

# Bad Capacity: State Capacity, Terrorist Group Behavior and Terrorist Group Termination



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## The Puzzle

- Why do some terror groups end but others don't? What is the effect of state capacity on terrorist group termination?
- Examples: Uruguay vs Tupamaros, Sri Lanka vs LTTE, Peru vs Shining Path, Nepal vs CPN, El Salvador vs FMLN. On the other hand, Spain vs ETA, Britain vs IRA,
- Is there a negative relationship between state capacity and terrorist group termination?

## Existing Literature

- High state capacity is associated with lower likelihood of civil war onset, experiencing less terrorist violence (Blankenship 2016; Hendrix and Young 2014; Fjelde and Soysa 2009; DeRouen and Sobek 2004)
- The recent studies challenge to this conventional wisdom (Koren and Sarbahi 2018; Ghatak 2018; Ghatak and Prins 2017).
- The extant literature on terrorist group termination covers many factors affecting the decision of terror groups to end their campaigns, such as intergroup competition (Phillips 2015, Young and Dugan 2014, Nemeth 2014), various group characteristics (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2011, 2013), economic sanctions (McLean et al 2016), criminal activities of terror group (Piazza and Piazza 2017), state repression (Daxecker and Hess 2013).
- My contribution to the literature:
  - Reconsidering the impact of state capacity on intrastate conflict and violent group's behavior
  - Looking at the effect of state capacity on terrorist group termination, which has not sufficiently examined yet.

## Theoretical Framework

- Terror groups survive with three crucial pillars: "men, weapon and popular support" (Hewit 1984).
- Although increasing state capacity can improve the ability of the government in a way that undermines the mobilization capacity of the terror group and diminish the popular support for it, terrorist groups have an incentive to respond to increasing state capacity to survive and maintain the organization.
- As the state its capacity to penetrate society and exercise power across its territorial domain as well as to gain quasi-voluntary compliance by winning over its citizenry;
  - Terror groups might respond to increasing state capacity by producing more terror in order to prove that the group still exists and operates
  - Terror groups might engage in coercive recruitment and fundraising to rebuild its physical capacity.
  - Terror groups might also engage in provide positive incentives to regain the support of its constituents.

## Hypotheses

- Hypothesis 1: Terror groups are less likely to end as state capacity increases.
- Hypothesis 2: Terror groups are less likely to end as state capacity increases, especially when the terror group claims ethnic or religious status.

## Research Design

- Young and Dugan's (2014) terror group data. 2,223 terror groups.
- DV: Terrorist group end. Dichotomous. Discrete Time Survival Analysis.
- IV: RPC, Government Spending, Bureaucratic Quality
- Controls: Type of the terrorist group, group size, attack diversity, goal breadth, foreign presence, regime type, GDP, Population, Ongoing civil war.

## Discrete Time Survival Models

### • Hypothesis 1

Government spending	-0.103*		
	(0.0594)		
RPC		-0.136**	
		(0.0606)	
Bureaucratic quality			-0.129***
			(0.0481)

### • Hypothesis 2

RPC	0.0976		
	(0.0876)		
RPCxethnoreligious	-0.402***		
	(0.119)		
Bureaucratic quality (BQ)		-0.143**	
		(0.0631)	
BQxethnoreligious		0.0243	
		(0.0719)	
Government spending (GS)			-0.0441
			(0.0778)
GSxethnoreligious			-0.0743
			(0.0710)
Ethnoreligious	-0.128*	-0.194	0.618
	(0.0740)	(0.197)	(0.637)

## Testing the Causal Mechanism

- Greater bureaucratic quality is associated with more terror attacks by the group, and increases the likelihood of coercive recruitment, coercive fundraising, public good provision.
- Higher tax capacity (RPC) is associated with coercive recruitment and fundraising, but no effect on terror attacks and public good provision.
- More government spending actually reduces the likelihood of public good provision and coercive recruitment, but strongly increases terror attacks. No effect on coercive fundraising.