This week’s ‘debate’ illustrated two key ideas for me that seem to characterize a lot of the big thinkers in educational research
1) Each theory operates in fundamentally different paradigms and start from very different presuppositions. This makes even issues that are fundamental to the cause, such as the learning goals that each theory considers to be of importance, incommensurable
2) Each theory and the group that champions for it, target different aspects of the learning experience and as such use different lenses and languages to describe what is essentially the same phenomena. This makes it difficult to effectively synthesise the theories and to identify commonalities between them. Debates in the field therefore tend to be superficial as the two (or more) groups involved talk through each other and over each other rather than with each other.
Primarily, the difference between the two processes seems to be a disagreement on the approach to analytical focus. The situatists work top-down: looking at any situation and breaking it down in terms of the actors and tools, the environmental factors that influence the interaction and the subsequent degree of ‘learning’ that has occurred in this interaction that individual actors can then carry forward into future situations with similar structures. The constructivists work bottom-up: looking at any interaction in terms of the cognitive structures that each individual brings to the interaction and how such cognitive structures can be created and enhanced through learning; either through situational interaction or from individual instruction. Both schools of thought eventually have to encounter the issue of transfer, and I will try and present my thoughts on that at the conclusion of the post.
In what follows I try to examine the claims laid forth in Anderson et al’s preliminary critique (1996) and show why the two arguments presented above and the subsequent papers published by the two schools of thought render this argument counterproductive. I only consider the first two claims here but the analysis for the other two is the same (I realized after writing on the first two claims that it’s starting to run a little long for a blog post).
Claim 1: Action is grounded in the concrete situation in which it occurs
Anderson et al’s (1996) claim that there are “many demonstrations of learning that transfer across contexts” (p.6) is offered as an argument against what they presume is a situativitist claim that “more general knowledge cannot and will not transfer to real world situations” (p.6). Greeno’s counterargument (Greeno, 1997) is to claim that the studies cited by Anderson et al as a constructive argument for the cognitivists are actually proof for the situative claim that activities in some situations can include aspects of practices that have been learned in other situations. Clearly, the same studies can be shown to different claims depending on the lens we choose to employ to analyse the results. The efficacy of a teaching methodology in the classroom that transfers to a real world situation is viewed by the constructivists as proof that cognitive structures and general knowledge are being transferred by the individual to be deployed in multiple situations whereas the situatists would take this as proof that structural similarities between the two contexts enable a learner to deploy the same practices in both situations. However, it is undeniable that the situatists have argued that school knowledge is not legitimate. Even this simple statement is interpreted differently by the two schools. Cognitivists view this as a blanket critique that the situatists have of the merits of any kind of schooling system whereas Greeno argues that illegitiamacy of school knowledge is due to the learning of algorithms that is “not a necessary condition for successful reasoning” (p.7).
Greeno’s rephrasing of the two questions does little to help the situation and Anderson et al can’t see the difference “for the life of [them]” (Anderson et al, 1997, p.19). The only way they seem to be able to find some reconciliation is if the difference becomes a matter of “definitons one chooses for knowledge and learning”.
It bothered me that neither school chose to elaborate on this statement because I definitely feel like this is where the crux of the difference is. Greeno and the situatists view knowledge and learning in terms of the kinds of practices that students can engage in situationally. Cognitivists look at knowledge and learning as the development of stable cognitive structures that are deployable by the learner in different situations. Situatists look at practices as they constructed in situ and then look at structural similarities between activities and therefore would seek to enforce an activity based learning in schools that simulate the kind of activities that students will have to face in the real world. They eventually come close to some form of reconciliation when they look at the gaps that each theory can fill in the other; cognitivsts need to look at other actors in a situation and situatists need to look at individual cognizing agents and the structures they bring in to a situation (Anderson et al, 2000).
Claim 2: Knowledge does not transfer between tasks
Anderson et al argue that situatists deny the existence of transfer, again quoting Lave (1988) to make their case. Greeno’s rephrasing this time explicitly shows the defintional differences between the two schools. His ‘cognitive question’ uses the word ‘knowledge’ when talking about transfer whereas his situative question uses the phrase ‘participating in an activity’. Here we can’t deny that every situation that a learner engages in involves both knowledge and how to put that knowledge into practice. This suggests that we ideally would need to consider both analytical lenses in trying to understand student participation in any kind of activity and how learning can facilitate transfer. However, we again encounter an issue as the two schools look at transfer differently because their notion of what gets transferred is different. Cognitivists don’t deny the situative nature of activity, but they argue that in such situations transfer is of cognitive structures. They work bottom up. Situatists look at practices as they constructed in situ and then look at structural similarities between activities and therefore enforce an activity based learning in schools that simulate the kind of activities that students will have to face in the real world. They work top down.
Viewed in this manner, the differences between the two theories disappear. What they offer are two different analytical frameworks that can provide different insights into the way that learning occurs and the ways in which what is learnt is manifested in different situations. The authors coming together acknowledge this eventually in agreeing that in “the present state of our theoretical understanding, both perespectives are needed” (Anderson et al 2000, p.12).
I’m left feeling that there needs to be a stronger synthesis of the two approaches into one consolidated theory. While they are both useful they differ in terms of their implicaitons for the classroom. It is imperative that research is able to reconcile the differences in the conceptual underpinings of these two theories to produce a theory that can direct educational implications for the classroom that can incorporate the salient features of individual cognition and interactionist, situative considerations.
References
Lave, J. (1988). Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics and Culture in Everyday Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511609268
Anderson, R. A., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Situated Learning and Education. Educational Researcher, 25(4), 5–11.
Greeno, J. G. (1997). Response: On Claims That Answer the Wrong Questions. Educational Researcher, 26(1), 5–17.
Anderson, J.R, Reder, L.M., Simon, H. (1997). Rejoinder: Situative versus Cognitive Perspectives: Form versus Substance. Educational Leadership, 26(1), 18–21.
Anderson, J. R., Greeno, J. G., Reder, L. M., & Simon, H. A. (2000). Perspectives on Learning, Thinking, and Activity. Educational Researcher, 29(4), 11–13.
Greeno, J. G. (2006). Chapter 6: Learning in Activity. New York: Cambridge University Press.
This whole debate seems like something that could have been better addressed at a conference or some other fact to face interaction. Maybe then the could have just written the las Greeno paper together and simplified things dramatically.
Ashwin – I think your blog post is spot on. I was having some similar frustrations with the articles in feeling like the authors were all talking past each other, and essentially arguing about “a disagreement on the approach to analytical focus” as you said. I think the distinction between “top down” and “bottom up” is useful to understand the two perspectives. As their differences lie in the focus and language they use to describe their methods, the reality is that there may not really be an uncompromising difference between the two. Instead of a debate, I agree that there needs to be more conversation – I think there could very well be strong synergy between the two approaches to describe the experience of learning. I think the “let’s get along” article from 2000 really reveals the fact that the two frameworks are compatible – on all the major issues, they seem to agree.
Ashwin – I appreciate your description of the two different theories as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. I think this is a helpful way of thinking about them because although I think it is oversimplified (which is the intention), I think it also helps in understanding the scope of the frames they apply to understanding learning. Top-down implies a larger frame of reference that includes interactions, society, contexts, practices, tools, and more. On the other hand, bottom-up demonstrates a frame that thinks of the individual only that is surrounded by other entities. I think you could also think of these frames as privileging environment versus individuals. In many ways, the cognitive lens requires you to center humans and their minds, while situative frames expand that and allow you to decenter humans and consider other influences on the learning of students.
Finally, your last paragraph made me wonder if we should consolidate the theories because as you state, they both inform the same phenomenon, and while their implications for learning environments are different, by keeping both theories separate it allows for more interaction and conversation about learning. Sure, I think conversations tend to move in the direction of consolidation, especially when thinking about research through a “scientific” lens, but the heterogeneity within the field can only make it more robust in the long run in my opinion.