



# EVENT SEQUENCES IN DISPUTED ISSUES

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

### Specific Research Question

How does a territorial dispute's first settlement attempt type impact the subsequent settlement attempts' distribution?

### Proposed Insights

- **SUBSTANTIVE:** The first settlement attempt's type can alter disputants' incentives to subsequently employ certain types settlement attempts (Slantchev 2011).
- **METHODS:** To empirically test sequence-based hypotheses, alter the dataset structure. Examine the entire sequence, and then sample unobserved sequences to add to dataset.

### Existing Research

- Any past settlement attempts increase the probability of present-day settlement attempts of any type in territorial disputes.
- Short-Term Effects: focuses on 5-, 10-, 15-year windows. Longer-term effects of past settlement attempts = unknown.
- Individual Events: cannot speak to what these increased probabilities mean for a dispute's overall event sequence (e.g., more militarizations compared to negotiations? Equal numbers?)




FIGURE 1: Event Sequences, Territorial Disputes (Huth and Allee)

## 3 RESEARCH DESIGN

### Methodology

- Global set of territorial disputes between states, 1919–1995
- OBSVSEQ = 0/1; did we observe this sequence?
- Sample unobserved sequences (20:1 ratio w/287 observed seqs.)
- Weight unobserved sequences to ensure equal Pr(selection)

Observed?	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event 4	Event 5	Weight
1	C	M	C	N	R	1
0	C	N	R			1/9
0	C	N	M	C	R	1/81
0	C	N	M	N	R	1/81
0	C	N	C	N	R	1/81
0	C					1

### Key Variables

- MIL1ST = 0/1; was sequence's first settlement attempt a MID?
- COUNTM = # of subsequent militarization attempts in sequence
- COUNTN = # of subsequent negotiation attempts in sequence
- MIL1ST\*COUNTM, MIL1ST\*COUNTN

### Data

Huth and Allee territorial dispute data; ICOW (not reported here)

## 2 FIRST-EVENT EFFECTS

### Key Logic

The initial attempt can impose different costs (and/or benefits) on *some but not all* future settlement attempt types, ultimately producing a different number of subsequent militarized and peaceful settlement attempts within the dispute.

**H<sub>GEN</sub>:** The distribution of militarized-to-peaceful settlement attempts in a sequence is affected by the first settlement attempt's type.


### Example Mechanism

- Conflict spiral (Vasquez and Mansbach 1984; Vasquez 2009)
- Prior interactions create psychological hostility or friendship, which accumulates and serves as a set of constraints for future interactions
- Militarized actions create (latent) psychological hostility, increasing probability of more hostile military actions in future
- *Implied:* the increase in latent hostility also reduces the probability of peaceful settlement attempts over the dispute


Observable Implication: sequences beginning with a militarization should have ↑ future militarizations, ↓ future negotiations (vs. random)

## 4 FINDINGS

>> **Take-Home Point:** First-event effects exist for subsequent negotiation attempts, but not for subsequent militarizations. Similar general effects exist in ICOW data. <<



Compared to true randomness, we see fewer sequences than we should beginning with militarization for 1-7 subsequent negotiation attempts.



No first-event effect exists for subsequent militarization attempts, compared to true randomness.

Simulations calculated based on observed sequence values + 267500 unobserved sequence values (militarized first) - (militarized first), 1000 draws. Thin lines = 95% CIs