorb personnel and material losses to a degree unimaginable to the West” (Alberque).  

Deterrence 

One of the challenges to responding to the threat of non-strategic nuclear weapons is that it puts into question just how far the policy of mutually assured destruction and nuclear deterrence should extend. During the Cold War, US and Russian nuclear stockpiles grew not with the intent of winning a nuclear war but preventing one. Although both countries possess far less nuclear warheads than in the previous decades, each still maintains an arsenal capable of obliterating the other nation.  

Unfortunately, “The Russian perception of the lack of credible Western will to use nuclear weapons or to accept casualties in conflict further reinforces Russia’s aggressive NSNW thought and doctrine” (Alberque). Russia may be willing to use a small, non-strategic device with the thought that NATO would not have the will to escalate towards the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Still, the US has warned there would be “catastrophic consequences” to the use of smaller nuclear arms, although this retaliation could come as conventional aerial bombardment of Russian military bases (Hennigan).  

Aftermath 

In both cases, escalation towards strategic nuclear warfare or the single use of a non-strategic weapon, the consequences would stretch across the globe. Escalated nuclear warfare, even with the detonation of less than 1% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, is estimated to cause over 27 million initial deaths and 255 million deaths over the following 2 years (Hennigan). While a small, non-strategic nuclear weapon would not have as large of an impact, thousands would die in the initial blast and radiation would be scattered among the territory of Ukraine. Radioactive contamination scares would diminish Ukraine’s ability to export grain, leading to food shortages across the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.  

Both scenarios would devastate the world as a whole. In order to prevent either from happening, the US and NATO must find the narrow edge of having enough conviction to use nuclear weapons as a deterrent to prevent any nuclear conflict while still keeping any nuclear conflicts that may arise as limited as possible. By becoming more informed on the issues of nuclear weapon policy domestically and foreign, we as citizens can put politicians in power who will help to maintain this delicate balance.  

Image Source: The Warzone

 

Works Cited: 

Alberque, William. “Russian Military Thought and Doctrine Related to Non-strategive Nuclear Weapons: Change and Continuity.” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 22 Jan. 2024, https://www.iiss.org. 

Hennigan, W.J. “Nuclear War: The Rising Risk, and How We Stop It.” The New York Times, 04 Mar. 2024, https://www.nytimes.com. 

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