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Refugees and Host State Repression



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How do refugees affect repression?

- Refugee camps:
 - Little economic opportunity
 - Opportunity/motivation for militarization
 - Place strain on host state's capacity
- Refugee mobilization vs. State maintenance of political strength

Refugee Populations as “shock”

- Repression levels largely stable and determined by structural factors (regime type, economy, population)
- Refugees present a shock to the political status quo
- Do refugee populations lead to increased or decreased political strength, relative to threat?

Increased Repression

- Opportunity for militarization
- Resource strain on host state economy and capacity
- “Otherization” of those in camps by host state citizenry

Mitigating Factors

- External Threat Environment
 - Host states providing sanctuary to those fleeing rival state's government.
 - Militarization against rival state supported.
- High State Capacity
 - Allows states to “absorb” the shock of refugee inflows without destabilizing system.

Expectations

- **Hypothesis 1:** Increased amounts of refugees lead to increased repression by host states.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Increased amounts of refugees from rival states will mitigate the effect of refugees on repression.
- **Hypothesis 3:** Increased state capacity will mitigate the effects of refugees on repression.

Research Design

- Unit of analysis: state-year (1977-2001)
- Dependent variable: -
 - Repression: 5 point Political Terror Scale (State Dept.)
- Independent variables: -
 - Log of total number of refugees received in a given year (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006)
 - Proportion of refugees from rivals to total refugees received (Salehyan 2008 + Klein et al 2006)
 - Host state's capacity-"relative political reach" (Hendrix and Young 2014)
 - Standard repression controls (GDP pc, Population, Civil Conflict, Democracy level)


Ordered Probit Results, 1977-2001

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Total Refugees (ln)	0.009** (0.004)		0.034** (0.015)
Rival Refugees (% of Tot. Ref.)		0.009*** (0.003)	
Relative Political Reach			-0.045 (0.121)
Total Ref. X Rel. Pol. Reach			-0.024* (0.013)
<i>(Controls Not Displayed)</i>			
Wald Chi-Square	1368.83	1357.79	1213.20
Observations	3,548	3,538	3,088


Results: Summary

- Increased amounts of refugees (+, sig.)
- Increased amounts of rival refugees/total refugees (+, sig.)—*counter to expectations.*
- State capacity X increased refugees (-, sig.)

Effects of Refugees on Repression



State Capacity, Refugees, and Repression



Discussion and Next Steps

- Rivalry maintenance vs. need for internal stability.
- Need for Disaggregation?
 - Finding out *where* can gain insight as to *why*.