SCIED 552: Science Teaching and Learning Developing Models of Science Teaching

Looking beyond the implications Vygotsky has for education, this week’s reading was particularly interesting for two reasons: Firstly, it counteracts the narrative that had existed until the time of his publications, a narrative that still exists in some parts today, of psychology being a descriptive field with very few elements of scientific experimentation or rationale in it. With the introduction of Vygotsky who mandated that psychology must be causal-explanatory in nature, psychology feels more ‘scientific’ and more applicable to education. The other reason that I personally found Vygotsky to be a fascinating read is the historical context and the influences that the pervading culture of the time had on Vygotsky’s thinking, with Marxist ideals of humanity and it’s influence on nature forming the basis of his writing.

By attributing decision making and other cognitive actions to a set of internalised signs, Vygotsky is able to trace the path of causality that leads to the development of a cognitive structure. In contrast with behaviorism which only focuses on the action and even constructivism, which characterises thinking in terms of actively built up structures by the individual, we can trace where actual development stems from by noticing that signs are internalised when they are ’emancipated from their primary external forms’ (p. 45). In casting cognitive development in terms of internalised signs and actions based on auxiliary stimuli provided by the signs and supported by tools, there is now a complete framework for understanding how students cognise actively. Looking back at last week’s reading of Brown, Collins and Duguid (1989), cognitive apprenticeship now appears more useful. By understanding the tools and signs used by the scientific community, we can effectively develop curricula that follows the line of ‘qualitative transformations’ (p. 46) that a sign goes through with students, the goal being that by the end of schooling students effectively have internalised sign systems that can produce the responses to a range of stimuli with mediated action that reflects scientific thinking. Since all intrapersonal processes are internalised from interpersonal processes through the use of signs, creating the right environment through a cognitive apprenticeship model becomes crucial.  Mediated action between students in the classroom and between students and a scientifically trained instructor is essential as ‘higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals’. This also seems to place a greater emphasis on a historical study of science and scientific communities to understand how scientific theories are conceptualised and how they evolve, which is probably the role that science studies has to play in science education.

Methodologically, Vygotsky provides a more scientific way of conducting research in psychology. By moving from a phenotypic to a genotypic analysis, psychologists are now forced to look beyond phenomenologically similar behaviors and understanding the origins of it and characterise the differences. This has huge implications for assessment of students in the classroom as looking at simple actions, the way behaviorism would propose, is not sufficient to ‘discover the means and methods subjects use to organise their behaviour’ (p. 74). By ‘objectifying’ psychological behaviour, Vygotsky’s characterisation of a new method of research is far more comprehensive to truly understand higher psychological functioning.

The argument for categorising psychology as a natural science is not something I am personally inclined to subscribe to. While Vygotsky’s models do provide an effective way to causally explain responses to stimuli in an unprecedented manner, I do not find any instances of predictive capacity that Vygotsky’s theories can possess. No matter how efficient the theories are in an explanative capacity, the fact remains that internalised sign systems are only accessible to us through external mediated action and their characterisation therefore is only approximate. I’m not sure if there is a push in the psychology community to be considered as a natural science or why such a push would conceivably exist, but the scientific nature of Vygotsky’s methods do not warrant the branding of his psychological theories as natural science, not that it diminishes it’s utility or proficiency in any way.

There was a curious paragraph that caught my interest and I would be grateful if someone can point out whether I’m reading into this too much. Vygotsky rejects the view that cognitive development is a ‘gradual accumulation of separate changes’ (p.73). Instead, he believes that there are points in development that are ‘spasmodic and revolutionary changes’. He goes so far as to chastise naive minds who, when a linear narrative history is disrupted, only see ‘catastrophe, gaps and discontinuity’. The chracterisation of psychological development bears a remarkable amount of similarity to Kuhn’s (1970) portrayal of scientific progress through revolutions. This seems to suggest that there could be some merit in trying to understand cognitive development through understanding scientific progress, both of which are highly dependent on sociocultural context. How such a parallelism would work is not something I can quite describe, but maybe it is worth thinking over.

References:

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42.

Kuhn, Thomas S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago :University of Chicago Press,

Vygotski J, Cole, M., Scribner, S., John-Steiner, V., & Souberman, E. (1981). Mind in Society, Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky and some thoughts about his thoughts,

Harriet Smith

A challenge for this week was to condense and make sense of the reading into relatively few words for this blog post. In order to do this, I decided to pick out what I considered key points or more so interesting ones and try to discuss them a little.

The role of social interaction in developing cognition

A prominent aspect of the Vygotsky reading this week was the idea that human development preceded, and is greatly influenced by, social interaction. This was in contrast to Piaget’s argument that development precedes learning. Something that stood out to me in relation to this topic is the idea that individuals can interact, and learn from society, but can also modify and change society. The initial quote of the chapter somewhat hints at this complex ability of the individual to modify and construct, but fundamentally must interact with his/her environment in order to develop. Although I am not sure if this is an exact example, when I read this section of the article I immediately thought of how a child born into an English speaking household will pick up the language that he/she is immersed in, likewise a child born to Chinese speaking parents will pick up, without even taking specific language lessons, the language of their environment. This leads me to the next point that I believe to be important is the idea of tools and signs.

Tools and Signs within learning

Vygotsky’s use of the vocabulary terms ‘tool’ and ‘sign’ are descendants of Engels conception. What I can comment on as being the difference between the two terms is that a tool is employed by the individual to assist ‘as the conductor of human influence’ on the activity and is externally oriented (p.55). Tools are objects that are used by the individual to enact change on another object. In contrast, a sign is internally oriented and has no influence on the object of interest for the individual. Examples of such ‘signs’ could be, as given in the article, tying a knot in a handkerchief as a reminder, the knot itself is not the sign, but what the knot represents, to evoke a reminder of something else is. On a base level, I understand the differences between these two, but as the article goes on and discusses the relationship between them being more complex but not analogous, I am a bit confused by this concept of a higher psychological function (p.55). Did anyone else have a stronger understanding of this? Another question I pose to the class is how do you interpret the use of the tool word in this article related to last weeks readings and the use of a tool within cognitive apprenticeship? Are there any crossovers in meaning? What do you consider to be different?

Experimentation

Another important point I drew from the reading was the focus on how Vygotsky undertook research and experimentation. In opposition to American psychology at the time, ‘for Vygotsky, the object of experimentation is ..different. The principles of his basic approach do not stem from a purely methodological critique of established experimental practices; they flow from his theory of the nature of higher psychological processes and the task of scientific explanation in psychology’ (p.12). Experimentation was a study of change over time, and did not explicitly focus on an end goal or outcome, but rather how the subject went about achieving that goal or outcome ‘a central tenet of this method is that all phenomenon be studied as processes in motion and change’ (p.7). An example of such would be giving a set of tasks to a student and then studying the way in which that individual went about making sense of and answering those problems. Additionally, these experiments would involve adding a second challenge dimension that would cause the student to have to approach the problem in a way that was different from the norm, such as collaborative learning with another student who speaks a different primary language. ‘Vygotsky believed that the experimental could serve an important role by making visible processes that are ordinarily hidden beneath the surface of habitual behavior. He called this method ‘experimental-genetic’ method,’ (p.12).  The use of a twofold form of stimulus is later described as the double-stimulation method. I linked this evidence back to the initial critiques Vygotsky had for the ‘crisis in psychology,’ where none of the existing schools of psychology provided a unified theory of human psychological processes, or, one of the current theories could explain problem-solving behaviors in individuals.

VygotskiJ, Cole, M., Scribner, S., John-Steiner, V., & Souberman, E. (1981). Mind in Society, Development of Higher Psychological Processes. Harvard University Press.

Early in this week’s reading, Cole and Scribner set the stage for Vygotsky’s works by describing the questions psychology was attempting to solve. Primarily the work at the time was aimed at answering, “What are the relationships between animal and human behavior?” (p. 3) They go on to detail how some scholars described human consciousness in relation to stimulus and believed “high psychological processes could only be investigated by using “historical studies of cultural products” (p. 3) rather than experimental methods. This led to many psychologists to focus on behaviors rather than consciousness that sounded like the foundations of a Skinnerian model of thinking about learning. Vygotsky took these two competing ideas and worked to find a “unified theory of human psychological processes” (p. 5) because the available models either did not explain behaviors or did not manage to go beyond describing complex phenomenon.

Key to Vygotsky’s understanding of how thinking works are tools and signs. Tools are simply ideas or conceptions that mediate responses to a given sign. A sign on the other hand, while described similarly to tools, are situationally bound signifiers of something. In the case of Vygotsky’s experiments, the tool the children used was their method of remember using the various cards, while the sign was the culturally embedded ideas that indicated what strategy to use to remember in various tasks. For example, some of the participates turning the images to represent a bucket to remember such an item. What makes Vygotsky stand out above his contemporaries and has allowed him to remain relevant today is his willingness to consider both biology and culture in his understanding of human thinking; biology controls initial responses and more complex responses become mediated by culture.

Many of Vygotsky’s ideas connect directly to the ideas that Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) describe because as Vygotsky states, “The child does not suddenly and irrevocably deduce the relation between the sign and the method for using it.” (p. 45) This indicates the children must be taught HOW to use the sign. In a science classroom, this means providing students with tools (the conceptual method) of engaging in particular science signs such as experimentation (I put the words tool and sign in here to indicate my thinking because I want to make sure I am understanding these concepts correctly.) Overtime, by engaging in enough of the ideal behaviors, students will begin to experience internalization, or in other words, being able to utilize the tools for specific signs without the need of them being externalized. This is similar to how Brown et al. (1989) discuss the need to engage in authentic activities. In essence, students need to engage in activities that will provide the signs which lead to the development of tools.

Another important feature of Vygotsky’s thinking that connects to Brown et al. (1989) is how culturally bound signs and tools are. First, the transition for adolescents from thinking by recall to recalling to think is a huge transition. It implies the need for students to recognize specific signs to implement the correct tools; both of which are culturally and situationally embedded. For example, Vygotsky states, “Equating psychological and nonpsychological phenomena is possible only if one ignores the essence of each form of activity, as well as the difference between their historic roles and nature” (p. 53) to demonstrate how unique each sign is and the tools ascribed to them. This is the same for Brown et al.’s (1989) description of how students can do math in grocery stores, but not in a classroom. The signs in both areas are completely different and therefore, they are not able to recall the tools needed to solve problems that by all intensive purposes are the same.

Moving forward, I hope to receive feedback on my understandings of this week’s reading, especially around signs and tools. Additionally, I want to examine how Vygotsky’s thinking has influences in other areas of education, particularly with a focus on social justice science pedagogy, teacher education, and science teaching practices.

The main reading this week, Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning, concerns the idea of “situated cognition” and “cognitive apprenticeship” (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989). Brown, Collins and Duguid argue that a school teaching environment is too decoupled from context to be effective for long-lasting or meaningful learning. Their basis for this assertion is that natural or real world learn is done through experience within a certain context while schools teach knowledge in the environment, or culture, of school. The authors use the examples of apprenticeship in certain fields as examples of how knowledge can be acquired in context. As such they also believe that by teaching subject in the context of the profession that uses that subject would be a better way to contextualize the information and improve student learning. This would seem to be a good way to learn certain tasks that are based less on knowledge and more on skill, the tailor example that they gave, but less on fields that require extensive background knowledge to participate (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989). I agree with Palincsar when she said “Students must cultivate a level of self-awareness, background information, behavior control, social interaction, and understanding of how they learn before they can hope to use tools with the expertise of experienced practitioners” (Palincsar, 1989).  Most advanced fields function by the model that students study the information first and once they grasp the information adequately then they enter an apprenticeship of sorts to learn how to apply their knowledge. Medical doctors and trained scientists are educated in this way. It was not clear from the Brown article to what extent he and his colleagues expect the cognitive apprenticeship to reach. If the idea is simply to expose or introduce students to the subject from the perspective of practitioners then his approach reminds me of the Ambitious Science Teaching approach (Windschitl, Thompson & Braaten, 2018). In that approach students are taught a subject in a context that is similar to one that scientists might experience but is not a true apprenticeship or seek to exactly emulate the scientific research culture. If this is the idea that Brown, Collins, and Duguid had in mind then the concerns of Wineberg when he said “…it is far from clear whether adopting the latest fashions of disciplinary specialists will leave us better off” should be alleviated (Wineburg, 1987).

References

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated cognition and the culture of learning. Educational researcher, 18(1), 32-42.

Palincsar, A. S. (1989). Commentary: Less Charted Waters. Educational Researcher, 18(4), 5-7.

Windschitl, M., Thompson, J., & Braaten, M. (2018). Ambitious Science Teaching. Harvard Education Press. 8 Story Street First Floor, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Wineburg, S. S. (1987). Remembrance of theories past. Artificial Intelligence and Education: Principles and case studies, 2, 276.

Brown et al (1989) differs from our previous models of learning in that it introduces the role of context and environment in learning. The paper uses the example of word usage to illustrate the difference between knowing self-contained pieces of knowledge and knowledge that is contextualized. Upon reading this example, I began thinking of how language knowledge and use differs from what we traditionally consider “scientific” knowledge. To me, language knowledge and use seems much more ubiquitous and thus easier to see as indexical. Brown et al later states: “This would also appear to be true of apparently well-defined, abstract technical concepts. Even these are not wholly definable and defy categorical description; part of their beaming as always inherited from context of use” (Brown et al, 1898, p. 33). While this may be the case, what other “contexts of use” besides the school context are school-aged students going to encounter topics like cell biology or atomic models? Brown et al (1989) also says: “When authentic activities are transferred to the classroom, their context is inevitably transmuted; they become classroom tasks and part of the school culture” (Brown et al, 1898, p. 34). This seems like another example of a statement that schools are “unnatural” places for learning and that putting learning in the school context makes it “school learning” which is inherently different than “real-world” learning. Also, this statement from Brown et al makes it seem that no school activity can truly be an authentic activity because it takes place outside the practices of the culture.

In our previous learning models, we determined that individuals demonstrate their knowledge through a performance of some sort. Brown et al (1989) explains “learning and acting are interestingly indistinct, learning being a continuous, life-long processes resulting from acting in situations” (Brown et al, 1989, p. 33).  To me, this seems like that in a model of this learning theory, an individual not only demonstrates knowledge through a performance or action, but also learns something every time this action is acted out. In the discussion of teaching fourth grade multiplication, the first step in teaching is to “begin with a task embedded in a familiar activity, it shows the students the legitimacy of their implicit knowledge…” (Brown et al, 1989, p. 38). This seems similar to our discussion of conceptual change, in which students’ previous conceptions are seen as valuable to the learning process and are drawn upon.

Chapter 6 from the NRC (2007) book states: “Students, if they are to understand what science is, must accept that it is something that people do and create. From this flows the implication that science involves creativity and that science is not science because it is “true” but because it is persuasive” (NRC, 2007, p. 171). The idea that science is done by people and is a way for people to understand the world around them, and not just out-of-this-world abstract facts that we mere humans are trying to grasp, is something that I think alludes most portrayals of science in traditional schooling. I think that by putting more focus and emphasis on the idea that science is something people do and create is a way of making the leap from student to practitioner culture smaller.

I found the discussion of cultural norms in Chapter 7 from the NRC (2007) book interesting. The chapter explains that “The structure of classroom norms is often left tacit, making it difficult for students to figure out the rules on their own, especially if these ways of thinking, talking, and behaving are not as frequently encountered in their home communities (Ladson-Billings, 1995; Delpit, 1995)” (NRC, 2007, p. 191). Based on the cognitive apprenticeship model, it can be a challenge for students to be enculturated into the culture of real-life practitioners, and often only situate themselves within the culture of school. For students whose personal backgrounds and culture differ greatly from school culture, adopting and thriving in school culture is the first and major hurdle to cross before even considering adopting the culture of practitioners. How can school culture (and other learning cultures) be made more easily accessible for students whose personal cultures do not align with these other cultures?

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42.

National Research Council. (2007). Understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 168–210.

The Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt (1990) begin their discussion of anchored instruction by referencing “inert knowledge” (p. 2) or knowledge that can be remembered when prompted but has little use outside of those contexts. The group then argues that instruction should be anchored in context and details a program designed with Brown, Collins, and Duguid’s (1989) theory of situated cognition. This theory of learning is primarily based in the idea that learning is rooted in the context of a discipline’s or communities’ practice. For example, Brown et al. (1989) provide an example from research done by Schoenfeld where students brought problems they found in the world to the teacher who then modeled how to solve them mathematically. In this example, the problems were rooted in the students’ observations and wonderings about the world, and consequently, the teacher showed them how to “do” mathematics by demonstrating how to solve these problems.

Situated cognition has undertones of Skinnerian models of learning as well as conceptual change. Brown et al. (1989) discuss “representations,” but rather than theorize that these representations are decontextualized, they argue that each one is very context dependent. Additionally, like with Skinnerian ideas, the only way to observe this learning is to physically observe it with behavior or other outward expressions. Using situated cognition as a theory of learning requires a deeper understanding of the nature of science and how to participate in scientific practices and discourse (NRC, 2007).

Brown et al. (1989) discuss the difference between an apprenticeship and school; in an apprenticeship, students are integrated into a culture and community, school integrates students into a culture and community that is absent of the same values, beliefs, ideas, and skills of the discipline they prepare them for. Therefore, understanding the nature of science and the practices and discourses are a necessity if students are to learn in the style of a cognitive apprenticeship. The information provided by the NRC (2007) outlines many of the ways ontologies, epistemologies, practices, and discourses can support students in learning science. However, there are areas where good intentions can fall short of the espoused goals by science educators to enact the true values of a cognitive apprenticeship in schools.

One of the biggest problems facing schools is that schools are not places where current science is being done. This is not said to diminish the fact that students do science in school, but school is not where scientists work. So, the goal is to make school more like a place where science happens by engaging them in practices found in communities of scientists. One way of doing this in math was to provide scenarios for students to solve (Vanderbilt, 1999). While the scenarios were rooted in “real world” experiences like boating, I wonder if the context in which students were learning would translate to them succeeding with a boat in the same manner? This question is rooted in the fact that the context students are learning is a classroom video game, not dealing with an actual boat. Additionally, each scenario is rooted in specific contexts, how would a student, who has no access to a boat, connect with this scenario? Motivation and identity influence how students learn science (NRC, 2007), and therefore, if students are not motivated by a video game or identify with the scenario how much learning will take place?  One way to potentially overcome this challenge might be to have students bring their own questions to bear in a unit and work with them to solve those authentic questions (Vanderbilt, 1990; Brown et al., 1989) because this incorporates aspects that make apprenticeship valuable; getting an expert in the field to support you in improving in ways that align most closely with your needs as a learner. Yet, as the NRC (2007) details, this may not be enough because of how outside factors play a role in how students learn science.

The NRC (2007) discuss that a major challenge of science is to help students navigate a Western way of knowing with their potentially non-Western culture and way of knowing (p. 201). The NRC (2007) then unpacks ways different populations’ cultures influence their experiences in science noting language, motivation, cultural practices, and beliefs. Each of these aspects, in a situated cognition theory of learning would be important to incorporate into a learning environment to support students in learning science. For example, when discussing motivation, the authors acknowledged that students bring different goals with them to class. These goals are defined by many factors both in and outside school, and as a result, these goals must be thought about when teaching science or students will be learning science for goals they do not possess. This situation could easily result in that knowledge being “inert” as discussed earlier.

Interestingly, the sections in the NRC (2007) about participation in scientific practices were designed to emphasis how science classrooms can be more inclusive of students from minoritized populations while also actively demonstrating why students from these groups do not succeed at the same levels in science as privileged populations. This is emphasized not to take an unfair shot at the chapters, but to emphasis how a situated perspective can inform how students learn. For example, the authors state, “Science, mathematics – and for that matter, ham radio and drug selling – are activities conducted by organized groups of people who tend to communicate in particular linguistic styles…” (p. 189). This reference, made in good faith and to communicate the idea that science is different from other forms of communication, actually can alienate students from science because by referencing “drug selling” next to “ham radio” the juxtaposition of the images raised by both statements is jarring (for sake of this post I will not elaborate further). Later, when detailing “border crossings” (p. 201), the authors highlight how all students can struggle to cross into science. Combining this statement with the one above and the theme of the section, it takes on an “All Lives Matter” stance. Understanding that situated cognition demands that context be considered and that the context determines the representations students make about content in a discipline, how is it possible for a student to form a positive or full representation in science when the field itself fails to recognize how it actively misrecognizes students who are minoritized?

Thankfully, efforts have been done to broaden the scope of who can participate in science by recognizing differences in culture. The vignette about Haitian students is a constant reminder that practices exist in other cultures that mirror science practices (NRC, 2007, p. 194). This one example demonstrates the unique power of the perspective outlined by Brown et al. (1989) because it opens the doors to learning in contexts that disciplines like science are used in and allows students to learn knowledge in ways that are useful to them and their future goals.

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42.

National Research Council. (2007). Participation in scientific practices and discourse. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 186–210.

National Research Council. (2007). Understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 168–185.

The Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt. (1990). Anchored Instruction and Its Relationship to Situated Cognition. Educational Researcher, 19(6), 2-10.

When reading the articles for this week, two major topics came to mind: 1) incorporating “real world” culture with school culture and 2) emphasizing group work between students, allowing them to engage in collaborative learning. I expand on both ideas below, but would love to hear others’ ideas on them.

Before this week’s readings, I felt that culture was hinted in the previous weeks’ readings but not fully addressed. Brown and his colleges (1989) fully address this topic and illustrate the point that students often feel a gap between what they are learning in schools (“school culture”) and the world outside of those four walls (“real-life culture”).  As educators, we want students to be able to apply what they learn in science class to real-world sceneries, but that often is not the case. I know when I TA students, and even from my own schooling, I am often asked “How does this assignment deal with the real world?” and “Why should I care? I’m just taking this class because it’s required for graduation.” This link between school and real-world cultures is often problematic but Brown and his-coauthors propose a solution when they state, “When authentic activities are transferred to the classroom, their context is inevitably transmuted; they become classroom tasks and part of the school culture” (1989, p. 34). The authors suggest that by including “real-world”, i.e. authentic activities, students can develop, acquire, and combine their previous ideas with new ones to create a more complex understanding.

Chapter 7 also hints at this idea when it states “Children are not passive recipients who simply receive or are molded by culture….. relationships between culture and personal meaning area always fluid and complex” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 191). Even with this said and emphasized in the readings, I feel that this link between school and real life culture is one that is still lacking in science classes. I feel that schools are not creating real-world experiences for their students in science classrooms that give them a better understanding of how things work outside of school or how the content they learn in school can be applied in real-life scenarios. I know most of my high school classes had us memorize definitions, and then “apply” them to structured examples. It was really not until college, where I had laboratories in the sciences that I started to understand the real-world applications of what I was learning in class. This lead me to thinking: while labs are not the only way to bridge the gap between these school and real-life cultures, what are other time and cost efficient activities that can bridge these two cultures together in K-12 education? For example, do you think if professionals come into a class and relate a real-life problem with that being taught in class, that would help to bridge both cultures (for example, a medical doctor coming in and presenting students a real life problem about antibiotic resistance during that unit of a Biology class)? I honestly am not sure what the answer to these questions are, but from my own learning, I find it easier to link “real life” culture with “school” science culture when an example is provided to me.

Another point I was thinking about when reading the Brown et. al (1989) article was the idea of collaborative learning. Prior to this week, the readings focused on the individual within science learning: Skinner (1954) emphasized reinforcing behaviors in a student until he/she successfully completed the desired behavior while Posner et. al (1982) focused on the impact an experience can have on a child’s conception about a science idea, i.e. assimilation or accommodation. This week’s reading from Brown and his co-authors (1989) was the first reading this semester that brought attention to the impact of peers on student learning in the science classroom. The article argues that peers can help construct, challenge, and contribute to a students’ own theory, with the authors even including a section of group features vital to learning: collective problem solving, displaying multiple roles, confronting ineffective strategies and misconceptions, and providing collaborative work skills (Brown et. al, 1989, p. 40). This idea of groups/peers influencing science learning is also seen in Chapter 7 when argumentation and participation are discussed (National Research Council, 2007).  I know that not everyone enjoys working in groups during class, but it is important to note that groups allow students to be aware of others’ cultures, views, and thoughts on a science topic. Incorporating group activities into learning can broaden students’ views on a concept and enable to them integrate ideas into their conceptual understanding that they would have otherwise not thought of.

References:

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42.

National Research Council. (2007). Participation in scientific practices and discourse. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 186–210.

National Research Council. (2007). Understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 168–185.

Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accomodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66(2), 211–227.

Skinner, B. F. (1954). The science of learning and the art of teaching. In A. A. Lumsdaine & R. Glasser (Eds.), Teaching machines and programmed learning: The science of learning (pp. 99-113): National Association for the Education of Young Children.