ENDING CORRUPTION: THE INTERPLAY AMONG INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, RESOURCES, AND INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURS

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We draw from theories of institutions and collective identities to present a threefold framework of institutional change—involving institutional logics, resources, and social actors—that furthers our understanding of the mitigation of corruption. Those social actors intent on reforming corruption function as institutional entrepreneurs, and their success depends both on articulating an anticorruption institutional logic that incorporates corruption-disabling identities, cognitive schemas, and practices and on having or developing the resources necessary to propagate the new anticorruption institutional logic.

Observers claim that "anticorruption campaigns have always begun with enthusiasm and ended with cynicism" (Krastev, 2000: 24). Indeed, systemic and persistent corruption appears to be a common reality of organizational life in both developing and developed economies. In some developing and transition economies, corruption is associated with inefficiency, reduced foreign direct investment, reduced economic growth, misdirected entrepreneurial talent, and increased rates of poverty and inequality (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Kaufmann, 1997; Mauro, 1996), but corruption often remains a problem despite years of reform efforts (Open Society Institute, 2002; Tisńe & Smilov, 2004). The corruption recently receiving attention in developed economies such as the United States also reveals corruption's systemic, persistent nature: it has been industry wide (e.g., accounting, energy, insurance, mutual funds) or regional (e.g., California's energy crisis) and not merely a matter of misbehavior by a specific organization, group, or individual. For example, a recent investigation by the attorney general of the state of New York found systemic corruption in the insurance industry, in which "many brokers, with the assistance and collusion of insurance companies, engage in systematic fraud and market manipulation" (quoted in Treaster, 2005). Even cases of corruption in specific organizations (e.g., Adelphia, Parmalat) can involve enduring collective corruption, rather than isolated individuals and incidents.

Effective remedies for systemic corruption remain elusive, despite considerable attention and research from both academics and policy makers. Research and practice regarding corruption have been dominated by two alternative frameworks. One is based on an economic perspective and focuses on the roles of rational self-interest, efficiency pressures, and explicit, formal regulative structures in explaining and combating corruption. As we argue below, this approach has had limited success in remedying corruption because it neglects the role that normative and cognitive structures play in the development, perpetuation, and remediation of corruption. A second major stream of research, primarily in the organizational behavior literature, is more attentive to normative and cognitive aspects of corrupt behavior. In explaining and remedying improper behavior, however, this research focuses extensively on culture,

structure, and cognition within organizations and not on the larger institutional orders that also influence the behavior of individuals and organizations.

We draw from research on institutions and identity to argue that the deinstitutionalization of endemic corruption requires changes in both the symbolism and substance of corrupt institutional orders—through the creation of alternative identities that cognitively and morally frame action differently, and through the development of noncorrupt habits and practices rooted in such newly constructed frameworks of meaning. Effective remedies for corruption must attend to a complex interplay of institutional logics and the resources used to sustain them both substantively and symbolically. Those who would seek to implement such remedies function as institutional entrepreneurs—social actors, at any level of analysis, who use the resources available to them to "actively define, justify, and push the theory and values underpinning" the practices of a new institutional order (Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000: 241; see also DiMaggio, 1988), which in this case includes a new, noncorrupt sense of identity. But anticorruption efforts also must anticipate how defenders of a corruption-favoring status quo will marshal available resources so as to legitimate and maintain that institutional logic.

In sum, our account builds on existing organizational and economic treatments of corruption but looks beyond intraorganizational processes and coercively regulative structures in order to consider the interplay of identity and macroorganizational contexts. We proceed by first examining and comparing the economic and organizational behavior perspectives on corrupt behavior, with the aim of pointing to a larger, more encompassing understanding of corruption that each perspective only hints at in different ways. Next, we develop a model of purposive institutional change and use the model to examine how corrupt institutional orders may be changed by corruption's opponents, as well as how defenders of corrupt systems might try to sustain them. We conclude with a discussion of the research and policy implications arising from this broad-ranging, identity-based, and institutional approach to ending corruption.

ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CORRUPTION

Interests, Markets, and the Regulation of Corrupt Behavior

From an economic perspective, corruption generally is defined as the misuse of a position of authority for private or personal benefit (Doh et al., 2003; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Tanzi, 1998), where misuse typically constitutes a breach of legal norms (Johnston, 1986; Kaufmann, 1997). Corruption is expected to occur where (1) there is control over economic benefits and costs and, thus, the potential for economic rents—that is, profits (e.g., as a result of government regulation), and (2) persons in positions of authority have discretion over the allocation of such benefits and costs (Mauro, 1996). Corruption, by this account, reflects rational, self-interested behavior by persons using their discretion to direct allocations to themselves or to other social actors who offer rewards in return for favorable discretionary treatment (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). This approach assumes that corruption is a response to situations that present opportunities for gain and the discretionary power to appropriate that gain; therefore, corruption is thought best remedied by curtailing discretionary power and/or incentives to avoid corrupt activities (Klitgaard, 1988). In short, an economically oriented approach suggests that corruption is minimized by fostering one or more of the disciplinary effects of market efficiency, government regulatory structures requiring accountability and transparency, and enforcement of punitive structures that make corruption illegal (or that render its perpetrators incapable of accreditation, in the case of self-regulating industries and professions; Kaufmann, 1997; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Tanzi, 1998).

This approach, however, leaves open the question of what constitutes the best route to rectify an already corrupt system. On the one hand, market liberalization—meaning the removal of excessive formal governmental regulative structures—is considered by many to be the panacea for reducing corruption. In this view, "if we abolish the state, we abolish corruption" (Tanzi, 1998: 566). Thus, mass privatization policies, as instituted in some former Soviet bloc countries (e.g., Czech Republic; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000), in theory remove much of the control and discretion afforded public of-

ficials under regimes of central planning and extensive government ownership or control and, hence, eliminate their ability to exploit that discretion for personal gain. The disciplining effects that efficient product and capital markets are purported to have on corrupt managerial behavior in the private sector are then able to operate (in theory). Empirical evidence regarding this approach, however, is not encouraging. For example, market liberalization policies (e.g., mass privatization) used in transforming some ex-Soviet bloc countries have failed to eliminate corruption and instead have sometimes led to more, albeit different, corruption (Kaufmann, 1997; Open Society Institute, 2002).

On the other hand, attacking corruption through the imposition of added regulative and punitive structures is a common approach (Ivancevich, Duening, Gilbert, & Konopaske, 2003; Klitgaard, 1988). For example, governmental "omnibus" programs have been used to fight corruption in transition economies, and they generally contain all or a selection of the following elements: an anticorruption law; a national anticorruption program; a ministerial commission, specialized unit, or agency dedicated to corruption reform; an implementation action plan; and a monitoring mechanism (Tisné & Smilov, 2004). As such, these programs focus on increasing transparency and accountability and on strengthening and enforcing penal codes. Such compliance-oriented regulative changes also appear to be ineffective at curbing corruption. Although evidence suggests that regulative reforms may improve economic performance (e.g., growth and investment; Abed & Davoodi, 2000), there is little evidence to suggest that these reforms effectively reduce corruption. In part, this may be because corrupt organizations can respond to regulative changes with "window-dressing" policies (Tisné & Smilov, 2004).

Organizational Behavior and Corruption

Organizational behavior research on corruption and ethics (see Ashforth & Anand, 2003, and Treviño & Weaver, 2003) does not deny the relevance to corruption of rational self-interest, opportunities to exploit discretion for gain, and the regulative institutional structures of an economy or society. This literature focuses, however, on controls occurring within organizations and on the normative and cognitive impacts of the social situations that inform and influence behavior in organizations. It stresses the importance of the ways in which organizational settings can generate amoral reasoning and behavior, such as is associated with obediently carrying out one's role in a particular social situation (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001). Thus, corruption is understood as reflecting an array of interacting individual and situational factors within organizations and as including breaches of moral principles or social norms, in addition to legal norms (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

The organizational approach explicitly attends to how corrupt practices and activities become institutionalized within organizations—becoming "part and parcel of everyday organizational life" (Brief et al., 2001: 473). As Ashforth and Anand (2003) have described the process, leaders might sanction or authorize corrupt behaviors, explicitly or implicitly, by imposing reward structures that promote corrupt practices or by condoning or ignoring such practices when they occur. Corrupt practices then become embedded within the scripts associated with depersonalized organizational roles, as well as within ongoing organizational processes. As a result, corrupt practices become routinized and habitual and, thus, institutionalized within the organization. Moreover, corrupt activities then become less salient as *corrupt,* because routinization makes them normative and enacted automatically. Insofar as an activity remains salient as corrupt—among new organization members, for instance—it is made acceptable through socialization processes, reward systems, rationalizing ideologies, expectations to obey leaders, and presumptions that existing practices are rational and legitimate.

The implications of organizational behavior research on corruption are open to at least two interpretations. On the one hand, this research encourages the prospect that corrupt or unethical behavior in an organization can be reduced or eliminated by cultural change within the organization, involving both formal elements (e.g., reward systems, formal ethics initiatives) and informal elements (e.g., changed leader behavior), so that organization members identify with and commit to high standards of behavior (Treviño & Weaver, 2003; Weaver & Treviño, 1999; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999). On the

other hand, the organizational behavior framework also indicates how deeply embedded corrupt behavior can become within an organization and within the normative and cognitive frameworks that guide organization members' thoughts and actions. Once corruption is deeply embedded, even exogenous shocks such as media exposure or governmental intervention (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States)—while making corrupt activities salient to participants—might not be sufficient for ending corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In fact, the difficulty of stopping corrupt activities that have become embedded within daily routines leads some scholars to suggest that corruption "is best handled through *prevention*" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003: 39).

Interests, Role Identities, and Institutional Frameworks

The organizational behavior perspective indicates that corrupt behavior within organizations is strongly influenced by situational factors. In particular, depersonalized roles have become the reality of organizational life (Ashforth, 2001), so corrupt actions can become institutionalized in situationally defined role identities. Identities strongly influence and motivate behavior, including ethically significant behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2005; Weaver, 2006; Weaver & Agle, 2002), and, thus, normally well-meaning people can end up engaging in corruption while fulfilling their organizational roles. As a result, more than compliance-oriented remedies are necessary to root out corruption; roles and identity are important factors in perpetuating and preventing corruption.

In contrast, more economically oriented approaches assume that people consciously partake in acts (corrupt or otherwise) when it is in their self-interest to do so—a self-interest based on fixed and stable preferences (Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996)—and, thus, there is no room for roles or identity in such accounts of behavior (Friedland & Alford, 1991). So, in this view, (1) corruption is a result of situational factors only to the extent that those factors present an opportunity for gain, and (2) remedies for corruption involve structuring situations so that corrupt behavior leads to losses, due either to market reactions (e.g., mass privatization) or to coercive threats (e.g., rules, laws, and sanctions).

But this focus limits the perspective's ability to prescribe effective remedies for reducing or stopping much corruption. For example, a common aphorism in some pre-1989 Soviet-dominated societies urged that "those who do not steal from the state steal from their families." In short, the identity of a "good provider" for one's family included the practice of theft, against a background in which large institutions such as the state were viewed as illegitimate or corrupt. Because such identities and role definitions remained embedded within the thinking of individuals and in their social networks during the post-Soviet years (Stark, 1989), mere structural changes to the economic/regulative system did not bring about expected changes in corruption. Despite structural change, it was still "rational" to steal from the state, given that the conventional identities and roles (e.g., stealing to aid one's family) did not change. That identity change did not occur with the movement of these societies to more capitalistic logics is evidenced by the forms of stealing from the state (e.g., extortion or bribery involving police and customs officials, tax evasion) that remain extremely common and similarly justified (Open Society Institute, 2002). Unless corruption reform efforts change such deeply embedded identities, corruption in some form is likely to persist.

In summary, the organizational behavior perspective on corruption offers a richer portrait of the sources and cures of corruption than does a purely economic account focusing on incentives, monitoring, and discipline. The former approach allows that individual behavior is affected by regulative, normative, and cognitive structures, whereas the latter only considers regulative structures. Nevertheless, the organizational behavior approach too is limited by its typical focus on organizations as the context for action, sometimes supplemented by attention to regulative institutional structures. Individuals and organizations alike are embedded within both organizational and wider institutional environments (Granovetter, 1985) and are subject to not only formal but also informal pressures rooted in their institutional environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and cognitive communities (e.g., Porac & Rosa, 1996; Porac, Wade, & Pollack, 1999). Organizational behavior accounts of corrupt behavior tend to ignore this embeddedness. For example, consider the potential intraorganizational impact of externally defined identities

that license stealing from the state. Although state-run enterprises might have been replaced by privatized ones, insofar as the established role identity of good provider remains largely intact, and insofar as large institutions and organizations continue to be viewed as suspect or alien, the privatized entities of posttransition economies easily could see "stealing from the company" replace "stealing from the state."

Given the limitations of these two perspectives on corruption, we now turn to developing a model of the ebb and flow of institutionalized corrupt practices. This model grants the insights of economic and organizational behavior approaches but puts them into a larger institutional framework that includes a recursive relationship among social actors, resources, and institutional logics. Our hope is that our analysis will help to reveal not only the way macrosocial factors can be involved in efforts to address corruption at individual and organizational levels but also the commonalities in efforts to remedy corruption across individual, organizational, and societal levels of analysis. Consistent with this intention, we adopt the broad definition of corruption that characterizes much organizational scholarship (i.e., breaches of legal, moral, or social norms; Ashforth & Anand, 2003), and we take a broad view of institutions, treating them as the "regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior" (Scott, 1995: 33). Similarly, our discussion allows that social actors can be constituted by persons or collectives, such as organizations (Scott, 1995), and we use the term *social actor* in this broad sense.

REFORMING CORRUPT ORDERS: THE CHANGING OF IDENTITIES AND PRACTICES

Any attempt to understand and change a social world characterized by corruption must attend to the influence of institutional orders on the cognition and behavior of social actors within those orders, and it must also consider the institutional impact of those social actors. Previously, scholars examined the general relationship between the actions of individuals and the social structural frameworks within which they act (e.g., Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992). But purposely changing a corrupt system requires attending to the ways in which institutional orders influence the cogni-

tive frameworks and behavioral repertoires of actors, the resources for action that institutional orders provide to actors, and the ways in which institutional orders can lose their influence and, thus, be changed. Stated simply, intentional, successful corruption reform requires aligning three essential elements of institutional change: institutional logics, resources, and social actors. Although these aspects of institutional change have been examined to varying degrees, they have not previously been integrated into a theoretical framework of purposive institutional change. Therefore, we first develop such a framework. We then use it to examine how institutionalized corruption may be changed.

Institutional Change: Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and Social Actors

Formal and informal institutions provide the shared meaning that gives coherence to social life through the creation of social identities (Scott, 1995) that delineate categories of social actors and define the cognitive schemas and roles governing behavior in a given situation (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Hogg & Terry, 2000). Schemas serve as mental maps that not only involve representations of the relations within any given situation (i.e., a "meaning space") but also act as mechanisms that simplify cognition (DiMaggio, 1997). Schemas promote efficiency and facilitate interaction, as repeated practices within specific situational contexts are cast into patterns or scripts (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Roles, meanwhile, define the values and norms and, thus, the appropriate action for specific social positions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In short, social action within any institutional order is guided by an *institutional logic* (Friedland & Alford, 1991)—a "socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material substance, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality" (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999: 804). Institutional logics are therefore constituted by the relationship between symbolic systems (i.e., identities, meaning) and material practices (i.e., substantively embodied actions), a relationship mediated by the cognitive frameworks (i.e.,

schemas) and behavioral roles that form the basis on which actors interact with the world.

The identities, roles, schemas, and practices occurring within an institutional logic presume a substrate of resources that undergirds the capacity for engaging in particular practices and sustaining the corresponding identities. Resources (Sewell, 1992)—or capital (Bourdieu, 1990)—serve as foundations on which an institutional logic is acted out. While these resources can be economic, they may equally be human capital—for example, education or expertise; symbolic influence—for example, the capacity to define and legitimize institutional rules and values; or social status—for example, access to and positioning in important networks (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998; Sewell, 1992). As such, resources are also central to defining social identities, since they in part determine the "positional identities" from which actors operate within any given institutional field, whether these be formally defined or emergent and informal (Oakes et al., 1998). Thus, the structure and form of resources influence institutional logics (Bourdieu, 1985). Institutional logics can be reproduced over time only to the extent that they are supported by and embedded in resources (Sewell, 1992). In short, resources provide a limit on both the durability and malleability of institutional logics.

Postwar (i.e., post-1995) Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), which has been described as a criminalized state (Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004a), provides a useful example of institutional logics and supporting resources coalescing in ways that engender corruption. Indeed, criminalization of the state and elements of the business sector appears deeply embedded in the institutional logic of BiH. Corruption was enabled in BiH society through the encroachment of an institutional logic centered on ethnicity (i.e., a tripartite Serb, Bosniak, and Croat division at one time, later reduced to a division into Serb and a Bosniak/ Croat alliance). The symbolic domain of the corruption-enabling logic was constructed around ethnic identities, incorporating schemas, norms, and expectations often oriented around within-ethnicity trust and cooperation and interethnic distrust and conflict. This, in turn, affected the substantive domain in a manner allowing networks of corrupt practice in government and business to operate and flourish. For instance,

along with other ethnically defined government entities, education systems, and so forth, the police forces of BiH are rooted in ethnically defined regional identities, despite continuing efforts by the international community to foster a nationwide, professionalized (i.e., transethnic and noncorrupt) BiH police force. This situation has a strong effect on police activity; any necessary cooperation and coordination between police forces occurs within an ethnically charged atmosphere, and accountability of the police forces is to their respective regional ethnic governments and political parties, as opposed to BiH citizens in general and the national government (e.g., see Office of the High Representative, 2005). In short, the fragmented social situation (e.g., noncooperating police departments) engendered by an institutional logic of ethnic identity (and related ethnic suspicions) generates a range of practices (e.g., competing authority structures, social networks defining "friends" and "enemies") that provide opportunities for corrupt behavior and the resources needed by corrupt actors to maintain the current corruption-enabling institutional logic.

In this way, institutional logics and their relationship to resources also exemplify "the recursiveness of social life" (Giddens, 1976: 5). As Figure 1 depicts, the relationship within institutional logics among identity, schemas/roles, and practices reflects such recursivity (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). Institutional persistence and conformity arise from the automatic enactment of scripts, habits, and rituals that become embedded in identities and, thus, perpetuate a particular institutional logic (Jepperson, 1991). In terms of Figure 1, this is the downward influence from institutionally embedded identities to cognitive schemas to substantive practices. This downward relationship is emphasized, for example, in sociological discussions of legitimacy imperatives, which stress the conformity of action to institutionalized categories and rules (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Previous accounts claiming that normalized corruption within organizations will be relatively stable and difficult to remove (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001) also rest on this downward process.

But the reproduction of institutional logics is not automatic. Rather, it is shaped by social interaction (Sewell, 1992). Institutions might be the media within which social actors' beliefs and actions occur, but, diachronically, they are

FIGURE 1
Institutional Change: Interplay Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and Social Actors

the product of human cognition and action (Giddens, 1984). With regard to cognition, conditions that trigger deliberative cognition about behavior make institutional change more likely, since such deliberation renders often taken-for-granted institutional logics visible and therefore open to question or challenge (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Seo & Creed, 2002). "Revolution becomes possible once institutions, however fragile or robust, are no longer perceived as inevitable" (Stinchcombe, 1978: 40). Although institutional change is often the result of some type of exogenous shock or crisis (Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996), it may also occur when internal contradictions exist within institutional systems (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002), since such situations stimulate deliberative cognition (DiMaggio, 1997) and grant actors discretion over practices (Goodrick & Salancik, 1996). Furthermore, institutional fields often involve a multiplicity of sometimes competing logics, and this competition may facilitate institutional change (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell, 1992). As depicted in Figure 1, when multiple, competing

logics exist, there is no one-to-one relationship between meaning and practices (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Institutional logics can and do intersect with regard to their practices, and practices can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the institutional logic that subsumes them; behavior that one institutional logic treats as loyalty another treats as nepotism.

As Figure 1 also shows, human action within any particular institutional field (Oakes et al., 1998; cf. organizational fields; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) is ordered by the recursive relationship between institutional logics and resources (depicted by bidirectional arrows in Figure 1). Hence, this recursive relationship is of major importance to the control of institutions, as well as to their potential transformation. The "positional" identities that allow access to resources within any institutional field (e.g., the ethnically nationalist political parties that have often been dominant in postwar BiH) clearly also reflect the ways each particular institutional logic names and distributes these positions (e.g., regional, ethnically based police versus nationwide, transethnic police). Furthermore, whether some-

thing qualifies as a valuable resource itself depends on the meaning given to it in an institutional logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992); what one institutional logic identifies as a gold coin might, in another logic, be identified as a shiny though worthless object. Thus, institutional logics also can be bases of power, insofar as they delineate what does, and what does not, count as a resource (Stryker, 1994: 855). Indeed, the existing institutional logic in BiH of ethnic identity–based politics and administration empowers corrupt elements in the society, and those elements, in turn, attempt to use their resources to further maintain the institutional logic of ethnicity that empowers them.

The final element central to institutional orders, and their transformation, is social actors, who are the interpreters, carriers, and enactors of identities and meaning (Zilber, 2002). Although institutionalization (i.e., the entrenchment of an institutional logic) can be an emergent, unintentional phenomenon, it also can be the intentional product of actors within an institutional field: "institutionalization as a *process* is profoundly political and reflects the relative power of organized interests and the actors who mobilize around them" (DiMaggio, 1988: 13). Thus, social actors may seek to achieve their ends by creating or transforming an institutional logic by means of the resources available to or created by them (DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004; Seo & Creed, 2002). In other words, institutional entrepreneurs (see right side of Figure 1)—those social actors intent on establishing a new institutional form—may engender successful institutional change insofar as they are social "actors with sufficient resources" (DiMaggio, 1988: 14) and are able to "infuse new beliefs, norms, and values into social structures" (Rao et al., 2000: 240; see also Fligstein, 1997).

Such "entrepreneurs" can be individuals, groups, organizations, or collectives. For example, the 1995 peace accords ending the violent conflict in BiH gave sweeping influence over civilian affairs to the Office of the High Representative (OHR),[1] which embodies the interna-

tional reconstruction and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and others. The OHR thus functions as an institutional entrepreneur in BiH, with corruption reform a top priority.

At the same time, defenders of the status quo, whose positions are supported by the existing resource structure and institutional logic, can attempt to use the resources available to them to maintain the existing institutional logic (left side of Figure 1); those empowered by an existing institutional logic and resources may act in defense of the status quo. Emergent institutional logics may be particularly subject to public scrutiny, since they are not yet legitimate, and their outcomes remain subject to evaluation (Henisz & Zelner, 2005). Thus, defenders of the status quo may use existing reference points and resources to demonstrate the inconsistency of an emergent institutional logic with the prevailing institutional logic in an attempt to undermine the emergent logic. For example, privileged and somewhat corrupt political elements in BiH aid the status quo by supporting the continuance of separate government statistics offices based on ethnic/regional entities. Efforts to share data among those statistics offices, or to merge them into one national office, have been blocked by some ethnic entity–level officials exercising their political authority. The result is unreliable demographic and economic data for BiH, and unreliable data, in turn, undermine efforts to rationalize and decriminalize the political system.

In summary, the intentional changing of an institutional order involves efforts by institutional entrepreneurs to use the economic, cultural, social, and symbolic resources available to them to propagate a new institutional logic in the face of opposition from those empowered by the existing logic who, in turn, would defend the status quo. This account has several implications for those seeking to reform corrupt structures. First, it is crucial that such institutional entrepreneurs articulate and embed a new anticorrupt institutional logic; successful reform will happen only if new anticorrupt identities are constructed and institutional change occurs *both* in terms of the roles, schemas, and rules attendant to the new identities and in terms of

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[1] Although the OHR originally was expected to cease functioning earlier, as of 2008 it was still operating (conjointly with the European Union Special Representative), pending the achievement of several remaining goals, such as "fiscal responsibility of the state" and "entrenchment of the rule of law" (Lajčák, 2008).

the practices and actions through which such identities are lived out. Second, reform attempts most likely will be challenged by defenders of the old corrupt structure, and, thus, access to and the *definition* of resources also are critical to successful change. The legitimacy of any new emergent institutional logic depends on how well it ties into the existing institutional logic (Clemens & Cook, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002), and opponents of change will attempt to exploit inconsistencies between an emergent logic and prevailing notions of legitimacy (Henisz & Zelner, 2005).

Therefore, third, in order to effect institutional change, institutional entrepreneurs must have a critical understanding of existing institutional logics and their attendant resources—an understanding that allows them to employ resources while at the same time reidentifying existing practices under the new desired logic. Finally, the symbolic elements of an institutional logic may become decoupled from the substantive (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981), and evidence suggests that when institutional structures are challenged, those empowered by such structures use their resources to adopt symbolic but not substantive aspects of the new institutional logics in order to stave off further change efforts (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). Institutional entrepreneurs must therefore clearly delimit the boundaries of the new institutional logic, as well as seek concurrence between its symbolic and substantive elements (Friedland & Alford, 1991). We now further examine each of these issues, starting with the processes involved in transforming the symbolic domain of a corrupt institutional logic into one that is anticorrupt.

Identity Change and Legitimating Accounts

The primary means by which the symbolic domain of institutional logics can be changed is through the creation of new identities for participants (i.e., an anticorrupt collective identity) in the institutional field. The articulation of collective identities constitutes a primary means of institutional change (Friedland & Alford, 1991), since it leads to the creation of categories of social actors and objects (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Scott, 1995) that define new role structures and cognitive schemas that, in turn, guide behavior (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Fligstein & Mara-Drita, 1996; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997). Therefore, Fligstein argues that the ability to

construct a new "meaning space" through identity creation is the essential "social skill" required of any social actor seeking to successfully change an institutional order:

> Social skill can be defined as the ability to motivate cooperation in other actors by providing those actors common meanings and identities in which actions can be undertaken and justified. . . . Skilled social action revolves around finding and maintaining a collective identity of a set of social groups and the effort to shape and meet the interests of those groups (1997: 398).

Social actors attempt to create common identities by advancing "legitimating accounts" through the use of framing processes (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002: 479). Legitimating accounts, which are similar to the "collective action frames" used by social movement collective actors (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613), are culturally resonant, action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate action and mobilize resources (Creed et al., 2002). Framing processes involve "meaning work—the struggle over the production of mobilizing and counter mobilizing ideas and meanings" (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613). Although there is a host of framing processes, collective action frames essentially involve three core types of framing (Benford & Snow, 2000; Creed et al., 2002): diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. Diagnostic framing identifies some condition as problematic and in need of improvement and also casts blame for the situation—"it involves casting others into the role identities of villain, culprit, or antagonist" (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994: 191). Prognostic framing lays out what needs to be done to resolve the problem. Motivational framing then provides compelling reasons to undertake this resolution—it "entails the social construction and avowal of motives and identities of protagonists" (Hunt et al., 1994: 191). In short, social actors seeking (or defending) institutional change use diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing processes to make ingroup ("protagonists") and outgroup ("antagonists") distinctions by advancing collective and personal identity claims. These claims define the criteria for what it means to be a member of the "protagonist identity field" as well as the "antagonist identity field" (i.e., sets of beliefs, values, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors).

Institutional entrepreneurs, then, must use such framing processes to offer legitimating ac-

counts of the new institutional logic they seek to promote. As Figure 2 depicts, this process involves advancing accounts that create, legitimize, and delimit the boundaries for the new anticorrupt identities necessary for an anticorruption logic to take hold. In terms of Figure 2, institutional entrepreneurs attempting corruption reform must simultaneously advance diagnostic frames as to the existing problem (e.g., corruption) and who is responsible for it (e.g., "antagonist" identities and practices under existing corrupt institutional logic), prognostic frames that detail solutions to this problem (e.g., legal reforms), and motivational frames that define and legitimate "protagonist" identities and, thus, further define the practices acceptable for these new identities (i.e., anticorruption logic). At the same time, however, defenders of the status quo may also use similar framing processes to defend the existing identities undergirding the corruption from which they benefit (see Figure 2).

As an example of diagnostic framing, consider that institutional entrepreneurs seeking to change corruption in ex-Soviet transition countries (e.g., Transparency International, World Bank) typically have used campaigns meant to raise public awareness of the negative impact of corruption on social goals (i.e., economic growth), since "for many people in the post-communist region corruption is a normal phenomenon that is internalized or easily excused" (Karklins, 2005: 67). Such diagnostic framing appears to have been quite successful in achieving its goal of problem definition. Following awareness campaigns in Bulgaria, BiH, and Macedonia, for instance, "corruption went from being one of many problems to being the most serious problem facing the region," at least in public perceptions (Tisné & Smilov, 2004: 30). Furthermore, such diagnostic framing typically plays to citizens' perceptions that the state and its actors (e.g., civil servants, doctors) are the perpetrators of corruption (i.e., "antagonists") and, thus, are to blame (Karklins, 2005).

But this type of framing also can be used to counter the diagnoses offered by those seeking reform. Status quo defenders might, for example, claim that corruption is a consequence (rather than a cause) of poverty, so poverty and

FIGURE 2
Corruption Reform: Changing Both Identities and Practices

not corruption should be addressed (Wanner, 1991). Moreover, defenders of corrupt orders can, in some instances, rely on the fact that within the established logic, corruption is a taboo topic of discussion. Hence, they can depend on, and actively promote, a taboo against the kind of talk that would contribute to institutional entrepreneurial diagnostic framing (Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004b). Or—again in the case of BiH—anticorruption forces can be identified in undesirable terms; in BiH this means defining the intervention power of the OHR as undemocratic and, thus, illegitimate.

Prognostic framing processes also appear to be prevalent in attempts at fighting corruption. For example, anticorruption initiatives in the former Soviet bloc during the 1990s generally involved calls for either market-oriented initiatives (e.g., rapid dismantling of state-owned industry in the Czech Republic; Spicer et al., 2000) or, more commonly, the adoption of various legal and regulatory structures aimed at increasing accountability (e.g., governmental omnibus programs; Karklins, 2005; Tisné & Smilov, 2004). Indeed, Tisné and Smilov found that "omnibus programs are seen as universal tools in the fight against corruption" (2004: 40) in their study of southeastern Europe, and that such programs were forcefully recommended by those seeking corruption reform. For defenders of the status quo, prognostic framing may not be required, since the primary goal is to have no changes. If anything, defenders of the status quo may assert that corruption is culturally relative so that what those speaking from outside the institutional logic call corruption is, in fact, part of "our way of life" (Wanner, 1991).

Identity is motivating (Hunt et al., 1994; Weaver, 2006), providing a basis for action. The efforts of those seeking to reform corruption in BiH, primarily through the OHR, provide examples of the attempted use of identity in motivational framing. Beyond diagnostic and prognostic framing similar to that described above, the OHR has actively engaged in motivational framing through the propagation of a new collective identity for BiH. The OHR proffers a distinctively European identity (and EU accession) as an alternative to existing, corruption-enabling ethnic identities. Such a European identity—in contrast to Bosniak, Croat, and Serb identities—ultimately would eliminate the perceived need for

ethnic identity politics and social fragmentation and would carry with it EU anticorruption role expectations. For example, a statement by the OHR, criticizing a walkout by Serb members of the BiH parliament, made the contrast with "normal European countries" in which "there are consequences" for such action. The presumption, in this case, is that BiH should become a "normal European" country (Office of the High Representative, 2006a). Similarly, another statement advocating the development of Western-style chambers of commerce recommended that BiH follow the model of postwar Germany, again suggesting a European framework of identity (Office of the High Representative, 2006b). Police restructuring and other problems likewise are portrayed as steps on "the reform path to Europe" (Office of the High Representative, 2006c).

Motivational framing may be quite important to the maintenance of the status quo as well, especially if an identity structure and its boundaries are under serious attack. In the face of the motivational framing efforts advanced by the OHR to embed a European identity within BiH (with attendant expectations for corruption reduction), for example, defenders of the status quo have played to ethnic identity fears concerning the status and welfare of ethnic groups in a more unified and centralized BiH. These defenders of the status quo have attempted to maintain the currently established boundaries of their identity field (i.e., ethnic identities) in opposition to the new boundaries offered by the OHR (i.e., European identity) in an effort to ensure the continuation of their privileged status (and corrupt activities), despite the gains made by the OHR and others in raising awareness of corruption as an important national problem.

In sum, both institutional entrepreneurs seeking an anticorrupt institutional order and defenders of an existing corrupt order can use diagnostic, prognostic, *and* motivational framing processes to support their respective institutional logics. Such framing processes advance collective and personal identity claims, which define and delimit what it means to be corrupt and anticorrupt. The above example suggests, furthermore, that the actual content of identity and its constituent schemas and roles need not be framed explicitly in terms of corruption. In BiH, it is ethnically defined collective identities that significantly contribute to an institutional logic within which corruption can flourish. At-

tending to the role of such corruption-enabling collective identities helps to broaden the focus of anticorruption efforts; the identity frameworks that enable or restrain corruption might not themselves embody particular schemas or role expectations regarding corruption. Given the focus on ethnic identity by the defenders of the status quo in BiH, for example, the success of institutional entrepreneurship toward ultimately reforming corruption in BiH may lie in addressing the continuing sources of ethnic factionalism (such as the unresolved grievances growing out of the early 1990s conflict; Freebairn & Jelacic, 2004). In general, attention to identity, especially motivational framing, is a central element in any corruption remediation. It appears, however, that it is not necessarily an explicitly *corrupt* identity that will always need to be addressed.

Resources for Changing Institutional Logics

Because institutional logics help to define the resource structures on which social actors depend (see Figure 2), winning the conflict over identity claims is crucial to successful institutional reform. Glynn's study of the conflicting identity claims advanced by musicians (i.e., orchestra as artistic entity) and administrators (i.e., orchestra as economic entity) within the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra during a musicians' strike in 1996 offers an intraorganizational illustration of how identity claims "can frame the manner in which resources become emphasized, prioritized, and deployed" (2000: 295):

> Claims on the aesthetic identity evoked resource claims consonant with artistry (e.g., expanding the size of the orchestra, tenuring more musicians, investing in more complex musical pieces, touring worldwide, hiring guest conductors, etc.); claims on the economic identity argued for a pecuniary strategy of resource deployment (e.g., cutting costs, increasing ticket prices, raising funds, growing the endowment, limiting the number of costly orchestra performances, etc.) (Glynn, 2000: 293).

In terms of reforming corruption, however, winning an identity conflict may be especially problematic for reformers (i.e., institutional entrepreneurs), given that the existing resource structure will tend to favor those it empowers (i.e., defenders of the status quo). Access to key social resources is, of course, necessary to en-

able corruption reformers to compel noncorrupt behavior by offering incentives or disincentives (e.g., legal punishment) in relation to corruption. The use of incentives or disincentives might even contribute to the development of institutional logics based on noncorrupt identities, schemas, and practices. But a much broader array of resources can play a role in changing institutional logics. Media access and support, for example, were important for achieving success in propagating anticorruption diagnostic frames in some post-Soviet economies (Karklins, 2005). But the following example of relative success in reducing corruption in the BiH judiciary system illustrates more indirect ways in which access to a wide range of resources *and* attention to identity are important for changing corrupt institutional logics, in part by undermining the social resources of corruption's defenders.

Public opinion surveys (Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004a) show that perceptions of the BiH judiciary have improved over time, especially regarding the relatively new (established November 12, 2000, in Sarajevo) national-level State Court, which has successfully handled organized crime and corruption cases (Devine & Mathisen, 2005). The State Court was imposed on BiH by the OHR, which used its political and social resources to require that the court be staffed with Bosnian judges and a select number of non-Bosnian judges (e.g., a former Delaware Superior Court judge sits on the war crimes and organized crime bench in Bosnia). The presence of international judges disrupts established social networks, thus straining the resource structure supporting the old corrupt logic (i.e., ethnic clientelism). Furthermore, by placing non-Bosnian judges into close working relationships with Bosnian judges, the OHR-imposed judicial arrangement can rely on social learning processes (Bandura, 1986) to help professionalize the judicial identity of Bosnian judges, while reducing the salience of ethnic identities within judicial roles. The placement of key persons in positions of influence can work in concert with more overt, resource dependence pressures for change to not only create a new institutional logic but also internalize it in the role identities of key actors.

Overall, then, the OHR used the resources at its disposal (a treaty-based right to intervene, access to international judges, NATO and EU military support) to address judicial corruption in two

ways. First, it redefined the critical positional identity of judge away from a corruption-enabling identity based on ethnicity. Second, by doing this, it reconfigured the resource structure that empowered the previous corrupt institutional logic, in that high-level judges are no longer so exclusively linked, through their social networks or identity, with established criminal elements. In short, the OHR attempted to use its resources to alter the resource structure that supported defenders of the corrupt status quo.

Backward Compatibility of New Institutional Logics

Access to resources in itself is not sufficient for successfully changing institutional logics. In order to become successfully established, the new collective identity (i.e., new anticorrupt "protagonist" identities) being promoted must be perceived as legitimate (Scott & Lane, 2000)—as "desirable, proper, and appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 571). Human agency in general—and institutional entrepreneurship in particular—involves the capacity to adapt symbols and schemas from one institutional logic so as to create another (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992). Consequently, a new anticorruption identity must be given some coherence with the existing institutional logic; the legitimating accounts projected by institutional entrepreneurs must, to some degree, engage the existing ideologies and schemas of social actors (Benford & Snow, 2000; see the horizontal arrows in Figure 2). The newly proposed logic must tap into the existing institutional logic "in a way that embellishes, clarifies, or invigorates those [established] values and beliefs and resonates with potential constituents" (Creed et al., 2002: 480).

Thus, one of the keys to successfully changing a collective's identity is linking the desired future identity to the collective's past (Goodrick & Meindl, 2004). The collective's history, in effect, "becomes revisionist history" (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2000: 71), revised and reinterpreted in ways that make extant identity claims conform to some desired future arrangement. This also means that identity claims will tend to be idealistic, simple, and coherent, selectively high-

lighting desired features at the expense of the less desirable (Alvesson, 1990).

For example, the legitimating accounts offered by institutional entrepreneurs within BiH in their efforts to establish a European identity involve the argument that the history of the country is one of multicultural toleration—that BiH is characterized by a tradition of harmony and cooperation among its constituent religious and ethnic groups (as evidenced, for example, by historic rates of intermarriage), rather than by ethnic factionalism (Holbrooke, 1998). This appeal to a multicultural (and European) past attempts to legitimate a multicultural, European (and relatively corruption free) future and delegitimates the ethnic identities that undergird corruption.

Concurrence of Substantive and Symbolic Change

Finally, because of the recursive relationship between the domains of meaning and practice that together constitute an institutional logic, anticorruption change efforts must concurrently address each domain in a coherent way. Thus, any attempts to directly change the substantive domain (i.e., practices) of an institutional logic must occur concurrently with efforts aimed at the symbolic domain (i.e., identity and meaning). As part of this effort, institutional entrepreneurs must advance framing processes that focus on redefining or reinterpreting existing substantive practices in a manner consistent with the new anticorrupt institutional logic they seek to promote. Existing practices serve as a repertoire or "tool kit" (Swidler, 1986: 273) for constructing alternative identities and their corresponding schemas and rules (Clemens & Cook, 1999). Building a new logic partially on the basis of existing but reinterpreted practices also helps to provide legitimating coherence with the old order in a manner similar to the legitimating processes just discussed above.

The reinterpretation of existing practices is not sufficient by itself, however; corruption remediation is not merely a matter of reinterpreting existing practices. Successful reform also entails the initiation of new practices that are congruent with the new anticorruption logic, as well as the abolition of existing practices that are inconsistent with the new logic. New symbolic orders arise in

part from changes in substantive practices (Barley, 1986). But because new practices that are incongruent with the old logic will lack legitimacy, the institutional work required to legitimate such new practices may be harder than for those simply needing redefinition; it is crucial that the institution of new practices be accompanied by framing processes that are able to define, explain, and legitimate those new practices. Furthermore, as Figure 2 depicts, framing processes must be used to clearly delimit the boundaries of the substantive practices constituting the new logic—the "old" and "new" practices that are congruent, and the "old" practices that are not.

As an example, the banking administration system that BiH inherited from Yugoslavia fit well within the country's corruption-enabling institutional logic. For instance, the payment bureaus handling noncash transactions within the former Yugoslavia extracted, by law, a .4 percent fee on all such transactions, thus providing bureau officials and their political allies an income stream that was easily hidden and not construed as a direct tax on citizens. Hence, as part of its efforts to change the overall institutional logic in BiH, the OHR forced the elimination of the payment bureaus and compelled the creation of a new central bank and a Western-style system for clearing noncash transactions. Eliminating the payment bureaus helped to delimit the boundaries with regard to substantive practices in a manner consistent with a new desired anticorruption logic at the same time that it removed a corruption-enabling resource. This helped to take the central banking system out of the realm of the reigning corruption-enabling institutional logic and thereby contributed to the creation of a professionalized, Western-style institutional logic in the central banking system. Simultaneously, the OHR brought in experienced international central bankers to frame—that is, define, explain, and legitimate—these new practices of central banking previously alien to those involved in the system; for example, a veteran of New Zealand's central bank was the first chief of the postwar BiH central bank's board of governors. This dual focus on eliminating practices incongruent with an anticorruption logic (i.e., payment bureaus) while concurrently instituting and legitimating new practices congruent with the new logic (including efforts to redefine the

identity of the central bank's governor) produced, in the words of Peter Nicholl (the New Zealander first governor of the postwar Bosnian central bank), an "almost normal" system that plausibly can claim to be "the only state institution that works effectively and efficiently" (quoted in James, 2004).

AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO ANTICORRUPTION RESEARCH AND POLICY

We have argued that corrupt practices reflect the identities and categories characteristic of a particular institutional logic and that these identities affect the schemas and roles guiding participants in that institutional logic. Those schemas and roles, in turn, influence the substantive practices and actions of participants in the institutional logic. This enactment of practices, however, contributes to sustaining the symbolic domain of an institutional logic; each time a practice is repeated, the identities and categories defined by the institutional logic are reaffirmed. The perpetuation of an institutional logic also requires certain economic, cultural, social, and symbolic resources, without which the meaning of an institutional logic cannot be embodied in practices. Corruption, in this account, reflects an institutional logic that identifies corrupt behavior as legitimate and inrole and that fosters schemas that make corruption a routine practice. Moreover, it reflects an array of resources that enable the development and perpetuation of a corrupt institutional logic. Remedying corruption, then, requires replacing an existing institutional logic supporting corruption with a logic incorporating *both* new identities *and* new practices. Such a new logic will only be successfully embedded if it is understandable and credible; its legitimacy hinges upon how well it resonates with existing identities, as well as on whether the symbolic and substantive changes concur. Furthermore, because any such reform attempt most likely will be contested by the beneficiaries of the existing order, access to resources is critical to successful change.

This institutional account of corruption reform helps to clarify the shortcomings of narrowly economic accounts of corruption, which generally do not consider or allow for the importance of identities and roles. Our framework suggests that motivational framing, which serves as the "impetus for collective

action" (Hunt et al., 1994: 191), is critical to successful reform. It is here where new anticorrupt identities and practices are defined. Yet it is precisely this type of framing that is missing in economic approaches. This might help to explain the failure of some anticorruption initiatives in ex-Soviet transition economies. For example, despite the initial widespread success of diagnostic (e.g., awareness campaigns) and prognostic (e.g., "omnibus" programs) framing of anticorruption initiatives in Albania and Bulgaria, the ultimate failure of these initiatives has explicitly been attributed to two primary factors (Tisńe & Smilov, 2004): (1) the anticorruption coalitions in both countries assumed that simply providing the public with knowledge of the amount and effect of corruption would motivate citizens to actively fight corruption, and (2) in both cases, the coalitions adopted nonconfrontational stances toward governments, and, thus, to the general public they were seen as too close to distrusted governments. Although the sources of these failures most certainly also included resource constraints (e.g., limited capacities on the part of prosecutors and courts), a lack of motivational framing also appears at fault, both in terms of the construction of a new anticorruption identity and its boundaries (e.g., the critical although nonconfrontational stance taken toward the governments was not enough to separate the anticorrupt identity of the coalitions from the corrupt identity of the governments). In short, more must be done than simply raising an awareness of corruption as a societal problem (i.e., diagnostic framing) and generating policy interventions (i.e., prognostic framing); new identities must also be defined in a manner that leads them to be embedded and lived out (motivational framing).

In addition, by putting the process of corruption and anticorruption into a more general, macrosociological context, our account helps to provide an understanding of why intraorganizational change efforts sometimes are less than optimal. Specifically, the institutional logic guiding any particular organization resides within the boundaries of larger institutional fields (society, industry, etc.), and the institutional logics of those larger fields (e.g., an ethnicity logic) can constrain the development of new anticorruption logics within organizations in those fields.

For example, typical organization-level treatments of corruption (e.g., Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001; Treviño & Weaver, 2003) rely heavily on amoral reasoning for explaining why corruption can become normalized within organizations. While recognizing that such reasoning can reflect wider institutional forces, organizational behavioral treatments typically view these forces as a given within which intraorganizational behavior is to be examined, rather than as an essential element of any effort to remedy corruption. (The common exception to this is attention to changes in the extraorganizational legal environment.) Our framework indicates that something such as amoral (and corrupt) reasoning and the responses to it need to be construed as part of a larger institutional logic within which individuals, organizations, and even researchers are embedded—perhaps a logic of "market capitalism" (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Thus, if remedies for corruption within organizations are to be effective, anticorruption researchers and practitioners need to consider macrolevel institutional logics in their remediation efforts. Treating the roles and scripted practices of a corrupt, macrolevel institutional logic as "given" risks confining remedies to the ones sanctioned by such a logic. In the BiH situation, for example, the OHR acts as a change agent by rejecting the existing ethnicity-based logic.

Instituting Corrupt Orders

Our focus has been on mitigating corruption. But because our account is rooted in a general framework of institutional change, it also can be used to explain how some corrupt institutional orders develop. At the risk of engaging in revisionist history, consider how the current corruption-enabling institutional logic developed in post-Yugoslav BiH and how specific social actors functioned as institutional entrepreneurs in using resources and legitimating accounts to produce it. Although prewar Yugoslavia had its share of corruption, the collapse of the Yugoslav state provided opportunities for self-interested individuals and groups to gain politically and economically in corruption-enabling ways (Devine & Mathisen, 2005; Divjak, n.d.; Rogel, 2004).

The institutional entrepreneurship toward corruption at this time involved increasing citizens' sense of ethnic identity, with a consequent growth in support for and influence by those who claimed to speak for that ethnicity (Malcolm, 1996), as well as growing tension (and ultimately war) among ethnic groups.

Thus, as in our model, the institutional entrepreneurs expressly dealt in identities. The heightened allegiance to ethnic identity was fostered by legitimating accounts that adapted an earlier and arguably more tolerant, multicultural, and nominal sense of ethnicity into an explicitly and virulently exclusive form of ethnicity. Finally, those elements seeking to gain by promoting greater ethnic identity (and consequent fears of other ethnicities) had social resources—such as established social networks (i.e., "mafias") or control of key media—that enabled them to begin constructing the new, ethnically defined institutional logic by propagating new identities and linking them to practices. The resulting war, in turn, provided opportunities to enhance those resources through war profiteering based on the control of scarce goods by ethnic/regional mafias. In short, institutional entrepreneurs used their established network resources to adapt existing but relatively nominal ethnic identities into a more potent form of ethnicity, in ways that enabled the creation of a new, corruption-enabling institutional logic. After the war, this new logic remained embedded in the practices of ethnically delineated regional governments within BiH, thus setting the stage for the anticorruption initiatives described above.

Implications for Research

The overall framework of institutional logics, resources, and social actors is applicable at multiple levels of analysis, such as corruption within organizations or economic sectors, or within an entire society, and those settings lend themselves to different research methods. Although quantitatively oriented survey research and qualitatively oriented ethnographic approaches might suffice for delineating the nature of institutional logics at any level of analysis, empirical studies of remediation efforts likely will be constrained by the setting. On the one hand, society-wide interventions by institutional entrepreneurs—such as the OHR in BiH—

are sufficiently uncommon and, thus, most hospitable toward ethnographic and historical investigation (e.g., comparative case studies). On the other hand, anticorruption interventions across multiple departments within a large organization (e.g., an entire government), or across multiple organizations in an industry sector, might provide more opportunities for gathering quantitatively analyzable data. In either case, however, longitudinal research will be necessary if we wish to consider the recursive and dynamic relationship of institutional logics, resources, and social actors that is implicated in the maintenance or remediation of corruption. Cross-sectional research can identify the nature of a current institutional logic and the social actors and resources in play at a given time, revealing how certain kinds of actors, resources, and legitimating accounts are related to corruption-relevant elements of identity. But such research cannot so easily reveal how the use of legitimating accounts and resources by social actors brings about sustainable changes in institutional logics and resources over time. In any case—whether longitudinal or not, and whether qualitative or quantitative—empirical research is needed to understand the specifics of how sets of social actors, resources, and institutional logics combine in various ways to reduce or eliminate corruption in social systems.

One area of necessary study is construct development regarding the elements of identity most relevant to eliminating or defending corruption. Although recent research has led to the development of reliable measures of a general notion of moral identity in individuals (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003) and has considered the social cognitive factors that influence morally relevant individual identities (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2005; Weaver, 2006), little is known about the specific identities and roles that constitute an anticorruption institutional logic. Thus, future research could attempt to delineate and measure additional elements of identity that might be particularly relevant to introducing and maintaining an anticorrupt logic. For instance, should the reporting of observed corruption be seen as an inrole behavior within an anticorruption identity, as has been suggested by observers of corruption (cf. Karklins, 2005)? Should an anticorruption identity

equate the giving and receiving of bribes so that the identities corresponding to anticorrupt practices address both sides of corruption (demand and supply), and should it not incorporate excuses for one or the other (Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2004a)? Research in this area is critical for understanding how motivational framing can be used in anticorruption institutional entrepreneurship. Furthermore, our theoretical account makes clear that construct development regarding anticorruption identities must incorporate multiple levels of analysis: the identities and roles that constitute an anticorrupt institutional logic can reside at individual, group, organizational, societal, or other analytical levels.

The work of institutional entrepreneurs, as well as their interaction with resources in affecting corruption reform, also calls for future empirical study. For example, persons' thoughts and actions often are guided by a fairness heuristic (van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 1998). Does this mean that any acceptable anticorruption prognostic frame offered by an institutional entrepreneur must include punishment (i.e., justice) for the perpetrators of corruption? If so, must anticorruption institutional entrepreneurs always have their sights on social resources that will enable them to impose some kind of punishment, whether formal or informal, on corruption's perpetrators?

Important questions also remain regarding the origins of institutional entrepreneurship in successful anticorruption efforts. For instance, what are the conditions of success for exogenous institutional entrepreneurs (e.g., the World Bank, new top management hired from outside the organization), in contrast to endogenous institutional entrepreneurs (e.g., government officials, a company's top management)? And what specific conditions give rise to endogenous anticorruption institutional entrepreneurs (and how can exogenous anticorruption actors gain endogenous allies by creating those conditions)? Microlevel processes of social learning and cognition likely are part of this process, but how are other macrolevel factors involved (e.g., social network structure or generational changes in demographics)? Also, although exogenous institutional entrepreneurs may be more likely to already carry an anticorruption identity, such entrepreneurs also might face very real obstacles to achieving success. How do such entre-

preneurs, if they are truly exogenous, gain and apply the resources necessary for success? How do they strip resources from those who would defend the status quo? Furthermore, how do exogenous actors, who have not been part of the existing corrupt institutional logic, gain the critical understanding of that logic necessary for its reform?

Implications for Practice

Despite these many remaining questions, our theoretical framework has some clear implications for policy makers. First, and perhaps most important, the impetus for corruption in any social setting is likely to persist as long as reformers fail to address the identities and related schemas that guide substantive practices. Second, anticorruption reforms must be championed by institutional entrepreneurs who possess the requisite capabilities for doing the institutional work necessary to successfully establish the new institutional order. Such entrepreneurs must have a critical understanding of the existing institutional order and must be able to construct a new anticorrupt institutional logic—a new collective identity that defines anticorruption roles and practices in a legitimate manner and that legitimates the social resources necessary to have the anticorrupt order prevail. Third, resources are critical to achieving reform; reformers must have the resources necessary to institute practices that will sustain a new institutional logic (and, implicitly, resources must be removed from, or made worthless for, an extant corruption-enabling order). Fourth, our framework also suggests the possibility that hybrid institutional logics might arise from efforts to develop new anticorruption institutional logics. Such hybrid logics involve not corruption's elimination but, rather, a new form of corruption.

Previous research (i.e., Haveman & Rao, 1997; Zilber, 2002) suggests that because the legitimacy of a new institutional logic depends on how well it ties into the existing logic, and because opponents to change will attempt to exploit any inconsistencies between the new and existing logics, the emergence of a hybrid institutional logic is highly probable. The overall lesson is that policy makers must not underestimate the political and long-term nature of the reform process; rather than merely adjusting

regulative institutional structures, corruption reform requires ongoing attention to developing a corruption-disabling collective identity that both gives meaning to institutional structures and guides behavior.

Conclusion

Systemic and persistent corruption affects developing and developed economies alike. Corrupt institutional orders tend to persist and can only be changed by affecting both their substance and symbolism—through the creation of alternative identities that cognitively and morally frame action in an anticorrupt manner, and through the corresponding development of habits and practices consistent with an anticorrupt logic. Although we grant that corruption might sometimes dissipate unintentionally, the question on which we have built our framework regards the more likely scenario in which social actors functioning as institutional entrepreneurs attempt to be the midwives of anticorruption logics. Indeed, because there are sure to be those who will benefit from and, thus, will seek to maintain corrupt orders, such a focus is more than needed. Anticorruption institutional entrepreneurs might be individuals, organizations, or alliances of such social actors. Our framework therefore suggests that future research and policy on corruption should move beyond examining simply the interplay of individual thought and action within organizations, and beyond a reliance on market liberalization and legal accountability, to a more complex dynamic of individual, organizational, and institutional phenomena that work together to create and maintain corruption or to create opportunities for mitigating corruption.

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