07
Sep 18

Cognitive Apprenticeship

 Another Tale by H.Smith

This week’s reading’s  (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; NRC, 2007) showed a distinct progression in the understanding of how students learn and the nature of knowledge itself. From the learning models of Skinner (1954) and Posner et. al (1981), I can appreciate how the idea of situated cognition has come about. Among many reasons, this aims to address the disparity in how school culture typically divulges facts and ‘knowledge’ to students, resulting in at best, the learning of discrete problem-solving skills that rarely translate into real-world skills and application.

The recognition of knowledge as being culture based and learned within a community of practice stands out to me as being defining differences in what literature has discussed up until this point. The idea that school itself is a culture of practice with its own implicit rules and regulations makes complete sense; no other time in our lives, unless wait…we are becoming teachers, ok nevermind…, will we be required to engage with knowledge as a student does during formative schooling. Behavioral differences in how an individual engages with knowledge are examined by (Brown, Collins & Duguid 1989) when comparing just plain folks (JPFs), practitioners, and students. Unlike JPFs, students reason with laws, act on symbols and attempt to answer well-defined problems. For the student in school, the goal is to produce the correct answer that has a fixed meaning before they can progress onto the next problem or class.  Although a student may master linear algebra or fractions in class, upon entering the real world, when faced with emergent problems in a context that is different from schooling, students tend to struggle with applying their schooling knowledge to find solutions, ‘school activity too often tends to be hybrid, implicitly framed by one culture, but explicitly attributed to another,’ (Brown, Collins and Duguid 1989, p 33). This is also supported by the NRC’s TSS chapter considering the nature of knowledge in the science classroom, ‘science taught in schools is often different from actual science and from everyday life. Students’ learning difficulties are thus increased because scientific goals are distorted and scientific ways of thinking are inadequately taught,’ (NRC 2007, p.178).  I can recall from my own schooling, the question often being asked ‘when will we ever need this in the real world?’  Schooling at present fails to recreate the community of practice that exists in the relevant subject domain outside the classroom.  Brown, Collins, and Duguid (1989) discuss this via the tool analogy that explains how one can learn all there is to know about using a tool, but if the individual is not engaging within that community of practice in a tactile, real-world sense, it is unlikely they can apply their knowledge and put the tool to good use.

The issue now is to create a school culture that allows for some form of enculturation for students within the discipline of the subject. Designing class to emulate how mathematicians, engineers, and scientists engage with problem-solving is outlined within the cognitive apprenticeship model. I need to say that I consider the heart of the cognitive apprenticeship model to be a far more appropriate method of teaching. However, I do wonder how well we can use this idea of knowledge enculturation within classrooms when we as teachers have likely not participated in this model of learning before. Steering clear of facts and memorization has immeasurable merit for when a student enters the real world, but that’s the point, for schools, this is often immeasurable. Unfortunately, when we still demand high scores on standardized tests, will we be able to move away from teaching ‘to the test’ so to speak? Teachers would themselves require a re-schooling on how certain communities of practice engage with knowledge because I know myself that I do not know, on a deep level, how a mathematician engages with real-world problems, and it has not been until I undertook research as part of my undergraduate that I felt I had engaged with a community of science practice.

A question I have now, is that in going with this model of cognitive apprenticeship, is it all or nothing? I ask this because nearly all actual apprenticeships do have some form of schooling, I look at how tradespeople in Australia undergo training with the initial period of time being in a classroom at trade-school, learning fundamentals before they are allowed to be on site and under supervision. Creating schooling environments that can allow for scaffolded forms of cognitive apprenticeship is perhaps a way to reduce the reliance on textbook teaching?

References:

Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, P. (1989). Situated Cognition and the Culture of Learning. Educational Researcher, 18(1), 32–42.

National Research Council. (2007). Participation in scientific practices and discourse. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 186–210.

National Research Council. (2007). Understanding how scientific knowledge is constructed. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 168–185.

 

 

 

 

 

 


02
Sep 18

Conceptual Change – Mieke

From behaviorism to conceptual change, we make a transition from external to internal treatment of the educational process. With Skinner’s work on behaviorism, there is a treatment of learning as the ability to give the correct response through reinforcement. This educational framework has the advantage of being fairly simple to implement and to assess. In contrast, conceptual change is more focused on the inner working of a student’s mind as new information is being taught. While behaviorism focuses on the external appearance of learning, conceptual change addresses the actual process of learning – what is actually happening as the student learns something new. This shift in thought, I believe, is highly appealing to many people. To address students as individuals with existing thoughts, feels significantly more sensitive and more likely to result in actual “understanding” of material. There is, however, the fact that to truly focus in on conceptual change is more challenging for many teachers than simple lecturing and would require significant training. The NRC text is encouraging in that a push for conceptual change-based education is present, meaning that there is hope that education can be more sensitive to students and their ways of thinking.

Tyson et al. note the primary difference between a conceptual change framework and rote learning is the creation of links. Thus, a goal of conceptual change is to give students a strong foundation from which new science can be learned. This is echoed by the NRC’s goals of shifting teaching many topics shallowly to fewer topics in more depth. By giving more robust explanations of important scientific topics, connections between subjects can be given more attention. There is a notable agreement in Tyson et al.’s article and the NRC text, in which similar points are made in regards to subject area and age playing a factor in learning. They make common points in that older children are more capable of complex reasoning and possess better memory than younger children, but that there are not clear delineations based on age. In addition, it may be possible to treat topics in greater depth than previously thought. As discussed in the NRC text, children will experience dramatic conceptual change in the early grades. What should be noted is that the amount of new information encountered will typically result in many misconceptions, but this is not necessarily a point of concern. Rather, these misconceptions serve as the building blocks that children will work through to develop more sophisticated understandings of the world around them. What may be important from this reading is the fact that attitudes of what children are capable of may be misguided. Using an example in the chapter, Chinese third graders were found to be more comfortable with inverse relations than American third graders. The idea in American education that a child may be too young for a certain concept is not supported by the literature. Instead, it is worthwhile for more complex topics to be broached with younger children, and for the teacher to then be aware of where misconceptions are being formed.

All three texts support the idea that conceptual change is not an instantaneous affair, but requires a gradual, longer period of multiple mental adjustments. The NRC proposes that the same concept appears multiple times throughout the grade levels with increasing detail. Since it requires significant work to shift a preconceived notion (or existing conception), it is required that scientific conceptions be revisited to reinforce the magnitude of what is being presented. By revisiting topics, it is more likely accommodation will occur, as opposed to assimilation of classroom concepts with problematic existing conceptions.

A couple details in the Posner et al. text that interested me were the use of historical examples by teachers and the possibility of compartmentalization by students. Posner et al. call into question the tendency for science educators to present scientific theories through historical experiments. As the authors state, “recounting historical anomalies […] won’t always do!” (Posner et al, pg. 221) Experiments are not actually easy to visualize for the novice, for whom these historical experiments are entirely foreign. Additionally, for accommodation to occur, they must be convinced that their original conception is unsatisfactory. Thus, students may not relate to the academic experimental approach, perceiving these experiments as unrelated to themselves. To convince students that their existing conception is unsatisfactory, it is vital that examples or metaphors more closely related to what a student will conceptualize as “real life” must be developed. They also discuss the possibility for compartmentalization, which may be expressed by students with the thought of “science doesn’t have anything to do with the ‘real’ world”. My “theory of learning” that I brainstormed in the first week of class included students treating academic concepts as a different class of information than “real life” knowledge. I think this can occur for students at both the top and bottom of the class, grade-wise. High-achieving students who compartmentalize are simply more efficient at expressing the “book smart” knowledge they possess, but may still ultimately lack connections between these academic concepts and their “real life” knowledge. I think educational reforms must be particularly sensitive to the issue of compartmentalization, which I think can be aggravated by the tendency to only present historical experimental examples, which may appear to students as incredibly detached from their ‘real’ life. 

Posner et al. ultimately address how educators might encourage accommodation. Instead of simply informing students of scientific theories, it may prove beneficial for educators to focus on finding cognitive conflicts which may prime the student for accommodation, which is a proposal echoed in the NRC text. Labs, lectures, homework, etc. can be developed which expose anomalies, thus allowing students to realize a dissatisfaction in their current conceptions. In order to facilitate this goal, the authors propose that educators should also represent information using multiple means, such as mathematical, pictorial, and verbal. Helping students to make connections between these representations should then enforce the concept. Additionally, having these multiple representations may also allow for incorrect conceptions to become more apparent. A more mathematically-inclined student may be able to mask their conceptual conflict by correctly solving the relevant equation(s), but addressing the concept through pictures of the physical phenomenon may reveal their missing understanding.

Overall, through the use of conceptual change, educators can be more aware of the initial thoughts of their students as well as the way their thoughts are affected by new information. Educators can pay attention to the ways that new information conflicts with a pre-existing worldview, and they can attempt to address this by highlighting this conflict and showing how a new conception better describes reality. This framework seeks to address the psychological process of learning and presents multiple paths that can occur. I believe that there are some similarities to Dewey’s paper, which addresses a need for flexibility from teachers to better work with students. This can be seen by proponents of conceptual change calling for teachers to tailor their teaching to respond to the way students learn.

 

References:

National Research Council. (2007). Science learning past and present. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 11–25.

Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education66(2), 211–227.

Tyson, L. M., Venville, G. J., Harrison, A. G., & Treagust, D. F. (1997). A multidimensional framework for interpreting conceptual change events in the classroom. Science Education81(4), 387–404.

Skinner, B. F. (1954). The science of learning and the art of teaching. In A. A. Lumsdaine & R. Glasser (Eds.), Teaching machines and programmed learning: The science of learning (pp. 99-113): National Association for the Education of Young Children.


02
Sep 18

Conceptual Change- Sarah

The introduction of the Posner (1982) paper explains: “Learning is concerned with ideas, their structure and evidence for them. It is not simply the acquisition of a set of correct responses, a verbal repertoire or a set of behaviors” (Posner et al., 1982,  p. 212). This description of what learning is not is almost exactly a definition for what learning is under Skinner’s point of view. Right from the start of the paper it is clear that this model of learning will look very different from the one developed by Skinner. When discussing the conditions for an accommodation to occur, Posner explains that the first condition is that “there must be dissatisfaction with existing conceptions”. When I first read this, the first thing I thought was that the student must be made to believe their current ideas are “wrong”. Later in the paper, when discussing science teaching implications, the paper suggests that teachers should “spend a substantial portion of their time in diagnosing errors” and develop strategies to “deal with student errors” (Posner et al., 1982, p. 226). Rather than thinking of students’ current explanations as “wrong” or “errors”, I think it is important to view them as incomplete. If teachers spend time diagnosing student “errors”, an effort should be made to not label student ideas as right or wrong, as a trust must be built with students so that they are accepting to new ideas. I found the use of the term “ecology” to describe conceptual ecology a very powerful metaphor– as we normally think of ecology and ecosystems as complex systems with a variety of types of interactions between players, both positive, negative, and neutral. I think the same can be said for the ideas and thoughts we have about how the world works– some ideas confirm others, and some ideas create tension between other ideas (“anomalies”). This idea of ecology makes sense when Posner explains that accommodation is “a gradual adjustment in one’s conception, each new adjustment laying the groundwork for further adjustments” (Posner et al., 1982, p. 223), as one or few ideas may change that lay the groundwork for further change. The experiment in this paper reminded me of A Private Universe, where a student who is taught an entire unit on seasons maintains her original ideas when re-interviewed after time as passed. In the case where the student was receptive to the new way of thinking about relativity, I wonder if this new view will stand the test of time.

I found the discussion of science learning in primary school-aged children in Taking Science to School interesting. As we discussed in class, schools seem to be constantly trying to make learning more “natural” like the type of learning children engage in on their own. The NRC explains that primary schools are often reluctant to engage in teaching the difference between evidence and theory because of cognitive development issues. If schools want children to think in a way that is more “scientific” when they get to high school, it makes sense that they are engaging in the “scientific method” from an early age– as the book puts it “these capacities need to be nurtured, sustained, and elaborated in supportive learning environments that morvie effective scaffolding…” (NRC, 2007, p. 45).

In the discussion of biological misconceptions, Taking Science to School, explains that only 60 percent of Israeli fourth graders think that plants are alive while 90 percent of US/Japanese children believe plants are alive. I wonder how much of this difference comes from a fundamental difference in what different cultures mean by the term “alive”. Could there be a difference in how cultures think about the state of being alive, and could this affect overall thinking of how the natural world works? If this is the case, I wonder how many other instances, however minor, may contribute to differences in how groups of people think and how this affects how we determine what way of thinking is “right”.

 

References:

National Research Council. (2007). Science learning past and present. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 26–127.

Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accomodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education, 66(2), 211–227.


02
Sep 18

Week 3 Readings-Zac

The first reading, Goals for Science Education, concerns itself with the topic of what is science and how to teach it. In my experience as a wildlife scientist, my education began as an issue of mostly content. I have no memory of what we did in middle school but in high school we mostly focused on the facts rather than the process. In college as a biology major the first two years were largely concerned with background facts but little process. The emphasis on process was increased in the last two years of college but those years were mostly spent on facts. Graduate school was entirely focused on the process of doing science. That transition from learning facts to learning the process of scientific investigation was a difficult one due to the relatively little background I had in the realm of designing and executing a scientific study. The idea of focusing more on that aspect of science in the lower grades, K-12, seems like it would be very beneficial for the reason that it would facilitate a more well-rounded introduction to science and help those students who might decide to pursue it as a career. Also, while working in the medical fields I was frequently reminded of the fact that people do not understand that scientific theory and understanding is subject to change over time.  For example, many of my patients would grouse about following diet guidelines because they thought that in ten years doctors would decide that those guidelines were wrong. In some cases that may be true but in other cases, diabetic diets for example, that was not the case. Teaching the idea that science as a process of theory change might help clear up this confusion (National Research Council, 2007). On an unrelated note, I appreciated the fact that the authors brought up the idea that “children are natural scientists” (NRC, 2007, p. 35). That phrase has always bothered me because children are naturally curious but being curious does not make a person a scientist. A fundamental understanding of natural process and an understanding of how to undergo scientific investigation does.

 

The second reading, Knowledge and Understanding of the Natural World, deals with the issue of what K-8th graders know or understand about the world around them. One point that the authors made is that the idea of increased understanding does not “… come for free with increasing age” (NRC, 2007, p. 94). I like that this is mentioned because I have often had the experience with adults or teaching college students where there is a gap in understanding that I would have thought would not have been possible with people of that age. The reality is that if certain things or thought processes are not taught then they may never be learned. The author continued with this point when discussing children’s knowledge of the world, specifically anatomy. “Most adults have huge gaps in their understanding of body structure and function in addition to misconceptions” (NRC, 2007, p. 98). I think that anyone that has worked in medicine can relate to this statement. My only criticism for this chapter is that the authors seem to think that it is possible to teach everything about a subject at each grade level. “At the same time, they can miss many other mechanisms, such as that food is broken down not only physically but chemically…” (NRC, 2007, p. 99). Is it realistic to think that every nuance of a subject can be taught during elementary school, the time that the previous quote refers to?

 

The third reading, Accommodation of a Scientific Conception: Toward a Theory of Conceptual Change, is focused on how the process of changing a student’s understanding of certain subjects. The term accommodation is used to mean the replacement or significant change in a student’s understanding of a phenomenon (Pozner, Strike, Hewson & Herzog, 1982). The difficulty of replacing or modifying a person’s misconceptions or simply incorrect recall of facts is considerable. Trying to convince a student of something as simple as the idea that porcupines do not shoot their quills is difficult to do. The case that the authors chose to study, Einstein’s theory of relativity, seemed to be a particularly high bar to use as an example. It took many years for physicists to wrap their heads around this subject so it seemed an odd place to start an investigation. That being said the authors conclusions seemed to be correct but could have been improved through clarification. How exactly does a teacher “Develop lectures, demonstrations, problems and labs which can be used to create cognitive conflict in students” (Posner et al., 1982, p. 225)? Also, the authors did not give sufficient time to the problem of strongly held beliefs that might be due to other issued beside logic. It is one thing to convince a student of relativity in the face of their understanding of Newtonian physics, it is another to convince them of evolution in place of religious beliefs. One other thought that I had was that some of the firmly held ideas that students have are due to the way that they are taught a subject. Would it be possible to teach Einstein’s theories while teaching Newtonian physics thereby eliminating the need for accommodation later?

References

National Research Council. (2007). Taking science to school: Learning and teaching science             in grades K-8. National Academies Press.

Posner, G. J., Strike, K. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a                scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science                                    education66(2), 211-227.


02
Sep 18

Prior Knowledge, Misconceptions, and Conceptual Change – Chloe

“… learning science is difficult not because of what children don’t have or lack, but because of what they do have: some initial commitments and ideas that will need to be revised and changed” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 107). As I was reading the articles for this week, I stumbled upon this quote and kept thinking about it. Initially, I was drawn to the quote because it references students’ prior science knowledge, an idea that I feel is often not integrated into teaching. With a jammed packed teaching schedule, educators often do not have time, or forget, to determine what students come into their classes already knowing. I think that referencing students’ prior knowledge is vital in science classes as many of the concepts have been previously taught, or heard about, by the students. Understanding what students know can help us, as educators, determine where to focus our energy and time on.

On the other hand, the quote also resonated with me because it does not reference students’ prior knowledge with a negative connotation, i.e. the idea that students come in to class with ideas or misconceptions that are completely incorrect and need to be retaught (“accommodated” as Posner and his colleges would put it.) I tend to view misconceptions as ideas that need to be corrected, rather than “attempts by children to make sense of the world around them” (National Research Council, 2007, p. 98). When looking at misconceptions in this way, it is easy to see that children tend to want to answer “why” and “how” phenomena, events, and things around them work, so they rationalize it. This rationalization gives students a concept or an explanation that they believe to be true. From a teacher point of view, it can be very difficult to change students’ science conceptions that are misinformed, which leads me to wonder: if students believe a misconception, one that is often so prevalent that most non-science people commonly believe it, how can educators have their students not only accept a valid explanation but change their future thinking about the phenomena?

To answer this question, I start with a quote from Posner and his colleagues “…learning is the result of the interaction between what the student is taught and his current ideas or concepts” (1982) and one quote from the National Research Council “However, their prior knowledge also offers leverage point that can be built on to develop their understanding of scientific concepts and their ability to engage in scientific investigations” (2007, p. 191). Both these quotes illustrate that without referencing students’ current understanding on how/why something works, educators cannot 1) determine how students’ ideas interact with new, sometimes incompatible, ideas that are being taught to them or 2) have students accept a new explanation. By understanding where students’ thought processes are, educators can assimilate and use part of students’ existing concepts to help explain to them why the presented theory or view of a phenomena is “correct.” In doing so, students will be more likely to accommodate and replacing their current (“incorrect”) conception with new, “correct” ones since they can compare and contrast their old conceptional understanding and the newly presented one. While this is not the only way for students to accept a new outlook/theory about a science concept, it would increase the likelihood of students changing their conceptional understanding.

With that said, I do appreciate the five accommodation-centered teaching techniques Posner and his colleges provide for teachers (1982) as it gives educators specific areas to focus on. However, I did find myself questioning the second teaching strategy “Organize instruction so that teachers can spend a substantial portion of their time in diagnosing errors in student thinking and identifying defensive moves used by students to resist accommodation” (Posner et. al, 1982, p. 226). To me, Posner and his colleges are viewing any idea that does not align with the suggested conceptions as errors. But more importantly, the authors consistently mention concepts that align with a certain conceptual framework, but do not really expand on how such a framework is created, when it was created, or by whom it was created. I wish there had been more information on this framework, but overall enjoyed reading Posner and his colleagues’ article.

Citations:

National Research Council. (2007). Science learning past and present. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 11–25.

Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accomodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education66(2), 211–227.


02
Sep 18

Conceptual Change – Challenges for classrooms -Ashwin

Conceptual change is clear in it’s intention to have a clean break from the behaviourism based instruction that Skinner advocates starting from their very definition of learning as a kind of inquiry and not “a verbal repertoire or a set of behaviours” (Posner, 1982, p. 212). The focus is on inquiry based instruction where the reasons for accepting a concept based on students’ existing conceptual knowledge and the barriers they may face in the process are addressed. The foundations for conceptual change theory seems to draw from the works of Kuhn and Lakatos who characterised the way scientists and scientific communities look at conceptual change in the process of so called ’scientific revolutions’. While this may seem to be a good foundation for curriculum to produce students “capable of understanding and evaluating information… and of making decisions that incorporate that information” (NRC, p. 34), adapting characteristics of theory change as it occurs in the scientific world for designing learning processes presents unique challenges. Concepts of assimilation and accommodation for students are more nuanced and challenging.
A central tenet of conceptual change theory for learning environments is the notion of a conceptual ecology Posner, 1982). Conceptual ecology required us to analyse how epistemological and metaphysical commitments play a role in the accommodation of new concepts. However, this may not always be easy for students where there is a lack of understanding of and an inability to articulate what these commitments are for individuals. To make these commitments visible in a classroom would be difficult.
One of the main barriers to changing these commitments is identified by Posner when a new conceptual framework challenges existing metaphysical, epistemological or ontological commitments. This suggests that teaching students about the nature of science as an explicit form of instruction, stressing on the evolving nature of the subject may potentially be useful. However, Duit says that conceptual change research has failed to take into consideration that understanding science includes knowledge of science concepts and “about this science content knowledge” (Duit, p. 674). This seems to indicate a failure of the program, in the 21 years between Posner’s and Duit’s articles, to incorporate nature of science instruction in the program. However, in the strands of scientific proficiency laid out by Taking Science to Schools (NRC, 2007) proficient students are required to ‘understand the nature and development of scientific knowledge’. In principle, the TSTS framework does consider this problem as being addressed through implicit directives in curricular materials. I personally am of the opinion that explicitly addressing the challenges scientists face through a ‘Nature of Science’ module can provide some much needed context for students.
When presented with alternate frameworks, anomalies are shown to play a key role in helping students accommodate. Posner recommends the development of “instructionally viable and effective anomalies” (Posner, p. 221). For advanced scientific concepts, finding anomalies may become difficult to demonstrate in the classroom. In the transition from Classical Mechanics to Quantum Mechanics, for example, the only anomalies that are demonstrable and powerful enough to change conceptions are a series of experiments that require sophisticated machinery and setups to perform and can’t effectively be simulated in a classroom. This is one of the key drawbacks of conceptual change as I see it: Effective simulations of scientific activities may not always be possible because of the practical limitations of the environment. Even if we consider that accommodation in the classroom is only a “gradual adjustment in one’s conception” (Posner p. 223), the ‘fruitfulness’ and ‘viability’ of a new framework will be difficult to convince for students if it is in direct contradiction with a framework that correlates with everyday experience. Modelling for students to increase viability for new theories may also be counter-productive as models are multiple and modelling as an instructional tool is a complex activity. Most students do not reach ‘Level 3’ where they can effectively view models as mere thinking tools and can be “manipulated by the modeller to suit his/her epistemological needs” (Duit, p. 678). We need to reconsider a way to make alternate conceptions that are fruitful and viable, taking into account the limited capacity of students.
Posner also fails to take into account affective factors such as interest and motivation (Duit, 2003). Since conceptual change was motivated by studies of scientific communities, interest and motivation can be assumed to remain fairly high over the course of an assimilation or an accommodation. Within students, it is my opinion that constant modifications of concepts must be treated cautiously as it could have a negative effect on motivation and student perception of science. It is in precisely such a scenario that I disagree with Posner who says  that historical anomalies aren’t sufficient. Such accounts can provide much needed context in which students can place their conceptual changes to relate more with the scientific world and ensure that interest is generated.
From an instructor’s perspective, conceptual change theory poses some interesting challenges. As noted earlier, making student thinking visible, not just in terms of conceptual understanding but also with regards to epistemic and metaphysical commitments is difficult. For teachers to spend a “significant portion of their time diagnosing errors” and to represent content in “multiple modes” (Posner p. 226) requires vast amounts of expertise with teachers who are proficient in technical knowledge of their fields as well as in fundamental nature of science. To train teachers no have not just a knowledge of subject matter but “a clear understanding of…components of scientific development” (NRC, p.35), requires teachers to think like scientists and know how scientific research is carried out. This would require a re-skilling of teachers who have been entrenched in the old ways of teaching who may not possess such expertise. From a practical standpoint, diagnosing errors individually may not even be feasible with overburdened, understaffed classrooms. Since there is considerable variability in scientific reasoning within any age group (NRC, p.42), standardised evaluation is impossible. The burden then falls on instructor to individually evaluate students and build developmental goals on that basis which may make democratic participation in scientific practices in the classroom, one of the key goals of the report (NRC, p. 40) difficult to implement in practice.
Adapting conceptual change for learning seems to me to face two broad challenges. At the theoretical level, there is the issue of adapting a theory that stemmed from studies of scientific communities and using that at an educational level. Secondly, conceptual change theory depends on individual’s conceptions about areas such as their scientific understanding of knowledge and concepts, which are based for the most part on tangible real world entities, but also on individual perceptions of epistemology and metaphysics. This makes a centralised set of guidelines difficult and the job of the instructor in the classroom difficult in having to cater to students on an individual basis. The conception of the TSTS suggests that older children are “building on products of preschool growth” (NRC, p. 105). Therefore, we need teachers to track the growth of these students across multiple levels. The theory is as dependant on the individual capabilities of the instructor as it is on a curriculum and a set of centralised guidelines.
References:

National Research Council. (2007). Science learning past and present. Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K-8, 11–25.

Posner, G. J., Kenneth, S. A., Hewson, P. W., & Gertzog, W. A. (1982). Accommodation of a scientific conception: Toward a theory of conceptual change. Science Education66(2), 211–227.

Duit, R. (2003). Conceptual change: a powerful framework for improving science teaching and learning. International Journal of Science Education25(6), 671–688.


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