13
Sep 13

Cognitive Apprenticeship–Julianne

While reading Situated Cognition (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989) I found it interesting that Dewey’s ideas can be seen at the core of the cognitive apprenticeship concept. Equally interesting was that Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) got called out by Palinscar (1989) and Wineburg (1989) for not acknowledging Dewey in their paper. Then B,C & G still did not acknowledge Dewey in their rejoinder to Palinscar and Wineburg. Perhaps Brown et al did not want to invoke Dewey because they envisioned that classroom activities would be sufficient to enculturate students into science practices and understanding (ala Vygotsky) rather than considering students individual interests and motivations as drivers to learning (ala Dewey).

In TSS (2007), students’ motivations, attitudes, and identities are cited as significant factors to student engagement in science learning. The importance of educators recognizing and understanding the diverse lives of students and how science and science learning is integrated into student lives is also stressed. While this seems more student-centric than Brown et al, it also seems to follow the “activity, concept, and culture are interdependent” (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989:33) line of reasoning. Helping students “develop the confidence, skills, and knowledge necessary to solve problems and become independent thinkers and learners” (C&TGroup-Vanderbilt, 1990:2) is the goal of most educators and is stated in a variety of ways in this week’s readings. What I found most striking is a shift from Brown et al where the teaching method just needs to be changed for students (the empty vessels that they are) to learn to TSS where students come into the classroom (or any other learning environment) with preexisting ideas and beliefs that may play significant roles in how and what they learn.

The Vanderbilt group aligned their work with the ideas expressed in Brown, Collins & Duguid (1989) but they became trapped by the technology they wanted to exploit to create a system for learning through “anchored instruction”. What the Vanderbilt Group was aiming to accomplish by creating their “videodisc-based, problem-solving environments” is not really dependent upon the videodisc technology. The compression of time they attribute to the disc technology takes place in all storytelling media—voice, books, comics, films, etc. Their compression of time argument triggered a long forgotten memory. Did the C&T Group intentionally frame their argument on Marshal McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” concept where the medium influences how the message is perceived? Admittedly, it has been quite some uncompressed time since I read Understanding Media (McLuhan, 1964) so I took advantage of Wikipedia in an attempt to verify what I thought I remembered about his take on film and found “Taking the movie as an example, he [McLuhan] argued that the way this medium played with conceptions of speed and time, transformed ‘the world of sequence and connections into the world of creative configuration and structure.’” Hmmm. I do think the group’s self-stated goals for their anchored instruction project are reasonable but I think they can be applicable to other media (both high and low tech) and methods (in and out of classrooms)l. The group wanted to create “semantically rich, shared environments that allow students and teachers to find and understand the kinds of problems that various concepts, principles, and theories were designed to solve, and that allow them to experience the effects that new knowledge has on their perception and understanding of these environments” (C&T Group-Vanderbilt, 1990:9). No matter how effective the storytelling media are, can they really provide learning experiences that are more effective than “traditional apprenticeship training” (p.8)? “It is quite possible to acquire a tool but to be unable to use it” (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989:33).


13
Sep 13

Week 3: Cognitive Apprenticeship – Kate Brennan

The theme for this week’s readings was cognitive apprenticeship. The articles also focused on constructing scientific knowledge and situational learning. At first, I was not exactly sure what cognitive apprenticeship meant or how I could relate the information back to my own learning. However, once I began reading the articles, I quickly found the importance of each topic with help from the different examples provided.

The first article I read was TSS6 (2012) which focused on understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed. It described one of the four K-8 scientific strands for learning science. This strand emphasized that an important aspect of learning science is students understanding of the nature and structure of scientific knowledge and the process by which it is developed. Students learn better when they understand why and how knowledge is constructed. I agree that once you start to know why and how learning takes place it makes information more accessible, and in my opinion much more enjoyable. Engaging students in how we learn is imperative. Sometimes I believe we (teachers) focus too much on information rather than the why or how of learning information.

In TSS6, Osborne and colleagues (2003) identified nine key themes about the nature of science that are essential in the classroom setting: science and certainty, analysis and interpretation of data, scientific method and critical testing, hypothesis and prediction, creativity/science and questioning, cooperation and collaboration, science and technology, historical development of scientific knowledge, and diversity in science thinking. It was good to see how diverse the key themes were, making them more relevant to individual learning styles. However, I felt Sandoval’s four epistemological themes (revised from Osborne and colleagues (2003) nine key concepts) were more succinct. These included the following: Students must understand what science is, that it is diverse, comes in various forms, and varies in certainty.

Another interesting part in TSS6 framework was learning about epistemic doubt. This is the idea that once students begin to understand knowing they may enter an epistemological crisis. This is when they become uncertain about everything. While I believe this can happen, more information would be needed as would different levels to determine if a crisis was actually occurring. A fleeting doubt opposed to an actual epistemic crisis seems very different on the spectrum of this theory. 

TSS7, which discussed participation in scientific practices and settings, was a very interesting article to read. It described that learning is more than a cognitive ability. Science learning is also a social and cultural process. Students must learn the appropriate language to communicate their ideas and be active participants in the classroom. Students past experiences, culture, linguistic, and economic background are also important facets in recognizing why and how they are learning. Each student has unique strengths the teacher must discover.

Strand 4 was discussed in this chapter, which is as follows: participate productively in scientific practices and discourse. The article discussed how participate productivity contributed significantly to the student and classroom.

  • Argumentation is not genuine in many classrooms. Maybe classrooms should be more like in a college setting?
  • The language of science is important. Familiarizing students with terms & context would help achieve conceptual change.
  • Culture and embodied knowledge is important. A teacher must establish instructional congruence where the goal is to make science meaningful, relevant, and accessible to all students. This concept is important in helping students who are less familiar with the language. Also, students set the criteria for evaluating questions and persuasive evidence. By creating the rules students begin to take ownership in their questions.
  • Productive participation helps building confidence, positive attitudes, motivation, and contributes to the identity of a learner, understanding and challenging peers, and constructing their own theories with evidence.
  • Gender differences in learning. I went to the websites www.target.com and typed in ‘science learning kits.’ Both genders were represented on the boxes. www.walmart.com had no kids on many of the science or engineering kits. The science kits from Target were more appealing to me than the childless versions from Walmart. I disagreed with this gender research, such as boys gravitate toward dinosaurs or dogs and girls toward the arts or social relationships (TSS7, pg. 200). TV and gender are subliminal and parental influence was also not discussed. I do not believe we can really gauge gender specific things without acknowledging the above aspects.
  •  Identity: how people see themselves, how they present themselves, and how others see them. People develop different identities that include excelling in science, math, art, etc. Border crossing in science culture/everyday culture can be difficult if what is expected from you at home is different than how you want to identify yourself in school.

I believe students need to connect lessons with goals, values and interests. The phrase, “I want to do science” was mentioned in the article, but why? Students of all ages need reasons, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. What about students who do not see the value in science? What are ways to motivate them? I believe creating curiosity and teacher excitement is an excellent start. Having a general interest helps. For example, from the time I was a child I enjoyed, practiced, and sought out art related activities.

Brown, Collins, Duguid (1989) thoroughly discussed their interpretation of cognitive apprenticeship. They defined cognitive apprenticeship as honoring the situated nature of knowledge. The authors argued that knowledge is situated in the activity, context, and culture in which it is developed and used. I could not agree more with this. Culture and tool used together determine how a person sees and interprets the world.

The authors described how the where and what is not thought of as together, but should be. Meaning making should be put into lessons, such as their example of how spelling lessons are just repetitive drilling exercises. We learn to spell and say the word, but are not necessarily able to use it in the correct context. The authors compare knowledge to tools, in which tools can only be understood through use. This reminded me of the phrase, use or lose it. However, one criticism is that people often use tools incorrectly or not for its intended purpose.

One part of the article I especially found interesting was the discussion on authentic verses school activity. Enculturation is defined as a way in which people consciously or unconsciously adopt the behavior and belief systems of new social groups. I found it interesting in the discussion about the different ways schools teach and use relevant domain culture and how it is different than actual practitioners. We should strive for competency in life after school. If you cannot apply the knowledge what is the point of studying and memorizing concepts? Students need to be exposed to the domains conceptual tools in authentic activity. Maybe situated learning makes it impossible for students to do authentic activities if they are in a school setting? “When authentic activities are transferred to the classroom, their context is inevitably transmuted; they become classroom tasks and part of the school culture (Brown et al, pg. 34).”  Solutions from Lave (1988): Just plain folks (JPFs) have two options: become a student/practitioners or cognitive apprentice, which is where students get to see and work with instructors on different problems. They work in the culture of the subject, not the culture of the school. Schoenfeld’s teaching of problems is a great example. I liked how he emphasized that all strategies are illustrated in action, developed by the class, and not declared by the teacher. Lambert uses storytelling to create more authentic activities with visuals to aide in student’s conceptual learning.

Anchored Instruction and Its Relationship to Situated Cognition (1990) article described Vanderbilt’s Learning Technology Center experiments with new ways to structure the learning experiences of students. Their main objective was to give students the necessary knowledge, skills, and confidence to solve problems and become independent thinkers. Computers and video technology can help make this possible. They described the effects of situating instruction in videodisc-based, problem solving environments, or anchored instruction. Their second objective was to align their ideas on anchored instruction to the concept of situated cognition discussed in the article by Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989). They described that learning exercises are tolerated, but thinking of problems and tools for future problem solving is important and helps students feel enthusiastic about learning. The main goal of anchored instruction was to create environments that allow exploration by students and teachers. These explorations were to overcome the inert knowledge problem where students recall knowledge when explicitly asked to do so, but do not spontaneously do so even when relevant.

It was informative and interesting to read the research conducted using the movies, The Young Sherlock Holmes and Oliver Twist. Student’s looked for details and accuracy while learning language arts and social studies content. This would be a great way to implement an emergent, interdisciplinary curriculum. As I was reading the student conversation transcript, I noticed it was not just language arts and social studies, but also conversations on anatomy and health concerns.

Their second project, the Jasper Series, was designed to develop and evaluate a series of videodisc adventures that focused on mathematical problem formulation, science, history, literature concepts and problem solving. This entire article showed the interdisciplinarity of subjects and how information is connected. What was unique about this series is that it involves embedded data design where students generate the problems to be solved and then find relevant mathematical information presented in the video. Everything the student needs to know is embedded in the video. Strong visuals with a storyboard help students make the information relevant. I believe these types of lessons help meet diverse learning needs and help create conceptual change among students.


13
Sep 13

Week4 Cognitive Apprenticeship-Cori

After this week’s readings, it is apparent that some people mean different things when they discuss situated cognition and relatedly, cognitive apprenticeship. TSS, Ch6 started with the caveat that developmental trends and base-line competencies can be expected. However, they also state that inferences from this research are inappropriate and are likely to yield underestimates. They further discuss that it is not clear to what extent limitations are due to developmental stage as opposed to adequacy of instructional opportunity or other experiences. As a developmental psychologist, I understand their concern; however, I do think it is appropriate to consider these developmental trends when creating instruction or curriculum. I do agree with them about individual differences and that some children may not have these “limits”, but they should still be an integral part to designing instruction. Much of the field of developmental psychology focuses on understanding these developmental cognitive barriers (e.g., information processing, working memory, spatial reasoning, etc.) to learning.

One notion that I really enjoyed was the idea of controversy. TSS notes that students are rarely taught about controversy, which may help explain why they fail to understand that controversy is a part of science. TSS, Ch 7 discusses two types of argument (scientific vs. everyday) and that children do not understand the differences between these two. However, I personally think that some adult experts in their field of study cannot differentiate between the two, which can also be problematic.

The commentaries between Brown et al, Palinscar, Wineburg, and Brown et al are truly interesting because they all bring up excellent points to situated cognition. Overall, I think they can all agree that situated cognition is a tool to use when learning in new situations. Situated cognition should also help students form sound epistemological framework and give students a sense of agency in learning. I do think the issue of culture is strongly debated and still is. I must admit I am still a little confused as to where I stand as well.  The student has to implicitly understand parts of the specific culture’s belief system in order to acquire its skills (e.g., math). Brown then discusses the use of authentic activity in the way that people make sense of concepts through engaging in activity that circumscribes those concepts. However, I’m still a little unsure of what exactly constitutes a culture and its associated authentic activities.

The Vanderbilt group discusses anchored instruction in two interesting examples. They discuss anchored instruction in initial regards to overcoming the inert knowledge problem. This is done by creating environments that encourage sustained exploration by students and teachers that allow them to understand kinds of problems that experts in various fields encounter and the knowledge that these experts use as “tools.” This type of instruction simulates apprenticeships that comprise of authentic activities. Anchored cognition is evident through their two examples with younger children, but how is it done with older populations (e.g., high school and college students)?


12
Sep 13

Cognitive Apprenticeship – KeriAnn

Unlike the behaviorism and conceptual change models, the cognitive apprenticeship model describes knowledge and activity as being integral for learning to occur. Therefore, one cannot occur without the other. I find this to be similar to the views presented by the National Research Council (2012); however, in this document activity is replaced with practice. The National Research Council (2012) specifically describes the type of practices that students should engage in when practicing science, whereas Brown, Collin, Duguid (1989) state that students should be engaged in authentic activity. I feel like this is a shortcoming because the term ‘authentic’ can be interpreted in many different ways. For example, is it considered authentic for students to collect data about the Solar System from a computer simulation, or is it only considered authentic for students to collect data about the Solar System by using astronomical tools, such as a telescope? Depending on the definition of ‘authentic’, it may not be feasible for students to engage in authentic science in typical classrooms.

In addition to the inclusion of activity, Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) state that culture is required for learning to occur. I feel that this was one of the areas that Palincsar (1989) and Wineburg (1989) found to be problematic. According to Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989), students should engage in the cultural practices or norms of the field in which they are learning. However, there are many problems with this. For example, both Palincsar (1989) and Wineburg (1989) wonder how a teacher who has not had the appropriate experience in engaging in a particular field’s norms would be able to effectively include students in the field’s cultural practices. Wineburg (1989) also presents a concern about the number of cultures that a student would need to engage in during their academic careers. This is similar to a concern of mine. In the scientific field, there are many different cultural practices. For example, an astronomer would engage in different cultural practices than a chemist. Would this mean that students would have to learn the norms of all scientific fields? In response to this concern, Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) state “at best, students will only be able to assimilate partial understandings of any disciplinary cultures” (p. 11). If we do not expect students to develop an understanding of these cultural practices, is it truly necessary for them to engage in the culture in order for learning to occur?

Another concern that Palincsar (1989) and Wineburg (1989) had about the description of cognitive apprenticeship was whether or not students would be able to transfer concepts if they were studied in a contextual way. I feel that the coin multiplication example that Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) provide shows that the concept or skill is first learned in a contextualized way and is then generalized for further practice. Even though the concept is generalized, would the student know when it is appropriate to transfer certain concepts? For example, gravity decreases with distance, which can be observed when studying the Solar System. Although this is true for Earth-based gravity, it is not easily observed. Therefore, would a student who studied gravity in a Solar System context know whether or not to apply this particular concept to Earth-based gravity?

In Taking Science to School (2007), the National Research Council describes the two different types of motivation and states that students must be motivated in order to productively participate in learning. Although Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) do not include motivation in their description of cognitive apprenticeship, I feel that it is an important component and should be included. If we expect a student to engage in the activities and cultural practices of a particular field, then the student must have some reason for doing so. As the National Research Council (2007) explains, there are two different types of motivation: extrinsic and intrinsic. Because cognitive apprenticeship seeks to have the students ‘enculturated’ into the particular field of study, I would expect that the teacher would prefer the students to have intrinsic motivation; however, it can be difficult to be intrinsically motivated. Therefore, I think it would have been helpful if Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) included the role of motivation in their description of cognitive apprenticeship.


10
Sep 13

Our first models (of others’ models)

Behaviorism (based on Skinner)

IMG_2284

Conceptual Change (based on Posner)IMG_2285


09
Sep 13

Conceptual Change – Aubree

“…being exposed to new information is not the same as remembering or understanding it” (TSS, p.111).

This week’s readings focused on students’ conceptual changes – how it happens and how we can instigate these changes in classrooms.  From the readings, I pulled out small quotes and snippets that made me raise an eyebrow or scratch my head.  They are as follows:

* Essentialist biases & essentialism caused a “2000 year stasis” in evolutionary thought.

* People believe in the argument from design, that the elaborate functional structure of the living world must be caused by intentional agents who “designed” those living things.

* Thinking like Duit, are all of these vocabulary words useful for classroom practices – or is it more of an academic exercise: conceptual differentiation, coalescences, “discrepant events” as catalysts of conceptual change, etc.  In his study, Duit found that most of the teachers are not even familiar with the kind of students’ pre-instructional conceptions that have to be taken into account.  Their views about dealing with pre-instructional conceptions are not informed by conceptual change ideas.  He claims that  it is “necessary to make these theories more simple and describe conceptual change strategies in such a way that they may become part of teachers’ normal routines”.

* “Elementary schoolchildren have much more capacity for metacognitively guided learning than has been commonly supposed or taken advantage of by existing science curricula” .  Are we challenging students enough?  Are our bars set too low?

* What are heuristic procedures, such as analogical and imagistic reasoning, thought experiments involving extreme and limiting case analyses, and inference to best explanation?  They allow students to creatively extend, combine, and modify existing conceptual resources through the construction of new models.  Are these commonly taught in teacher education programs?

*Involving elementary, middle, and high school students indiscovery argumentation via cycles of model-based reasoning-practices, very similar to those used by scientists themselves, are highly effective means of building new understandings.  Many science educators believe that a key to promoting conceptual change in the classroom is to create a more reflective classroom discourse that is structured around explicit argumentation.  What is the status of classroom discourse and explicit argumentation?

* Our model of learning from the first day of class involved each person having a set of abilities with which new ideas can be generated.  This week’s readings provided support for this idea.  “Debates remain about how the early understanding that children bring to school continues to develop across later years According to one view, these core knowledge domains from infancy remain a nearly invariant framework of ways of understanding the world for much of one’s life afterward (Carey and Spelke, 1996)”.  That is, we are born with certain ways of understanding the world and build from there.

*  What is the relationship between Posner and Piaget?  It’s interested that Posner chooses to use the vocabulary assimilation/accommodation for conceptual change.

* What are central concepts?  The readings leave me confused about this idea:
“One rather common theme in recent literature is that central concepts rarely directly entail anything about experience. Rather they suggest strategies and procedures whereby phenomena may be assimilated. Central concepts are thus not judged in terms of immediate capacity to generate correct predictions. They are judged in terms of their
resources for solving current problems”.

* How do we measure students’ epistemological committments?
“…it is Important to find out just what epistemological commitments students have if one wants to understand what they are likely to find initially plausible or implausible and more generally, to understand their processes of conceptual change. What is their theory of theories? What is their theory of knowing? What is their view of the relation of plinary knowledge to everyday knowledge?”
Duit says that “students’ self-efficacy and control beliefs, classroom social context, ‘individual’s goals, intentions, purposes, expectations [and] needs’ (p. 168) are as important as cognitive strategies in concept learning”.

*Are teachers prepared and able to do what Posner asks at the end of his article? Tall order.

* How do we know when students are confronting a conceptual change?  “What may appear to be a change in conception by a scientist or a student could simply be a different way of describing a conception based on the context in which it is presented and the
preference for one conceptualisation or model over another.” (Duit)


07
Sep 13

Conceptual Change–Julianne

To “know, use, and interpret scientific knowledge of the natural world” (National Research Council, 2007: Strand 1) sounds easy enough—but of course it is not. This weeks’ readings provide ample evidence of the difficulties encountered when trying to move students beyond their naïve conceptions (or misconceptions?) of science and how science works toward more sophisticated and mature understandings and uses of scientific concepts. The key to really learning science is to learn science with understanding. The difficulty for students, it seems to me, is to reach the point where their understanding becomes profound enough that conceptual change is required to move beyond their naive conceptions and allow for acceptance of valid conceptions plus the rejection of the naïve ones. Conceptual change as accommodation (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) where inadequate existing concepts are replaced or reorganized to deal with new phenomena is necessary as more information is taken in by the learner; however, there are never any assurances that new ideas and concepts will be accepted and internalized or old ones will be rejected and discarded. People of all ages ultimately learn and retain what they want to or what they deem relevant to their lives. How they learn, what they learn, and when they learn depends on many internal factors (e.g., age, maturity, culture) over which teacher’s have little or no control.

So, is it realistic to expect science instruction to produce accommodation in students, rather than merely to help students make sense of new concepts and theories? (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982: 225). Does science instruction in school today have the, what I would call luxury of time to produce accommodation in students, to let them fumble about, make false starts, and frequent reversals in direction? Or are we stuck in a system that pushes teachers to teach for recall and assimilation? Can teachers expect to be allowed the time or given the chance to gain expertise in employing evaluation techniques that track the process of conceptual change in students, e.g., the Piagetian clinical interview (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982: 226). It has been more than thirty years since Posner and his coauthors suggested teaching strategies that, they felt, promoted conceptual change in students thinking. Have those strategies become the norm? Probably not, but that the concept has been taken seriously enough to warrant becoming “one of the most important domains of science education research during the past three decades” (Duit & Treagust, 2003: 671) is, to me, heartening.

I found it quite fascinating to read about the many definitions and descriptions of conceptual change that have been developed over the last three decades. Tyson’s chart (Tyson, Venville, Harrison, & Treagust, 1997: 390, figure 2) of the researchers and their varying terminology and connotations should be expanded to chronicle more recent developments of interpretation and understanding of conceptual change. That learning is a multidimensional, multifaceted series of mental exercises which may lead to conceptual change seems to be a well established concept in science education research and one that is similar to the basis of how science works. For example, the TSS characterization of a metaconceptual framework mode (NRC, 2007: 112) in the spectrum of conceptual change learning describes the very essence of how science works—a question is developed which generates alternatives (questions/answers/concepts), the alternatives are examined and evaluated which leads to the development of new questions that generate alternatives that must be examined and evaluated and leading to more questions, and so forth and so on. That conceptual change can take a variety of forms that can vary in degree and difficulty (National Research Council, 2007: 107) is probably an understatement.


06
Sep 13

Conceptual Change – Ryan

As I was reading the different perspectives on science in chapter two of TSS, I found myself thinking, “I don’t disagree with any of these,” so I was glad to see they were meant to be presented as complementary, rather than as alternatives as I initially thought.  That theme of different things fundamentally being connected and working together held throughout that chapter, particularly with the strands of proficiency.

I was intrigued by Posner’s conditions of accommodation.  For one thing, I’m not sure the last condition, “A new concept should suggest the possibility of a fruitful research program.” is completely necessary for conceptual change to occur.  It would be nice to have, but doesn’t seem as vital as the first three conditions.  If someone disagrees about this, feel free to try to convince me otherwise.

I also think the conditions of accommodation are very useful for explaining why quantum mechanics is so hard for most people.  First of all, there is little dissatisfaction with existing conceptions, because students don’t experience the world on the scale at which quantum mechanics is used.  The conditions of being intelligible and initially plausible are even bigger problems due to the extremely counter-intuitive nature of its predictions, such as particles tunneling through solid barriers.  It has been said that anyone who thinks they understand quantum mechanics, doesn’t.  This theory of conceptual change helps explain why it is so difficult.

My last idea about conceptual change and misconceptions has to do with the practice of giving assigned readings.  Since misconceptions arise when students attempt to construct their own understanding and incorporate incorrect information or inappropriate connections, it would seem to me that having students read a chapter before class would cause some of them to generate misconceptions from the reading.  As stated in TSS, these misconceptions can be very difficult to break, so I think it would be better to come into the class without that misconception.  If a student reads the chapter before class, it either creates misconceptions that are then difficult to break, or the student understands it, making the time in class redundant.  I think it would be better to give the lesson first, and reserve reading the book for further clarification.  The way we do it in this class is better, using the readings as a basis for group discussion, but many classes simply present the same material that was in the reading, making the practice of reading prior to class either negative or pointless.


06
Sep 13

Week 2: Conceptual Change – Kate Brennan

The two articles and book chapter we read for class each discussed conceptual change in learning scientific concepts across education from a constructivist viewpoint. Each article and chapter focused on different strategies of learning science by students, while two discussed teacher intervention in classroom application and curriculum development. Many of the theories and practices from chapter four of the book, A Framework for the K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas (2012) and Duit & Treagust (2003) were built from the Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) article.

The Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) article was one of the first significant contributions to conceptual change theory in science education. The research introduces the idea that learning is the result of what the student is taught and her/his current ideas and concepts. The article also discusses how learning comprehends and accepts ideas because they are now seen as intelligible and rational, which is a process of conceptual change. Two phases of conceptual change in science were discussed, which are central commitments (assimilation) and modification (accommodation). There was also a ‘bonus feature’ that included how inquiry and learning can occur against the background of the learner’s current topic. This was also discussed in chapter four from the Framework book. There were four conditions for a modification (accommodation) to occur:  dissatisfaction with the existing conceptions, the new conception must be intelligible, the conception must appear plausible, and the new conception suggests possibility of a fruitful research program.

Although this article was the most difficult of the three for me to read and understand, I found it to be most valuable after I had read the other two readings. One idea that was cited in the Druit & Treagust (2003) article was the notion of conceptual ecology, which is how current ideas, thoughts, and theories influence new information. I found this concept to be most interesting and one I would like to further research. I believe that students (regardless of the subject being taught)  bring many aspects to the classroom even before the teacher begins her/his lesson, such as culture, prior knowledge, and past experiences.

 The Druit & Treagust (2003) reading builds upon the Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982) article by discussing the limitations of ‘Classical’ conceptual change, such as how the understanding of science includes knowledge of science concepts and principles and about science content knowledge. The article also discusses alternate approaches to analyze conceptual change, such as group learning and student modelling. All three articles discussed how students come into the science classroom with pre-instructional knowledge and concepts and how teachers should be aware of this while thinking about conceptual change in their pedagogical practice.  

Chapter four of the book, A Framework for the K-12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas (2012) also discussed how knowledge changes and is built upon by knowledge prior to school. The chapter identifies three areas: improvement in children’s understanding, changes do not always bring students closer to ideal scientific view (ex. naivety – and the one I found most interesting), and variability in changes that occur. The examples used in both chapter four and Druit & Treagust (2003) were very helpful in visualizing how conceptual change occurs and areas of science students struggle to learn.

 As I read each of these articles, I placed myself (as a student and teacher) inside the framework of conceptual change from a constructivist viewpoint. I began reflecting on my own high school science education and my own learning of new information. I can remember teachers who definitely saw (and taught) the value in group learning and modelling to help student’s bridge the gap between theory and practice resulting in conceptual change. However, I also remember teachers who used the traditional, transmissive approach. My own learning style where conceptual change most often occurs is during kinesthetic and visual experiences (regardless of subject). It is very interesting to begin to study and think about how and why we learn.

 


06
Sep 13

Conceptual Change-Cori

The goals of science education vary depending on which perspective one takes. TSS (Ch2) discusses three main perspectives on science and as I was reading each I would categorize myself within each one. At the end, I’m not sure which perspective I really follow, but it is clear that each has their own agenda as well as contribution to the field of science. One common goal is to incite and encourage conceptual change throughout development. Conceptual change seems easy enough to operationalize on the surface, but when thinking about the types of conceptual change, various perspectives/theoretical frameworks, mechanisms of conceptual change, etc. it is clear that this construct is quite complex. One quote that I really resonated with was from TSS (Ch4), misconceptions are “necessary conceptual steppingstones on a path toward more accurate knowledge” (p. 98). When I first heard the word misconception, I originally thought it was something to avoid completely. However, it is apparent to me now that misconceptions are just a normal step in the process of conceptual change.

Posner (1982) explains assimilation (using existing concepts to deal with new phenomena) and accommodation (replaces or reorganizes central concepts because individual’s previous concepts were inadequate). One question that I have surrounds one of the main conditions of accommodation: dissatisfaction with existing conceptions. TSS (Ch4) discusses metacognitive guided learning as a mechanism for conceptual change, which involves fostering conceptual change by detecting and monitoring incongruities in one’s own existing conceptual change. The question is how do individuals, particularly children, become aware of this dissatisfaction? When do they start questioning their own theories and mental models? Is this process even conscious?

I chose the Tyson et al. (1996) article to read because it appeared on the surface to go over more cognitive developmental theories of conceptual change and it discussed issues that need to be addressed by researchers working within a conceptual change framework. Tyson noted the revisions made to Posner’s (1982) initial framework, which answered another one of my questions. What is the role of motivation and self-efficacy in learning, particularly conceptual change? Posner’s new framework included this issue and proposed a wider range of factors that need to be considered. One of the issues that Tyson discusses is the status of students’ conceptions, which speaks to the issue I brought up above regarding stability of current conceptions. For example, consider the question of “do I see more of myself in a mirror if I back-up?” My initial answer is yes (and has been for years); however, the true answer is no. I still do not understand or truly “see” this phenomenon. Thus, is my status weak and unstable? If someone were to present convincing evidence that you do see more of yourself, would I believe that more? Tyson’s multidimensional interpretive framework seems to be a good way to analyze conceptual change because it takes perspectives based on epistemology, ontology, and social/affective.


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