

# AID, SECURITIZATION, AND DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

CHAD/SUDAN/ETHIOPIA

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# QUESTION

- Does AID increase international defense agreements?
- Does AID increase militarization?
- What mitigates militarization?
  - Trade?
  - Democratization?
  - Aid?

# AMISOM



Le Van 2010

Bapat 2011

Fisher and Anderson (2015)

# AID VS. MILITARY SPENDING

## AS % OF GDP (TEN YEAR AVERAGE)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military Aid</i>	<i>US Aid</i>	<i>Total Aid</i>	<i>Military Spending</i>
Chad	0.03 %	0.91%	3.38%	4.61%
Ethiopia	0.03%	2.31%	6.83%	1.42%
Sudan	0.21%	1.40%	3.28%	4.34%



# SIZE OF MILITARY VS SPENDING

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military Size</i>	<i>GDP 2014</i>	<i>Military Aid % GDP</i>	<i>Military Spending</i>
Chad	34,850	13.92 Billion	0.03%	4.61%
Ethiopia	138,000	55.61 Billion	0.03%	1.42%
Sudan	349,300	73.81 Billion	0.21%	4.34%
Egypt	<b>1,314,500</b>	301.5 Billion	0.77%	2.15%

# RANDOM EFFECTS MODELING

- To analyze the effects of foreign aid on militarization and on defense agreements in Africa we employ a Random Effects model using panel data for the years 1967 to 2015 on 53 countries in Africa. The model is specified as follows:
- $$\text{MILT}_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{GDP}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{POP}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{AUT}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Battle}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Trade}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Manuf}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Agre}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Corr}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Infra}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Educ}_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{AID}_{it} + \mu_{it} \quad (1)$$

# VARIABLES

- **Dependent variable – Militarization/Securitization**
  - **Military Spending as % GDP**
  - **Armed forces per total labor force**
  - **Arms imports**
  - **Defense agreements**
- **Independent variable – Aid**
  - **Total Aid**
  - **US Aid**
  - **Development Aid**
  - **Military Aid**

# OTHER VARIABLES

- **Other explanatory variables and controls**
  - **Per Capita GDP**
  - **Total Population (log)**
  - **Battle deaths (log)**
  - **Manufacturing share GDP**
  - **Infrastructure**
  - **Corruption**
  - **Education quality**
  - **Trade openness**
  - **Defense agreements**



# RESULTS OF AID ON MILITARIZATION

	Armed Forces/ Total labor force	Arms Imports as % GDP	Mil Expenditures as % GDP	Defense Agreements
Model 1 Total Aid	0.009*	0.094***	0.008	0.001
Model 2 Dev Aid	0.009***	0.060***	0.003	0.004
Model 3 US Aid	0.105***	0.170***	0.123	0.036*
Model 4 Mil Aid	-0.030	0.054	-0.015	0.060*

# BATTLE DEATHS ON MILITARIZATION

		Armed Forces/ Total labor force	Arms Imports as % GDP	Mil Expenditur es as % GDP	Defense Agreement s
Model 1 Total Aid	<i>Battle Deaths</i>	0.114***	-0.214**	0.411***	-0.023
Model 2 Dev Aid	<i>Battle Deaths</i>	0.123***	-0.216**	0.399***	-0.033
Model 3 US Aid	<i>Battle Deaths</i>	0.122***	-0.239**	0.390***	-0.013
Model 4 Mil Aid	<i>Battle Deaths</i>	0.132***	-0.090*	0.434***	- 0.113***

# TRADE OPENNESS ON MILITARIZATION

		Armed Forces/ Total labor force	Arms Imports as % GDP	Mil Expenditur es as % GDP	Defense Agreement s
Model 1 Total Aid	<i>Trade Openness</i>	<b>-0.010***</b>	<b>-0.002</b>	<b>-0.010***</b>	<b>0.002**</b>
Model 2 Dev Aid	<i>Trade Openness</i>	<b>-0.010***</b>	<b>-0.001</b>	<b>-0.010***</b>	<b>0.002**</b>
Model 3 US Aid	<i>Trade Openness</i>	<b>0.012***</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>-0.012***</b>	<b>0.002**</b>
Model 4 Mil Aid	<i>Trade Openness</i>	<b>-0.001</b>	<b>0.001</b>	<b>0.006</b>	<b>-0.003**</b>

# CORRUPTION ON MILITARIZATION

		Armed Forces/ Total labor force	Arms Imports as % GDP	Mil Expenditures as % GDP	Defense Agreements
Model 1 Total Aid	<i>Corrupt</i>	0.249**	-0.328	-0.328	-0.389
Model 2 Dev Aid	<i>Corrupt</i>	0.268**	-0.287	-0.287	-0.335
Model 3 US Aid	<i>Corrupt</i>	0.177*	-0.386	-0.386	-0.460*
Model 4 Mil Aid	<i>Corrupt</i>	-0.450***	-0.267	-0.267	-3.827***

# SUMMARY

- **Aid** has positive, significant small effect on militarization as measured by armed forces personnel and on arms imports, but *not* on military spending per GDP
- **US Aid and Military Aid** has positive significant effect on Defense Pacts (somewhat backing up Le Van and Palmer et al)
- **Battle deaths** positive significant effect on militarization but Defense agreements have negative effect on battle deaths
- **Trade openness** discourages militarization – encourages defense agreements among nations
- **Corruption** encourages more armed forces, but interferes with military spending as per GDP and **discourages defense agreements**



# CHAD / SUDAN / ETHIOPIA



# DEFENCE PACTS

<i>Date</i>	<i>Pact</i>	<i>Countries</i>
<b>2006</b>	<b>Tripoli Agreement</b>	<b>Sudan – Chad</b>
<b>2008</b>	<b>Non Aggression Pact</b>	<b>Sudan – Chad</b>
<b>2010</b>	<b>Border Security agreement</b>	<b>Sudan – Chad</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>Border Security agreement extension</b>	<b>Sudan – Chad</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement on Criminal Matters between Sudan and Ethiopia</b>	<b>Sudan – Ethiopia</b>
<b>2014</b>	<b>Joint military cooperation</b>	<b>Sudan – Ethiopia</b>
<b>2016</b>	<b>MOU on Trade, imports Port Sudan</b>	<b>Sudan – Ethiopia</b>
<b>2016</b>	<b>Single Border Agreement</b>	<b>Sudan – Ethiopia</b>
<b>2016</b>	<b>Joint Border exercises</b>	<b>Sudan – Ethiopia</b>

# FUTURE



# DEPENDENCE VS. AFRICOM SUPPORT

