SCIED 552: Science Teaching and Learning Developing Models of Science Teaching

Well, we took our first crack at a little bit of Vygotksy this week. The big question that we need to discuss is how his vision/model fits into our developing ecosystem of models. There are some more focused questions that also need addressing:

• What are the key parts of how Vygotsky links tools and signs with learning (internalization)?
• How are Vygotsky’s notions of learning different from behaviorism (specifically stimulus and response)?
• How does Vygotksy’s method, in particular double stimulation, contribute to his thinking?

In addition, you all has some similar quotes from the reading that caught your interest, so it seems they might make a nice focus of our discussion. Here they are:

Memory rather than abstract thought is said to be “the definitive characteristic of the early stages of cognitive development” (p. 51). What about recognition of abstract images?

 

”The potential for complex sign operations is embedded in the earliest stages of individual development.”

 

”In the first case a temporary link is formed owing to the simultaneous occurrence of two stimuli that affect the organism; in the second case humans personally create a temporary link through an artificial combination of stimuli.”

 

“Within a general process of development, two qualitatively different lines of development, differing in origin, can be distinguished: the elementary processes, which are of biological origin, on the one hand, and the higher psychological functions, of sociocultural origin, on the other. The history of child behavior is born from the interweaving of these two lines. The history of the development of the higher psychological functions is impossible without a study of their prehistory, their biological roots, and their organic disposition.” (p.46)

 

“…for the young child, to think means to recall; but for the adolescent, to recall means to think…in the elementary form something is remembered; in the higher form humans remember something” (p. 51).

 

“This sign also possesses the important characteristic of reverse action (that is, it operates on the individual, not the environment” (p. 39).

Some other outstanding questions:

While children may not be able to identify with Vygotsky’s theory of signs and mediated responses, I have had discussions with children where they can identify abstract concepts through art. Some examples would be complex social relationships among other children, families, and the child’s environment. I am interested to discuss how children can form abstract concepts in other ways instead of just focusing on verbal identification.    

 

How are these tools and signs acquired? Are they communicated to us through older generations? Do we stumble upon them in early childhood? How are these differentially used in formal education settings?  

Here is west group’s model for cognitive apprenticeship (next two pictures).

Here is the east group’s model

Between the warnings about the difficulty of this reading and the Marx quote at the beginning, I fully expected to dislike Vygotsky, but to my surprise I actually found this to be the most interesting article we’ve read.  To begin with, I related with his desire for “a comprehensive approach that would make possible description and explanation of higher psychological functions in terms acceptable to natural science.”  I’ve long been bothered by the giant gap between the biological working of neurons and the description of psychological mechanisms, and it was nice to see that Vygotsky at least wanted to try to bridge that gap, even if he never fully succeeded.

I was a little bit concerned about Vygotsky’s experimental methods, as the introduction predicted people might be.  I think the small number of subjects used in his experiments makes them useful for seeing if that is a potentially fruitful area of investigation, but I would be hesitant to draw any factual conclusions from them.  Presumably (or at least hopefully) psychology is like other sciences in that other psychologists would duplicate Vygotsky’s experiments to verify the results, which would help alleviate the problem.

One thing I couldn’t get a handle on was whether or not Vygotsky believes in tabula rasa. One quote: “The child does not suddenly and irrevocably deduce the relation between the sign and the method for using it. Nor does she intuitively develop an abstract attitude derived, so to speak, from ‘the depths of the child’s own mind.’ This metaphysical view, according to which inherent psychological schemata exist prior to any experience, leads inevitably to an a priori conception of higher psychological functions” seemed to indicate to me that he did, but then this one seems like he doesn’t:  “The potential for complex sign operations is embedded in the earliest stages of individual development.”

I was also struck by how simple, yet profound some of his statements were, such as:  “In the elementary form something is remembered; in the higher form humans remember something.”  Statements like this helped me easily grasp the major points of his ideas, which I was expecting to be a difficult task.  He goes on to say:  “In the first case a temporary link is formed owing to the simultaneous occurrence of two stimuli that affect the organism; in the second case humans personally create a temporary link through an artificial combination of stimuli.”  This sounds like classical conditioning and behaviorism are examples of the elementary form.  It also emphasizes the importance of active participation for higher learning to occur.

Finally, unlike last week’s reading, which seemed to take the “knowledge as a tool” idea a bit too literally, Vygotsky makes it clear that tools are just a metaphor, and that psychological functions are not literally exactly like tools.  There are some useful similarities that allow them to be used an analogy, but there are also important differences.

I found reading the introduction extremely helpful in framing Vygotsky’s theories, practices, and definitions, such as defining his terminology of experimentation and mediation. However, the majority of the introduction discussed 19^th century theorists and post-revolutionary Psychology in Russia. Having only a small background in the field of Psychology, I found much of the background of Vygotsky conceptual framework very confusing as the descriptions of each person were short or the theories did not provide good examples. Nevertheless I did understand their inclusion in giving the reader a history of where and how Vygotsky’s theories began. The sections I found most relevant were the discussions on the development of Gestalt psychology and the Marxist theoretical framework as major contributions to Vygotskys foundation. What I found unique about him was his interest in many diverse research paths. However, the chapters focused on his study of investigating complex perceptual and problem solving behaviors with a developmental change rooted in society and culture. I also found it interesting to learn about Vygotsky’s research and writing on the problems of education. The term pedology or educational psychology came from within this research.

Vygotsky’s definition of research and experimentation is rooted in both qualitative and quantitative research. The method of investigation or experimental-genetic method is part of his research, which I concluded to mean how the mind defines thoughts and changes. Introducing new variables or alternate routes enabled Vygotsky to problem solve and map conceptual change. Vygotsky described that habits are visible, observable, and recordable. Introducing and studying objects can be helpful in this process. How our mind adapts to new situations and the observable responses are important to his research. He investigates above age level tasks to research the participant’s actions. Vygotsky discussed how the process of responding to stimuli and how conceptual change and learning are both important. This was in contrast to others work in the field of Psychology, which mainly includes studying the participant’s performance. There was also a good description of how Vygotsky used the term mediating, or the process of how the individual responded to different stimuli in a situation.

I found chapter three to be the most interesting with the memory and thinking study of children, adolescents, and adults. This chapter focused on how individuals developed mental association and meaning with sign learning. Vygotsky studied the effects of mediated memory with people ages 5-27. Three stages developed from this study. The first is how children, preschool in age, cannot master behavior that required mediation remembering because culturally elaborated features have not yet been seen. The second, in children, showed mediation to be effective, while the third stage of adults showed mediation helps but external reinforcement becomes internal and the stimuli then not needed, calling this stage internalization. The outcome of the mediated sign research suggests that using signs are transformations linked by stages of a single process. There is also an interweaving of biology and sociocultural experiences. During this time many transitional psychological systems occur.  Figure 1, 2, and 3 in chapter 3 definitely helped me visualize Vygotsky’s research. I also found it helpful to read the transcripts of people taking part in this experiment. One part I felt unsure about was in chapter 3. This was where Vygotsky discussed how children’s memories were based on concrete instances and did not possess the characteristics of abstraction. I do not necessarily agree. While children may not be able to identify with Vygotsky’s theory of signs and mediated responses, I have had discussions with children where they can identify abstract concepts through art. Some examples would be complex social relationships among other children, families, and the child’s environment. I am interested to discuss how children can form abstract concepts in other ways instead of just focusing on verbal identification.     

It is always interesting to read primary sources of older, established scientists or psychologists such as Vygotsky himself. I appreciated being able to read the introduction because it supplied me with an understanding of Vygotsky’s foundation. For example, Vygotsky shared Gestalt psychologists’ dissatisfaction with psychological analysis that began by reducing all phenomena to a set of small psychological units.  One thing that I did not remember about Vygotsky was that he uses a Marxist theoretical framework by urging others to truly understand in individual’s history and how it is characterized by not only qualitative change, but quantitative change as well.  Furthermore, Marx’s historical materialism influenced Vygotsky to really think about the role of society in developmental psychology. Overall, the mechanism of individual developmental change is rooted in society and culture according to Vygotsky.

One thing that I am still a little confused about is the operationalization of ‘signs’ and ‘tools.’ Vygotsky differentiates them by indicating a tool’s function is to serve as a ‘conductor’ of human influence on an object of activity (i.e., externally oriented) and must lead to changes in objects. On the other hand, a sign changes nothing in the object of the psychological operation (i.e., internal activity) and is aimed at mastering oneself. How are these tools and signs acquired? Are they communicated to us through older generations? Do we stumble upon them in early childhood? How are these differentially used in formal education settings?  I’m trying to fit what we just ready about Vygotsky into an education context or with the previous models of learning that we discussed over the past several weeks. It seems like he is a mix of behaviorism, but takes it much further—almost to cognitive apprenticeship with his theory of zone of proximal development and the use of tools and signs that help influence authentic activity as well as learning a broader culture.

This week you had the first literature that represents the situative perspective on learning. You got to hear in the debate in ER some of the historical perspective on where BC&D’s notions of cognitive apprenticeship have their roots. You also saw in TSS how situative ideas have been incorporated into the discourse in science education. So, tonight we will work on developing a model of cognitive apprenticeship, with specific emphasis on looking for the problems they were trying to solve (in schools and learning theory) and what criticisms they received. You all brought up some good questions that need to be dealt with as we work on our model:

• How does cognitive apprenticeship compare as a model to our other models?
• What is culture? What does it mean to be enculturated into disciplinary practices?
• What constitutes authentic activity in the context of learning science?

Here some relevant quotes from your posts:

KeriAnn:

In response to this concern, Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) state “at best, students will only be able to assimilate partial understandings of any disciplinary cultures” (p. 11). If we do not expect students to develop an understanding of these cultural practices, is it truly necessary for them to engage in the culture in order for learning to occur?

Cori:

I do think the issue of culture is strongly debated and still is. I must admit I am still a little confused as to where I stand as well.  The student has to implicitly understand parts of the specific culture’s belief system in order to acquire its skills (e.g., math). Brown then discusses the use of authentic activity in the way that people make sense of concepts through engaging in activity that circumscribes those concepts. However, I’m still a little unsure of what exactly constitutes a culture and its associated authentic activities.

Kate:

The authors compare knowledge to tools, in which tools can only be understood through use. This reminded me of the phrase, use or lose it. However, one criticism is that people often use tools incorrectly or not for its intended purpose.

Ryan:

While you certainly can learn things about a tool by using it, there are other things about it that need to be learned in a more traditional, abstract way.  I might know how to use a microwave perfectly well, but have no idea how it actually works.

Julianne:

What I found most striking is a shift from Brown et al where the teaching method just needs to be changed for students (the empty vessels that they are) to learn to TSS where students come into the classroom (or any other learning environment) with preexisting ideas and beliefs that may play significant roles in how and what they learn.

This week’s readings focused on the connection between knowing and doing.  The TSS chapters focused on the importance of understanding the nature of scientific knowledge and on engaging in scientific practices.  These two things fit very well with Brown et al’s article on cognitive apprenticeship and situational learning.  Brown et al argue that in order to learn in a useful way, one must enculturate themself in the culture that uses the knowledge tool that is to be learned.  I think that is what TSS chapter 6 is trying to get at by acknowledging the importance of learning how scientific knowledge is constructed (although they don’t mention the Brown et al article in their references).  The student will gain a deeper understanding of science by adopting the culture of the scientist.

I think this enculturation can be useful, but I do not agree with Brown et al on its complete necessity.  In describing knowledge as a tool, they say “Tools share several significant features with knowledge: They can only be fully understood through use, and using them entails both changing the user’s view of the world and adopting the belief system of the culture in which they are used.”  I strongly doubt that I need to change my view of the world or adopt any belief system to use a hammer.  Palincsar notes this issue in her story about the Yanamamo Indians, although I think that was actually a bad example, because one could say they broke the mirrors because they didn’t understand mirror-user culture.

The other key part of cognitive apprenticeship is learning through doing, which is also the theme of chapter 7 of TSS.  Once again, I see the value in learning through doing, but Brown et al seem to think that all learning should consist of context specific activities, and that using a tool/knowledge will teach you about it.  While you certainly can learn things about a tool by using it, there are other things about it that need to be learned in a more traditional, abstract way.  I might know how to use a microwave perfectly well, but have no idea how it actually works.  It would be very difficult, probably impossible, to learn just by using the microwave that it causes the water molecules in your food to vibrate, increasing their kinetic energy, and thus the temperature of the food.

Brown et al also use the example of children inappropriately using new vocabulary words learned straight from the dictionary in sentences as evidence of the importance of context and situated knowledge.  However, this problem can also occur the other way.  There are words that I know the context in which they are typically used, but don’t know what they actually mean.  Here the dictionary definition would help me more than hearing someone use the word in context.  In general, I think the ideas of cognitive apprenticeship are useful in some cases, but should not be considered the ultimate theory of learning…which will probably apply to all the theories we talk about in this class.