Changes to the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data,

Version 4.3¹

Correlates of War Project
The Pennsylvania State University
http://www.correlatesofwar.org

¹ We are grateful to a number of research assistants who worked to both verify and describe the changes to the MID data discussed in this document. These include Benjamin Ostick, Matthew Lane, Dennis Okyere, Sarah Parrott, and Zhanna Terechsenko. We are particularly grateful to Kim Tran, who worked diligently to compose many of the narratives contained herein.
Overview

This document contains detailed information on each of the changes made to the Militarized Interstate Dispute data between versions 4.01 and 4.3.2.

The majority of these changes were made in response to the recommendations detailed in Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) (hereafter GML). Interested readers should also consult Palmer, D’Orazio, Kenwick, and McManus (2019) for additional information on how we evaluated GML’s recommendations.

For background on the MID coding rules, interested readers should consult:


2 Version 4.3 revokes some changes that were made in Version 4.2.
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Evaluation Process for Cases GML Recommended Removing

GML recommended removing several cases from the MID data on the basis that they uncovered historical information about a MID that indicated the original entry was coded in error. Our evaluation process therefore sought to determine whether this evidence was sufficiently strong to warrant the removal of a particular observation from the MID data.

We began by checking whether the narratives provided by GML plausibly accorded with all the actions that served as the basis for the original MID. This was true in the majority of cases, but occasionally we found that the GML narrative appeared to pertain to a particular subset of incidents that occurred within the course of a broader MID. In these cases we determined that this evidence may warrant a re-classification of militarized incidents, but not necessarily the original MID entry and therefore did remove the original observation.

When the narrative did, on descriptive grounds, appear to warrant MID removal we conducted additional searches to corroborate the information provided by GML. We began by consulting the documents cited by GML. When reported, we then consulted with the original source documentation associated with earlier iterations of the MID data, while also consulting with general and encyclopedic histories such as Richardson (1994) and Stearns (2002). In cases where these searches returned little additional information we queried a variety of news sources from LexisNexis using a search string containing the actors listed in the original MID data and relevant date restrictions. When little corroborating information was uncovered we searched through secondary histories on international relations in the relevant regions or among the relevant actors.

The GML recommendation was then re-evaluated with regard to any new information uncovered in the search process. As detailed in the main text, we typically found that GML had provided sufficient evidence for the recommendation be accepted. At other times, our additional searches revealed information that was consistent with the original MID coding. In some instances, there was significant uncertainty in the sources cited by GML and uncovered by ourselves. In these instances the inclusion or exclusion of a MID typically hung on how the coding rules should be applied within the context of this uncertainty, and in some cases we deferred to the decisions of the original coders and maintain the inclusion of the MID.
Part 1 – Cases from Gibler, Miller, and Little’s (2016) “Appendix IIB—Cases that should be dropped” that have been dropped

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Part 2 – Cases that Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016) recommend dropping that have been kept (with changes, as applicable)

MID#217
MID#217 concerns a show of force by France targeting Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the United Kingdom. GML contend that there is no evidence in Langer or Anderson's "the Eastern Question" that any codable action took place between France and other European powers during the crisis in Egypt regarding Muhammad Ali. Sources (Khon 1961; Langer 1972; Richardson 1994, p. 48) suggest a show of force by France was likely, during this time, noting that the French stationed naval forces nearby British forces conducting naval operations. Additionally, France built additional fortifications around Paris as it expanded its military; these actions appear to be a direct response to the ongoing tensions. Given this context, we do not believe sufficient grounds have been presented for removing MID#217.

MID#508
GML state that when "France said that it would not interfere in the war between Austria and Italy as long as Austria did not advance farther than Milan," this did not constitute a militarized incident. However, we find that GML's own description here suggests that a militarized threat took place.

MID#1028
GML state that MID#1028 is coded inexplicably as a clash and that sources indicate a vague threat by Bolivia towards Paraguay. Rout (1970, p. 173), however, notes that there were clashes between Bolivia and Paraguay on October 3 and 9, 1936. We decided to keep MID#1028, changing the end date from October 4, 1936 to October 9, 1936.

MID#1028 CHANGES:
MIDA
EndDay: 9
MaxDur: 7
MinDur: 7

MIDB
EndDay: 9

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#1042
GML state that "it would have been impossible” for Egyptian and Jordanian forces (Arab Legion) to have come into contact during June 1948 of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War because "Jordanian forces were not in the area" of Hebron and Bethlehem, as had been noted by the original source (Shimoni 1965). Additional source (NYT - 14 June 1948: 3), however, provides a statement from the joint headquarters of the Arab Armies in Palestine, which detail their official frontline positions effective during the United Nations ceasefire. The Arab Legion (Jordan) specifically lists Bethlehem as a held position. On the basis of the argument by GML, we find it reasonable that the armed incidents between the armies of Egypt and Jordan occurred as noted by the original source and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#1042.
**MID#1157**
GML state that while Ecuador accused Peru of massing 20,000-30,000 troops on the border, aerial reconnaissance proved the allegations to be baseless. Source (NYT - 15 Sept 1955: 15) notes that a four-nation committee of guarantors conducted reconnaissance missions and found no evidence of the Peruvian troop concentrations alleged by Ecuador. However, we find that: (1) This source only pertains to one possible incident, taking place before the end date of the dispute. (2) The reconnaissance missions did not prove Peruvian troops were never at the border, only that there was no evidence of such at the time of the missions. (3) While this particular action is ambiguous, there is a target protest, which justifies the classification of such cases according to the MID coding rules. (4) The HiAct of the dispute is a border violation, which this news story in no way rules out. (5) The NYT also references an Ecuadorian complaint of Peru's arrest of four Ecuadorian soldiers on Aug. 10, suggesting the possibility of an additional militarized incident that is part of this dispute.

**MID#1335**
GML state that Botswana placed an embargo on trade between itself and Rhodesia and this was therefore not a blockade of Rhodesia and does not qualify as a militarized incident. Source (Keesings - Volume 15 (1969), Issue No. 12 (December), Page 23,723) notes that the President of Botswana is quoted as stating "We have prevented Rhodesia from using their railway to import arms and military supplies; Botswana's airline has ceased to fly into Rhodesia. We are preparing to do more. Botswana has committed itself to diverting long-standing trade with Rhodesia despite the very considerable economic and administrative problems which such a course presents." As the prevention of goods entering into Rhodesia is sufficient to qualify as a blockade as originally coded, we have decided to keep MID#1335.

**MID#1449**
MID#1449 concerns a threat to blockade by India against Nepal. GML contend that “Nepal demanded the withdrawal of Indian military liaisons and wireless operators from posts on Nepal’s Chinese border. India threatened to close the border in response. Nepal never threatened India’s military, and India’s threat was economic, not military. This is not a MID.” Source (Shaha 1978, pp. 128-9) confirms that Nepal demanded the withdrawal of Indian military liaisons and wireless operators. Dinesh Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister, had earlier threatened to close the border for security purposes should Nepal insist on going back unilaterally on the existing understanding and assurance about mutual security. Although the Indian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs subsequently downplays this statement, this threat appears not to be simply an economic threat, as GML note. We find this sufficient to keep MID#1449.

**MID#1501**
GML state that the coders misinterpreted the Spanish source for this case. They believed that Bolivian troops were sent to Cobija to dismantle the Chilean guano processing plant there in 1863 and that Chile responded with a warship (show of force), followed by a request from the Bolivian president of his congress to declare war if necessary. GLM claim that these events are already captured in MID#1502 (seizure by Chile and threat to declare war by Bolivia from February 1863 until December 1863). They recommend to drop this case as double-count. Based on our reading of Barros (1970), however, we were able to uncover what we believe to be confirmatory evidence that these events did, in fact, occur in 1861. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#1501.

**MID#1526**
GML state that although Argentine armed forces invaded and occupied Villa Occidental, Paraguay [present-day Villa Hayes], Paraguay was not a system member when MID#1526 is coded. Additionally, GML state that Brazil was in no position to protest on behalf of Paraguayan interests and that there is no evidence of a Brazilian show of force. Sources (Strauss 1978; James R. Partridge to Hamilton Fish, 24 March 1874, No. 164, No. 55, Despatches [sic] from United States Ministers to Brazil, Record Group 59, No. 121, roll 42, volume 40) note the hostile environment between Argentina and Brazil that led to a codable incident where
in response to the Argentine fortification of the island of Martin Garcia ("a cannon shot away from Uruguay, Brazil's ally"), the Brazilian fleet in the river Río de la Plata (between Argentina and Uruguay) was reinforced to a total of ten vessels. This action qualifies as a show of force against Argentina. We accept that Argentina's actions on Paraguayan lands do not constitute a militarized incident against Brazil. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#1526, changing ARG HiAct from 15 to 0 and revising the date as a single-incident MID for March 24, 1874.

MID#1526 CHANGES:
MIDA
StDay: 24
StMon: 3
StYear: 1874
EndDay: 24
EndMon: 3
EndYear: 1874
MaxDur: 1
MinDur: 1
HiAct: 7
HostLev: 3
Recip: 0

MIDB
StDay: 24
StMon: 3
StYear: 1874
EndDay: 24
EndMon: 3
EndYear: 1874
SideA: 0 (ccode 160)
SideA: 1 (ccode 140)
RevState: 0 (ccode 160)
RevState: 1 (ccode 140)
RevType1: 0 (ccode 160)
RevType1: 4 (ccode 140)
HiAct: 0 (ccode 160)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 160)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

**MID#1725**
MID#1725 concerns an attack by Germany against Argentina between March 1914 – February 1915. GML describe MID#1725 as German U-boat attacks on Argentine ships that were not protested by Argentina, with specific details such as a German offer of apology with a salute of the Argentine flag at sea. Martin (1925, pp. 193-254) notes that the sinking of the Argentine ships as described by GML actually occurred between April - June 1917; this is MID#1724. Furthermore, these U-boat attacks had immediately incurred an Argentinian protest to the German government. As GML did not challenge MID#1725 on the basis of
the actions that took place between March 1914 and February 1915 as coded, we have decided to keep MID#1725.

**MID#1734**

MID#1734 concerns an attack by the United States and the United Kingdom targeting Honduras and Guatemala. GML contend that all USA and UKG actions were not taken against Honduras, but rather, against Honduran rebels and therefore do not qualify as a MID. GML also contend that the threat made against Guatemala was not specific enough to constitute a MID. Source (NYT - 16 Jan 1911: 5) notes that the U.S. warned Guatemala not to provide aid to the Honduran rebels during a revolution there, and subsequently ordered two naval ships to patrol the Guatemalan and Honduran coasts "in order that the...important American interests concerned may be protected." While the non-specific warning by the United States against Guatemala does not qualify as a MID, the subsequent action meets the definition of a show of force as a public demonstration by a state of its military forces. American and British marines did later occupy the port city of Puerto Cortez, but there is evidence that the American and British forces were invited by the Honduran government. Therefore, we decided to keep MID#1734, but drop UKG and HON as participants, recode USA HiAct from 16 to 7, and revise the dates to January 15, 1911 as a single-incident MID for the show of force.

**MID#1734 CHANGES:**

**MIDA**
- StDay: 15
- StMon: 1
- StYear: 1911
- EndDay: 15
- EndMon: 1
- EndYear: 1911
- MaxDur: 1
- MinDur: 1
- HiAct: 7
- HostLev: 3
- Recip: 0
- NumA: 1
- NumB: 1

**MIDB**
- Drop ccode 91
- Drop ccode 200
- StDay: 15
- StMon: 1
- StYear: 1911
- EndDay: 15
- EndMon: 1
- EndYear: 1911
- HiAct: 7 (ccode 2)
- HostLev: 3 (ccode 2)

**MIDI**
- N/A

**MIDIP**
- N/A
MID#1790
MID#1790 concerns a clash between Hungary and Germany near the end of World War II. At the time of this MID, Hungary, which had previously been occupied by Germany months earlier, was now being occupied by the Soviet Union; political power and institutions appeared to be divided among those loyal to German-backed authorities and those loyal to Soviet-backed authorities. GML contend that this MID should be dropped because the Hungarian army as a whole ignored a declaration of war against Germany from the Soviet-established Hungarian provisional government. The New York Times (31 Dec 1944: 12) notes that the Hungarian Provisional Government was acting on authority granted by the Provisional National Assembly. While the German-puppet government of Hungary considered the Hungarian Provisional Government and its forces as traitors (including the commander of First Hungarian Army who joined the Hungarian Provisional Government), control of Budapest appears to have been ceded to Soviet-backed Hungarians by January 20, 1945, within the coding of this MID. The Hungarian state then was represented by the Hungarian Provisional Government and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#1790.

MID#2051
MID#2051 concerns a threat to declare war by Ecuador targeting Peru and Colombia. GML contend that the Ecuadorian notice to the U.S. State Department that it would go to war to "protect her Amazonian rights in the pending conflict between Colombia and Peru" provides no indication that Ecuador was targeting any one country and that they were not targeting Colombia and Peru in tandem. Sources (NYT - 15 Nov 1932: 4) confirm the memorandum, but we disagree with GML's interpretation and find that the threat to declare war as originally coded is satisfied by Ecuador's declaration that should either Colombia or Peru threaten Ecuador's Amazonian rights, Ecuador would go to war. We have decided to keep MID#2051.

MID#2077
GML state that the placement of a buoy near Navarino Island by Argentina against Chile in March of 1905 was obviously not a show of force because it was done secretly, and no land was seized. GML also state that there was no protest of the event by the Chilean government. Based on our reading of Morgana (1969: 192), it is not made explicit whether the mission by the Argentine navy to replace the “Spar Buey” near Puerto Williams with their own marker was a secret. More importantly, if the placing of the buoy was in fact done in secret, the action was undertaken by military forces and ultimately functioned as a public signal to Chile demonstrating Argentina's position on the disputed maritime border. Moreover, while the author notes that civilian authorities in Argentina were not consulted, subsequent actions taken by the Argentine government seem to indicate that the action was sanctioned. We believe this action was sufficient to constitute a MID and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#2077.

MID#2108
MID #2108 details a clash between Iraq and Iran in 1969. The original coders appear to have classified this MID on the basis of a New York Times (15 Sep 1969: 13) report, which stated that Baghdad Radio announced that the Iraqi Army had killed 30 and captured 14 Iranian soldiers. GML argue that this MID should be removed without corroboration from sources other than Bagdad Radio. Without additional evidence to the contrary, however, we do not believe that there is sufficient evidence to remove this MID. The MID coding rules have no criteria for rejecting sources, and we generally treat information received from our sources as reliable unless we have specific information to indicate otherwise.

MID#2172
MID#2172 concerns a threat to use force by Turkey targeting Cyprus. GML contend that the statement by the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, which suggested possible Turkish military retaliation against the Cyprus government, is not an explicit threat directed towards Cyprus and does not specify a use of force. While we agree that this initial statement by Turkey detailing that Cyprus must be able to prevent further attacks to Turkish Cypriots does not meet the criteria for a threat, a New York Times report (18 Nov
1965: 16) notes that a subsequent statement was made by Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in regards to the Cyprus dispute [on November 16, 1965], warning that Turkey "would use any means, including force if necessary, to achieve a just solution." We find this sufficient for a threat to use force and have decided to keep MID#2172, with the following date changes:

MID#2172 CHANGES:
MIDA
StDay: 16
StMon: 11
StYear: 1965
EndDay: 16
EndMon: 11
EndYear: 1965

MIDB
StDay: 16
StMon: 11
StYear: 1965
EndDay: 16
EndMon: 11
EndYear: 1965

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#2621
MID#2621 concerns a show of force by Uganda targeting Rwanda. GML contend that when Uganda ordered their border with Rwanda to be closed, their action was directed at Zambia guerrillas who were entering Uganda through Rwanda, and not at the Rwandan government. GML further contend that the border closing was not a show of force. However, Idi Amin’s demands demonstrate that the border closing was used to make Rwanda take measures against guerrillas. When Amin later reopened the border with Rwanda, he made three demands to the Rwandan Government concerning the guerrillas and subversive activities in general (Africa Research Bulletin, 1971, 2193). We agree with GML, however, that border closing is not a show of force rather, we believe the action constitutes a blockade. We have decided to keep MID#2621 and change UGA HiAct from 7 to 13.

MID#2621 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 13
HostLev: 4

MIDB
HiAct: 13 (ccode 500)
HostLev: 4 (ccode 500)

MIDI
N/A
MID#2701
MID#2701 concerns a show of force by Japan targeting China. GML contend that when four Chinese vessels sailed into the Amur River (intent on recovering the right of naval navigation through the water system from Russia) they were followed by Japanese torpedo boats. They argue that the action between China and Japan does not qualify as a MID because the “Japanese are really just bystanders.” Leong (1976, pp. 60-69) confirms that China sailed four armed vessels into Russian-administered waters. China was also noted to be anxious because of Japan's aspiration to gain control of Russian territory; Japanese had earlier demonstrated its intent by seizing several Russian vessels in the area. Based on these accounts, we find that the sailings of military ships by both China and Japan were purposeful public demonstrations of force targeting each other, as both states desired to take control of Russian territory and to dissuade one another from doing the same. We have decided to keep MID#2701 and change CHN HiAct from 0 to 7.

MID#2701 CHANGES:
MIDA
N/A

MIDB
HiAct: 7 (ecode 710)
HostLev: 3 (ecode 710)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#2712
MID#2712 concerns a border violation by China targeting the USSR. GML contend that China denied Soviet accusations that they committed border violations against Soviet-backed Mongolia and further state that contemporary analysts suggest that these accusations were fabricated by the Soviets and therefore, MID#2712 should be dropped. However, we believe that this MID should be kept and that the target should be changed to Mongolia (as the actions occurred along the Chinese-Mongolian border). Sources (Whiting 1975, p. 246; NYT - 16 Sep 1973: 11; Washington Post - 07 Sep 1973: A23, 15 Sep 1973: A18; Christian Science Monitor - 15 Sep 1973: 1) note that the Soviets and Chinese were engaged in a rivalry over Mongolia, and that in September 1973, Soviet-backed Mongolia charged China with border violations, subversion, and sabotage. Soviet broadcasts, quoting the Mongolian press, accused the Chinese of an unspecified number of direct border violations, saying that despite numerous Mongolian protests, Chinese troops had deliberately penetrated as far as 20 kilometers inside Mongolian territory. We believe that the Soviet broadcasts are sufficient for the coding of this MID, as it is unlikely that the broadcasts were fabrications. We have decided to keep MID#2712, dropping USR as a participant and add MON as the target of the actions by CHN.

MID#2712 CHANGES:
MIDA
N/A

MIDB
MID#2737 involves a threat to use force by Canada targeting France. Specifically, Canada threatened to seize French fishermen caught fishing in the Burgeo Bank area because France had exceeded its cod quota. GML contend that this threat to use force was directed against French civilians, not the government. Sources (Facts on File - March 13, 1987, March 27, 1987) note that the Canadian transportation minister warned France against exceeding a negotiated limit on cod fishing and cautioned Paris that ports would be closed to French trawlers if France violated the accord. After a subsequent announcement that Canadian ports were indefinitely closed to French fishing vessels, the transportation minister “also warned that French crews would be arrested if found fishing in the…area.” Here, a naval vessel arrest would constitute a seizure. Furthermore, the French foreign ministry called the action "unjustified and contrary to international law and commitments made by Canada," indicating that the French government viewed the threat as a state-to-state action. Therefore, we decided to maintain MID#2737.

MID#2814 involves a show of force by the Netherlands and Belgium targeting Iran. GML contend that this was coded as the result of the Dutch and Belgians sending minesweeping vessels to the Persian Gulf as a part of a coalition of countries clearing mines. They argue that this was not a show of force against Iran. Sources (Facts on File - September 11, 1987, September 25, 1987, October 9, 1987; AP - September 7, 1987; NYT - September 23, 1987) confirm that the Dutch and Belgian ships were in the Gulf to assist in minesweeping operations, as opposed to directing its forces against Iran. However, these sources also note that Iran did not fully welcome these operations, as an American military helicopter attacked and disabled an Iranian naval vessel that was allegedly laying mines on Sept. 21, and Iran continued to conduct raids on vessels that were unescorted by any of the growing number of foreign warships now patrolling the Gulf. These actions indicate that the minesweeping operations were central to the coalition's challenges against Iranian policy. We therefore decided to keep MID#2814.

MID#2837 concerns a show of force by Russia, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, the United Kingdom, and Italy targeting Greece. GML contend that this "probably refers to the increasing pressure placed on the Sultan to resolve the Cretan Crisis in 1896 – the Great Powers had fleets in the Mediterranean" and if so, this pressure does not constitute a codeable militarized incident. Dakin (1972, p. 150), however, notes that the Greek government did nothing in response to a massacre of Greeks in Crete by Turks, which was a retaliation for a May 18, 1896 incident, "for the powers had sent their warships to the island," referring to the European Great Powers as coded. Greek Prime Minister Deliyannis was waiting to see what became of the Cretan request to Britain to occupy the island and of the proposal of the powers, initiated by Austria, that the central government of the Ottoman Empire should summon the Cretan assembly and grant general amnesty. The European powers made a political initiative in Athens on July 6, and the Porte demanded that the flow of money, arms, and volunteers from Greece to Crete should cease. While the pressure by the Great Powers does seem to be directed towards the Ottoman Empire to resolve the issues in Crete, Greece appears to be affected by the pressure as well. The actions of sending warships to the island constitutes a public demonstration by a state of its military forces as originally coded; therefore, we have decided to keep MID#2837.
MID#2882
GML contend that MID#2882 refers to a June 11, 1961 seizure and detainment of several Japanese fishing vessels by a Soviet patrol vessel and that, without evidence of a protest by Japan, this MID should be dropped. Sources (NYT - 12 June 1961: 3, 16 July 1961: 25, 30 July 1961: 18, 29 Aug 1961: 22, 30 Aug 1961: 66, 05 Sep 1961: 31, 27 Oct 1961: 22) note that from June 1961 to at least until August 30, 1961 (encompassing the dates as originally coded), the Soviet Union seized several Japanese fishing vessels, detained the boats and their crew, and slowly released them continuing into October 1961. The sources also note that Japan had demanded the immediate release of the 13 boats and their crew taken prior to the August 30, 1961 seizure; this constitutes a protest. We have decided to keep MID#2882, changing the EndMon, EndDay, and EndYear to April 27, 1962, respectively, to reflect that on October 27, 1961, Soviet authorities freed 21 Japanese fishermen, while still detaining 7 vessels and 8 other fishermen. As the seizures are a sub-war militarized dispute in absence of a formal resolution, the end date reflects when there are no codable incidents for at least six months.

MID#2882 CHANGES:
MIDA
EndDay: 27
EndMon: 4
EndYear: 1962
MaxDur: 321
MinDur: 321

MIDB
EndDay: 27
EndMon: 4
EndYear: 1962

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#2910
MID#2910 concerns a show of force by the United States targeting the Soviet Union. Specifically, a New York Times report (13 June 1965: 2) details an incident where a Soviet tourist ship was buzzed four times by U.S. military planes. GML contend that “this was not a show of force against a tourist ship, and there was no formal protest.” From our reading of the incident, however, we concluded that the action did, in fact, constitute a public demonstration by a state of its military capabilities directed against another system member. As there was little evidence of ambiguity, no protest from the target state is required. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#2910.

MID#2970
This MID originally codes a Norwegian attack on Denmark on August 31, 1981. The New York Times (01 Sep 1981: A5) report indicates that, on this date, Norwegian sailors boarded six Danish vessels fishing in Arctic waters claimed by each state. The Danish Foreign Minister initially ordered a Coast Guard ship into the area, and then offered to submit the dispute to international arbitration. The report does not specify whether the order to the Coast Guard was withdrawn.
GML state that this boarding lasted less than 24 hours and should therefore be dropped. The 24-hour criterion, however, is only required in cases of seizures and is therefore irrelevant to the classification of this incident. Given the context of this report, we have, however, reclassified this MID as a show of force since the action constitutes a public display intended to dissuade the Danish government from exercising fishing rights in the disputed waters. Denmark’s highest action remains 0 (none) because it is unclear whether ships were ever sent to respond to Norway’s actions.

MID#2970 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 7
HostLev: 3

MIDB
HiAct: 7 (ccode 385)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 385)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#2978
GML state that two American fighters buzzing a Libyan jetliner was not a show of force by the United States government. We, however, find this to be a public demonstration by the U.S. of its airborne capabilities intended to be directed against the Libyan state (not the Libyan citizens on the jetliner) and have therefore decided to keep MID#2978.

MID#3012
MID#3012 concerns an attack by France and Morocco targeting Angola, with Angola engaging in a clash. GML state that this MID should be dropped because it concerns a Moroccan expeditionary force (with French logistical support) assisting Zairean troops in fighting rebels attacking from Angola. GML appear to be referencing a source (Keesings - Volume XXIV (1978), Issue No. 12 (December), Page 29125), that states this attack occurred in March 1977; MID#3012 takes place in February 1978. An additional source (Facts on File - February 10, 1978) notes that "Angola had charged that French and Moroccan troops mounted raids on Angola from neighboring Zaire, according to a report Feb. 1." Based on this information, we have decided to keep MID#3012 and change ANG HiAct from 17 to 0, FRN HiAct from 16 to 12, and MOR HiAct from 16 to 12.

MID#3012 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 12
HostLev: 3

MIDB
HiAct: 0 (ccode 540)
HiAct: 12 (ccode 220)
HiAct: 12 (ccode 600)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 540)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 220)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 600)
MID#3060
GML state that while Zambian troops were deployed along the border with Zaire, Zaire was not being targeted by Zambian actions, which were instead in response to an ambush by Zairean bandits against Zambian workers. Sources (Keesings - Volume 30 (1984), Issue No. 4 (April), Page 32779; Volume 30 (1984), Issue No. 12 (December), Page 33268) confirm that the President of Zambia said that the troops and increased policing resources were in response to the "escalation of crimes of banditry and smuggling by Zairean nationals in the border area." However, it is also noted that during discussions between delegations from the two countries concerning the border dispute, in early 1984, there was an exchange of fire between border security forces of both states at Mokambo, north of the Zambian capital and on the boarder of Zambia and Zaire. The original coding of MID#3060 records a HiAct of a clash between both states; therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3060.

MID#3077
GML state that when three Argentinean fishing vessels were told by British warships to leave the waters near the Falkland Islands, no attack on the boats occurred and therefore, MID#3077 should be dropped. Sources (Facts on File - August 20, 1982; NYT - 12 Aug 1982: A7, 13 Aug 1982: A2) note that Argentine fishing boats and British naval vessels had been involved in three separate incidents near the Falkland Islands, where the British intercepted and forced the Argentine vessels out of the area. While the sources confirm no violence was reported, a helicopter equipped with rockets and a jet buzzed one of the ships. Additionally, the Foreign Minister of Argentina stated that they are going to protest the incidents, indicating that Argentina interpreted these actions against their citizens as a hostile signal. We therefore decided to keep MID#3077, changing UKG HiAct from 16 to 7.

MID#3115
MID#3115 concerns a show of force by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen targeting Oman. GML contend that when the Soviet Union installed surface-to-air missiles in South Yemen along the borders with Oman and North Yemen and increased naval activity, these were Soviet actions and not directed towards Oman. Sources (Foreign Broadcast Information Service - SOVIET UNION, FBIS-SOV-80-098 on 1980-05-19; FBIS - MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA, FBIS-MEA-80-098 on 1980-05-19; Keesings - Volume 27 (1981), Issue No. 3 (March), Page 30745) confirm that the Soviet Union installed surface-to-air missiles in
South Yemen, but that additionally, the Soviets had several T-72 medium tanks moved in South Yemen toward the borders with Oman and North Yemen. The sources also indicate that the South Yemen regime was amassing troops along the borders of Oman and that extraordinary preparations were being made in the border regions for launching acts of sabotage against Oman. The chairman of South Yemen's legislature said on the same day that the U.S. bases in Oman constituted a threat to all neighboring states, including South Yemen. We find that these actions together by South Yemen and the Soviet Union represent an explicit attempt to publicly demonstrate control over a border area and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3115, changing YPR HiAct from 7 to 11 and adding USR as a Side A participant with a HiAct of 7.

MID#3115 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 11
HostLev: 3
NumA: 2

MIDB
HiAct: 11 (ccode 680)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 680)

Add Soviet Union as participant:
DispNum3: 3115
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “USR”
code: 365
StDay: 19
StMon: 15
StYear: 1980
EndDay: 19
EndMon: 15
EndYear: 1980
SideA: 1 (ccode 365)
RevState: 1 (ccode 365)
RevType1: 3 (ccode 365)
RevType2: -9 (ccode 365)
Fatality: 0 (ccode 365)
FatalPre: 0 (ccode 365)
HiAct: 7 (ccode 365)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 365)
Orig: 1 (ccode 365)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#3121
GML state that when Zairean troops were sent to guard the border with the Congo, this show of force targeted non-state actors (Cuban forces and Zairean dissidents) because the Congolese Government allegedly stopped preparations for an attack on Zaire by such groups. However, it remains equally plausible that the show of force of the Zairean troops was also directed at the Congo as their actions relate to these
groups. It cannot be presumed that their target was the non-state actors alone and we have therefore decided to keep MID#3121.

**MID#3136**
GML state that MID#3136 is a duplicate of MID#2683. While MID#3136 does appear to be a double-count of MID#2683, MID#3136 is coded with UKG as RevState 1 (Yes) and RevType1 2 (Policy), while MID#2683 is coded with HAI as RevState 1 (Yes) and RevType1 2 (Policy). Sources (Montague 1940, p. 176; Léger 1907, pp. 230-231 and pp. 239-240; Bulmer-Thomas 2012, p. 168) note that this dispute refers to the Maunder incident, where the UK made a claim for $682,000 on behalf of Madame Maunder, a Haitian by birth but a British subject. Maunder had been given Tortuga Island, but failed to pay rent from 1870 to 1875; in response, the Haitian Government seized the products of the island. "Great Britain affected to consider this as a grave attack upon the interests of one of her subjects, which caused her in due time to resort to threats to extort an indemnity from Haiti." In response, the HMS Canada anchored in the harbor of Port-au-Prince, demanding that Haiti pay an immediate settlement or risk bombardment. These events suggest (in addition to the coding of UKG as SideA/initiator) that UK G is considered the state that is dissatisfied with the existing status quo and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3136 and instead drop MID#2683.

**MID#3255**
MID#3255 concerns an attack by Russia targeting China in 1912. GML describe this MID as when Russia sent a small military mission to Mongolia to train the Mongolian army, who subsequently attacked Chinese forces and forced the surrender of a Chinese garrison in Western Mongolia. GML contend that as Mongolia was not an independent system member and that this dispute should therefore be dropped. Sources (NYT - 19 June 1912: 8, 20 June 1912: 8, 21 June 1912: 7; Straight 1913, Journal of Race Development; WSJ - 31 Aug 1912: 6; Washington Post - 02 June 1912: E6; Williams 1916, American Journal of International Law) discuss loan negotiations between the major powers and China in June 1912, with Russia attempting to secretly negotiate a bilateral agreement for special privileges in Mongolia and Manchuria. China eventually yields to the larger conference of the six great powers and accepts their terms for a loan agreement. These sources also describe a general hostility between Russia and China at this time over the issue of Mongolia, which declares its independence from China in late 1911. GML describes this MID as involving a Russian military mission to Mongolia and subsequent Mongolian attack on a Chinese garrison in the summer of 1912. They argue that Russian troops did not accompany Mongolian forces and that the latter was not a system member, disqualifying this action as a MID between Russia and China. We find it plausible that Russian forces accompanied the Mongolian troops on their attack on the Chinese garrison and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3255.

**MID#3517**
GML state that MID#3517 is counted three times in the dataset (as MID#1789 and MID#3886). Sources confirm the GML narrative, and this MID is indeed counted three times in the data. However, we have decided to keep MID#3517, as it spans the duration of the dispute (11/26/43-5/26/44), and to drop MID#1789 and MID#3886; this is instead of GML’s recommendation to drop MID#3517 and MID#3886.

**MID#3524**
GML state that MID#3524 is double-counted as MID#3877. Sources confirm the GML narrative. We have decided to keep MID#3524 in favor of merging MID#3877 into MID#3524.

MID#3524 CHANGES:
MIDA
NumA: 3
NumB: 1
MIDB
SideA: 1 (ccode 740)
SideA: 1 (ccode 255)
SideA: 1 (ccode 325)
SideA: 0 (ccode 70)
RevState: 1 (ccode 255)
RevType1: 2 (ccode 255)
HiAct: 16 (ccode 255)
HostLev: 4 (ccode 255)
Orig: 0 (ccode 740)
Orig: 0 (ccode 325)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#3646
GML state that MID#3646 concerns the Russian ultimatum given to the Chinese in March of 1911, which is actually already coded in MID#3647, and because there are no separate militarized incidents besides the threat during this time frame (May 1910 to April 1911), MID#3646 should be dropped. Sources (NYT - 22 Aug 1910: 3, 17 Feb 1911: 4, 18 Feb 1911: 5, 19 Feb 1911: 10, 15 Mar 1911: 4; Washington Post - 29 Dec 1910: 5, 17 Feb 1911: 1, 21 Feb 1911: 1, 23 Feb 1911: 1, 25 Mar 1911: 1, 28 Mar 1911: 3; Christian Science Monitor - 28 Jan 1911: 30, 14 Mar 1911: 14, 18 Mar 1911: 1, 28 Mar 1911: 16) note that in addition to the Russian Ambassador issuing six demands to China in Feb. 1911 to yield and surrender certain provinces according to the Russian-Chinese Treaty of 1881, Russia announced that it will make a military demonstration on Russian-Chinese frontier border. Subsequently, Russian troops were being concentrated at a settlement close to the Chinese frontier and opposite Chinese towns. The Chinese resident-general of Mongolia also received orders to mobilize troops. As these border fortification actions are reflected by the original coding of USR HiAct of 11 in MID#3646 and that the participants, dates, and USR HiAct of MID#3647 are eclipsed by the coding of MID#3646, we have decided to keep MID#3646 in favor of dropping MID#3647.

MID#3655
MID#3655 concerns an attack by Russia targeting China. GML contend that because the Soviet Union was invited into a conflict between Chinese warlords and that there was no protest from the Chinese state, MID#3655 is not a militarized incident. Sources (NYT - 05 Dec 1933: 11, 07 Jan 1934: E8; Clark 2011, pp. 30-33; Lin 2010, pp. 44-47) note that in December 1933, the capital of Xinjiang was captured by the Muslim General Ma Zhongying/Ma Chung-Yeng. The Chinese government is noted to favor General Ma, even though the recently-ousted General Sheng Shicai/Sheng Shih-Tsai was appointed the Border Defense Commissioner for Xinjiang by the Chinese government. General Sheng was instead fully backed by the Soviets and received substantial Soviet military aid in December 1933. In January 1934, Soviet air support and two brigades helped General Sheng rout General Ma's forces, and the Soviets installed General Sheng as the new governor of Xinjiang. The sources also indicate that China considered Xinjiang their territory: although Xinjiang was considered distant and uncontrollable by Chiang Kai-shek, he had appointed various governors to oversee the area. Further, Chinese General Huang Shaohong prepared an expeditionary force, ready to back either General Ma or General Sheng to return control of Xinjiang to China. By May 1934, the province had fallen to General Sheng, and China's most likely ally General Ma was retreating; Chiang ordered General Huang to halt because Chinese intelligence was informed of the Soviet backing of Sheng, and China did not want to risk an international situation. Altogether, this context and these actions indicate
that the Soviet Union was not invited into Chinese territory by the Chinese state and that the Chinese state considered itself to have been under attack by the Soviets (and nearly sent military forces to respond), in accordance with the original coding. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3655.

**MID#3701**
This dyadic MID takes place in 1940 and features a German attack and the Dutch joining an interstate war. GML state that despite rumors of a German attack on the Netherlands and that the Germans were massing military forces, there was no target of the Dutch fortification that had commenced. Sources (NYT - 01 Nov 1939: 2, 05 Nov 1939: 42, 06 Nov 1939: 4, 07 Nov 1939: 1, 08 Nov 1939: 3, 08 Nov 1939: 4, 08 Nov 1939: 5, 08 Nov 1939: 6, 13 Nov 1939: 1, 20 Nov 1939: 1) note that on November 5, 1939, a statement appearing in the German press declared that since the Polish Campaign has ended, the troops and cannons on Germany's Western Front could be used for offense or defense. In response, the Netherlands began military preparations to guard its neutrality. The Dutch proceeded to confer with the Belgians on a joint defense against aggression. Furthermore, during the time frame coded by MID#3701, the Dutch fired on German planes flying over their territory with anti-aircraft batteries and patrol planes. As the end date of MID#3701 coincides with the German invasion of the Netherlands and that the Dutch participation in MID#258 (representing World War II) begins the same date, we find sufficient evidence that there was a militarized dispute between Germany and the Netherlands prior to the Netherlands' full entry into World War II. We have decided to keep MID#3701.

**MID#3821**
GML state that MID#3821 is a double-count of MID#3542 and should be dropped. GML also claim that MID#3811 should be combined with MID#3542, making the highest act a clash. MID#3821 appears to be the same incident of MID#3542, but with a longer date range. We therefore chose to drop MID#3542 in favor of keeping MID#3821 and merge MID#3811 into MID#3821, making the highest act for MID#3821 a clash.

**MID#3821 CHANGES:**
MIDA
HiAct: 17
HostLev: 4

MIDB
HiAct: 17
HostLev: 4

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

**MID#3833**
GML state that MID#3833 resulted from a British vessel forcing a German vessel into a Uruguayan port after a battle, but that the British did not violate Uruguay's waters and that there was no protest. Sources indicate that British and German forces clashed within the mouth of the River Plate, which Argentina and Uruguay consider their jurisdictional waters. There appears to have been debate about whether the ships fought within the neutral zone or Argentina and/or Uruguay's territorial waters, but Uruguay protested both countries for alleged violations. Uruguay and Argentina jointly patrolled the waters thereafter. After the battle, Uruguay allowed the German ship to remain in port for repairs. Britain protested with ships positioned in international waters, since this action took longer than the 24-hour period permitted by
existing laws regarding docking in neutral countries. We agree with GML that the naval battle between Great Britain and Germany does not constitute a MID since there was no violation of a territorial land boundary and because the action cannot plausibly be a show of force directed against Uruguay or Argentina. However, based on the joint-naval patrols by Uruguay and Argentina, we have decided to keep MID#3833 and chose to re-classify as a show of force by Uruguay and Argentina against Britain and Germany.

MID#3833 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 7
HostLev: 3
NumA: 2
NumB: 2

MIDB
SideA: 1 (ccode 165)
SideA: 0 (ccode 200)
HiAct: 7 (ccode 165)
HiAct: 0 (ccode 200)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 165)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 200)

Add Argentina as participant:
DispNum3: 3833
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “ARG”
code: 160
StDay: 13
StMon: 12
StYear: 1939
EndDay: 13
EndMon: 12
EndYear: 1939
SideA: 1 (ccode 160)
RevState: 0 (ccode 160)
RevType1: 0 (ccode 160)
RevType2: -9 (ccode 160)
Fatality: 0 (ccode 160)
FatalPre: 0 (ccode 160)
HiAct: 7 (ccode 160)
HostLev: 3 (ccode 160)
Orig: 1 (ccode 160)

Add Germany as participant:
DispNum3: 3833
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “GMY”
code: 255
StDay: 13
StMon: 12
StYear: 1939
EndDay: 13
GML state that there were no Allied or Italian submarines in the vicinity of an alleged sinking of a Spanish ship. The incident was detailed in a New York Times report, which also indicated that two additional Spanish ships were also sunk by Italian subs in recent weeks. As GML note, Rohwer (1997) argues that the ship was more likely sunk by a mine, since there did not appear to be Axis ships in the area at the time. Rohwer, however, provides little evidence to substantiate this claim. Given the difficulties in precisely locating submarine locations, we have decided to keep MID#3837 based on the original news report.

MID#3858
GML state that MID#3858 concerns a policy dispute pitting Bulgaria against Germany and Romania, and that there was no show of force by Germany and no border fortification by Bulgaria against Germany; therefore, MID#3858 should be dropped. Sources (NYT - 04 Oct 1940: 5, 08 Oct 1940: 1, 09 Oct 1940: 9, 10 Nov 1940: 37, 12 Oct 1940: 1, 15 Oct 1940: 4, 16 Oct 1940: 1, 17 Oct 1940: 4, 05 Nov 1940: 5; Washington Post - 08 Oct 1940: 1, 11 Oct 1940: 2, 19 Oct 1940: 4, 24 Oct 1940: 2, 26 Oct 1940: 2, 02 Nov 1940: 1; Christian Science Monitor - 16 Oct 1940: 5, 19 Oct 1940: 4; Keesings - Volume III-IV (1940), Issue No. 10 (October), Page 4286; Volume III-IV (1940), Issue No. 10 (October), Page 4295; Volume III-IV (1940), Issue No. 11 (November), Page 4310; Volume III-IV (1940), Issue No. 11 (November), Page 4349) confirm that Bulgaria adamantly refused pressure by the Germans to mobilize 300,000 to 400,000 men against Greece or Turkey; while King Boris of Bulgaria was determined to join the Axis powers during this time, the Bulgarian Government was officially neutral. While on two separate occasions, Bulgaria rushed military reinforcements to her borders and ordered partial mobilization, the border fortifications and troop mobilizations were on Bulgaria's borders with Greece and Turkey. Therefore, there does not appear to be a border fortification by Bulgaria directed towards Germany and Romania, as originally coded. However, the sources also note that a German military plane flew on the capital of Bulgaria, immediately after the German army reached the capital of Romania and 20,000 German troops had taken up strategic positions throughout Romania. This action indicates that Germany conducted a deliberate public demonstration of its airborne capabilities against Bulgaria, as originally coded with a show of force by Germany. Romania appears to be a participant because by early November, Bulgaria was considering a deal with Axis powers and allowed the movement of German troops from Romania into Bulgaria. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3858, dropping RUM as a participant, changing BUL HiAct from 11 to 0, and changing the date to a single-incident (10/11/1940), reflecting the German military plane on Sofia.
MID#3858 CHANGES:
MIDA
EndDay: 11
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1940
MaxDur: 1
MinDur: 1
HiAct: 7
NumA: 2

MIDB
Drop ccode 360
EndDay: 11
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1940
HiAct: 0 (ccode 165)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 355)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#3870
GML state MID#3870 occurred when "Hungary placed special Iron Guard controllers in charge of units along its border with Rumania in January of 1941. While border fortification is not routine, and the action was government-authorized, this action was not necessarily an explicit threat toward Romania." However, MID#3870 is coded as a border fortification in the other direction, by Romania towards Hungary. Sources (NYT - 03 Dec 1940: 1, 29 Dec 1940: 15, 31 Dec 1940: 3, 03 Jan 1941: 5) note that the Iron Guard is a Romanian far right party, and not Hungarian. While both states were party to the Axis Tripartite Pact by January 1941 and had allowed Germany to move its troops through their territories, the Iron Guard party was hostile towards Hungary and warned Romanians of "knives in the back." Thus, when the Romanian government tightened the border patrol along their Hungarian border by appointing special Iron Guard controllers to oversee border guards, the act was directed and overt. We have decided to keep MID#3870.

MID#3918
GML state that when a Sri Lankan soldier fired upon 20-30 Indian peacekeepers who had been invited into Sri Lanka, the firing was accidental and therefore not a dispute. Sources (NYT - 18 July 1989: A5, 29 July 1989: 1; Keesings - Volume 35 (1989), Issue No. 7 (July), Page 36812; Associated Press - July 15, 1989; Sydney Morning Herald - July 15, 1989; The Guardian - July 17, 1989) note that this incident occurs during Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War, and relations between the two countries had deteriorated since June 1st when Sri Lankan President demanded the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. On July 15, 1989, the date coded for MID#3918, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister stated at a press conference that the Indians were disobeying the President's orders to observe a cease-fire in their operations against Tamil Tiger separatists and raised the possibility of an armed confrontation. The sources for the clash that also occurs that same day confirm that a Sri Lankan soldier had fired on an Indian patrol of about 20 soldiers passing a remote jungle camp. While an Indian spokesman stated that the clash was accidental and said both countries considered the matter closed, sources indicate that the Sri Lankan army gave a different account of the event: "[The Sri Lankan army] said their camp was attacked by the patrol. They killed four Indian soldiers and three members of two Tamil groups which often accompany Indian patrols. The army
claimed that one of the groups had abducted two Sri Lankan soldiers earlier in the day." Given this evidence, we have decided to keep MID#3918.

MID#3951
GML state that MID#3951 concerns a French inspection lasting less than 24 hours and note that there was no protest. MID#3951 takes place during the Gulf War, with a French ship firing warning shots at a North Korean freighter amidst a trade embargo on Iraq. The freighter was initially not stopping for inspection, but did so after the warning shots and was then allowed to proceed. Since the original MID was classified as an attack, neither a protest nor a 24-hour occupation period is necessary. Given that the vessel was North Korean, we have also determined that these actions were taken against state, rather than private, actors. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#3951.

MID#4023
MID#4023 concerns an alert by China targeted at Taiwan. GML contend that neither the COW listed sources, nor any other newspaper sources, describe any such alert by China targeted towards Taiwan in January 1993. Sources (BBC - February 8, 1993; Keesings - Volume 39 (1993), Issue No. 2 (February), Page 39316) note that after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui won party and parliamentary approval for his preferred candidate as Taiwanese Premier, a report in a Hong Kong newspaper indicated that Chinese armed forces had been placed on combat readiness "in view of the drastic changes in Taiwan's political situation." The article further notes that "forward units of the Guangzhou Military Region have been ordered to third-degree combat readiness, forward air units of the Nanjing Military Region has been ordered to second-degree combat readiness, the Seventh Army of the Air Force has been ordered to third-degree combat readiness, the East China Sea Fleet and naval air units have been ordered to third-degree combat readiness and the submarine section has been ordered to second-degree combat readiness." It is further noted that Chinese armed forces have indicated that if changes in Taiwan's political situation are "stepped up," China's combat readiness against Taiwan will also be stepped up correspondingly. We find this sufficient evidence of a reported increase in the military readiness of China's regular armed forces and we have decided to keep MID#4023.

MID#4026
This MID is based on a show of force by Japan to Taiwan. Japanese patrol boats blocked attempts by Taiwanese civilian boats to enter the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands twice. On 9/4/96, Japanese boats prevented Hong Kong journalists aboard on a Taiwanese charter boat from entry. Two days later, Japanese patrol boats turned back a ship sailing with a Taiwanese lawmaker. GML state that the Taiwanese lawmaker was acting as a private citizen and did not represent Taiwan in the incident. However, according to sources (UPI – September 6, 1996), these incidents are part of Taiwanese civilians' attempts to destroy a lighthouse built by the right-wing Japan Youth Federation on the main islet of Diayu (Senkaku). The same sources also mention that "both Taiwan and communist China claim ownership of the islets and see the lighthouse and Japan's efforts to enforce its claims of sovereignty as a resurgence of Japanese militarism". Therefore, the actions of Japanese patrol boats were a public display of force aimed at signaling Japan’s claim to the government in Taiwan. We believe these actions are sufficient to constitute a MID and therefore, we have decided to keep MID#4026.

MID#4032
MID#4032 concerns a threat to use force against one another by Zaire and Belgium. GML contend that when Belgium stated that it 500 paratroopers on standby to help an evacuation of Belgian nationals in response to rioting in Kinshasa, Zaire, this was not a threat to use force against Zaire (and if a clear threat was made, it would be against the rioters). Sources (NYT - 31 Jan 1993: 14; The Independent (London) - February 1, 1993a, February 1, 1993b, February 5, 1993; Inter Press Service - February 1, 1993; The
Guardian (London) - February 1, 1993; The Gazette (Montreal) - February 1, 1993; Keesings - Volume 39, January, 1993 Zaire, Page 39257 ; The Observer - January 31 1993; The Herald (Glasgow) - February 1, 1993; The Age (Melbourne) - February 1, 1993) confirm that in response to widespread rioting in Kinshasa, Belgium deployed 300-550 paratroops to nearby Brazzaville in order to facilitate the evacuation of Belgian nationals from Zaire/DRC’s capital. However, Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko and Zaire's military chiefs "sent a clear warning it would prevent a Belgian military landing" and warned that "any intrusion by Belgian troops into national territory will be considered an invasion." Belgium's Defense Minister responded by saying they would "see what has to be done" and "do the necessary" to protect their nationals, but Belgian troops maintained their position and never left for Kinshasa. We agree that these statements by the Belgian Defense Minister do not qualify as a threat. However, GML do not address the coding of a threat to use force by Zaire against Belgium. We believe the statements made by the Zairean President do qualify as a MID. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#4032, changing BEL HiAct from 1 to 0.

**MID#4032 CHANGES:**

**MIDA**
EndDay: 30  
EndMon: 1  
EndYear: 1993  
MaxDur: 1  
MinDur: 1

**MIDB**
EndDay: 30  
EndMon: 1  
EndYear: 1993  
HiAct: 0 (ecode 211)  
HostLev: 1 (ecode 211)

**MIDI**
Drop IncidNum3: 4032002

**MIDIP**
Drop IncidNum3: 4032002

**MID#4264**

GML state that MID#4264 is not a militarized dispute and is a diplomatic dispute, if anything. MID#4264 is related to Australian peace-keeping operations in East Timor. The Australian-led Interfet force sent to East Timor in September 1999 faced aggressive probing from Indonesian aircrafts and submarines. Consequently, Australian-led warships and combat jets were on alert for the first two weeks of the East Timor military operation. GML acknowledge that Australian warships and jets were placed on alert, but contend that this is not a MID because there is evidence that Indonesia and Australia were working together at a later date. We agree with GML that the states were cooperating generally, however, we believe that the evidence GML provides does not disprove the fact of military conflict occurred between Australian and Indonesian forces amidst this backdrop. Specifically, the Australian alert functioned as a signal of Australia’s discontent over the actions of Indonesian aircrafts and submarines. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#4264.

**MID#4274**

GML state that MID#4274 should be dropped in favor of extending the end date of MID#4215. MID#4274 is concerned with when Iraq moved a large number of troops to the Kuwaiti border. GML state that
MID#4274 and MID#4215 code two troop alerts by Kuwait in response to Iraqi moves in 1999 and because these incidents are ten days apart (in January), they concern the same border issue. However, the high act in MID#4215 is an alert, which was a response to Iraq's claim that Kuwait participated in the attacks on Iraq by U.S. and British planes. Therefore, while MID#4274 is concerns the border issue, MID#4215 concerns the response to Iraq's rhetoric. Therefore, we have decided to keep MID#4274 and make no changes to MID#4215.
Part 3 – Changes to cases related to cases from Gibler, Miller, and Little’s (2016) “Appendix IIB—Cases that should be dropped”

**MID#1142**
For MID#2182, original sources (NYT - 15 Dec 1917: 3, 24 Dec 1917: 2, 28 Dec 1917: 1, 30 Dec 1917: 2) confirm GML narrative to drop MID#2182 in favor of keeping MID#1142. However, MID#1142 should be recoded to EndDay Dec. 29 1917 and HiAct of 17 for both participants.

MID#1142 CHANGES:
MIDA
EndDay: 29
MaxDur: 25
MinDur: 25
HiAct: 17
HostLev: 4
Recip: 1

MIDB
EndDay: 29
HiAct: 17
HostLev: 4

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

**MID#3046**
For MID#3039, original sources (NYT - 09 Oct 1984: A1) confirm GML narrative to drop MID#3039 in favor of keeping MID#3046. As GML noted, recommend including UKG to MID#3046.

MID#3046 CHANGES:
MIDA
NumB: 2

MIDB
Add United Kingdom as participant:
DispNum3: 3046
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “UKG”
ccode: 200
StDay: 8
StMon: 10
StYear: 1984
EndDay: 8
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1984
SideA: 0 (ccode 200)
MID#2683
GML state that MID#3136 is a duplicate of MID#2683. We have decided to keep MID#3136 in favor of dropping MID#2683 [see MID#3136 for explanation].

MID#2683 CHANGES:
MIDA
Drop

MIDB
Drop

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#1789 and MID#3886
We have decided to keep MID#3517 in favor of dropping MID#1789 and MID#3886 [see MID#3517 for explanation].

MID#1789 CHANGES:
MIDA
Drop

MIDB
Drop

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

MID#3886 CHANGES:
MIDA
We have decided to keep MID#3646 in favor of dropping MID#3647 [see MID#3646 for explanation].

MID#3647 CHANGES:
MIDA Drop
MIDB Drop
MIDI N/A
MIDIP N/A

GML state that MID#3821 is a double-count of MID#3542 and should be dropped. GML also claim that MID#3811 should be combined with MID#3542, making the highest act a clash. MID#3821 appears to be the same incident of MID#3542, but with a longer date range. We therefore chose to drop MID#3542 in favor of keeping MID#3821 and merge MID#3811 into MID#3821, making the highest act for MID#3821 a clash.

We have decided to keep MID#3821 in favor of dropping MID#3542 and MID#3811 [see MID#3821 for explanation].

MID#3542 CHANGES:
MIDA Drop
MIDB Drop
MIDI N/A
MIDIP N/A
MID#3811 CHANGES:
MIDA
Drop

MIDB
Drop

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A
Part 4 – Additional MID Creation

MID#3699 (branched from MID#3858)

MID#3699 CHANGES:
MIDA
Creation of MID#3699:
DispNum3: 3699
DispNum4: -9
StDay: 23
StMon: 10
StYear: 1940
EndDay: 23
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1940
Outcome: 8
Settle: 4
Fatality: 0
FatalPre: 0
MaxDur: 1
MinDur: 1
HiAct: 3
HostLev: 2
Recip: 0
NumA: 1
NumB: 1
Link1: 0
Link2: 0
Link3: 0
Ongo2010: 0

MIDB
Creation of MID#3699:
Add Turkey as participant:
DispNum3: 3699
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “TUR”
ccode: 640
StDay: 23
StMon: 10
StYear: 1940
EndDay: 23
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1940
SideA: 1 (ccode 640)
RevState: 0 (ccode 640)
RevType1: 0 (ccode 640)
RevType2: -9 (ccode 640)
Fatality: 0 (ccode 640)
FatalPre: 0 (ccode 640)
HiAct: 3 (ccode 640)
HostLev: 2 (ccode 640)
Orig: 1 (ccode 640)

Add Bulgaria as participant:
DispNum3: 3699
DispNum4: -9
StAbb: “BUR”
code: 355
StDay: 23
StMon: 10
StYear: 1940
EndDay: 23
EndMon: 10
EndYear: 1940
SideA: 0 (ccode 355)
RevState: 1 (ccode 355)
RevType1: 2 (ccode 355)
RevType2: -9 (ccode 355)
Fatality: 0 (ccode 355)
FatalPre: 0 (ccode 355)
HiAct: 0 (ccode 355)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 355)
Orig: 1 (ccode 355)

MIDB
Drop

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A
Part 5 –MID Changes Unrelated to Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016)

**MID#365**

MID#365 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 15
HostLev: 4

MIDB
HiAct: 15 (ccode 740)
HiAct: 0 (ccode 365)
HostLev: 4 (ccode 740)
HostLev: 0 (ccode 740)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

**MID#3723**

MID#3723 CHANGES:
MIDA
HiAct: 15
HostLev: 4

MIDB
SideA: 1 (ccode 367)
SideA: 0 (ccode 255)
HiAct: 15 (ccode 367)
HiAct: 0 (ccode 255)
HostLev: 4 (ccode 367)
HostLev: 1 (ccode 255)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A

**MID#3824**

MID#3824 CHANGES:
MIDA
N/A

MIDB
StAbb: “ITA” (ccode 235)
ccode: 325 (ccode 235)

MIDI
N/A

MIDIP
N/A
Part 6 – Isolated Merge Unrelated to Gibler, Miller, and Little (2016)

MID#2095/2096 -> 623

Part 7 – Accepted and Rejected Merges from Gibler, Miller, and Little’s (2016) “Appendix IIC—Cases that should be merged with other disputes”

Accepted:
MID#251 -> MID#2929
MID#266 -> MID#1706
MID#1008 -> MID#1006
MID#1020 -> MID#1019
MID#1134 -> MID#2112
MID#1204 -> MID#1202
MID#1211 -> MID#1027
MID#1315 -> MID#1312
MID#1316 -> MID#1312
MID#1349 -> MID#1347
MID#1421 -> MID#1423
MID#1467 -> MID#1312
MID#1617 -> MID#1360
MID#1624 -> MID#1740
MID#2004 -> MID#1764
MID#2073 -> MID#2072
MID#2094 -> MID#199
MID#2114 -> MID#2115
MID#2183 -> MID#136
MID#2189 -> MID#2188
MID#2190 -> MID#1379
MID#2210 -> MID#2209
MID#2213 -> MID#2212
MID#2243 -> MID#1623
MID#2362 -> MID#1109
MID#2617 -> MID#1362
MID#2624 -> MID#1229
MID#2628 -> MID#1302
MID#2709 -> MID#343
MID#2766 -> MID#2823
MID#2839 -> MID#1347
MID#2844 -> MID#3218
MID#2874 -> MID#1347
MID#2889 -> MID#1347
MID#2895 -> MID#1347
MID#2905 -> MID#1347
MID#2941 -> MID#1379
MID#2943 -> MID#2946
MID#2979 -> MID#2971
MID#2993 -> MID#409
MID#3124 -> MID#1333
MID#3310 -> MID#1347
MID#3407 -> MID#3434
MID#3408 -> MID#3434
MID#3409 -> MID#3434
MID#3410 -> MID#3434
MID#3423 -> MID#3434
MID#3424 -> MID#3434
MID#3425 -> MID#3434
MID#3431 -> MID#3434
MID#3433 -> MID#3434
MID#3435 -> MID#3434
MID#3436 -> MID#3434
MID#3500 -> MID#1272
MID#3501 -> MID#1272
MID#3832 -> MID#3834
MID#3857 -> MID#3850
MID#4087 -> MID#4022
MID#4157 -> MID#4156
MID#4233 -> MID#4210
MID#4336 -> MID#4280

Rejected:
MID#1216 -> MID#1213
MID#1217 -> MID#1213
MID#1379 -> MID#2188 (but: see MID#2941/ MID#2190 -> MID#1379)
MID#1523 -> MID#1506
MID#2028 -> MID#2030 (but: MID#2030 -> MID#2028 was merged)
MID#2084 -> MID#2085 (but: MID#2085 -> MID#2084 was merged)
MID#2340 -> MID#2339
MID#2595 -> MID#2584
MID#2797 -> MID#2594
MID#3385 -> MID#3384
MID#3541 -> MID#3071
MID#3811 -> MID#3542 (but: see changes to MID#3821)
MID#4043 -> MID#3554
Part 8 – References for MID Decisions

MID#217


MID#508
N/A

MID#1028

MID#1042


MID#1157


MID#1335

MID#1449

MID#1501

MID#1526


38
MID#1725

MID#1734

MID#1790

MID#2051

MID#2077

MID#2108

MID#2172

MID#2621

MID#2701

MID#2712


MID#2737

MID#2814


MID#2837

MID#2882


MID#2910

MID#2970

MID#2978

MID#3012

MID#3060


MID#3077


MID#3115


MID#3121

MID#3136


MID#3255


MID#3517


MID#3524

MID#3646


MID#3655


MID#3701


MID#3821
N/A

MID#3833


MID#3837
New York Times. 1940. “British Lose 131,857 Shipping Tons in Week; Figure Exceeds Average High in Last War.” New York Times October 2: 3.


MID#3858


**MID#3870**


**MID#3918**


**MID#3951**

**MID#4023**
MID#4026

MID#4032


MID#4264


MID#4274
References
