

Repression or Accommodation?

How Transnational Ties Affect Governments' Policies Toward Ethnic Groups

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
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THE RESEARCH QUESTION:

What determines whether state policies toward ethnic groups are exclusive or inclusive?



WHY CARE?

EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES....

- ▶ spark grievances and lead to armed conflict (Gurr 2000; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010)
- ▶ foster conflict contagion (Metternich, Minhas, and Ward 2015)
- ▶ prolong conflicts (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, and Gleditsch 2012)
- ▶ make non-violent campaigns turn violent (Rørbæk 2016)
- ▶ spark terrorist attacks (Choi and Piazza 2016)
- ▶ inhibit economic growth (Birnir and Waguespack 2011)
- ▶ harm the consolidation of democracy (Houle 2015)
- ▶ hamper the provision of public goods (Baldwin and Huber 2010)
- ▶ lead to ethnic cleansing or genocide (Mylonas 2013; Bulutgil 2016)

INCLUSIVE POLICIES...

- ▶ are at the heart of domestic peace and stability (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker & Cederman 2016; Cederman et al. 2017)
- ▶ can prevent conflict recurrence (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007).





PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Focused on
**domestic
explanations:**

- ▶ Type of government
- ▶ Ethnic group characteristics
- ▶ Wartime dynamics

**International
explanations**
limited to:

- ▶ Case study research
- ▶ Regional quantitative studies
- ▶ Restricted to war-time situations
- ▶ Focused on more extreme policy choices

CONTRIBUTIONS


- ✓ unsettles a long-held belief in the literature that domestic factors are key, providing an argument for how relationships with foreign states are causally linked to prospective government policies toward ethnic groups
- ✓ demonstrates empirically with a disaggregated and comprehensive research design that foreign policy considerations influence the domestic policy choices of governments

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT




Ethnic ties to foreign governments affect governments' threat perception and subsequent treatment of a particular group

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT




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


THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

HOST STATE




EXTERNAL STATE



THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

HOST STATE


EXTERNAL STATE



THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

HOST STATE

EXTERNAL STATE





HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis I: States are more likely to engage in repressive policies against ethnic groups if they share ethnic ties with a rival state that has revisionist territorial claims.

Hypothesis II: States are more likely to accommodate ethnic groups if they share ethnic ties with a friendly state who has no territorial claims vis-à-vis the government.

RESEARCH DESIGN

- ▶ Global analysis 1946-2013
- ▶ Unit of analysis: government-ethnic group year
- ▶ Dependent variable/s: political discrimination; power-sharing (EPR)
- ▶ Independent variables: kinship ties to revisionist rival/non-revisionist ally (EPR TEK+Peacescale+ICOW)
- ▶ Two-level mixed effect logistic regression
- ▶ Controls: Group size, geographical concentration, number of groups, connection to armed movement, democracy, GDP per capita, temporal controls

Table 1: Mixed effect, logistic regression of determinants of political repression

	1	2	3	4
Ethnic ties to rival _{t-1}	0.358 (0.113)**	0.394 (0.114)**	0.545 (0.175)**	
Size of group _{t-1}		0.379 (0.311)	-0.407 (0.511)	-1.004 (0.386)**
Group concentration _{t-1}		-0.442 (0.093)**	0.193 (0.158)	0.116 (0.140)
Group in conflict _{t-1}		-0.298 (0.154)+	0.434 (0.214)*	0.738 (0.178)**
Democracy _{t-1}			-1.698 (0.177)**	-1.999 (0.155)**
GDP pc _{t-1}			-1.012 (0.131)**	-0.343 (0.081)**
Nr ethnic groups _{t-1}			-0.118 (0.048)*	-0.112 (0.041)**
Ethnic ties to friend _{t-1}				0.519 (0.507)
Time, discriminated	-0.003 (0.000)**	-0.003 (0.000)**	-0.003 (0.000)**	-0.004 (0.000)**
Constant	1.369 (0.145)**	1.649 (0.156)**	8.888 (0.958)**	4.728 (0.672)**
Constant	1.476 (0.296)**	1.379 (0.279)**	8.803 (2.044)**	5.908 (1.271)**
N	28,591	28,591	16,861	22,721

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on cell.

Table 2. Mixed effect, logistic regression of determinants of political accommodation.

	1	2	3	4
Ethnic ties to friend _{t-1}	-0.113 (0.520)	-0.439 (0.534)	-0.574 (0.652)	
Time, state accommodation	-0.007 (0.000)**	-0.007 (0.000)**	-0.006 (0.000)**	-0.006 (0.000)**
Group size _{t-1}		1.593 (0.207)**	1.648 (0.267)**	1.241 (0.321)**
Group concentration _{t-1}		1.142 (0.111)**	1.030 (0.133)**	0.917 (0.159)**
Group in conflict _{t-1}		-1.261 (0.166)**	-1.126 (0.189)**	-1.841 (0.257)**
Democracy _{t-1}			0.193 (0.130)	0.314 (0.170)+
GDP pc _{t-1}			0.222 (0.066)**	0.221 (0.090)*
Nr ethnic groups _{t-1}			-0.012 (0.034)	-0.003 (0.039)
Ethnic ties to rival				0.331 (0.186)+
Constant	2.371 (0.194)**	1.138 (0.213)**	-0.479 (0.565)	-0.536 (0.724)
Constant	3.339 (0.600)**	3.268 (0.586)**	4.693 (0.926)**	6.292 (1.317)**
	35,937	35,937	22,721	16,861

+ $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$


Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on cell.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

- ✓ groups that have ethnic ties to rival states with territorial claims are more likely to become targets of exclusionary policies
- ✓ groups with ties to an allied state are not more likely to be included in inclusive power sharing arrangements. This suggests that ethnic ties may accentuate rather than mitigate governments' threat perception of particular groups

NEXT STEPS

- ▶ Global data on accommodation?
- ▶ Robustness checks — suggestions?
- ▶ Model interstate power dynamics



THANK YOU!

I look forward to your
questions and comments.