Conceptual change is clear in it’s intention to have a clean break from the behaviourism based instruction that Skinner advocates starting from their very definition of learning as a kind of inquiry and not “a verbal repertoire or a set of behaviours” (Posner, 1982, p. 212). The focus is on inquiry based instruction where the reasons for accepting a concept based on students’ existing conceptual knowledge and the barriers they may face in the process are addressed. The foundations for conceptual change theory seems to draw from the works of Kuhn and Lakatos who characterised the way scientists and scientific communities look at conceptual change in the process of so called ’scientific revolutions’. While this may seem to be a good foundation for curriculum to produce students “capable of understanding and evaluating information… and of making decisions that incorporate that information” (NRC, p. 34), adapting characteristics of theory change as it occurs in the scientific world for designing learning processes presents unique challenges. Concepts of assimilation and accommodation for students are more nuanced and challenging.
A central tenet of conceptual change theory for learning environments is the notion of a conceptual ecology Posner, 1982). Conceptual ecology required us to analyse how epistemological and metaphysical commitments play a role in the accommodation of new concepts. However, this may not always be easy for students where there is a lack of understanding of and an inability to articulate what these commitments are for individuals. To make these commitments visible in a classroom would be difficult.
One of the main barriers to changing these commitments is identified by Posner when a new conceptual framework challenges existing metaphysical, epistemological or ontological commitments. This suggests that teaching students about the nature of science as an explicit form of instruction, stressing on the evolving nature of the subject may potentially be useful. However, Duit says that conceptual change research has failed to take into consideration that understanding science includes knowledge of science concepts and “about this science content knowledge” (Duit, p. 674). This seems to indicate a failure of the program, in the 21 years between Posner’s and Duit’s articles, to incorporate nature of science instruction in the program. However, in the strands of scientific proficiency laid out by Taking Science to Schools (NRC, 2007) proficient students are required to ‘understand the nature and development of scientific knowledge’. In principle, the TSTS framework does consider this problem as being addressed through implicit directives in curricular materials. I personally am of the opinion that explicitly addressing the challenges scientists face through a ‘Nature of Science’ module can provide some much needed context for students.
When presented with alternate frameworks, anomalies are shown to play a key role in helping students accommodate. Posner recommends the development of “instructionally viable and effective anomalies” (Posner, p. 221). For advanced scientific concepts, finding anomalies may become difficult to demonstrate in the classroom. In the transition from Classical Mechanics to Quantum Mechanics, for example, the only anomalies that are demonstrable and powerful enough to change conceptions are a series of experiments that require sophisticated machinery and setups to perform and can’t effectively be simulated in a classroom. This is one of the key drawbacks of conceptual change as I see it: Effective simulations of scientific activities may not always be possible because of the practical limitations of the environment. Even if we consider that accommodation in the classroom is only a “gradual adjustment in one’s conception” (Posner p. 223), the ‘fruitfulness’ and ‘viability’ of a new framework will be difficult to convince for students if it is in direct contradiction with a framework that correlates with everyday experience. Modelling for students to increase viability for new theories may also be counter-productive as models are multiple and modelling as an instructional tool is a complex activity. Most students do not reach ‘Level 3’ where they can effectively view models as mere thinking tools and can be “manipulated by the modeller to suit his/her epistemological needs” (Duit, p. 678). We need to reconsider a way to make alternate conceptions that are fruitful and viable, taking into account the limited capacity of students.
Posner also fails to take into account affective factors such as interest and motivation (Duit, 2003). Since conceptual change was motivated by studies of scientific communities, interest and motivation can be assumed to remain fairly high over the course of an assimilation or an accommodation. Within students, it is my opinion that constant modifications of concepts must be treated cautiously as it could have a negative effect on motivation and student perception of science. It is in precisely such a scenario that I disagree with Posner who says that historical anomalies aren’t sufficient. Such accounts can provide much needed context in which students can place their conceptual changes to relate more with the scientific world and ensure that interest is generated.
From an instructor’s perspective, conceptual change theory poses some interesting challenges. As noted earlier, making student thinking visible, not just in terms of conceptual understanding but also with regards to epistemic and metaphysical commitments is difficult. For teachers to spend a “significant portion of their time diagnosing errors” and to represent content in “multiple modes” (Posner p. 226) requires vast amounts of expertise with teachers who are proficient in technical knowledge of their fields as well as in fundamental nature of science. To train teachers no have not just a knowledge of subject matter but “a clear understanding of…components of scientific development” (NRC, p.35), requires teachers to think like scientists and know how scientific research is carried out. This would require a re-skilling of teachers who have been entrenched in the old ways of teaching who may not possess such expertise. From a practical standpoint, diagnosing errors individually may not even be feasible with overburdened, understaffed classrooms. Since there is considerable variability in scientific reasoning within any age group (NRC, p.42), standardised evaluation is impossible. The burden then falls on instructor to individually evaluate students and build developmental goals on that basis which may make democratic participation in scientific practices in the classroom, one of the key goals of the report (NRC, p. 40) difficult to implement in practice.
Adapting conceptual change for learning seems to me to face two broad challenges. At the theoretical level, there is the issue of adapting a theory that stemmed from studies of scientific communities and using that at an educational level. Secondly, conceptual change theory depends on individual’s conceptions about areas such as their scientific understanding of knowledge and concepts, which are based for the most part on tangible real world entities, but also on individual perceptions of epistemology and metaphysics. This makes a centralised set of guidelines difficult and the job of the instructor in the classroom difficult in having to cater to students on an individual basis. The conception of the TSTS suggests that older children are “building on products of preschool growth” (NRC, p. 105). Therefore, we need teachers to track the growth of these students across multiple levels. The theory is as dependant on the individual capabilities of the instructor as it is on a curriculum and a set of centralised guidelines.
References:
National Research Council. (2007). Science learning past and present. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 11–25.
Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66(2), 211–227.
Duit, R. (2003). Conceptual change: a powerful framework for improving science teaching and learning. International Journal of Science Education, 25(6), 671–688.
I think the idea of specifically teaching about the challenges that scientist face, as you suggest, is also beneficial for students when they go out into the world. Many of my patients in the hospital used to gripe about “why don’t doctors know this” in reference to why have they not figured out a cure or treatment. If they had any idea how hard it is to create new and meaningful discoveries in science then maybe they would have a different perspective. Zac
I agree with your thoughts on feasibility of implementing conceptual change practices. While I think addressing conceptual change within classrooms would certainly benefit students, it does require a lot practically in terms of teacher expectations. I know when I was in middle school, for example, I had a math teacher who would only do examples out of the textbook because she didn’t actually know math very well. Because many elementary and middle school teachers lack specific training in math and science, these educational practices would be challenging. I think the adjustment for students could also be challenging because, as you said, students may lack the ability to express their existing commitments.
Ashwin – You stated one challenge of using a theory of conceptual change to explain learning is potential practical limitations of an environment to produce dissatisfaction with students’ initial conceptions by showing anomalies. I found this statement to bring up practical and ethical considerations. Practically, environments always dictate what happens in classrooms. Whether it is being underfunded and unable to buy lab materials, other educators and policies acting as road blocks for innovative teaching, or the level of expertise of the teachers, classrooms look very different. Even the students can dictate what happens in the classroom (as they should). Therefore, I think the question of the challenges facing conceptual change in a practical sense revolve around the ethical concerns.
When I say ethical, I mean to consider the goals of science education overall. In your example of not having equipment needed to properly demonstrate an anomaly between Classical Mechanics and Quantum Mechanics, is supporting students in this understanding a goal of education? I state this because I wonder if the goal of science education, as broadly stated in some of the articles this week, being scientific literacy can be met without students recognizing the differences between the areas of Classical and Quantum Mechanics? Additionally, you bring up the need for teachers to know more. With this, I wonder how other entities can influence and by proxy teach the nature of science because teachers are already required to know so much. Maybe this is a job for secondary teachers to understand and receive through their instruction at the university level? However, I think well structured curriculum and support for those teachers in delivering that curriculum may be able to accomplish this goal. Again, practically speaking I wonder if this is possible?
I do think as in all issues within education there is a difficult balance between practical and ethical concerns within educational innovation. As my father says about school finance, “If we had unlimited resources, maybe we could try out some new ideas.” As much as I agree with that statement, I also think there would always be challenges. Thanks for raising some practical and ethical concerns in your post this week. I hope we can talk about more of them in class!