

# Don't Change Horses in Midstream: Leader Change and Civil Conflict Outcomes

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How does leadership change (gov't or rebel) affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements in civil war?

# What do we know already?

Leadership change matters for the duration and termination of conflict:

- Interstate wars
  - Leader incentives to end wars (Stanley and Sawyer 2009, Croco 2011, MacGillivray and Smith 2008; Goemans 2000)
  - Occurrence and success of negotiations (Ghosn 2010)
  - Ending interstate rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 1995, 2000; Bennet 1997, 1998, Dreyer 2012)

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- Terror organizations (Jordan 2009, Price 2012, Johnston 2012)

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- Terror organizations (Jordan 2009, Price 2012, Johnston 2012)
- Civil war (Tiernay 2013, Thyne 2012)

# Bargaining model of civil war

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  - There are credibility and commitment issues (Walter 1997; Fearon 1995)

# What we expect: leader relationship

Focus: relationship between government and rebel leaders.

A longer relationship can:

- Increase information through shared experiences, gained knowledge of the other side, perhaps meetings or negotiations that may have stalled or failed
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*$H_1$ : As the duration of the relationship between the government and rebel leaders increases, the likelihood of a settlement will also increase*

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### Internal leadership changes

- Wars can become “sticky” due to personal preferences, information deficiencies, or entrapment (Stanley and Sawyer 2009)
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  - In civil war, we expect only internal changes can have this effect
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*H<sub>2</sub>: Internal leadership changes, in either the government or rebel group, will increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement*

# What we expect: external leader changes

External change is expected to have the opposite effect

- Outsiders bring new policies, 'resetting' information gained under the previous leader
- 'Reset' credibility built in terms of committing to a settlement
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*H<sub>3</sub>: External (rebel) or outsider (government) leadership changes will decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement.*

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- **Controls:** Polity 2, active dyads, population, GDP per capita, lootable resources, rebel territorial control


# Findings

## Leader Tenure



	Model 1 One-Year Effect	Model2 Two-Year Effect	Model 3 Three-Year Effect	Model 4 Four-Year Effect
Relationship	1.183** (0.023)	1.188** (0.017)	1.198** (0.014)	1.194** (0.019)
Insider Gov't	3.377** (0.014)	3.122** (0.017)	3.527*** (0.003)	4.379*** (0.000)
Outsider Gov't	0.311* (0.063)	0.463* (0.055)	0.696 (0.210)	0.639 (0.117)
Rebel Internal Change	3.480*** (0.010)	2.958** (0.023)	2.329* (0.060)	2.136* (0.087)
Rebel External Change	2.360 (0.136)	1.838 (0.284)	1.707 (0.351)	1.551 (0.457)
Regime Type	1.070** (0.047)	1.075** (0.033)	1.070** (0.042)	1.068** (0.045)
Ongoing Wars	1.043 (0.688)	1.071 (0.512)	1.054 (0.618)	1.065 (0.554)
Population†	0.638*** (0.000)	0.614*** (0.000)	0.604*** (0.000)	0.587*** (0.000)
GDP per capita†	0.939 (0.597)	0.930 (0.542)	0.916 (0.471)	0.914 (0.460)
Lootable Resources	1.665* (0.081)	1.684* (0.068)	1.715* (0.059)	1.713* (0.058)
Territorial Control	2.657*** (0.001)	2.784*** (0.000)	2.696*** (0.000)	2.640*** (0.000)
$N_{Conflicts}$ ( $N_{Failed}$ )	189 (55)	189 (55)	189 (55)	
N	578	578	578	578
$\chi^2$	62.22	60.85	56.10	60.00
Log Likelihood	-228.918	-230.466	-231.172	-229.162

p-values in parentheses; \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; † indicates a logged value

# Cumulative Incidence Functions



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  - Inside/internal changes can help the settlement process
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- Policy implications

Thank you!


# Supplemental materials

	<i>N</i>	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Relationship	891	2.6	2.5	1	17
Gov't Insider Change	891	0.06	0.2	0	1
Gov't External Change	891	0.13	0.34	0	1
Reb Internal Change	693	0.01	0.12	0	1
Reb External Change	693	0.03	0.17	0	1
Regime Type	874	1 .0	6.3	-9	10
Active Dyads	891	2.7	2.0	1	9
Population†	891	10.3	1.7	6.2	13.9
GDP per capita†	747	6.5	1.3	4.4	10.5
Lootable Resources	889	0.33	0.47	0	1
Territorial Control	878	0.41	0.49	0	1

† indicates a logged value

Table : Descriptive Statistics

# Relationship Histogram



# Endogeneity Concerns

- Leadership change may be related to the status of the war
- If leader changes happen because the war is going poorly (one side is unlikely to win), it may increase the chances of a settlement
  - Initial efforts to address this by using Inverse Mills Ratios (no obvious instrument)
  - First stage models regime change, IMRs from it used in regular models for outcome
  - No evidence of endogeneity via these tests



# Supplemental materials

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Relationship	Relationship 1.211*** (0.002)	One-Year Effect —	Two-Year Effect —
Gov't Insider Change	—	2.947** (0.026)	2.604** (0.046)
Gov't Outsider Change	—	0.283** (0.041)	0.427** (0.033)
Rebel Internal Change	—	2.990** (0.021)	2.568** (0.044)
Rebel External Change	—	1.961 (0.232)	1.475 (0.495)
Regime Type	1.073** (0.014)	1.059* (0.081)	1.063* (0.066)
Ongoing Wars	1.106 (0.286)	1.037 (0.731)	1.069 (0.527)
Population	0.683*** (0.000)	0.655*** (0.001)	0.633*** (0.000)
GDP per capita	0.911 (0.370)	0.952 (0.678)	0.949 (0.657)
Lootable Resources	1.777** (0.018)	1.720* (0.068)	1.732* (0.060)
Territorial Control	2.825*** (0.000)	2.866*** (0.000)	3.167*** (0.000)
N	725	578	578
$\chi^2$	47.032	63.75	56.10
Log Likelihood	-337.203	-231.24	-231.17

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**Table :** Separating Relationship Measure from Change Indicators

# Supplemental materials

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	Any Gov't, Any Reb	Gov't Out, Any Reb	Gov't Out, Reb Ext
Relationship	1.183** (0.023)	1.059 (0.149)	1.061 (0.139)
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Outsider	0.311* (0.063)	0.311* (0.066)	0.316* (0.070)
Rebel Internal Change	3.480** (0.010)	3.551*** (0.009)	3.261** (0.013)
Rebel External Change	2.360 (0.136)	2.268 (0.131)	2.278 (0.129)
Regime Type	1.070** (0.047)	1.067* (0.059)	1.067* (0.058)
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**Table :** Different Specifications of the Relationship Indicator