Going into this week’s reading, I have been interested in seeing readings bridging conceptual change and sociocultural learning models. To my surprise, the Brown et al (1993) and Pea (1992) readings on distributed expertise and distributed intelligence, respectively, stood out to me the most this week. Some of the issues that I have had with the Vygotskian models were eased by these papers. One of my larger issues was with the idea that “learning is an integral and inseparable aspect of social practice.” (Lave and Wenger, 1991) I’ve been questioning whether learning requires a social component to occur. I was never very attentive in school growing up, and I never really worked on homework or studying with classmates, and yet I did well by academic standards! So, how can I subscribe to the notion of learning as innately social? This question was answered in Pea’s (1992) writing on distributed intelligence. “What was thus missing, in my view, was an explicit recognition of the intelligence represented and representable in design, specifically in designed artifacts that play important roles in human activities.” (Pea, 1992) If we take a more liberal definition of social learning, and consider a sort of delayed social interaction embedded in “artifacts” (objects) that we use, then the ubiquity of social learning becomes apparent. There are many instances where I have taken an attitude of “I’ll learn how to do [some concept] when I do the homework.” I’ve always considered this as a solitary activity of learning, but would the homework itself constitute an interaction with my teacher? Any tools I consider, a textbook, a calculator, a periodic table, are embedded with meaning from many other people in their designs, allowing me (and any other person) to learn from others indirectly. What also struck me about Pea’s work was the criticism of measuring intelligence as individual, stating that “[w]e should reorient the educational emphasis from individual, tool-free cognition to facilitating individuals’ responsive and novel uses of resources for creative and intelligent activity alone and in collaboration.” This is something that I’ve considered in the past – why force students to memorize polyatomic ions, for example, when a “real” chemist would always have access to tools to look them up? I personally regularly forget whether sulfate has three or four oxygens, and normally have to look it up online, but I wouldn’t consider that to make me a “bad” chemist. Rather, in reality, we always have tools and social networks at our disposal to help ourselves. Thus, testing students for memorization of facts that no real member of the field actually needs memorized seems to be a poor choice of assessment.
This train of thought continues into Brown et al’s (1993) paper on distributed expertise. Here, they oppose a more literal apprenticeship model where we would attempt to make middle school science students into apprentice scientists. Instead, they argue that the point of schools is to be “communities where students learn to learn.” I think this is an important perspective that we’ve been needing to address. The idea of enculturating every child into all the communities of practice covered by K-12 education seems unrealistic. Instead, to help children become lifelong learners makes sense and sets them up for success as they specialize later in life. To bring this together with distributed intelligence, Pea discussed the use of tools and technology as a valuable part of learning. This makes sense if we seek to “learn to learn.” I don’t need to have the exact structure of all the common polyatomic ions memorized to be a good chemist, but I do need to know where to look and to have some idea of what I can do with this information. Brown et al’s description of a classroom taking a distributed expertise approach was incredibly interesting to me. Allowing students to research particular subjects and teach each other and allowing them to take part in the formation of their own curriculum and assessment is an exciting approach to a classroom. I think what really allows this social learning method to work is the role of the teacher as a guide. If the teacher were to take on a too distant role, then I could see this classroom strategy as being fruitless for many students as they struggle to understand what the teacher wants from them. On the other hand, if the teacher were to give the students too much information, then they might not learn strategies for learning, and instead return to the typical classroom environment where the teacher bestows knowledge for students to learn (or memorize). By enculturating children into a community of learners, then “[t]hese learning experts would be better prepared to be inducted into the practitioner culture of their choosing; they would also have the background to select among several alternative practitioner cultures, rather than being tied to the one to which they were initially indentured, as in the case of traditional apprenticeships.” I think this is really important, not just as a discussion of the purpose of schools, but also in the face of statements like “why do we need to learn algebra? I’ll never use it” or “why do we learn art? I don’t need it!” There’s a big difference between choosing not to be a scientist and having the option of becoming a scientist totally barred from you. By having an educational system with a goal of gaining some proficiency in a variety of subjects, and teaching students how they would go about further learning, children will be able to leave school with many paths open to them.
Going into the readings by Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle (2016) and Driver et al (1994), we see a link from conceptual change to sociocultural learning models. In the former reading, the authors avoid treating students as willing recipients for conceptual change. “The assumption that students approach their classroom learning with a rational goal of making sense of the information and coordinating it with their prior conceptions may not be accurate.” (Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle, 2016) This statement feels like an obvious observation – of course many students don’t have that goal! – but it is something that is important to recognize. The authors discuss how scientists may internalize our community’s goal of seeking knowledge and consistency in theories, models, and data to describe how the world works. They go on to discuss how this is not typically the case for students. I think this might bring up an issue with the cognitive apprenticeship model, which has largely focused on behavior – will students act like a certain community of practice? – it leaves out the interior experience of students, many of whom will simply not enter class with the goals of the community of practice. So, the ability to internalize the norms of the community will be mediated by the student’s actual goals. By considering the combination of internal (conceptual change) and external (cognitive apprenticeship), we can see that learning is not so simple as giving students some demonstration that makes them dissatisfied with their current concepts, nor is it satisfactory to throw them into a scientist-like environment. Students are individuals with individual motivations, and this will affect their tendency to engage in deeper cognitive activity. Finally, thinking over Driver et al’s (1994) paper, they discuss how conceptual change does not occur in the absence of a larger culture. They discuss the existence of common-sense explanations for phenomenon that are common amongst many groups of people, and how this serves a purpose of communication. For example, the idea of letting cold air in is not a scientific description of heat, but it is so common a statement, that even a scientist who knows better will state it for ease of communication. Thus, conceptual change does not result in a replacement of information. When we learn something new, the previous idea is not wiped out from our minds. Instead, we may still use these common-sense ideas in day-to-day communication, even though they are not scientific. This can also explain the inability to use academic information easily in everyday contexts – the socially commonplace explanation might be the most natural understanding to come to mind, and thus takes precedence.
Overall, this week’s readings have left me with a lot to think about as I consider what I want to say in my theoretical framework. I’ve been interested in the theories coming from the Vygotsky side of things, but felt unsure if I could really agree with them. If I consider that all learning requires social interactions (both direct and indirect) to be facilitated, in the very least due to the need for language to express thoughts, then this makes learning as a social practice much more coherent.
References:
Brown, A. L., Ash, D., Rutherford, M., Nakagawa, K., Gordon, A., & Campione, J. C. (1993). Distributed expertise in the classroom. Distributed Cognitions: Psychological and Educational Considerations, 188–228.
Pintrich, P. R., Marx, R. W., & Boyle, R. A. (2016). Beyond Cold Conceptual Change : The Role of Motivational Beliefs and Classroom Contextual Factors in the Process of Conceptual Change, 63(2), 167–199.
Driver, H., Asoko, H., Morimer, E., & Scott, P. (1994). Constructing Scientific Knowledge in the Classroom. Educational Researcher, 23(7), 5–12.
Pea, R. (1992) Practices of distributed intelligence and designs for education. Cambridge
University Press, 47-87.
Lave, J. & Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge University Press.