

Organized Violence Against Organized Labor

Labor Union Violence in Colombia

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Conflict and Violence Against Colombian Labor Unions



Figure: Labor protest of paramilitary violence against workers, 2010.

Conflict and Violence Against Colombian Labor Unions



Figure: Protestor against the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 2011, photo courtesy of AFL-CIO



Figure: Farmers Protest in Bolívar Square 2013, photo courtesy of Getty Images

Conflict and Violence Against Colombian Labor Unions

Perpetrators

Who does the killing?

Conflict and Violence Against Colombian Labor Unions

Perpetrators



Temporal Variation in Labor Union Repression

- Observation 1: Violations of labor rights seem to decrease over time

Variation in Labor Union Repression




Figure: Violent incidents (lethal and non lethal) against labor unionists, 2001-2014

Variation in Labor Union Repression

Lethal vs. Non Lethal

- Observation 2: Variation between lethal and non-lethal violence used against labor unionists

Temporal Variation in Labor Union Repression

Lethal vs. Non Lethal




Figure: Government Incidents Against Labor Unionists, 2001-2014

Temporal Variation in Labor Union Repression

Lethal vs. Non Lethal




Figure: Paramilitary Incidents Against Labor Unionists, 2001-2014

Theory

Substitution of Tactics under Public Scrutiny

1. The government and its surrogates are sensitive to public scrutiny
2. When scrutinized, repressive actors will seek less visible forms of repression
3. Under scrutiny, repressive actors will substitute nonviolent for violent repression

Theory

We know that democratic institutions correlate with a rise in less visible forms of repression (Davenport 2007, Rejali 2009)


...but how do we measure public accountability subnationally?

Theory

NGOs provide a crucial accountability mechanism in Latin America (Franklin 2008), and in Colombia in particular (Tate 2007)

The screenshot shows a news article from **El País.com.co**. The header features the website's logo and navigation links for Cali, Valle, Opinión, Colombia, Economía, Deportes, Sociales, Judicial, Mundo, Multimedia, Cultura, Entretenimiento, Gente, and a search bar. Below the header, the main headline reads: "ONG llama a la UE a incrementar la presión sobre Colombia por desaparecidos". A sub-headline provides context: "La ONG Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos-Acción Colombia, Oldhaco, instó este jueves a la Unión Europea, UE, a incrementar la presión sobre ese país para que esclarezca casos de desaparecidos." The article is dated "Jueves, Agosto 30, 2012 - 9:41 a.m." and includes author information: "Por: EFE" and "Temas: Internacional | Colombia | Juan Manuel Santos | Unión Europea". The page also includes social sharing options (Twitter, Facebook, Print, Report error) and sidebar links for "Informe Especial sobre el delito de desaparición forzada". At the bottom, there is a photograph of a protest banner reading "SIN OLVIDO".

Descriptive Statistics: NGOs Over Time



Hypotheses

1. Government non-violent repression against labor unionists **increase** in the presence of Human Rights NGOs
2. Government murders and assassinations against labor unionists **decrease** in the presence of Human Rights NGOs

Labor Rights Accountability Dataset (LRAD)

- Incident-level information on 15 different violations of collective bargaining rights
- Data gathered from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions' Annual Surveys of Violations of Trade Union Rights (not NGOs)
- Emphasis on attributing responsibility for violations of labor rights
- Aggregated to department-year totals for present analysis

Independent Variables

- NGO Presence (2 Separate Measures)
- Homicides
- AUC-perpetrated Homicides (paramilitary models only)
- Population (natural log)
- Industrial Firms present (natural log)
- Coca Crops (hectares)
- Time Trend

Empirical Results: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 1, Government Labor Rights Violations - Random Effects

	Lethality	Lethality	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonviolent Repression	Nonviolent Repression
Directory HRNGOs	-11.165*** (0.643)		0.226* (0.131)		0.226* (0.131)		-0.102 (0.457)	
UN HRN-GOs		-3.107*** (1.158)		0.018 (0.011)		0.018 (0.011)		-0.032* (0.019)
Homicides	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003** (0.001)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Coca Crops	-0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Industrial Firms	1.788 (1.663)	2.189* (1.164)	0.198 (0.242)	0.150 (0.242)	0.198 (0.242)	0.150 (0.242)	0.485 (0.369)	0.718** (0.289)
Population	-4.738** (1.988)	-4.112*** (1.406)	-0.049 (0.564)	-0.082 (0.532)	-0.049 (0.564)	-0.082 (0.532)	-0.172 (0.685)	-0.134 (0.794)
Time Trend	-0.001 (0.210)	-0.002 (0.201)	-0.044 (0.050)	-0.031 (0.053)	-0.044 (0.050)	-0.031 (0.053)	-0.049 (0.116)	-0.085 (0.121)
Constant	41.397*** (11.453)	29.821*** (8.117)	-2.318 (6.392)	-1.646 (6.185)	-2.318 (6.392)	-1.646 (6.185)	-4.299 (7.540)	-6.261 (9.210)
N	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196

Empirical Results: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 2, Government Labor Rights Violations, Control Function Estimation - Random Effects

	Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonviolent Repression	Nonviolent Repression
Government Lethality	-3.915*** (1.401)	-3.356*** (0.736)	-4.273* (2.193)	-4.412*** (0.974)
Homicides	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Coca Crops	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Industrial Firms	0.040 (0.268)	0.125 (0.238)	-0.032 (0.298)	0.112 (0.304)
Population	0.630 (0.678)	0.374 (0.600)	0.979 (0.749)	0.549 (0.828)
Time Trend	-0.036 (0.071)	-0.045 (0.067)	-0.021 (0.127)	-0.042 (0.126)
Stage 1 Residuals (Directory HRNGOs)	1.982*** (0.440)		2.533*** (0.583)	
Stage 1 Residuals (UN HRNGOs)		3.063*** (0.648)		4.465*** (0.916)
Constant	-10.668 (8.121)	-7.632 (7.235)	-16.880* (8.797)	-11.696 (9.731)

N

196

196

196

196

Empirical Results: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 1, Paramilitary Labor Rights Violations - Random Effects

	Lethality	Lethality	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonviolent Repression	Nonviolent Repression
Directory HRNGOs	-2.050*** (0.751)		-1.985*** (0.449)		-1.878** (0.811)		-1.382*** (0.497)	
UN HRNGOs		-0.060* (0.033)		-0.047*** (0.015)		-0.036 (0.032)		-0.042*** (0.016)
Homicides	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
AUC Homicides	0.040 (0.027)	0.044 (0.030)	0.042 (0.036)	0.047 (0.037)	0.045*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.024** (0.011)	0.025** (0.012)
Coca Crops	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Population	-0.105 (0.275)	-0.057 (0.292)	0.014 (0.240)	0.056 (0.261)	0.582 (0.776)	0.692 (0.875)	-0.269 (0.393)	-0.247 (0.426)
Industrial Firms	0.362** (0.181)	0.316* (0.188)	0.345** (0.162)	0.278 (0.175)	0.222 (0.330)	0.098 (0.316)	0.757*** (0.245)	0.728*** (0.270)
Tme Trend	-0.133*** (0.050)	-0.142*** (0.051)	-0.145*** (0.039)	-0.151*** (0.042)	-0.149* (0.079)	-0.140* (0.080)	-0.110 (0.079)	-0.125 (0.079)
Constants	-1.322 (3.211)	-1.607 (3.454)	-2.491 (2.829)	-2.595 (3.217)	-10.899 (9.388)	-11.657 (10.987)	-3.252 (4.425)	-3.257 (4.871)
N	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196

Summary of Findings

- NGO presence may change the tactics of labor repression...
- ...but not entirely eliminate it

Next Steps

Remaining Challenges

- Labor union presence/strike volume
- Interrogate exogeneity of NGOs and nonviolent repression
- Understanding anonymous violence and threats

Additional Charts: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 1, Government Labor Rights Violations - Fixed Effects

	Lethality	Lethality	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonviolent Repression	Nonviolent Repression
Directory HRNGOs	-1.839 (3.292)		0.332 (0.236)		0.258 (0.231)		0.392 (0.482)	
UN HRN-GOs		-7.821*** (0.537)		0.095* (0.054)		0.077 (0.055)		-0.175 (0.251)
Homicides	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Coca Crops	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)
Industrial Firms	-34.581 (40.599)	-33.255 (40.610)	0.090 (1.173)	0.033 (1.117)	0.343 (1.161)	0.289 (1.114)	21.925*** (8.168)	20.913** (8.264)
Population	119.547 (339.796)	111.594 (337.397)	1.995 (5.495)	1.862 (5.245)	0.813 (5.548)	0.614 (5.336)	155.721*** (40.116)	202.632*** (55.686)
Time Trend	2.441 (1.801)	2.398 (1.805)	-0.060 (0.191)	-0.072 (0.184)	-0.070 (0.189)	-0.079 (0.183)	-4.690*** (1.361)	-5.004*** (1.308)
Constant	-1512.673 (4836.918)	-1364.396 (4799.183)	-34.042 (87.039)	-32.242 (82.495)	-17.624 (87.744)	-14.700 (83.851)	- (657.119)	- (866.998)
N	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196

Empirical Results: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 2, Government Labor Rights Violations, Control Function Estimation - Fixed Effects

	Nonlethal Vio- lence	Nonviolent Re- pression
Government Lethality	-3.182*** (0.951)	-5.711*** (1.353)
Homicides	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Coca Crops	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001* (0.000)
Industrial Firms	0.809 (1.481)	26.812** (11.330)
Population	1.838 (7.108)	151.779*** (52.796)
Time Trend	-0.141 (0.233)	-5.351*** (2.016)
Stage 1 Residuals (UN HRN-GOs)	3.268*** (1.267)	7.481*** (1.757)
Constant	-37.818 (111.685)	-2593.869*** (902.045)
N	196	196

Empirical Results: Control Function Estimation

Table: Stage 1, Paramilitary Labor Rights Violations - Fixed Effects

	Lethality	Lethality	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Lethal and Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonlethal Violence	Nonviolent Repression	Nonviolent Repression
Directory HRNGOS	-0.613 (1.183)		-0.934 (0.998)		-14.453*** (0.731)		-0.809 (0.591)	
UN HRNGOs		0.029 (0.101)		0.103 (0.071)		0.048 (0.101)		-0.170 (0.106)
Homicides	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
AUC Homicides	0.052** (0.023)	0.053** (0.023)	0.045** (0.020)	0.050** (0.020)	0.022 (0.022)	0.033 (0.020)	0.060** (0.027)	0.059** (0.028)
Coca Crops	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Population	-2.876 (4.942)	-3.421 (4.799)	-0.165 (5.186)	-1.410 (4.822)	34.765 (21.982)	21.816 (24.293)	-5.647 (6.264)	-5.051 (6.386)
Industrial Firms	-0.180 (1.032)	-0.399 (1.029)	0.047 (0.937)	-0.329 (0.936)	-1.293 (2.015)	-0.882 (1.992)	-0.691 (1.730)	-0.639 (1.627)
Time Trend	-0.009 (0.162)	0.017 (0.161)	-0.077 (0.147)	-0.040 (0.149)	-0.262 (0.214)	-0.202 (0.211)	0.174 (0.248)	0.188 (0.234)
Constant	38.385 (79.027)	48.631 (76.785)	-1.314 (81.393)	20.062 (76.194)	-521.131 (326.186)	-327.362 (360.617)	91.080 (102.268)	83.404 (102.928)
N	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196

Bivariate Probit Models: NGO Presence and Labor Repression

	Bivariate Probit Regression			
	GovLethal (1)	GovViolent(1)	ParamLethal (2)	ParamViolent(2)
ONGhronly	-2.904*** (0.366)	0.336** (0.158)	-0.989*** (0.336)	-1.042* (0.536)
lnpop	-1.650*** (0.259)	0.156 (0.295)	-0.0394 (0.244)	0.252 (0.416)
cocahectares	-9.09e-05 (6.91e-05)	1.87e-05 (4.13e-05)	4.49e-05 (3.25e-05)	-8.66e-05 (5.65e-05)
homicides	0.000771*** (0.000182)	4.94e-06 (5.57e-05)	7.85e-05 (9.27e-05)	4.28e-05 (0.000130)
lnanyfirm	0.252 (0.403)	0.0511 (0.143)	0.145 (0.163)	0.145 (0.186)
timetrend	0.0105 (0.131)	-0.0412 (0.0399)	-0.0697*** (0.0239)	-0.0660* (0.0356)
homicides-AUC			0.0283 (0.0251)	0.0183 (0.0179)
Constant	16.29*** (2.814)	-3.262 (3.430)	-0.817 (2.766)	-5.469 (5.079)
ρ	0.352 (0.453)		0.227 (0.174)	
Observations	196	196	196	196

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on department

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Bivariate Probit Models: NGO Presence and Government Labor Repression

	Bivariate Probit Regression			
	GovLethal (1)	GovViolent(1)	GovLethal(2)	GovViolent(2)
ONGhronly	-2.904*** (0.366)	0.336** (0.158)		
UNngos			-1.896*** (0.271)	0.0131 (0.00827)
lnpop	-1.650*** (0.259)	0.156 (0.295)	-1.896*** (0.543)	0.130 (0.272)
cocahectares	-9.09e-05 (6.91e-05)	1.87e-05 (4.13e-05)	0.000110 (8.21e-05)	1.44e-05 (4.10e-05)
homicides	0.000771*** (0.000182)	4.94e-06 (5.57e-05)	0.00190*** (0.000134)	-1.45e-05 (6.33e-05)
lnanyfirm	0.252 (0.403)	0.0511 (0.143)	0.929* (0.478)	0.0669 (0.147)
timetrend	0.0105 (0.131)	-0.0412 (0.0399)	-0.00176 (0.119)	-0.0328 (0.0418)
Constant	16.29*** (2.814)	-3.262 (3.430)	13.95*** (5.074)	-3.071 (3.248)
ρ	0.352 (0.453)		0.141 (0.609)	
Observations	196	196	196	196

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on department

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Bivariate Probit Models: NGO Presence and Paramilitary Labor Repression

	Bivariate Probit Regression			
	ParamLethal (1)	ParamViolent(1)	ParamLethal(2)	ParamViolent(2)
ONGhronly	-0.989*** (0.336)	-1.042* (0.536)		
UNngos			-0.0301** (0.0118)	-0.0193 (0.0181)
lnpop	-0.0394 (0.244)	0.252 (0.416)	-0.0161 (0.258)	0.285 (0.444)
cocahectares	4.49e-05 (3.25e-05)	-8.66e-05 (5.65e-05)	4.80e-05 (3.35e-05)	-8.59e-05* (4.70e-05)
homicides	7.85e-05 (9.27e-05)	4.28e-05 (0.000130)	0.000119 (8.94e-05)	8.81e-05 (0.000127)
lnanyfirm	0.145 (0.163)	0.145 (0.186)	0.120 (0.176)	0.0746 (0.172)
timetrend	-0.0697*** (0.0239)	-0.0660* (0.0356)	-0.0760*** (0.0246)	-0.0624* (0.0366)
homicides-AUC	0.0283 (0.0251)	0.0183 (0.0179)	0.0292 (0.0244)	0.0202 (0.0170)
Constant	-0.817 (2.766)	-5.469 (5.079)	-0.941 (2.976)	-5.479 (5.592)
ρ	0.227 (0.174)		0.241 (0.169)	

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on department

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Bivariate Probit Models: Marginal Effects of NGOs on Government Labor Repression



Bivariate Probit Models: Marginal Effects of NGOs on Paramilitary Labor Repression

