Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators
Supplementary Coup Data Appendix

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1 Coup events in the Powell-Thyne data

1.1 Coding rules for coup events

Powell and Thyne (2011, 12) define coup attempts as “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive”. In this section we outline the coding rules used to: (1) define a coup event; and (2) to categorize both successes and failures as either regime change or reshuffle coup events.

Following Powell and Thyne (2011) we define a failed or successful coup event as a concrete and observable action by at least one member of the regime’s current military or security apparatus to unseat the incumbent regime leader using unconstitutional means. Accordingly, the event must meet all of the following criteria:

- Target the regime leader, as identified by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), and the national government (not a regional government)
- Involve a concrete and observable action that is reported in a publicly available source; an action must be ONE of the following:
  - the movement of troops, soldiers, or weapons in an effort to oust the regime leader
  - a public announcement (radio, television, newspaper, etc.) by coup plotters that the regime leader has been ousted from power
- One of the individuals who pursues the attempted coup must be a current member of the military:
  - the individuals who attempt to use armed force to oust the regime leader cannot be members of the military who either: (a) were dismissed from or (b) defected from the regime at a prior date
  - a member of the current military must have a publicly acknowledged rank or title in the current regime’s military or security organizations, outside the cabinet
  - the leader or member of an allied warlord group is NOT considered a member of the military UNLESS the individual also has a
publicly known rank in the country’s military or security organizations\textsuperscript{1}

- a formal position in the regime leader’s cabinet does NOT necessarily constitute being a member of the regime’s military with a publicly acknowledged rank or position

- a soldier or rebel unit commander who is currently (nominally, not necessarily de facto) integrated into the regime’s military ranks during a peace process is considered a member of the regime’s military if both of the following are met:
  1. someone from the former rebels/warlord group is given a formal position in the regime’s government (e.g. cabinet portfolios or vice presidencies)
  2. the former rebel soldier or unit commander had been a part of the rebel/warlord group that has been nominally incorporated into the regime’s government in (1)

Our definition of a coup event differs from the one in Powell and Thyne (2011) because we only include events in which the target of the coup is the regime leader; the coup attempt event entails a substantiated concrete action and thus not simply a plot; and at least one of the coup attempt perpetrators must be a current member of the regime’s military.

Coup Successes

A successful coup attempt is a coup event in which the regime leader loses power during the event. If the coup event fails to unseat the incumbent regime leader during the dates of the event, but the event is the start of a successful rebellion that later ousts the regime leader from power, the coup event is coded as a failed coup attempt.

We use autocratic regime data from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) to identify coups that occur during the lifetime of an autocratic regime. We also use this data to identify the subset of all successful coup events that entail

\textsuperscript{1}For example, in referring to Afghan tribal militias during the Najibullah regime, Oliker (2011, 55) explains, “In all cases, including whether or not they were former Mujahedin, tribal militia groups continued, in theory, to be commanded by Afghan Army officers. In practice, they retained their own commanders, who were given military rank and reported to army or KhAD leaders.”
regime change. We code successful coup events that oust the entire regime along with the nominal leader as **successful regime change coups**. All other successful coup events that take place during autocrat rule are coded as **successful reshuffling coups**.

Successful coups that occur under autocratic rule and in which one military officer replaces another as the regime leader BUT during which the autocratic regime does not collapse are coded as reshuffling coups **EVEN IF** the coup leader calls for new elections. We do this because at the time of the coup (and despite promising fresh elections) we do not know if and when new elections will be held. However, when a successful coup leader promises fresh elections **AND** the coup entails the transfer of power to a civilian group, the event is coded as a regime collapse (usually followed by a provisional regime) by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). We code these coup events as successful regime change coups.

**Coup Attempts**

A **failed coup attempt** is a coup event in which the regime leader does **NOT** lose power during the calendar dates of the events. We examined every event listed as a failed coup attempt in Powell and Thyne (2011) to place the event in one of the following mutually exclusive categories: **successful regime change coup; successful reshuffle coup; failed regime change coup; failed reshuffle coup; plot; not regime leader; prior defection; OR not exist**. Because the decisions for distinguishing failed regime change coup attempts from failed reshuffling coup attempts can entail some subjective judgements, we provide a brief description of the event and the rationale for the coding decision. Further, for some events in the Powell-Thyne data, we code the event as one that falls outside of our definition of a coup event. Thus we provide details on the event and the rationale for coding these cases as non-coup events (according to our definition).

1. Powell-Thyne failed coup event is not a coup event:
   - **plot**: coup plot, no concrete action to oust leader is reported
   - **not regime leader**: target of coup was nominal executive and not regime leader;\(^2\) or the target was a regional government and not the national government

\(^2\)In some cases, the regime leader may use the military to oust a nominal executive during the process of purging potential rival elites.
• **prior defection**: coup perpetrators defected earlier from the regime to start a rebellion at an earlier date
  
  – If the coup leaders who were prior defectors use current military soldiers/security personnel in the planning and execution of the coup attempt, then this means a current member of the military took part in the coup attempt – especially if there is evidence that current military members were plotting with the prior defector before the attempt event. These cases should be included as coup attempts.
  
  – If the coup leaders are prior defectors and the evidence indicates that current military units join only after the coup event is under way, then this should be coded as prior defection.
  
  – If the coup leaders are prior defectors and they use current military personnel to execute the coup attempt, who had not publicly defected prior to the coup event, then this does **not** constitute prior defection.

• **not exist**: event does not exist; event occurs in a country other than the PT country; or coup involves armed civilians, not members of the military or government

2. Powell-Thyne coup attempt event is a failed coup attempt:

   • **failed regime change coup**
   
   • **failed reshuffle coup**

Distinguishing failed regime change attempts from failed reshuffle attempts entails assessing whether a coup success in these cases *would have* led to a reshuffling of elites within the regime or if it would have established a new regime, as defined by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). To aid this assessment, we collected *objective* information for each failed coup attempt on whether the main coup actors were: junior officers; blood relatives of the regime leader; part of the same politically relevant ethnicity as the regime leader; or were from a group outside the regime elite. Using this information as well as news reports and case study evidence on the purported motivations for the coup attempt,

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3We use the *Ethnic Power Relations* data base for distinguishing the main ethnic groups. For more on the EPR data, see Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).
we subjectively assess whether the coup event, had it been successful, would have entailed a reshuffling or regime change event.

- We code events where coup plotters’ aim is to restore military officers’ power vis-a-vis the regime leader as reshuffling coups, unless there is evidence that the military coup plotters (had they been successful) would rule in accordance with at least one of the following:
  - either without members of regime leader’s family (in cases of observed father-to-son leadership transitions) or without the leader’s ethnic group; thus attempts to prevent personalization of the regime are coded as attempted regime change coups under the assumption that had the coup succeeded the new leader would rule without the deposed leader’s family and/or main group of ethnic supporters
  - with a newly elected civilian leader in cases where the incumbent regime leader nullified a prior election result
  - with an opposition party\(^4\) leader in cases where the regime leader ruled without an executive from that opposition party
  - with an election that would allow previously excluded opposition political parties to participate or exclude the prior regime leader (or his family) from participating
  - with a new group of ethnic elites who were previously excluded from the regime or junior partners
- Code coup attempts by military officers from an excluded or junior partner ethnic group (as defined by EPR) as regime change coup attempts, unless: (a) the regime leader is a member of the junior partner ethnic group (e.g. Musharraf in Pakistan); or (b) we find direct evidence from case studies that indicates ethnicity did not play a role in the military cleavages underpinning the coup attempt.\(^5\) In countries such as Libya, where EPR does not capture salient clan/tribe/ethnic cleavages, we attempt to replicate

\(^4\)An opposition party is defined as a recognized political party that is not allied with the regime leader at the time of the coup attempt.

\(^5\)For example, if the case study literature identifies a generational or ideological cleavage in the military underpinning the coup attempt AND the generational or ideological cleavage does not fall along ethnic lines, then we use this as evidence that ethnic-narrowing was not part of the coup attempt, even if the coup leader is from a junior partner ethnic
the idea behind EPR’s categories of excluded, junior, and senior groups. For example, we treat the Warfalla in Libya as a junior partner and the Qaddafa as the senior partner because while the Warfalla were one of the tribes loyal to Gaddafi, they did not hold key positions in the air force or the internal security apparatus.

- Code coup attempts where military officers attempt to oust a monarchy as regime change coup attempts if the military officers were not allied with a faction of the monarchical family.

- Code coup attempts where the coup perpetrators strive to preserve the incumbent ruling coalition by preventing new groups from being included in the government (e.g. after a peace agreement to end a civil war), as a failed reshuffling attempt because the coup leaders want to replace the incumbent regime leader with a new leader who will preserve the de facto incumbent coalition (including the regime leader’s ethnic group). However, when the de facto incumbent coalition is comprised of multiple ethnic groups, and there is evidence that the coup attempt leaders would exclude the regime leader’s ethnic group from power (even if the coup attempt leaders do not want the regime leader to expand the coalition to include excluded groups) code the case as regime change coup attempt. The key difference between these two scenarios is whether the coup leaders would exclude the targeted regime leader’s ethnic group in addition to preventing the inclusion of excluded groups.

- Code coup attempts where the perpetrators plan to hold multi-party elections in which opposition parties would be allowed as regime change attempts if the opposition parties are observed to be independent from the ruling party – that is, not funded by the regime leader or his family members; and not part of the regime front coalition.

- Code coup attempts by junior officers against a civilian regime leader as regime change coups. A civilian leader is defined as a regime leader who was not a member of the military prior to becoming the regime leader.

We also construct a second variable, **staged attempt**, which is coded “1” if BOTH of the following are true and “0” otherwise. This allows
users to treat these alleged coup attempts as non-coup events in applied research.

- the only evidence for the coup attempt is provided by the regime leader
- we find evidence that regime opponents accuse the regime leader of orchestrating the coup attempt in a bid to oust “suspected” coup plotters and other potential rivals

For each failed coup attempt event, we provide a brief factual description of the event and the rationale for coding the event as either a failed regime change coup attempt or a failed reshuffling coup attempt.

Coup attempt events not included in PT We also record some historical events that fit our coding criteria as failed coup attempts but that are not identified in the Powell-Thyne data set:

- failed regime change coup
- failed reshuffle coup
1.2 Successful coup attempt cases

We checked each coup event listed in the Powell-Thyne data set and determined that two events often classified as coups were not coup events according to our definition because the leader of the group that ousted the incumbent regime leader had previously defected from the regime. We treat these events as not-coup events:

1. the foreign invasion led by French paratroopers allied with Dacko, a former general, that ousted Bokassa (Central African Republic, 20 September 1979)

2. the fall of the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan to the Taliban (15-16 April 1992)

Second, we code the two ‘coup’ events in the Powell-Thyne data set from Congo-Brazzaville (3 August 3 and 30 August, 1968) as part of the same regime-change event dated on 4 September 1968. On August 3 the military ousted the civilian president, Massamba-Debat, and reinstated him a day later (UPI, 1968). On August 5, a leading military officer, Ngoubi, created a rival ruling council, the National Revolutionary Council (UPI, 1968). On August 29-30, a Cuban-trained paramilitary force loyal to the civilian president, Massamba-Debat, refused to submit arms to Ngoubi and fighting broke out (Decalo, 1976, 155). On September 4, Ngoubi announces that Massamba-Debat had resigned the presidency (UPI, 1968). This recoding falls outside the temporal domain of the present study.

1.2.1 Successful coup events in Powell-Thyne data

Tables 1 and 2 contain all of the coded cases of reshuffling coups and regime change coups in autocratic regimes from 1970-2006. Each table lists the country, date, and the leader that was ousted as a result of the coup. There are 78 successful coup attempt events listed: 40 are reshuffling coups, and 38 are regime change coups.
<table>
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1.3 Failed coup attempt cases

1.3.1 Failed coup attempt events in Powell-Thyne data

- # 41-1970-4-24: Haiti, François Duvalier

  **Category:** failed regime change coup

  **Event:** This failed coup attempt against François Duvalier involved three Coast Guard cutters (apparently, the three operable ships in Haiti’s Coast Guard of five ships; Haiti had no navy). Sporadic shelling targeting the National Palace in Port-au-Prince occurred from Friday April 24, 1970 through April 25 (Associated Press, 1970b). After failing to incite a larger rebellion among anti-Duvalier forces and with scores of arrests being made of rebel family members, the three ships with 118 crewmen under the command of Colonel Octave Cayard sailed to Guantanamo Naval Base on April 26 (New York Times, 1970). All but one of the crewmen sought and obtained asylum in the United States.

  **Coding rationale:** We code this case as a regime change coup attempt because the apparent leader of the coup, Colonel Octave Cayard, was a junior officer from a branch of the military (the Coast Guard, later named as the Navy) that was completely sidelined by the Duvalier regime. Prior branch military commanders had been exiled; the most powerful security forces of the regime were outside of the formal military command structure; and François Duvalier had destroyed the

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6 "[I]n August [1962], the Haitian Army chief of staff sought asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy. The general’s action reflected increased military concern about the growing strength of their Tonton Macoute rivals. Duvalier called all members of the Tonton Macoute to the capital to defend his palace, and the embassy asked for fleet units to be available for evacuation purposes. But, to the disappointment of opposition leaders, there was no follow-up by the army" (Martin, 1981, 67).

7 A 1977 U.S. embassy assessment of the Haitian security forces states that “[t]he Army is the largest element with approximately 5,800 men. The Navy has a strength of about 400 men and the Air Corps consists of a 200 man force... Each of the special departments takes orders direct from the President and they are considered the most powerful of Haitian forces. Of these departments, the Presidential Guard is the most influential. It is responsible for the personal protection of the President and senior members holding key positions in all other major commands including the General Staff” (Brooke, 1977, 35). The regular military units (i.e. not special security departments) were “so atomized, so ill equipped and so ill trained, that they are considered impotent as a fighting force.” By comparison the private militia of the President, the Tonton Macoutes (later renamed the
independent organizational capacity of the formal military (Delince, 1979, 89-93). A White House assessment noted that “Cayard has been a politically ambitious officer and was involved in contingency planning last summer to take control of the Government when Duvalier was incapacitated by a heart attack” (Vaky, 1970). Further, when the Duvalier regime fell in 1986, a military officer became the de facto head of state, marking a regime transition in Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Together, we use this evidence to assume that had Cayard succeeded in his coup attempt, the new government would have excluded the Duvalier family and thus changed the group from which leaders could be selected, which would indicate a regime change.

• # 41-1989-4-2: Haiti, Prosper Avril

  Category: failed reshuffling coup

  Event: Four junior officers – Lt. Col. Leonce Qualo (age 35), Col. Philippe Biamby (age 36), Lt. Col. Himmler Rebu (age 38), and Col. Guy François – orchestrated the kidnapping of Lt. Gen. Prosper Avril early in the morning on Sunday, April 2. Avril was abducted at his mansion as he returned home from a party around 4 or 5 a.m. According to U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Susan Clyde, the rebel soldiers drove Avril to the airport to be deported, where instead he was rescued by his presidential guardsmen and escorted back to the National Palace. The attempt collapsed when Maj. Gen. Herard Abraham – who had been Foreign Minister under the previous Namphy-led regime – refused the rebels’ offer for the presidency. On Tuesday, April 4, three rebels were deported to the Dominican Republic and flew to Miami on April 5, where they applied for asylum in the United States (Howell, 1989). Col. Guy François would not be deported, as he convinced Avril to let him keep his post, only to immediately lead his Dessalines Battalion in another attempted coup only days later (Bohning, 1989).

  Coding rationale: The coup attempt occurred shortly after Avril arrested four top army officers accused of being involved in the drug trade and after he restored part of the 1987 Constitution, which included a provision barring elites from the Duvalier regime from holding

VSN under Jean-Claude Duvalier) was “the National Security Volunteers (VSN), a force of some 5,000 to 7,000 irregulars.”
office (Associated Press, 1989b). This appears to be a coup attempt aimed at replacing the President, himself a military officer, with another military officer. While the immediate trigger for the coup attempt appears to have been Avril’s sacking of senior officers, a large schism had occurred within the military over the role of officers from different generations (Preston, 1989c), with some presumably more loyal to the Duvaliers: the coup perpetrators came from the Dessalines barracks, which “had long been a nest for officers sympathetic to the Duvalierists’ tenacious campaign to stage a comeback” (Preston, 1989a, A26).

However, another source states that “[o]rdinary people believed that the co-authors of the putsch intended to remove president Avril and transfer power to Major General Herard-Abraham that would have to lead a military junta composed of himself, Himmler Rebu and Philippe Biamby. That junta was to assume power for 120 days during which it would implement the full restoration fo the 1987 constitution abolished under the Henry Namphy regime” (Dumay, 2011, 269). This source also notes that General Abraham, who was the head of the military at the time, declined the offer to lead the junta and the coup leaders decided to transfer power to the chief justice of the supreme court, Gilbert Austin.

An internal struggle within the military over officer appointments and promotions does not constitute a regime change because the group from which the regime leader is chosen remains the same. However, if the coup plotters aimed to bring back Jean-Claude Duvalier to reconstitute the Duvalier regime (e.g. heavily reliant on private militias rather than the military for security), then this case would be coded as a regime change coup attempt. But under the assumption that the coup plotters were officers who wanted to gain control of the regime in order to promote their personal interests and to restore some formerly deposed officers – all while keeping the regime in the hands of the military – we code this case as a reshuffling coup attempt.

• # 41-1989-4-5: HAITI, PROSPER AVRIL

Category: **failed reshuffling coup**

Event: Spokesmen for the Dessalines Battalion, the second largest military unit in Haiti, issued a statement over the independent Radio
Metropole at about 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday, April 5, mandating the ouster of Prosper Avril, threatening bloodshed if he did not resign and leave the country by the end of the day. In response, the Ministry of Interior declared a state of emergency; the government imposed a curfew (Bohning, 1989). An armed standoff between 1,100-strong Presidential Guardsmen and rebel Dessalines troops at the National Palace continued for several days. On Friday evening, the Presidential Guardsmen sought to intimidate the Dessalines troops by firing on them. Scared, most Dessalines troops fled the Barracks that night. However, fighting continued through the next day. The 22-hour engagement was the first time Haitian troops had fired on each other since 1957. In a communiqué released Saturday, April 8, the Avril government announced it had retaken the Dessalines Battalion Barracks (Preston, 1989b). At this point, the Leopards Battalion said it was willing to negotiate with Avril to end the rebellion, but insisted there be no reprisals and for the unit to remain intact (Treaster, 1989). On Sunday, the Leopards Battalion ended the mutiny with the assurance there would be no reprisals (Preston, 1989c). Avril reasserted control.

Coding rationale: This event is coded as a part of the prior event (April 2) because one of the coup plotters in the prior event, Col. Guy François, was retained by Avril, only to attempt another coup a few days later (April 5) (Preston, 1989c). See coding rationale for case 41-1989-4-2.

• # 90-1988-5-11: GUATEMALA, CEREZO

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Wednesday, May 11, 1988, the Defense Minister Gen. Hector Gramajo announced that two army officers had led 2 of the army’s 74 bases and installations in “acts of indiscipline” against the government, but that they had been immediately neutralized and the officers involved arrested. Gramajo said the two ringleaders led officers and enlisted men from bases in Jutiapa, 75 miles east of the capital, and Retalhuleu, 115 miles southwest of the capital, and led them towards Guatemala City (Associated Press, 1988). But loyal troops intercepted the rebels on the international highway to El Salvador and blocked passage to the capital (Reuters, 1988). After troops in important units in
the capital failed to support the rebels, senior army commanders convinced the mutinous troops to return to their bases without any shots fired (LeMoyne, 1988).

According to Cerezo, the traditional economic groups “went to senior army leaders and asked them to overthrow the Government, which is what they have been used to doing in the past. This time it did not work, so they had to find discontented officers at lower ranks” (LeMoyne, 1988). Col. Luis Arturo Isaacs Rodríguez, the chief military spokesmen, stated: “the coup attempt resulted from some officers listening to those who got rich during the years of direct military rule” (Farah, 1989).

On the same day that a civilian court officially began investigating eight civilians and three former officers for treason, Major Gustavo Díaz López appeared on the t.v. show Aquí el Mundo, owned and directed by Mario David García, who had called on viewers to wear red handkerchiefs to show support for the coup attempt. Díaz López charged the Christian Democratic government with planning to move the country towards socialism, and he decried Gramajo’s swearing allegiance to the state on April 11 1986, which he saw as submission to the Christian Democrats. Portillo told the press that Christian Democracy was “a greed vehicle that transports red passengers” that sought to destroy the army. On May 19, the government suspended channel 3’s frequency just as the 5 civilians were preparing an Aquí el Mundo group appearance (Schirmer, 1998, 219-20).

Coding rationale: The 1985-95 regime is an indirect military regime because although a civilian Christian Democratic controlled the executive, the military (i.e. senior military officers including General Gramajo) retained control over defense policy and prevented the democratic left from participating in elections. Coding this case as a failed regime change coup assumes that had the coup by junior officers allied with conservative civilian groups been successful, it would have entailed military officers ruling without the Christian Democrats (as had been the case prior to the 1985 election). Ruling without the PCD elites would have constituted a change in the group from which leaders could be drawn and hence a regime change.

• # 90-1989-5-9: GUATEMALA, CEREZO
Category: **failed reshuffling coup**

**Event:** On Tuesday, May 9, 1989, troops from an air force unit based at the international airport south of Guatemala City reportedly marched on both the National Palace and the home of Gen. Hector Gramajo, the Defense Minister, but they were turned back by loyal troops (Associated Press, 1989a). Early that morning, the coup plotters led 200-300 troops and sealed off other important locations, such as a national radio station and national police headquarters. They were aided by helicopter gunships and at least one jet fighter that roared over the capital after 5 a.m., in an apparent attempt to intimidate loyalist forces (Hockstader, 1989). But the leaders “hopes ended abruptly when their troops, unaware they were participating in a coup, obeyed a Government command to return to their barracks” (Uhlig, 1989a). By 7 a.m., the coup was put down without bloodshed or shots fired (Hockstader, 1989).

Cerezo initially identified Col. Cesar Ramón Quinteros Alvarado, an Israeli-trained officer who had lost out to Gramajo for the army’s top post, as the chief plotter (Boudreaux, 1989). At a news conference, Cerezo said they had no evidence of civilian participation from right-wing groups (as had been the case the previous May). Western diplomats reported that the real target of the coup attempt was Gamajo (Larmer, 1989; Chicago Tribune Wires, 1989). However, Gramajo argued that the Officers of the Mountain who had been dismissed after the May 1988 coup masterminded the plot. Both the coup plotters (the officers of the mountain) and the Gramaja linea were nationalistic, and both realized the need to maintain a civilian presidency (e.g. to retain international support), but the “difference lie in how far and how much a civilian president should be allowed to maneuver” (Schirmer, 1998, 232).

**Coding rationale:** The 1985-95 regime is an indirect military regime because although a civilian Christian Democratic controlled the executive, the military (i.e. senior military officers including General Gramajo) retained control over defense policy and prevented the democratic left from participating in elections. Coding this case as a failed reshuffling coup assumes that had the coup been successful, it would have entailed the replacement of Gramajo as defense minister but that the military would have continued to rule alongside a Christian Democrat president.
If senior military officers (but not Gramajo) had continued to rule with PCD elites, this would not constitute a change in the group from which leaders could be drawn.

• # 91-1977-10-21: Honduras, Juan Alberto Melgar Castro
  Category: coup plot
  Event: On October 22, local news media alleged that a coup attempt had been crushed the previous day, saying its leaders Luis Alberto Padilla and Jorge Enrique Padilla were critically wounded in the process (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1977a), but these reports gave no details. After denying reports of a coup attempt for about a week, General Melgar Castro’s office issued a communiqué admitting the government had indeed uncovered “a subversive plan prepared by civilians who sought the connivance of lower echelon military officials to generate domestic unrest and confusion in order to take over the government of the republic”. In a media briefing, army chiefs stated that they had known of a plot prior to Melgar Castro’s visit to Washington on September 8, but that they allowed it to unfold to help identify the plotters. Originally set for October 8, the government said mishaps delayed the attempt until the 12th and finally the 21st. However, on October 20, “the intelligence service proceeded to arrest the civilians and military personnel involved” (Amador, 1977). On November 7, a civilian judge issued indictments or arrest warrants for 18 civilians implicated in the coup plot (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1977c). But on December 5, the government granted amnesty to these civilians as well as 9 sergeants implicated in the plot in the name of social harmony (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1977b).

Coding rationale: The initial government report on this coup event suggests that the government moved to arrest the coup plotters before they took any concrete and observable action. The government allegedly seized various documents, including a draft proclamation that the conspirators planned on issuing (but never did). Other documents seized by the government purportedly showed the plotters intended to execute Melgar Castro and install a civil-military junta. Melgar added that “if the revolt had taken place, there would have been ‘great bloodshed’” (Amador, 1977). Similarly, the amnesty bulletin issued in early
December emphasized that the government “has conclusive proof that a conspiracy did exist”, but never says that an attempt took place (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1977b). The Powell-Thyne source for this coup event provides no details of concrete actions that document a coup attempt actually occurred (Washington Post, 1977d). We interpret this evidence to mean that a coup plot existed, but that a coup attempt did not take place.

- # 92-1972-3-25: El Salvador, Fidel Sánchez Hernández

 Category: failed regime change coup

 Event: Before dawn on March 25, 1972, two army barracks launched a coup against the Sánchez government while president-elect Molina was in transit to Taiwan for an official visit (Reuters, 1970b). The coup was led by a group of young army officers led by Col. Benjamin Mejía, a 48-year-old artillery commander of El Zapote barracks that face the presidential palace (Associated Press, 1970c). Mejía and his followers seized the presidential palace and held Sánchez and his 17-year old daughter hostage for 12 hours. Shortly after noon, Duarte reluctantly issued a radio broadcast in support of the three lead rebels, Mejía, Col. Manuel Reyes Alvarado, and Maj. Pedro Guardado (Associated Press, 1970c). But throughout the afternoon, loyal forces from Sonsonate and San Miguel advanced against the rebels with air support from the air force. By the early evening, General Sánchez was released unharmed (Associated Press, 1970a)

 According to Haggerty (1990), the attempted coup had the immediate goal of establishing a “revolutionary junta”, but ultimately “favored the installation of Duarte as president”. The coup was masterminded by a minority faction of the officer corps, a “new Military Youth”, which was disillusioned with the “blatancy of the fraud employed to maintain the PCN in power” and sought “direct action to redress the official exploitation of a system that had until that point shown some promise of evolving in a genuinely democratic direction.”

 Coding rationale: This coup attempt followed a fraudulent election, in which the centrist party (Duarte’s PDC under the United Opposition Coalition) narrowly lost to the military candidate, Colonel Molinas. This event is coded as having regime change intent on the assumption
that the coup leaders would have installed Duarte as president and he would have ruled with the civilian leaders of the Christian Democrats, thus changing the composition of the group that could select the leader from the military to the military in conjunction with an elected civilian party. Duarte would later be appointed as head of a more moderate military junta in 1980 in a situation that continued the rule of senior military officers (that regime ended in 1982 with the election of a civilian president). The reformist junta that came to power in 1979 had some civilian allies and leaders but was there was no elected civilian party at that point.

• # 95-1988-3-16: Panama, Manuel Antonio Noriega

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On Wednesday, March 16, 1988, Col. Leónidas Macías, the Chief of the National Police, led a failed coup attempt against Gen. Noriega.\(^8\) The attempt occurred at about 6:30 a.m. which entailed exchanges of gunfire at military headquarters in Panama City (Branigin, 1988).

Coding rationale: A month prior to the coup attempt, the civilian executive attempted (but failed) to replace Noriega as commander of the defense forces\(^9\) (Gilboa, 1995, 547). Yates (2008, 53) states: “the motives of the conspirators were mixed: all had been passed over for promotion; some feared a U.S. invasion and the destruction of the Panama Defense Forces as an institution if Noriega remained in command; some were uneasy over Noriega’s growing ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya; and some merely wanted to preempt higher-ranking officers from launching their own coup.” However, one source indicates that the conspirators aims were “not to restore democracy; [but rather] to rehabilitate the PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] in the eyes of Washington so that it might continue in power” (Koster and Sánchez, 1990, 356). After the coup attempt, Noriega purged a number of senior military officers (Williams, 1988; Kempe, 1990, 280-81). We code this case as a reshuffling coup because although some of the coup plotters had connections

\(^8\)The Panamanian National Police were part of the Defense Forces (Williams, 1988).

\(^9\)The defense forces were called the Las Fuerzas de Defensa and were the successor organization to the Panamanian National Guard, which was renamed in 1983 (Koster and Sánchez, 1990, 414).
with civilian opposition party leaders (Kempe, 1990, 276), there is no evidence that the military was likely to give up power should the coup have succeeded.

- # 95-1989-10-3: Panama, Manuel Antonio Noriega

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** At 7:40 a.m. on Tuesday, October 3, 1989, General Noriega was seized when he walked into his office at his military headquarters after a brief gun battle that left several wounded (Sciolino, 1989). The rebels broadcast a communique in Panama City at 12:10 p.m. saying Noriega had been captured and would be forced to retire (Rosenthal, 1989). In the afternoon, troops loyal to Noriega began a bloody counterattack that crushed the coup attempt within three hours. The coup attempt was led by Maj. Moisés Giroldi Vega, who led the Urraca Battalion which “provided security at the Panamanian military headquarters” (Pitts, 1989). He was joined by other close advisors to Noriega, including the head of military intelligence “Col. Guillermo J. Wong and two other members of the high command” (Uhlig, 1989).

**Coding rationale:** According to a Panamanian sergeant under the command of Maj. Giroldi, the coup attempt was strictly an internal military affair designed to get Noriega and his six senior aides to retire, and was not designed to either kill Noriega or turn him over to the U.S. (Pitts, 1989). Other reports suggest that Giroldi simply wanted Noriega to retire with honor and step aside, which explains American officials’ hesitation not to provide military support to the coup plotters (Rosenthal, 1989). We use this evidence to assume that the coup plotters intended to retain military rule, just without Noriega. Under this assumption, we code this case as a reshuffling attempt.

- # 130-1975-9-1: Ecuador, Guillermo Rodríguez Lara

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On September 1, 1975, General Raúl Gonzáles Alvear, the army chief of staff (and the second highest ranking army officer), led several hundred soldiers and ten tanks in seizing the presidential palace. General Gonzáles stated in a radio communique that he had moved against the president because of the mismanagement of the country’s oil re-
sources (United Press International, 1975c). Gonzáles Alvear promised to hold free elections within two years (O Mang, 1975a) and announced one of his first acts in power would be to abolish the import tax (News Dispatches, 1975b). The morning newspapers included an advertisement approving the coup by the civic junta, which had prior knowledge of the conspiracy and criticized the regime for “a candidly demagogic...petroleum policy, traced under the vigilant influence of the Communist Party.” (Martz, 1987, 147). However, President Rodríguez avoided capture, having spent the weekend at his Cotopaxi ranch outside Pujili. When he heard of the rebellion, Lara fled to a loyal army base at Riobamba and rallied loyalist troops to join him in retaking the palace in the afternoon (News Dispatches, 1975b). Gen. Gonzáles sought asylum in the Chilean Embassy and flew to exile in Chile on September 26 (Reuters, 1975b).

Coding rationale: When the armed forces toppled José María Velasco Ibarra in 1972, they installed a self-styled “revolutionary nationalist” military regime, which under Lara “vassediated over the extent to which it should be reformist and nationalistic or traditionalistic in outlook” (Martz, 1987, 6-7). This coup attempt appears to have been a manifestation of this struggle. The precipitating event was the Lara government’s imposition of a 60% import tax on luxury goods that deeply upset the upper class (O Mang, 1975a).10 The coup attempt appeared “to have been a power bid by an ambitious general, encouraged by dissatisfied middle- and upper-class civilian elements” (O Mang, 1975a). According to one history, the “violence was the culmination of stormy policy conflicts between dominant-class organizations and the government during the summer of 1975. These conflicts were rooted in the increasing pressures of traditional bourgeois political parties for democratization and the opposition of the chambers of production to the governments policy of selective importation enacted in the wake of a renewed balance-of-payments crisis” (Conaghan, 1988, 102-103).

10 The discovery of oil in the early 1970s led initially to an economic boom. But production declined after Ecuador joined OPEC in 1973. That import tax was meant to compensate for foreign exchange losses that had been suffered since Texaco Chevron cut oil production in response to the governments insistence on keeping high prices (News Dispatches, 1975b). Critics on the right decried Lara’s high oil price policy for costing Ecuador much revenue (O Mang, 1975b).
Although civilian opposition groups supported the coup, there is no evidence they would have been included in a post-coup government. Thus, we interpret the evidence to suggest the primary purpose of the coup was policy change, not regime change, and that there would not have been a change in the group from which leaders could be selected.

• # 135-2000-10-30: Peru, 2000, Alberto Fujimori

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: In the pre-dawn hours of October 29, 2000, army lieutenant colonel Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso, who was in command of over 50 soldiers within the army’s powerful 6th Regional Command, mutinied for Alberto Fujimori’s resignation by taking control of a mining center in Toquepala. General Oscar Bardales, the commanding officer at the Arrica Barracks and a Vladimiro Montesinos loyalist, was taken hostage when trying to convince his men to end the uprising (Weissert, 2000). Tasso then took his troops and hostages towards the highlands of Puno province. Humala issued a communiqué saying that “I will only lay down my arms when the chain of command is legitimate and there is a president who has been truly elected by the people to whom I would be able to swear my subordination”, demanding the arrest and imprisonment of Montesinos. He was joined by his brother Antauro, a retired major recently forced to leave the military. Opposition politicians quickly distanced themselves from the revolt, saying they wanted a constitutional transition toward new presidential elections scheduled for April 2001 (Krauss, 2000b).

Coding rationale: On September 14, 2000, the Fujimori regime was thrown into a political crisis when a videotape was aired on television of Fujimori’s closest advisor and spy chief Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an opposition politician to switch parties. Fujimori responded to the scandal by announcing that he would disband the intelligence service headed by Montesinos, and that he would step down from the presidency in July 2001 (1 year into his 5 year term). Montesinos then flew to Panama but after three weeks of being refused asylum, flew back to Peru on October 24 and went into hiding. The army mutiny came only hours after Fujimori replaced commanders of the army, navy, and air force as the manhunt for Montesinos had failed for four days
in a row (Krauss, 2000a). “Military observers said the uprising was a sign that many middle-ranking officers have long disagreed with how promotions in recent years have depended on political connections to Mr. Montesinos and Mr. Fujimori” (Krauss, 2000b). The same political crisis which generated this coup attempt also led Fujimori to flee into exile in Japan in November 2000 and resign. We interpret this evidence as suggesting the coup attempt sought the collapse of the Fujimori regime. Its success would prevent the personalization of the regime around a consolidated group of Fujimori loyalists following the ouster of Montesinos.

• 145-1971-1-10: BOLIVIA, 1971, JUAN JOSÉ TORRES GONZÁLEZ

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On January 11, 1971, Bolivian Minister of Interior announced that “fascist elements” centered at Miraflores barracks had attempted a coup against the military government of Gen. Juan José Torres. He identified the leaders as Cols. Hugo Bánzer Suárez and Edmundo Valencia (United Press International, 1971). Torres likewise accused the revolters of trying to impose a “dictatorship of the right”, and said the revolters were tied to sinister foreign (e.g. U.S.) interests (Banzer was trained in the U.S.). Both men had been ordered the previous week to frontier posts in an apparent government effort to isolate potential sources of opposition. The revolt was supported by a number of recent graduates of the National Military School in La Paz. Backed by officers of the Ingavi regiment headquartered in La Paz, the officers took control of the army headquarters and took the army commander Gen. Luis Reque Terán and other high officials hostage. Loyal troops were mobilized immediately, and air force fighter planes were seen flying low over La Paz on January 10 firing machine-gun bursts over the rebel-held army headquarters and the military school (Associated Press, 1971d).

Coding rationale: Klein (2011, 228) argues that “agitation of the Popular Assembly created civilian support for a military coup”. Thus, Bánzer Suárez, commandant of the Bolivian army’s military college, despite being exiled to Argentina after his failed January coup, would return to Santa Cruz to lead a successful coup against Torres in August 1971 which was supported by “a broad antigovernment coalition
that included supporters of the FSB, the Siles-Paz sectors of the MNR, and the anti-Torres military” (Morales, 2010, 190). Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) use this latter event to code the end of the 1969-71 Bolivian military regime. We assume that Bánzer Suárez would have installed a similar regime had he succeeded in January rather than August, and thereby bring to power a different set of elites composed of a rightist faction of the military and different groups of civilians than than those supporting the Torres government.

- # 145-1974-6-5: Bolivia, Hugo Bánzer Suárez

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On June 5, 1974, while General Bánzer was in the south on an inspection tour, elements of the Tarapaca Armored Regiment briefly took over the presidential palace. Lt. Col. Raúl López Leyton and Maj. Gary Prado Salmón broadcast a radio communique claiming to be in charge of the government, saying the revolt was “strictly military”, but they withdrew to their barracks and surrendered after the regiment assigned to guard the palace gave them an hour to leave (Washington Post, 1974). López was a former aide to former President Victor Paz Estenssoro and commander of the “training center for special troops” in Cochabamba, while Prado was brother of a former minister in Bánzer’s government and had been the commander of the Tarapaca regiment until October 1973, after which point he became commander of the military academy (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974a). The head of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Ciro Humboldt Barrero, sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy on the day of the coup. By June 6, it was reported that Humboldt was charged as a leader of the coup attempt, though Humboldt denied it and said his enemies used the coup attempt as a pretext to oust him (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974g,e). The coup attempt leaders sought asylum abroad after their plot failed.

**Coding rationale:** On June 21, the Interior Ministry released a statement signed by four military officers who participated in the coup attempt calling for Bolivia’s “constitutionalization”. The statement said that “the army must respond to the people” and that their action
sought to prevent a new monetary devaluation. The officers said “we object to [the Bánzer government’s] totalitarian, repressive and despotic system whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of the people. The document adds that the armed forces are with the workers, the university students and the peasants and that the officers share the idea of labor freedom and of reopening the Bolivian labor unions. They state: We would not be fulfilling our duty if we did not denounce the peasant massacre in Cochabamba”. However, in its reply, “the Interior Ministry points out that the officers who signed the document do not represent the armed forces, which also maintain that their must be university autonomy, labor unions and constitutionalization. It is with regard to spirit, meaning, and direction that they have different views” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974d).

The government called the coup attempt a “subversive attempt by the extreme left” including some professors at the Greater University of San Andres (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974c). The FSB similarly repudiated the plot as a leftist attempt to restore the “antinational system [that] had been (ousted) on 19 August 1971” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974b). The coup attempt leaders had demanded general elections, the removal of President Banzer, and the installation of a military government (Reuters, 1974a). According to Hudson and Hanratty (1991), “On June 5, 1974, younger officers belonging to the Generational Group (Grupo Generacional) and led by General Gary Prado Salmón attempted a coup, demanding that Banzer legitimize his rule.” López and Prado would join the cabinet of President David Padilla Arancibia in November 1978. Prior to the coup attempt, Banzer had begun to sideline early civilian supporters. On January 8, 1974, former President Victor Paz Estenssoro and five members of his MNR were deported to neighboring Paraguay (Reuters, 1974b). We interpret this coup attempt as an effort to require the Banzer regime to rule with a measure of civilian (e.g. MNR) support. Had it succeeded, we assume a military regime would not have been led by civilians and the date for any elections would have been uncertain. As such, we code

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12 According to Hudson and Hanratty (1991), “In 1974 price increases for basic goods and control of food prices resulted in roadblocks by peasants in the Cochabamba Valley and their subsequent massacre by the military.”
this as a failed reshuffling coup attempt.

• # 145-1981-5-15: BOLIVIA, LUIS GARCÍA MEZA

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On May 11, 1981, the Commander of the Center for the Instruction of Special Troops (CITE), Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Lanza, led an uprising of paratroopers in Cochabamba demanding García Meza’s resignation. In a telephone interview with the Associated Press, Lanza said he “could not remain silent regarding the current situation of non-government, the covering up of the narcotics traffic, the chaotic form in which public forms are being handled and the abuse of the people in the name of the armed forces” (Associated Press, 1981c). Lanza also criticized “the military management of the country and had pointed out that it was the opinion of many officers that García Meza had betrayed the confidence they had in him” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1981c). By May 12, Lanza’s unit surrendered after General García Meza rallied loyal troops in Cochabamba (United Press International, 1981).

Coding rationale: This case and the following one two weeks later were both led by Lt. Col. Emilio Lanza. He opposed the corruption and policies of the García Meza, but not military rule in general. Had he succeeded, we assume the military elite would have remained in power. For more justifying this assumption, see case 145-1981-5-25.

• 145-1981-5-25: BOLIVIA, LUIS GARCÍA MEZA

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: Having escaped prison following his coup attempt of May 11, on May 25, 1981, Lt. Col. Lanza undertook another coup attempt in Cochabamba and again called for the resignation of General Luis García Meza. Lanza had asserted “in a telephone interview from Cochabamba that he had control of the city of 95,000 and the support of the country’s naval commanders”, but Lanza gave up his position later in the day (Associated Press, 1981a) and was later exiled to Ecuador along with several other conspirators.

Coding rationale: In a telephone declaration to reporters, Lanza said
that his uprising was "purely military", although he said he had the support of civilian nationalist forces in Santa Cruz, particularly those connected with former President Hugo Bánzer. Lanza also said "he wanted power handed over to whichever general was capable of getting the country out of its present disastrous state," adding that he favored former President Alberto Natusch Busch or General Banzer" (Shipp, 1981b). On June 15, 1981, a letter written by Lanza to his comrades in arms was reported, in which he stated that he opposed those in the military who "try to perpetuate in power one who desperately insists on committing the armed forces to the drug trafficking mafia, smuggling, illegal business deals and nepotism" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1981b). Following the August 1981 coup led by Gen. Alberto Natusch Busch unseating García Meza, Lanza declared his support for the new administration of Gen. Celso Torrelio Villa, saying it was not a mere extension of the García Meza regime, and asked to be reinstated (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1981a). However, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) do code the August 1981 coup as a reshuffling coup. Based on this precedent, we assume that had Lanza succeeded earlier, he would also have installed a similar military regime. We therefore code this and the previous case as a failed reshuffling coup. Also see case 145-1981-5-15.

- # 145-1981-6-27: Bolivia, Luis García Meza

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On Saturday, June 27, the third coup attempt against General García Meza was launched in six weeks. This uprising was led by the Army chief of staff Lucio Añez Ribero and the Army’s national commander General Humberto Cayoja Riart (Shipp, 1981a). But they were replaced and arrested the next day (Goodsell, 1981).

Coding rationale: After the two coup attempts in late May led by Lt. Col. Lanza (see previous cases), Maj. Gen. Luis García Meza Tejeda relinquished his role as Army commander-in-chief, naming Lt. Gen. Humberto Cayoja to the post, and he agreed to step down August 6 as president (Goodsell, 1981). According to a CIA report, “Cayoja and Añez were both considered prime candidates to succeed García Meza and reportedly acted to prevent him from making changes in the high
command that would have hurt their chances to replace him. They also may have been reacting to the General’s recent efforts to retain power beyond his leave of office in August.” The latter interpretation was stressed in news reports (e.g. Shipp, 1981a). We interpret this evidence as suggesting these generals sought to forestall García Meza from stepping down as announced in order to unify the military regime and to bolster their succession chances, not to topple the military regime itself, which according to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) lasted from 1980-82.

• # 160-1971-10-8: ARGENTINA, ALEJANDRO AGUSTÍN LANUSSE

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On Friday, October 8, 1971, about 1,200 troops from two armored cavalry units based in Azul and Olavarria south of Buenos Aires rebelled an 18-hour revolt by occupying the towns before being put down. By October 12, 65 people had been arrested in connection with the coup attempt, including right-wing priest Fr. Julio Meinvielle and former president retired Gen. Roberto M. Levingston, who was known to oppose Lanusse’s plan to hold democratic elections in March 1973 (Associated Press, 1971a,b). In a radio broadcast the rebels called for a return to the “original principles” of the 1966 revolution (Associated Press, 1971b), which inaugurated the 1966-73 military regime. The mutineers also broadcast appeals to other military units to help them “oust this corrupt, inept and ludicrous Government”. Sources said the mutiny involved “a few colonels who had no mass support” (Maidenberg, 1971).

Coding rationale: Associated Press (1971c) reported that the uprising was “believed led by right-wing elements opposed to the government’s attempts at conciliation with the followers of former dictator Juan D. Peron”. Lanusse’s military enemies reportedly opposed his announcement of elections for March 1973, seeing it as a humiliating admission the military had not solved the economic problems, fearing labor gaining power, and seeking to avoid losing their double income as soldiers and officials. Many experts reportedly viewed the rebellion as a test of strength of Gen. Lanusse by these military enemies (Maidenberg, 1971). According to Potash (1996, 384-5), the initial plotters for the
uprising set for October 9 or later included “officers of several different political orientations, including ultranationalists, moderate nationalists with links to Levingston, developmentalists, and even a small group of democratic officers unhappy with the government. What they had in common was their opposition to Lanusse, but their ideological differences had prevented agreement on a single leader, and led certain Air Force officers to withdraw from the plot.” Evidently, the coup failed because two lieutenant colonels, Fernando Amadeo de Baldrich, the deputy chief of the 10th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and Florentino Díaz Loza, the commander of the 2nd Cavalry, erroneously believed Baldrich’s commander Colonel Manuel García had been arrested and believed their arrest was imminent. They thus launched the rebellion without consulting the other plotters, who did not come to their aid. Potash (1996, 386) concluded, “In thus seeking to turn the clock back to 1966, or perhaps 1970, the October 8 uprising inevitably alienated most of the political forces in the country.” We interpret this evidence to mean the coup attempters sought to preserve rather than destroy the incumbent military coalition, and simply sought to reshuffle Lanusse out of leadership position.

- # 365-1991-8-21: Russia, Mikhail Gorbachev
  
  **Category:** failed reshuffling coup

  **Event:** On Sunday, August 18, 1991, an attempt to capture and oust Mikhail Gorbachev was first announced by TASS. The attempt was led by the “State Committee on the State of Emergency USSR” (GKChP), also known as the “gang of eight”. The perpetrators were a veritable who’s who of high-level Soviet officials: Vice President Gennady Yanayev, Premier Valentin Pavlov, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR Oleg Baklanov, Chairman of the Peasants Union of the USSR Vasily Starodubtsev, and President of the Association of State Enterprises Alexander Tizyakov. However, the public mobilized behind Gorbachev, with the coup’s failure symbolized by the famous image of Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank. By Wednesday, August 21, Gorbachev had been freed and the coup attempt failed (Oberdorfer and Devroy, 1991).
Coding rationale: Support for the August coup attempt among high-level military leaders was mixed. Several studies have analyzed military involvement and motivations in this coup attempt (e.g. Lepingwell, 1992; Meyer, 1991). But all sources agree that the key intention of the GKChP was to preserve the Soviet Union and Communist Party control, which the plotters believed Gorbachev’s leadership had imperiled. We thus code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

- # 373-1994-10-4: AZERBAIJAN, HEYDAR ALIYEV

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: After President Aliyev’s security chief and the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly (Milli Majlis) were assassinated by “members of a special militia” (OPON) under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Aliyev arrested 3 members of this group. In response, on October 2, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Rovshan Javadov, “stormed the office of the Prosecutor-General, taking him and his officials hostage and securing the release of the three OPON members in custody” (Europa World Year Book, 2004, 638). On October 5, “President Haydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan told a crowd of supporters that a coup against him had failed. Mr. Aliyev had earlier accused his Prime Minister, Surat Husseinov, of plotting against him” (New York Times, 1994). “Aliyev described the incident as an attempted coup... [in the immediate aftermath of these events, other forces mutinied in Baku and elsewhere in Azerbaijan” (Europa World Year Book, 2004, 638).

Coding rationale: We code this case as a regime change coup attempt because Rovshan Javadov, allied with Prime Minister Suret Husseinov, appears to be the main perpetrator of the coup event that threatened Aliyev in Baku. Javadov and Husseinov had been allied with Aliyev in ousting the Elchibey regime in 1993. Guliyev (2012, 3) notes that after Aliyev and Husseinov ousted Elchibey, “Suret Huseynov was named Prime Minister in an uneasy power-sharing arrangement according to which Huseynov took control of the power ministries in the new government: the ministry of defence, security and the interior.” Husseinov and Javadov later fell out with Aliyev after the former opposed Aliyev’s treaty with Russia that would allow Russian troops back into Azerbai-
jan. Prior to the coup event, Javadov declared his opposition to Aliyev by stating he would run for Parliament in 1995 as part of an opposition bloc to Aliyev. He also stated publicly that once elected to parliament, he would attempt to impeach Aliyev. We interpret this evidence to mean that had Javadov succeeded in ousting Aliyev from power in early October 1994, the new government would have been headed by Suret Husseinov. This episode marks the personalization of Aliyev’s rule. Guliyev (2012, 4) argues that “the alleged coup attempt allowed the president to undermine the power of his main rival Huseynov who was sacked and accused of treason.” Aliyev died shortly after the election in 2003, in which he stepped aside to let his son win and succeed him as president. The elder Aliyev had prepared for this succession long prior to his illness: “[h]e had begun grooming his son for the post even earlier by appointing him as the vice-president of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in 1994” (Radnitz, 2012, 66). We use this evidence to assume that had Aliyev been ousted in 1994, the group from which the leader could be selected would have included more than just the Aliyev family, thus marking regime change.

• # 373-1995-3-13: AZERBAIJAN, HEYDAR ALIYEV

Category: **failed regime change coup**

Event: On Monday, March 13, 1995, Col. Rovshan Javadov led the 3,000 strong OPON police unit with his brother Makhir in a mutiny on the outskirts of Baku. Seizing the police station, the rebels called for the resignation of president Aliyev and parliamentary speaker Rasul Guliyev, and called for the formation of a coalition government (Meek, 1995). On Tuesday, March 14, 1995, the government ordered the Opon unit to disband and relieved the colonel of his deputy interior minister job (Harding, 1995). On Wednesday, March 15, Aliyev broadcast that the Javadovs were mounting a coup attempt. On Thursday, March 16, Aliyev offered amnesty to officers who surrendered as government forces besieged the rebel police unit (Meek, 1995). See also Europa World Year Book (2004, 639): “following a decree by the government to disband the OPON militia (which had remained under the control of Javadov)... OPON seized government and police buildings in Baku”.

Coding rationale: We code this case as an attempt regime change coup
for the same reasons as stated in case 373-1994-10-4.

• # 404-1998-6-7: GUINEA-BISSAU, JOÃO VIEIRA

Category: **failed regime change coup.**

**Event:** According to Mendy and Jr. (2013, 266), “Ansumane Mané was appointed chief of defense staff by President Vieira in the early 1990s but was promptly dismissed on 5 June 1998 for alleged “neglect” in controlling arms trafficking to the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) separatist insurgents in the southern Senegalese region of Casamance, which he strongly denied. A failed attempted dawn arrest of Mane on 7 June 1998 ignited the bloody 11-month civil war that left over 2,000 Bissau-Guineans dead.” On June 7, 1998, troops led by Ansumane Mané attempted a coup in the capital Bissau, which resulted in prolonged fighting and a de facto civil war (New York Times, 1998).

Coding rationale: Although Mané had been recently dismissed, the troops who joined his cause were current members of the military at this time, so we do not code this as a case of prior defection. The failed coup attempted led to a successful rebellion – which is coded as a regime change event – at a later date.

• # 420-1981-7-29: Gambia, Dauda Jawara

Category: **failed regime change coup**

**Event:** Beginning at 5 a.m. on Thursday, July 30, 1981, an obscure 26-year old leftist politician Kukoi Samba Sanyang led a civilian group and part of the country’s paramilitary police force in an attempted coup while president Jawara was in London for the royal wedding of Prince Charles and Lady Diana. The 300 member paramilitary Field Force, part of Gambia’s police force of 900, joined the rebellion (Gambia had no standing army) (Dash, 1981c). The rebels announced that they had formed a 12-member National Revolutionary Council headed by Sanyang and composed of 8 civilians and three members of the field force (Dash, 1981d). The rebels broadcast a call for support from the Soviet Union, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau. On the afternoon of the coup, Jawara spoke with Senegal’s president Abdou Diouf by phone and invoked a 1965 defense agreement with Senegal (Dash, 1981b).
response, Senegal employed some 3,000 troops against rebel positions (Hughes, 1991). Jawara flew to Dakar on July 31 and returned to Gambia on August 2 (Dash, 1981e). For three days, the rebels held the capital Banjul and the surrounding suburbs. The rebels lost initial popularity after releasing and arming prisoners. The Senegalese troops captured Banjul August 2, but the rebels took 160 hostages to a paramilitary police barracks in Bakau six miles west of the capital and threatened to kill the hostages unless Senegalese troops were withdrawn. Hostages included one of Jawara’s two wives and 8 of his children. The Senegalese troops surrounded the compound and allowed the rebels to escape into the surrounding bush on Thursday August 6. At least 500 civilians died in the week-long fighting (Dash, 1981a).

Coding rationale: Kukoi Samba Sanyang, the rebel leader, was a member of the Marxist Gambia Socialist Revolutionary Party, which along with another leftist party, the Movement for Justice in Africa, had been outlawed by the government the previous year after an October 1980 Libyan-sponsored plot was uncovered (Dash, 1981b). Another alleged rebel leader, former deputy Field Force commander Usman Bojang, had been dismissed by Jawara after being implicated in that plot (Dash, 1981c). Sanyang had twice unsuccessfully sought election to the parliament, frustrating his personal ambition (Mwakikagile, 2010). According to Hughes and Perfect (2008, 41-2), “This was a weeklong insurrection mounted by disaffected members of the para-military Gambia Field Force and a self-styled Marxist civilian organization, the Gambia Underground Socialist Revolutionary Workers Party (known as the Gambia Socialist Revolutionary Party before its banning in October 1980). It was organized and led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, a Jola from the Fonis. The coup was put down by the Senegalese army, called in by President Dawda Jawara, who was in London when the coup attempt was launched. The plotter’s intention was to replace the Jawara government with a vaguely defined revolutionary Marxist state, though dissident members of the Field Force were more motivated by internal rivalries. Despite initial claims of Libyan involvement, the attempted coup was essentially a Gambian affair and no left-leaning foreign government supported it. Initially seizing the most strategic locations in the Banjul area, the rebels were driven out and overwhelmed by superior Senegalese forces, though not without severe fighting, considerable
economic damage, and an estimated 500 deaths.”
Although the coup attempt ringleaders (Sanyang and Bojang) were not current members of the armed forces, we do not consider this a case of prior deflection due to the involvement of current members of the Field Force. We consider this a failed regime change coup, on the assumption that had it succeeded, Jawara’s single-party (PPP) elite would have been replaced by the banned socialist opposition.

• # 420-1994-11-11: Gambia, Yahya Jammeh
  Category: failed regime change coup
  Event: On November 11, 1994, vice president of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), Sana Sabally, announced on the radio that “a few officers of the GNA” [Gambia National Army] staged a failed coup at 3 a.m.; Sabally apologized to citizens for a “sleepless night” of noisy fighting at the Bakao Barracks in Banjul. Shooting was heard until 7 a.m. in what one reporter initially called “a real fight”. Among the three reportedly killed in the fighting was Lt. Bassiru Barrow, the commander of the 1st Battalion of the GNA and alleged leader of the coup. A statement by the office of the head of state claimed that a document found on the mutineers indicated that they sought to take over military barracks before proceeding to the State House and installing a new “military government with no civilian”. Life had returned to normal later in the day (BBC World Service, 1994b). Former President Dawda Jawara, in England since being ousted in July, denied any knowledge or involvement in the coup attempt, saying he did not know Lt. Barrow, though he admitted to having tried to drum up support to remove the AFPRC in general (BBC World Service, 1994a). On November 12, a reporter was surprised to find that not much damage had actually been done to the barracks 14 km from the center of Banjul, given the shooting that he had heard the previous night (BBC World Service, 1994c).

whether this was a genuine coup attempt, rather than a fabricated incident to eliminate potential rivals within the army. The incident was savagely crushed by the junta leadership, with a reported 30 insurgents killed. Remnants of the group, who had escaped to Senegal, were foiled in an attempt to advance on Banjul in July 1997, following an attack on a police post in Kartong on the Gambian border with Casamance.” Bokary Dabo, Jawara’s Finance Minister, who fled after the July 1994 coup but was persuaded to return to his duties as Finance Minister, was fired on October 10, 1994, and later accused of being the “civilian instigator” of the November countercoup attempt (Hughes and Perfect, 2008, 45). McGowan (2007) records that a “rival group of officers allegedly sought the return of the previous Jawara regime. The coup attempt came two weeks after the military leadership announced elections would not be held as planned, and that the AFPRC would stay in power until 1998. Additionally, Western donors had cut all but humanitarian aid to the country in response to this extended deadline.” Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code the July 1994 coup toppling Jawara as a regime change. If a genuine coup attempt, we assume that the November plotters sought to return the Jawara regime to power, which we code as a failed regime change coup. STAGED COUP ATTEMPT

- # 432-1978-2-15: Mali, Moussa Traoré

  **Category:** coup plot

  **Event:** According to contemporaneous news accounts, several members of the ruling Comité Militaire de Libération Nationale (CMLN), along with many other army officers, attempted to bolster the military status quo by planning a coup d’etat in 1978. The plot was discovered and the culprits removed from the CMLN. On February 28, Traoré ordered three members of the CMLN to be arrested on charges of high treason, and were said to be opposed to plans to return to civilian rule (Schultz and Rundblad, 1978). In March 1978, Mali’s Minister for Foreign Affairs was arrested on his return to the country for conspiracy to corruption and treason. Traoré said they had planned a military coup for early March in which they were to murder Traoré and install the foreign minister Charles Samba Cissoko as president (Amnesty International, 1978, 59).
Coding rationale: This event does not appear in Roessler (2011) as a coup attempt, and it enters McGowan’s (2007, 29) data as a coup plot. The Historical Dictionary of Mali also lists this as a planned coup d’état (Imperato and Imperato, 2008, 72-73). The Powell-Thyne dataset enters a documented coup attempt on February 15, 1978; their source does not provide information to document the case.

• # 434-1975-1-21: Benin, Mathieu Kérékou

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Tuesday, January 21, 1975, Capt. Janvier Codjo Assogba, the Minister of Labor, launched a coup attempt against Mathieu Kérékou after circulating a memo alleging Kérékou’s implication in the Kovacs affair, namely taking a bribe form Bertin Babliba Borna. Ironically, Bertin Borna was also accused of complicity in the coup attempt and sentenced to death in absentia on March 7, 1975 (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013, 86). On January 23, the government announced it crushed the rebellion and relieved Assogba of his duties and sentenced him to 60 days in a military prison. He was charged with inciting troops to revolt and sending armored units under his command against Cotonou, the chief port and business capital (United Press International, 1975a). On March 18, seven men were sentenced to death and five to life in prison in connection with the coup attempt, including former president Zinsou (in absentia) (United Press International, 1975b).

Coding rationale: Cap. Janvier Assogba had been one of the key architects of the 1972 coup that brought Kérékou to power. He was first appointed minister of finance in April 1973 and then became Minister of Civil Service and Labor in October 1974 (Houngnikpo and Decalo, 2013, 10,64-65). However, whereas Kérékou was a northerner, cabinet members Janvier Assogba and Michel Aikpe were southerners (Fon from the Abomey region) (Decalo, 1973b). Morency-Laflamme (2014, 7) observed that “[D]issatisfaction over the division of power rapidly brewed. Outside of the junta, anti-socialist groups started to rally around captain Assogba and lobby for a change of guard (Akpo 2012, 66). Assogba, using the Kovacs Affairs as an excuse to intervene, commanded the entire Ouidah garrison to accompany him to a ministerial meeting in Cotonou on January 22nd 1975. This coup at-
tempt failed as pro-Kérékou officers within the Ouidah garrison warned
the high command of Assogba’s actions and slowed down the troops’
movements. Assogba and his closest supporters were afterwards ar-
rested. This marked, for a few years, the complete marginalization of
southern officers (Horowitz, 1985; Schultz and Rundblad, 1975, 530).”
We interpret this evidence as indicating that Assogba represented a
marginalized (southern) ethnic group seeking to prevent the personal-
ization of the regime around northerners. We therefore code this as a
failed regime change coup, assuming that had the coup attempt been
successful, Assogba would have established a new ruling group led by
different (non-northern) ethnic groups.

• # 435-1982-2-6: Mauritania, Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla

Category: coup plot

Event: A bloodless event took place early Sunday February 6, 1982 in
Nouakchott, the capital. Several people were reported arrested, includ-
ing Lt. Col. Moustapha Ould Salek, leader of the 1978 coup that ousted
president Moktar Ould Daddah and former Military Committee for Na-
tional Salvation (CMSN) president (Agence France-Presse, 1982c,b).
Warner (1988) records that “In February 1982, former CMSN presi-
dent Salek and former Prime Minister Bneijara, among others, tried
unsuccessfully to oust Haidalla”.

Coding rationale: According to Novicki and Beaubien (1982, 26), “In
early February, an alleged coup plot against the Mauritanian head of
state, Mohamed Khouna Ould Heydalla, was foiled when the plan was
discovered in advance. According to Jeune Afrique, Heydalla learned
of a plot to arrest or assassinate him just hours before he was sched-
uled to leave for Nairobi for an OAU meeting on the Western Sahara
from Nouakchott Airport. The aim of the coup was said to be to put
in power Lt. Col. Mustafa Ould Salek, former president of the Mil-
tary Committee of National Salvation and author of the coup which
overthrew President Moktar Ould Daddah in 1978. Salek was arrested
along with former Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara; Baham
Ould Laghdaf, former Minister of Interior, and other army officers.”
McGowan (2007) (ID 435), Roessler (2011), and the Historical Dictio-
nary of Mauritania (Pazzanita, 2008, xxxiii) all call this event a coup plot and not an attempt. We also code this event as a coup plot because evidence suggests the plot was preempted before a concrete action was taken by Salek supporters.

• **# 435-2003-6-8: Mauritania, Moaouya Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya**

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** At 4 a.m. on June 8, 2003, rebel army officers “commandeered an armored brigade, elements of the depleted air force (and possibly the navy, a perennial hotbed of antigovernment sentiment), and an infantry unit based in Nouakchott, and violently assaulted the most important installations of the regime” (Pazzanita, 2008, 148). They freed at least 32 Islamic activists, opposition officials said. Heavy fighting was seen around the presidential palace and a nearby radio station, reportedly killing the army chief of staff Muhammad Lamine Ould N’Deyane. Loyalist forces crushed the rebellion within 36 hours (Associated Press, 2003). Pazzanita (2008, 316) reports: “Led by former Capt. Saleh Ould Hanena along with fellow army officer Abderahmane Ould Mini, air force squadron commander Mohamed Ould Cheikna, and perhaps two dozen others, the uprising was only narrowly defeated.” These officers Hannenna and several others evaded capture and fled to Senegal or Libya. Hanenna was caught in October 2004 and tried and sentenced along with 130 army military personnel for their involvement in the coup (BBC, 2004).

**Coding rationale:** The self-proclaimed leader of the rebellion, Saleh Ould Hanenna, was a former army officer who was removed from the military in 2000, having reportedly been “accused of stirring discontent over Mauritania’s links with Israel” (Reuters, 2003). Al Jazeera reported that the uprising was led by officers that had been recently dismissed from the army and angry about the government’s campaign against Islamic extremism (Associated Press, 2003). However, at least one of the coup leaders does appear to have been a current military officer (Ould Cheikhna), so we do not classify this as a case of prior defection. “In testimony to the court, Ould Hanenna and Ould Mini said they had wanted to put a stop to corruption, tribalism, poor pay and mismanagement in the army, and discrimination against black
Africans.” However, Ould Hanenna was a member of one of the ruling white moore tribes, so it is unclear the extent to which he and his conspirators actually sought to prevent ethnic narrowing of the regime. On the assumption that the coup was driven more by “poor pay and mismanagement of the army” and policy differences, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup. The 2005 coup that ousted Taya was led by junior officers, though one of the coup leaders was Taya’s chief of security. The new military junta ruled without Taya’s party and scheduled elections (in 2007) as part of a transition to democracy. Since there is no indication – in the sources for the 2003 coup attempt – that the coup plotters wanted to rule without Taya’s party or implement a transition to democracy, we code this as reshuffling. The 2005 regime change coding stems from new leaders ruling without the old party and opening up the system to full participation of opposition parties – prior to the transition election.

• # 436-1976-3-15: Niger, Seyni Kountche

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** According to government authorities, a small group of soldiers led by Maj. Bayere Moussa seized the radio station in the capital early on the morning of March 15, 1976. By midmorning, loyalist troops had retaken the station. Kountche called the affair a “mad adventure” on the air (Reuters, 1976a). Two other ringleaders were arrested: Capt. Sidi Mohamed, a former defense ministry official, and Ahmed Mouddour, former head of Niger’s national labor federation, the National Union of Niger Workers (Washington Post, 1976a). Nine people were sentenced to death in connection with the coup attempt, 31 others received lesser sentences, and two others were acquitted (Schultz, Margolis and Rundblad, 1976a). Those executed included Bayere, Mouddour, Sidi, and former chief of general intelligence Idrissa Boube.

**Coding rationale:** The coup attempt was launched by disaffected former cabinet members (though apparently they still held military rank) representing excluded ethnic groups. Stoller (1995, 179-181), reports that the coup plotters were Hausa (Bayere) and Tuareg military officers (Mohamed and Mouddour), whereas Kountche symbolized power of Zarma-Songhay from the west: “The 1976 coup attempt, in fact,
brought into the open seething ethnic conflicts and rivalries that have troubled Niger since independence”. Libya also supplied arms in support of the coup attempt (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012). Had the coup attempt succeeded, we assume that the group of incumbent Djerma-Songhai ethnic elites would have been replaced with Hausas and Tuaregs, marking a regime change.13.

• # 436-1983-10-5: NIGER, SEYNI KOUNTCHE

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On the night of Wednesday, October 5, 1983, and into the predawn hours of October 6, several hours of shooting occurred around the presidential palace and army headquarters. On October 6, Premier Mamane Oumarou went on national radio to announce that “a group of armed men” had tried and failed to seize power. Kountche then flew back to Niamey, held a brief talk with Sankara, and attributed the coup attempt to a “few ambitious people” (Reuters, 1983b). The coup attempt was reportedly masterminded by his friend and security advisor Lt. Amadou Oumarou, a Fulani nicknamed “Bonkano”. Several others were reportedly involved, apparently solely for reasons of self-advancement, including Lt. Idrissa Amadou (commander of the Presidential Guard) and Maj. Amadou Seydou (commander of the Niamey garrison). Most of those involved escaped the country, including Bonkano (Idrissa and Decalo, 2012, 149-150).

Coding rationale: After being granted amnesty, Amadou Oumarou returned to Niger from exile and testified before the National Conference. He explained that in 1983 he planned a palace coup to replace President Seyni Kountch as head of state and admitted to having profited financially from deals made when he held government office (Amnesty International, 1993). Although several of the plotters were Fulani, there is no evidence that we can find suggesting the coup attempt was motivated by a desire to change the ethnic composition of the ruling elite. Because the coup attempt was launched by high-level regime insiders,

13 This is not to say that personal factors were not also important. As Idrissa and Decalo (2012, 95-96) contend, “Blinded by utter hatred of President Seyni Kountche, Bayere’s motives in the conspiracy were purely personal. The other conspirators wished power; he desired solely Kountche’s death. In his trial he reiterated his belief that Kountche was the devil incarnate.”
we code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 437-2000-9-18: Cote d'Ivoire, Robert Guei

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Monday, September 18, 2000, unidentified gunmen attacked the residence of President Robert Guei. Shooting reportedly began at 2 a.m. and automatic gunfire and mortars were heard. Gen. Guei later that day held a press conference saying that he had survived an assassination attempt in which two of his bodyguards were killed. “Some young military people were more or less invited by certain people who are known to me to make an attempt on my life”, Guei told reporters. Communications Minister Henri Cesar Sama blamed members of the presidential guard (Reuters, 2000d).

Coding rationale: There are two major competing accounts of the assassination attempt on Guei. The official investigation and trial implicated co-ethnic supporters of Alassane Ouattara, a northerner, former prime minister, and an opposition leader who planned to run against Guei in the upcoming presidential election in October (Reuters, 2000e). After the attack, Guei hinted strongly that “Ouattara had manipulated members of the presidential guard into carrying out the attack” (Farah, 2000). He first investigated and dismissed the security minister, General Lanssana Palenfo, and the transport minister, Air Force General Abdoulaye Coulibaly, the second- and third-ranking members of the military government. As northerners, the two generals were considered close to Ouattara. General Palenfo’s personal guard was arrested immediately (Reuters, 2000a). On November 8, the two generals were arrested and officially accused of masterminding the assassination plot (Agence France-Presse, 2000). A military tribunal acquitted Coulibaly in March 2001 for lack of evidence; Palenfo was found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail.

However, the official account has had skeptics from the beginning, as many suspected the attack of being staged (McKenzie, 2000). Guei began purging senior officers outside of his own Yacouba ethnic group even before the assassination attempt (Farah, 2000). Predictably, he also used the assassination attempt as a pretext for temporarily banning political activity and cracking down on opposition (Reuters, 2000c,b).
But the two generals never admitted to complicity in the plot and said their arrest was political. During their trial (which took place after Guei’s ouster), even Guei’s lawyer asked that the charges be dropped due to insufficient evidence. Defence witnesses told the court they were tortured into incriminating both men (IRIN, 2001). The U.S. government documented 3-4 alleged plotters who were tortured and killed by government security forces (U.S. State Department, 2001).

If the official account is essentially true, the coup attempt would constitute a failed regime change coup. A successful assassination would have prevented Guei from standing in the October presidential elections and thus prevent the personalization of the military regime. Whereas Palenfo, Coulibaly, and Outtara were all members of a discriminated ethnic group under Guei’s regime, we assume that northerners would dominate a post-Guei military junta, whose leadership would have fallen to Gen. Palenfo as second-in-command. If the plot was rather staged by Guei himself, then the purpose of the event was to continue not prevent the personalization of the regime. However, we have no hard direct evidence that the attack was staged, only rumors. Mcgowan (2007) accepts the official account. As such, we code this attempt as a failed regime change coup, assuming that if Guei was killed Palenfo would have taken power. STAGED COUP ATTEMPT.

- # 437-2001-1-6: Cote d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** At about 11:30 p.m. on Sunday, January 7, 2001, armed men in civilian clothing “commandeered taxis and other civilian vehicles to attack strategic sites, including state broadcasting offices, a military base, a paramilitary compound and Gbagbo’s residence” (Agence France-Presse, 2001c; Zavis, 2001). Gbagbo had left Abidjan on Friday for an unspecified destination in the interior after hearing reports a coup was in the making, a source close to him said. At 2:20 a.m., television began to send out a test pattern. Unconfirmed reports said the assailants tried to free General Palenfo (Agence France-Presse, 2001d). At 4 a.m., the state radio, which earlier went off the air, began playing the national anthem and an unidentified man read a brief statement: “At the hour that we speak the country has undergone another page of our history. Radio and television are currently in the hands of the
military. I want to reassure the population that their security is guaran-
teed...I ask all our brothers in arms to align themselves”. Machine-gun
and heavy weapons fire could be heard near the state broadcasting
facilities in the suburb of Cocody (Washington Post, 2001). “The In-
terior Minister said that the first attack was launched from Abidjan’s
Lycee Technique located near Rue Lepic, which is the seat of Alassane
Outtara’s Rally of Republicans party” (Radio France International,
2001). On Monday night, Ivorian radio reported that “mercenaries”
from Burkina Faso had headed south on vehicles towards Abidjan to
join the coup, but loyal army units based in the northern town of Ko-
rhogo pursued and forced the invaders to retreat at the central town
of Bouake “back to Burkina Faso from Tafire via Kong and Tafolo”.
Kong, in the northeast, is Outtara’s hometown (Radio Cote d’Ivoire,
2001). The government appeared back in control by mid-afternoon;
Gbagbo returned January 9.

Coding rationale: The government blamed the coup attempt on north-
ern sympathizers of Alassane Outtara and foreigners (particularly Burk-
ina Faso and Mali). Of the 31 arrested, most were northerners. The
RDR denied any such link (Agence France-Presse, 2001a). Some of the
soldiers sought in connection with the coup attempt were also sought
for the September 2000 assassination attempt on Guei (France-Presse,
2001). On January 16, Gbagbo told French radio that “We are under
attack by an individual that the majority of Ivorians don’t recognize
as being a fellow countryman. I am speaking about Alassane Ouatt-
tara. That is the whole problem” (France 2 TV, 2001). Chief sergeant
Ibrahim (“IB”) Coulbaly, a former body guard of Ouattara and key
actor in the 1999 coup that brought Robert Guei to power, was fin-
gered by state-run media as a key figure in the coup attempt (Agence
France-Presse, 2001b). Rebels led by Coulibaly were known to be based
in Burkina Faso since he took to the bush after falling out with Robert
Guei (Oxford Analytica, 2001), which would explain the armored col-
umn that came south from Burkina Faso. Based on this evidence, we
assume that the coup attempt was led by northerners who supported
Outtara, who had been barred from participating in the October 2000
presidential elections and whose party was barred from parliamentary
elections in December 2000. We therefore assume this coup attempt
sought to prevent personalization under Gbagbo, a Christian Kru from
the South. Thus we code this as a failed regime change coup.

• # 437-2002-9-19: COTE D’IVOIRE, LAURENT GBAGBO

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: While President Gbagbo was in Rome, troops, many of whom originated from the north of the country, mutinied in the early hours of 19 September 2002. They launched attacks in many cities, including Abidjan. By midday they had control of the north of the country. Their principal claim related to the definition of who is a citizen of Ivory Coast (and so who can stand for election as President), voting rights, and representation in government. The government first blamed the coup attempt on former president Gen. Guei (New York Times, 2002c), who died in the first day of fighting (New York Times, 2002a). But political opponents rejected this interpretation, pointing out Guei had been killed at home.

As of September 25, Western media reports suggested that so many groups had become disaffected that it was impossible to identify any particular group as staging the uprising (Onishi, 2002b). Rebels killed Interior Minister Emile Boga Doudou, while Outtara’s house was burned down by security forces and he took refuge in the French Embassy (New York Times, 2002b). Renegade troops said they were angry at being thrown out of the army and sent demands to the French Embassy on September 23 (New York Times, 2002b). By September 26, the government blamed Outtara and Muslim northerners in alliance with the president of neighboring Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, as being behind the failed coup attempt. The Compaore government rejected the accusations, though it does appear that disaffected northern troops constituted the bulk of the rebel force (Onishi, 2002a). The rebels called for a chance to return to the army and for new elections (New York Times, 2002b).

Coding rationale: Because Gbagbo was not ousted during this first phase of fighting, we code the event as a failed coup attempt. The event is the start of a successful rebellion, which ousts Gbagbo at a later date.

• # 438-1985-7-4: GUINEA, LANSANA CONTÉ
Category: **failed regime change coup**

**Event:** On the night of Thursday, July 4, 1985, after President Lansana Conté had left the country to chair a meeting of African leaders in Togo for the Economic Community of West African States, rebel police units seized the Conakry radio station for five hours. They broadcast two recorded messages by former prime minister Diarra Traoré announcing he was taking power and calling Col. Conté a “citizen in exile” (Elgood, 1985). Traoré’s radio statement said that Guineans had suffered 15 months of “disappointment, or intolerable disorder” which dashed the hopes raised by the April 1984 coup led by Conté, and that the government was “composed of elements whose major concern was only to personally enrich themselves”. Traoré announced that the ruling CMRN had been abolished and he had formed a Supreme State Council that would end “nepotism and economic sabotage” (Reuters, 1985c). He cited Conte’s unwillingness to devalue the currency (a move recommended by the IMF) or join the franc zone monetary union for fear of social unrest as the root of his action: “Today it is more than ever necessary to put an end to footdragging in making political, economic, and in particular monetary decisions which are to launch the development of our country”. He also said the Supreme State Council had acted due to the “disintegration of the situation in the country, the hesitations of the last few months, the partisan struggles with some ethnic coloration, the emergence of egotistical interests, the lust for personal power”. By July 5, loyalist forces had foiled the plot, imposed a curfew, and conducted a house-to-house search in the capital for Traoré (Reuters, 1985b).

**Coding rationale:** Conventional wisdom views the coup attempt as the product of both ethnic and personal rivalry (e.g. Camara, O’Toole and E.Bakers, 2014, 13). Traoré was prime minister until the post was abolished and he was demoted to education minister in December 1984. The coup attempt therefore could be seen as a power grab by a politically ambitious officer. Traoré had allegedly gained the support of seven cabinet members for his coup attempt who were subsequently dismissed and arrested.14 Traoré and 18 conspirators were captured and executed.

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14These included Ahmadou Kouyate (security minister), Capt. Lancine Kéita (permanent secretary of the CMRN, former Defense minister, Malinke), Capt. Mamadi Bayo (the
without trial (Associated Press, 1985a).

As evidence to suggest an ethnic power motivation, we note that Traoré was from the Malinke, the country’s largest tribe, whereas Conté was a member of the minority Soussou tribe, which predominates in the capital (Associated Press, 1985a). Touré’s Malinke tribe benefitted under his long rule to the detriment of the Soussou and Pheul, Guinea’s other main ethnic groups (Zalaquett, 1985). Almost all 200 people detained for their alleged involvement were from the Malinke tribe.

In addition, the government alleged a number of former Touré government officials that had been released the previous May were behind the coup attempt (French, 1985). Jean-Claude Diallo, for example, said that documents found on the plotters “prove that the coup attempt in Guinea was a plot of the PDG (the Guinea Democratic Party of former President Sekou Touré.” He argued they wanted to rehabilitate a party-based regime; he said that the plot was carried out by Malinkes, but was not a Malinke plot (Dakar PANA, 1985). The government said that Traoré wanted to rehabilitate the memory of the late Sekou Touré (Agence France-Presse, 1985b). However, in a magazine interview before the coup, Traoré said the civil service was bloated, corrupt, and retained too many bureaucrats from the Touré era (Reuters, 1985b).

Ethnicity play a role in Conte’s coup in 1984 after Touré’s (a Malinke) sudden death, as Conte restored to power coethnic who had been purged under Touré. Schissel (1986, 21) writes: “In the first heady days of the post-Touré era [i.e. Conte’s rule], almost all senior brass, many of whom played a role in the periodic purges organized by the late dictator, were automatically given a seat on the [Conte’s] CMRN.... The most serious problem, however, was the sharpening divisions between President Lansana Conte, a Soussou from a village about 50 miles north of the dilapidated capital, Conakry, and then-Prime Minister Diara Traoré, a Malinke like the late head of state.” Conte sent rival ethnic military leaders to posts outside the capital within six months of the coup attempt (Schissel, 1986, 23); and “[w]ithin his crack presidential guard unit, certainly the best armed and trained in the Guinean armed forces, he has set up a special mounted guard used for honorary

youth minister, Malinke), Capt. Mohamed Sako (the former Industry Minister, Malinke), Capt. Kabassan Kéita (the former Energy minister), and Maj. Sidi Kéita (the former Minister of Higher Education) (Reuters, 1985d).
parades and receptions. Both the French and the Moroccans provide training for the presidential guard, composed principally of soldiers from the Soussou ethnic group” (Schissel, 1986, 23). We interpret this background evidence on ethnicity to code the Traoré coup attempt as an attempt to restore the Malinke to power.

• # 438-1996-2-3: Guinea, Lansana Conté
  Category: failed reshuffling coup

  Event: On Friday, February 2, 1996, about 2000 mutinous soldiers (out of an army of 8,500) surrounded and shelled the presidential palace after a pay dispute escalated into an apparent coup attempt (Associated Press, 1996a). Mr. Conte told Radio France International early on February 3 that loyal troops had repulsed three attacks by rebels during the night and that shellfire had set the palace on fire. In addition to more pay, the soldiers demanded the firing of the defense minister, Col. Abdourahmane Diallo, whom they claim denied them raises and promotions. The president did sack the defense minister and went on state radio asking the troops to meet to talk (Associated Press, 1996b). Radio later reported that an agreement had been reached and that all of the soldiers were told to return to their units. At least 20 people were killed (Reuters, 1996).

  Coding rationale: Although most of the mutinous soldiers were Malinke, the rebellion appears to have been motivated by military pay raises and promotion. According to Oxford Analytica (1996), “President Lansana Conte was captured and forced to agree to a doubling of army pay and the dismissal of the high command. An amnesty was granted, but subsequently Conte described the mutiny as a coup attempt in which military officers and civilians were involved. Eight soldiers, including four senior officers, have since been sentenced, and others are under arrest”. By the time the mutiny ended, the mutinous troops were cheering Conté (Susman, 1996). The only demands were for pay raises and promotions and sacking of the Defense Minister who the troops blamed for denying them. They reportedly gave up without any other pressure once he promised to meet their demands. What’s more, the ringleader Ousmane Sow had quashed the 1985 coup attempt by Traore, which suggests ethnic grievances were not a key factor (Bah,
Based on this evidence, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup, on the assumption that the soldiers would install a regime elite who would agree to their terms had Conté refused.

- # 450-1985-4-1: LIBERIA, SAMUEL DOE

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On April 1, 1985, Samuel Doe announced that the deputy commander of his bodyguards, Col. Moses Flanzamaton, led an assassination attempt on him earlier in the day while he returning to his executive mansion from Paynesville. Doe said that although he was unharmed, a bullet had grazed his cap, his jeep was full of bullet holes, and two of his bodyguards were injured (Reuters, 1985e). On April 4, Flanzamaton was arrested and allegedly confessed, saying that four opposition politicians had offered him $1 million if he killed Doe (Reuters, 1985f). The politicians were Tuan Wreh, chairman of the Liberia Action Party (LAP); Harry Greaves, the LAP Vice Chairman; Gabriel Baccus Mathews, chairman of the United People’s Party; and Edward B. Kesselley, leader of the Unity Party. Flanzamaton also implicated a U.S. security advisor in Monrovia named Richard Smith in the plot, who allegedly offered him passage to the U.S. (News Dispatches, 1985; Emerson and Shawcross, 1985).

On April 8, Flanzamaton was executed by firing squad. The four opposition politicians were released for lack of evidence (Associated press, 1985b).

Coding rationale: Doe said he believed Flanzamaton implicated the four politicians and used them to camouflage his “evil intentions”. Doe said he believed Flanzamaton had acted out of fear of being imprisoned for being in arrears to the Liberia Produce Marketing Company (Agence France-Presse, 1985a). Skeptics suggested the episode was arranged by Doe in order to win upcoming elections. The opposition politicians were apparently paraded in public naked before they were released (Emerson and Shawcross, 1985). We could not find any first hand account of the assassination attempt other than that provided by Doe himself. Flanzamaton was executed without a public trial and was never allowed to talk to journalists. However, Flanzamaton and

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Although Flanzamaton apparently was an agent of the CIA, the CIA evidently did not sponsor the assassination attempt (Woodward, 2005).
Doe were apparently both Krahn (Fahnbulleh, 2004, 94). We therefore doubt this was an attempt to prevent ethnic narrowing. As such, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup. STAGED COUP ATTEMPT

• # 450-1985-11-12: Liberia, Samuel Doe

Category: prior defection

Event: Before dawn on Tuesday, November 12, 1985, former military chief Thomas Quiwonkpa clandestinely returned to Liberia from exile with a group of armed rebels. They assaulted the executive mansion and seized Monrovia’s three main radio stations. Over the radio Quiwonkpa accused Doe of a reign of “fear, brutality and blood tyranny”, claimed he had seized power, and said that he had the intention of holding elections. The announcement of the coup by rebels was met with celebratory crowds in the streets (Harden, 1985a,b). The rebels held Radio Elwa station for 13 hours until troops loyal to Doe retook the station. Fighting was also observed near the executive mansion, where his personal bodyguard and the First Army Battalion led by his cousin remained loyal (United Press International, 1985a). Fighting continued on November 13 on the road from Monrovia to Robertsfield Airport; by the end of the day loyalist troops seemed back in control. Doe said the coup failed due to a communications breakdown among Quiwonkpa’s forces. After Quiwonkpa’s forces rounded up several ministers and took them to the Army stockade, Quiwonkpa lost contact with his troops and fled (Harden, 1985a).

Coding rationale: On November 18, Liberia recalled its Ambassador to Sierra Leone for what it said was that country’s complicity in the coup attempt by allegedly providing the conspirators with transportation and other help crossing the Sierra Leone border (Wills, 1985b). Sierra Leone denied charges that it provided weapons, including Czechoslovak-made rocket launchers, rifles, machine guns, and grenades (Wills, 1985a,c). On November 21, Liberia began trials for 11 civilians and an undisclosed number of military personnel for the coup attempt based on a statement by Anthony McQuee, an army major captured during the coup attempt (Wills, 1985c). He apparently said the plot included mercenaries from Sierra Leone, Cuba, and Guinea (Ritchie, 1985). Doe claimed that Quiwonkpa had intended to hand over power to the

Former Brig. Gen. Thomas Quiwonkpa was accused of leading a failed coup in November 1983 and went into exile in the United States. Prince Yormie Johnson, commander of the Liberian military police, had accompanied him in exile and participated in Quiwonkpa’s coup (Dunn, Beyan and Burrowes, 2001, 180). Charles Taylor would eventually lead rebels over the border again on December 24, 1989, into Nimba County “in a quest to complete the 1985 attempt of General Thomas Quiwonkpa to remove Doe from power”. Taylor was related to Quiwonkpa through marriage, and owed his position in the Doe government to Quiwonkpa. This NPLF attack started the Liberian Civil War (Dunn, Beyan and Burrowes, 2001, 71), which would remove Doe from power at a later date. Although some members of the military (mainly from the Barclay Training Center) gave their support to Quiwonkpa after the coup was underway, there is no evidence that current members of the military were involved in initial planning or execution of the coup. We therefore code this as a case of prior defection.

• # 451-1987-3-23: Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** On Tuesday, March 23, 1971, army commander Brig. John Bangura sought to overthrow Prime Minister Siaka Stevens. According to later testimony at Jawara’s court martial and a reconstruction of events from reports in West Africa (Vidler, 1998, 178-79), the coup attempt began when Major Falawa Jawara led a failed attack on Steven’s residence. Later that morning Bangura is reported to have addressed troops at Wilberforce barracks and urged them to continue. Around 12:30, a gun battle lasting several hours occurred outside the PM’s home. Around 3 p.m. Bangura announced his takeover in a subsequent radio broadcast and warned against any outside interference. But Bangura was arrested by his own senior officers later that night. The army’s third in command, Lieut. Col. Sam King, went on the radio later that night to repudiate Bangura (Associated Press, 1971e).

Coding rationale: Stevens was ethnicizing the regime in a one-party state and using foreign troops for support. The coup attempt was led
by Brig. General John Bangura. In mid-1970, “i[m]portant Temne ministers – all of them from the Tonkolili district – left the Stevens cabinet and the APC. Then, joined by a Temne-Loko from Tonkolili, John Karefa-Smart, they founded a new party, the United Democratic Party. Its leadership was almost entirely Temne” (Horowitz, 1985, 478). Stevens then banned the UDP and began purging Temne officers (Horowitz, 1985, 478). “Bangura, closely associated with Karefa-Smart and, like him, a Temne Loko from Tonkolili, had become a mere figure-head” (Horowitz, 1985, 478). After the failed coup bid and Bangura’s execution, “[t]he leaders of the state, the party, and the army were all Limba. A further purge of the army decimated the Temne component of the officer corps” (Horowitz, 1985, 478). Horowitz’s (1985, 479) summary of March 23, 1971 is: “Brig. John Bangura attempts an unsuccessful coup after Stevens’ suppression of a predominantly Temne party with which Bangura had been linked and Stevens’ arrest of Temne officers.” We code this event as a failed regime change coup based on the evidence that a success would have restored Temne-Loko civilians and military officers to power, marking a change in the ethnic group from which leaders could be selected.

• # 451-1971-3-23: Sierra Leone, Joseph Saidu Momoh

  Category: coup plot

  Event: According to media reports and subsequent court trials, the government discovered a coup plot that was allegedly planned for March 24, 1987. In the early hours of March 24, the night before the suspected plotters were to act, the police raided Mr. Gabriel Kaikai’s two residences, where they faced a gun battle and subsequently gained entry and found weapons (Vidler, 1998, 181-82). On March 24, 1987, security forces announced the arrest of 16 persons in connection with a coup plot, including Kaikai (Washington Post, 1987a). Francis M. Minah, the First Vice President, was alleged to be the leader of the coup and was detained on April 4. Of 12 confirmed convictions, most were junior officers (Vidler, 1998, 182). Kaikai supposedly planned to kill Momoh on his weekday morning drive from his residence down Hill Cot Road to his office.

  Coding rationale: Because the police intervened to arrest the coup plot-
ters prior to executing a definitive coup attempt action, this case is coded as a coup plot. If the coup plotters had executed an action prior to being detained, this would be coded as a failed reshuffling coup by Kaikai because it was in response to the fact that Stevens picked Momoh instead of Kaikai as his replacement as regime leader.

• # 451-1992-12-29: Sierra Leone, Valentine Strasser

Category: not exist

Event: According to a January 1, 1993 AP news report, “A military tribunal condemned to death 26 people accused of plotting two coups against Sierra Leone’s military government. They are believed to have been executed almost immediately by firing squad. Nine were sentenced Wednesday on charges of trying to overthrow the country’s 28-year-old president, Capt. Valentine Strasser, on Monday, state radio reported. The tribunal, which accepts no appeals, sentenced the remaining 17 on Tuesday. They were arrested in a November coup attempt... Among those sentenced this week was Lt. Col. James Yaya Kanu, who has been in prison since Strasser seized power. He was believed to have been first in line for the presidency” (Associated Press, 1993). However, we can find no evidence from non-governmental sources to confirm that a coup attempt took place. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s reconstruction of the events of December 29-30, 1992 reveal that no trial or judicial proceeding took place before the summary executions of the alleged coup plotters. Further, we can find no explanation for how Yaya Kanu could have masterminded a coup attempt from prison when he had been denied visitors.

Coding rationale: Because we cannot find a source to confirm an action that would constitute a coup attempt, we code this case not being a coup attempt.16

16McGowan (2007) and Roessler (2011) code a coup attempt on December 29, 1992. McGowan’s coding of a coup attempt is based on news reports that reported the government announcement of trials and executions for a coup attempt – such as the AP news report above. However, there is no evidence of this other than a government allegation which was never substantiated in court. Even if there was a coup plot, there is no evidence that there was an actual coup attempt. Roessler also codes this as a coup attempt, but this appears because he follows the lead of McGowan. The Powell & Thye data also show this as a coup attempt, but their source is a contemporary news account that provide no
• # 451-1995-10-2: Sierra Leone, Valentine Strasser

**Category:** coup plot

**Event:** On October 4, 1995, the government announced that it had foiled a coup attempt by officers opposed to their plans to end military rule and restore civilian government. Six officers ranging from lieutenant to major were arrested (Washington Post, 1995a). On October 5, the government reported that the failed coup plot was tied to exiles based in neighboring Guinea and rebels (Washington Post, 1995b). By October 20, eight soldiers had been arrested: Lieutenant James Conteh, Captain Abu Bakarr Kamara, Major Matthew Kamara, Captain Alie Badara Koroma, Lieutenant Sahr Panda, Lieutenant Patrick Samura, Lieutenant Ina Sanu and Lieutenant Kanja Sandy. Amnesty International (1995) feared for their execution without a fair trial.

**Coding rationale:** Because we cannot find a source to confirm an observable action that would constitute a coup attempt, we code this case as a coup plot. The primary evidence for the event comes from government allegations of a coup attempt.\(^{17}\) STAGED COUP PLOT

• # 452-1979-5-15: Ghana, Fred Akuffo

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** According to Berry (1995), “On May 15, 1979, less than five weeks before the national elections, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings and several members of the air force (junior officers and corporals) unsuccessfully tried to overthrow the government. During the court martial of the coup’s seven plotters, Rawlings justified his action by claiming that official corruption had eroded public confidence in the government and had tarnished the image of the armed forces. Rawlings also charged that Syrian and Lebanese businessmen living in Ghana had gained control of the country’s economy at the expense of the African majority.”

**Coding rationale:** On June 4, 1979, Flt. Lt. Rawlings launched a successful coup attempt beyond government allegations.

\(^{17}\)The only evidence that a coup attempt may have taken place is by an unnamed western diplomat and residents of Freetown who “reported an exchange of heavy gunfire in the early hours of the morning” (New York Times, 1995).
ccessful coup against Lieut. Gen. Fred Akuffo, which was followed by the scheduled elections and a democratic transition on July 9, 1979. We code the June 4 event as a successful reshuffling coup, because Rawlings’ “housecleaning” coup did not entail the transfer of power to a civilian group prior to the democratic elections. The scheduled elected were not interrupted by either the failed attempt in May or the successful coup on June 4. Rather, both incidents were driven by Rawlings’ attempt to prepare for military disengagement from politics. Rawlings and other junior officers were upset with “Akuffo’s inability to fulfill one of the most important conditions for military disengagement” (Hansen and Collins, 1980, 15) [preserving the ban on old politicians from taking power during the scheduled elections]. They proceed to argue that “It was concerns such as these which on 14 May, 1979, moved Rawlings and the air force unit to try and force a meeting of the military council where they hoped to press for a resolution of such contradictions before the handing over to civilian rule. It was the failure of this attempt and the arrest of their leaders which made them go all out to seize power and resolve the contradictions themselves” (Hansen and Collins, 1980, 15). We interpret this evidence to suggest that coup attempt did not want derail the scheduled democratic elections, nor did the coup plotters want to prevent ethnic narrowing, even though Rawlings is from a junior partner ethnic group as coded by EPR.

Because Rawlings motives were presumably the same in May and June, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 452-1982-11-23: Ghana, Jerry Rawlings

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On Monday, November 22, 1982, the deputy head of state and army chief of staff Brig. Gen. Joseph Nunoo-Mensah resigned from the ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) and criticized the government in a resignation letter that circulated to Western embassies (Blittain, 1982). On Tuesday evening, November 23, shooting broke out at the Burma army barracks on the outskirts of Accra. In a six-minute broadcast, Rawlings threatened rebels holding out that they would be bombed if they did not turn themselves in (Associated Press, 1982b). News reports from November 25 state that the coup attempt “may have been mounted by soldiers loyal to a member of [Rawling’s] ruling
Coding rationale: In the first two years after the second Rawlings’ coup, Hutchful (1997, 254-55) describes the factionalization within the Ghanaian military in the following passage: “as the regime splintered, the AFDCs [Armed Forces Defense Councils] became the focus of rivalry between Rawlings, the civilian ‘left’, and radical soldiers like Sergeant Alolga Akata-Pore as they struggled for control over the ranks and the military camps... There were disagreements within the Government and the National Security Council, as well as inside the command of the Armed Forces, between those who were opposed to the concept in principle, including the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah, and those who felt that the AFDCs could be the foundation for a revolutionary new military structure. While others supported the committees (or their objectives) in some modified form, most of the officer corps did not care for the concept.”

This suggests that the factionalization within the military centered on reforms that would change the internal command structure of the military. One of the core cleavages within the military took the form of inter-generational factions: “[s]ome of the most dissatisfied were the ‘graduates’ of the Junior Leaders Training School which had been established in the 1950s to educate and train young recruits, mostly the children of soldiers” (Hutchful, 1997, 254). We interpret this evidence to assume that had the coup succeeded, the military would not necessarily have given up power but rather would have slowed the pace of internal military reforms sought by Rawlings.

While there is some evidence of ethnic narrowing of the PNDC to overrepresent Ewe officers in the 1980s (Hutchful, 1997, 258), we investigated the extent of this process to assess whether this ethnic narrowing constitutes sufficient evidence that a successful coup in 1982 would have drastically changed the ethnic make-up of the ruling PNDC. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004, 75) note that the original PNDC had only 1 Ewe (Rawlings), but 3 Akan (the plurality ethnic group), 2 northerners, and 1 Ga. While Ewes from the Volta region comprise only 10 percent of the population, “Ewes formed 23.1 percent, 28.6 percent, 21.4 percent, 20.7 percent and 18.5 percent respectively of the PNDC membership in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, and 1990 respectively” (Asante and Gyimah-
Boadi, 2004, 77). Thus while there was some over-representation of Rawlings’ ethnic group, Ewes by no means dominated the PNDC during the 1980s. Neither Nunoo-Mensah or Akate-Pore were Rawlings’ co-ethnic, but even after they were purged from the PNDC, the ruling council still included Akans and northerners. For example, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004, 75) state that “Alhaji Iddrisu Mahama who became a member after the departure of the northern radicals (Chris Atim and Sergeant Aloga Akata) remained the only northerner on the Council” after 1982. In summary, they note “Indeed, it is difficult to sustain a claim of Ewe dominance in Ghana under PNDC administration” (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004, 76). Thus we do not interpret the 1982 coup attempt as an effort to prevent the ethnic-narrowing of a personalist regime but rather a factional conflict within the military over internal structure; therefore we code this case as a reshuffling coup attempt.

- # 452-1983-6-19: Ghana, Jerry Rawlings

**Category:** prior defection

**Event:** On Sunday, June 19, 1983, former Sergeant Abdul Malik and Lieutenant Kenneth Korah reportedly led an invasion force from Togo which released from gaol 50 officers and soldiers arrested on charges of plotting coups or involved in the murder of three high court judges. Both were also charged with being involved in the November 1982 coup attempt (Brittain, 1983c). Malik was the former body guard of the former Chief of Defence Staff Brig. Nunoo Mensah. For 2.5 hours his forces held the radio station and announced they had taken over the government. Their spokesman, Corporal Halidu Gyiwah (who had been arrested the previous November) denounced Rawlings. The counterattack was led by Captain Quashiga, who also led the counterattack in November 1982 (Brittain, 1983b, 59-60). Diplomats reported explosions and heavy fighting midday near the Army headquarters, the airport, and Broadcasting House (the headquarters for Accra radio). Twenty six rebels died in the fighting (Brittain, 1983a).

**Coding rationale:** On June 21, Ghana announced that the rebellion had been led by former servicemen exiled in neighboring Togo who came back into the country (Brittain, 1983d). Because these officers
had already defected following the previous coup attempt in November 1982, we code this as a case of prior defection.

• # 452-1984-3-23: Ghana, Jerry Rawlings
   Category: prior defection
   Event: On Saturday, March 23, loyal soldiers reportedly confronted “a group of dissidents on the run”. On March 25, Radia Accra broadcast that government soldiers had killed eight of the rebels and executed three others, all of which were reportedly sentenced to death in absentia for the previous June 19, 1983 coup attempt (Associated Press, 1984). At least 11 were reported to be killed near the Ivory Coast border and near Togo, where former military exiles sought to blow up strategic installations. This attempt against the Rawlings regime appeared to seek to take advantage of unrest over the IMF austerity program introduced by Rawlings in 1983, which included a 90% devaluation of the currency (Blackburn, 1984).

Coding rationale: Because the rebel officers had defected following previous coup attempts in November 1982 and June 1983, we code this as a case of prior defection.

• # 461-1991-10-1: Togo, Etienne Eyadema
   Category: not regime leader
   Event: On the morning of Tuesday October 1, 1991 pro-Eyadema troops seized the state broadcasting center leaving eight dead. “But they returned to barracks after Eyadema, a general and commander of the armed forces, broadcast a message ordering them to lay down their arms”, saying their pay complaints would be considered (The Gazette, 1991). “State television reported that the troops, after seizing the station in the morning, departing in a hail of bullets a few hours later and then returning in the afternoon, had left a second time as nightfall approached” (Los Angeles Times, 1991).

Coding rationale: This event and the following three for Togo (cases 48-50) are coup attempts against the newly elected civilian Prime Minister Koffigoh by supporters of the regime leader, President Eyadema. We therefore code these cases as actions targeting an executive who is not
the regime leader. Further, these events could be interpreted as part of Eyadema’s strategy to pressure rival politicians in the ruling coalition because the events were perpetrated by supporters of Eyadema.

• # 461-1991-10-7: TOGO, ETIENNE EYADEMA

Category: not regime leader

Event: On October 8, 1991, troops loyal to Eyadema tried to kidnap Prime Minister Joseph Koffigoh. This was reportedly the third failed coup attempt in a week by Eyadema loyalist troops (although we find no evidence of a coup attempt taking place before this since October 1). Koffigoh broadcast a message that he would not submit to “blackmail by those possessed by the devil” (Washington Post, 1991).


• # 461-1991-11-28: TOGO, ETIENNE EYADEMA

Category: not regime leader

Event: On Thursday, November 28, 1991, troops loyal to Eyadema surrounded Prime Minister Koffigoh’s palace with tanks and threatened to destroy the capital unless Eyadema’s powers were restored. They also seized the national radio station and broadcast that “[t]he armed forces of Togo demand one more time of the head of state that he name an effective man to form a new government. If not, the entire town will be reduced to ashes” (Associated Press, 1991c). The troops were denied entry by the palace guard.

On Friday, November 29, Eyadema reportedly urged the troops to give up their attempt to restore him to power, broadcasting a statement that Eyadema “renews his trust in the prime minister and invites him to start consultations with all the country’s political groups with a view to forming a transitional government of national unity. Furthermore, the head of state reiterates his call for the soldiers occupying strategic points in the capital to return to their barracks”. Meanwhile, 300 French paratroopers and marines were camped out at the airport in Benin (half an hour away by plane). France said they were sent to protect French nationals and the democratic process in Togo. Koffigoh had requested French military intervention under a mutual defense treaty (Associated Press, 1991b). On Saturday, November 30, the
pro-Eyadema soldiers withdrew from their positions with only the presidential guard remaining outside the Prime Minister’s office. By then the coup event had left 25 dead and 100 wounded (Reuters, 1991b).


• # 461-1991-12-15: TOGO, ETIENNE EYADEMA

Category: **not regime leader**

Event: According to McGowan (2007), “On December 15th rebel soldiers seized control of the radio station in Lome. They demanded the dissolution of the High Council of the Republic. The tape of the communiqué was confiscated later that day by an Army Captain and the soldiers quit their occupation of the radio station.” Evidently, the soldiers wanted “the legalization of former President Eyadema’s political party (RPT) and the restoration of the Togolese People’s Assembly. They were opposed to the democratic reforms in Togo.”


• # 471-1984-4-6: CAMEROON, PAUL BIYA

Category: **failed regime change coup**

Event: In the pre-dawn hours of April 6, 1984, northern officers of Cameroon’s 500-man Republican Guard launched a coup attempt; they held the national radio station until late in the day, when when loyal troops retook it; fighting involving tanks took place in the capital of Yaounde until 5:30 p.m. (Dash, 1984). On April 6, former President Ahidjo, who had been in exile in France since being sentenced for a 1983 assassination plot against Biya, refused to say whether he was associated with the coup attempt, simply telling Monaco radio that “if my supporters are involved in a coup, they will gain the upper hand, I think.”, adding “They can get on with it by themselves” (Lewis, 1984a). Fighting continued for several days as rebels fled, though most were reported to be detained, including the supposed leader Ibrahim Saleh, the Republican Guard commander (Reuters, 1984). On April 12, Biya disbanded the Republican Guard and a government communiqué reported that 70 people were killed in the fighting; it said 1,053 rebels were imprisoned (Associated Press, 1984a).
Coding rationale: The coup attempt “apparently brought to a head a long-simmering power struggle between the formerly dominant northern Moslems and southern Christians” (Dash, 1984; Lewis, 1984b). Whereas Ahidjo had long favored “a clique of northern Moslems for power and money positions”, Biya sought to break Ahidjo’s power base (May, 1984b). Afterwards, Biya fired his military aide and the military commander for the capital, both northerners, for failing to try to stop the coup (Randal, 1984). The leader of the loyalist troops, Gen. Pierre Semengue, said that they had proof Ahidjo led the rebels (May, 1984a). Semenge said that most plotters were junior officers, and that the day before the coup an unusual number of bank clients in the north of the country withdrew cash from their bank accounts (Randal, 1984). We code this attempt as a failed regime change coup, assuming that had it succeeded, the Muslim northern officers would have re-installed a northern-dominated regime under Ahidjo or another northerner, thus displacing Biya’s southern and Christian-led elite that had ruled since 1983.

# 475-1976-2-13: NIGERIA, MURTALA MOHAMMED

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** Shortly after 8 a.m. on Friday, February 13, 1976, rebels attacked Iyoki Island, where the government has its military headquarters. President Mohammed was shot and killed by a rebel as his Mercedes limo was caught in traffic on the half mile drive from his home to his headquarters in Dodan Barracks. Then at about 9 a.m. the rebel officer leading the abortive coup, Lt. Col. Buka Suka Dimka, reportedly went to the office of the British High Commissioner Sir Martin Le Quesne. Announcing himself as the new head of state, Dimka demanded to place a telephone call to former president General Yakuba Gowon but was rebuffed. Dimka left at 9:15am. By 9:30 a.m., Dimka announced on the state radio station that “the Government has been overthrown by the young revolutionaries” (Darnton, 1976d). Throughout the day, divisional commanders and government leaders around the country (e.g. in Enugu, Kano, Kaduna, and Sokoto) disassociated themselves from the coup (Darnton, 1976c). Around 2:45 p.m., loyalists counterattacked and retook the radio station after about 10 minutes. Dimka escaped and the end of the coup attempt was announced on the
radio at 6:20 p.m. (Washington Post, 1976b).

On March 6, the government manhunt to arrest Lt. Col. Dimka succeeded (Reuters, 1976b). On March 11, the government ordered death sentences for 32 persons implicated in the coup attempt, including the former defense minister Maj. Gen. I.D. Bisalla (France-Presse, 1976). All but 7 were officers of the Nigerian army, including a colonel, four Lt. Col., and six majors. The government also executed a civilian, Abdul Karim Zakari, for participating in the coup attempt (DeYoung, 1976). Dimka was executed in mid-May along with seven others, including a former state governor, Joseph Gomwalk, who was named a “principal actor” (Schultz, Margolis and Rundblad, 1976b).

Coding rationale: On February 18, the government said the coup plotters had four goals, including (1) re-establishing non-alignment, (2) opposing recent promotions of brigadier generals in the army, (3) restoring General Gowon to power, and (4) restore to office the 12 former military governors who had been dismissed by Muhammed for alleged corruption. The government statement said that “there was ample evidence that General Gowon knew and by implication approved of the plot.” The statement also charged heavy “foreign backing and involvement”, despite the fact that the British High Commissioner had actually rebuffed Dimka’s request to call Gowon. The statement also said that Dimka was related to Gowon through a brother who is married to Gen. Gowon’s elder sister (Darnton, 1976b). Gowon denied any involvement or knowledge, pointing out his brother was Samuel Dinka, not Dimka (Washington Post, 1976b). As for Lt. Col. Dimka, he was a junior officer in the army signal training corps from Gowon’s minority animist tribe, the Angas, which has had traditional tribal hostility in the north with the Hausa, Mohammed’s tribe (Darnton, 1976d,e). However, given the 1975 coup which toppled Gowan was not coded as a regime change by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), we similarly code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

If the restoration of General Gowan to power was the goal of this coup attempt, then this provides sufficient evidence for a reshuffling coup because the coup against Gowon in 1975 is not coded as a regime change. The successful 1975 coup is not coded as regime change because the new military government after the coup was multi-regional/ethnic, comprise of Murtala Muhammed (Hausa), Olusegun Obasanjo (Yoruba), and T.
Y. Danjuma (Jukun from the middle belt) (Dummar, 2002, 24). One source cites Gowon’s brother-in-law, Joe Garba, as the lead coup plotter that ousted Gowon in 1975 (Dummar, 2002, 23). Another source cites Garba as the Commander of the Brigade of Guards (Peters, 1997, 16). A military coup attempt to restore Igbo power would be coded as a regime-change coup because the Igbo were excluded under the Gowon regime. General Ironsoni’s government (prior to Gowon’s successful coup in 1966) was Igbo; and Gowon’s regime was anti-Igbo (i.e. civil war period). The post-Gowon government that was part of the 1966-1976 regime was therefore not Igbo (southern) but had multi-ethnic/regional representation. Gowon, Garba, and Muhammed were all non-Southerners and non-Igbo. Therefore, we do not treat 1976 coup attempt as an effort to prevent or impose ethnic narrowing of the regime coalition.

• # 475-1990-4-22: Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: Early in the morning of April 22, 1990, artillery and automatic-weapons fire was heard in Lagos near the barracks where President Babangida lived. Soon afterward, a man identifying himself as Maj. Gideon Ngwozor Oka went on the radio saying that the government had been overthrown. Another broadcast called on students, workers, lawyers, and shopkeepers to take to the streets to support the coup attempt. About noon, the government broadcast that the rebels had been defeated. Radio stations in Benin and Kaduna broadcast announcements by officers saying their troops were loyal to Babangida. Lt. Gen. Sani Abacha, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, later announced on a Nigerian radio broadcast that troops loyal to Gen. Babangida had forced “a few disloyal and misguided soldiers” who had caused “sporadic fighting” in “some isolated parts of Lagos” to surrender after 11 hours (Noble, 1990). On April 23, the Nigerian government announced that 10 officers and more than 150 soldiers from lower ranks had been arrested in connection with the coup attempt, including Maj. Oka (Reuters, 1990b).

Coding rationale: During the coup attempt, Maj. Oka broadcast a long speech of grievances, which began “Fellow Nigerian citizens, on
behalf of the patriotic and well-meaning peoples of the Middle Belt and southern parts of this country, I...wish to happily inform you of the successful ousting of the dictatorial, corrupt, drug-baronish, inhumane, sadistic, deceitful, homosexually centered and unpatriotic administration of General Ibrahim Babangida” (Associated Press, 1990b). He said the people of central and southern Nigeria, many of them Christians, had been reduced to slavery by the government dominated by Muslims from northern Nigeria. Oka “accused the northern states of Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto of ruining the rest of Nigeria. He said those predominantly Muslim states would be excluded from the 21-state federation until they prove their loyalty to a new government” (Noble, 1990). The rebels also publicly “accused the Government of corruption, asserting that its austerity program was meant to enrich military commanders.” They also reportedly complained about the removal from the Cabinet of two leading southerners, Defense Minister Lt. Col. Domkat Bali, and the Interior Minister John Shagayi. Babangida took their portfolios, leaving no southerners in key positions (Associated Press, 1990a). According to Ihonvbere (1991, 615), this was the first time in Nigerian history that “only some members of the armed forces (as opposed to, at least hopefully, all) were stated to be carrying out a coup on behalf of a section of the country.” We interpret Oka’s speech as suggesting that had the coup succeeded, a new configuration of ethnic power relations would have been established unseating the dominant northern Hausa-Fulani.18 As such, we code this as a failed regime change coup.

• # 483-1976-2-5: Chad, Felix Malloum

Category: not coup

Event: N/A

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18By contrast, Nigeria’s ambassador to the United States wrote a letter to the editor protesting the New York Time’s coverage citing the North-South cleavage as the cause of the coup attempt. He said that the “insurrection of a few officers, mostly from the Bendel (including a civilian financier), Benue, Plateau and Cross river states, did not reflect religious division in Nigeria or a north-south split. It was a sectional madness, similar to the abortive 1976 coup of Lieut. Col. Bukars Dimka. Last month’s coup plotters were merely a band of irresponsible and greedy officers, known to have accepted large sums of money to start the rebellion” (Ahmadu, 1990).
Coding rationale: We find no evidence of a coup attempt in Chad on February 6, 1976. The Powell-Thyne data show one, but their source turns out to be an Agence France-Presse (1976b) article reported from Chad but covering a coup attempt in the Central African Republic, which is not included in the Powell-Thyne data. This would appear to be a coding mistake. Neither McGowan (2007) nor Roessler (2011) document a coup attempt in 1976 in Chad.

• # 483-1977-4-1: CHAD, FELIX MALLOUM

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: In the early morning hours of April 1, 1977, according to the government of Chad, an attempted coup by a few dozen commandos led to a five-hour gun battle that killed a senior officer and wounded 11 soldiers (United Press International, 1977c). President Malloum escaped unharmed and flew to Brazzaville to attend the funeral for assassinated Congo President Marien Ngouabi (Washington Post, 1977c). Unofficial reports said eight had died in fighting after 60 soldiers of the army’s Nomad Guard attacked a barracks near the Presidential palace with automatic weapons. But official sources later denied the involvement of the Nomad Guard. The government communiqué said only “armed persons” including NCO Brahim Abaka Koumba were involved (Reuters, 1977b). On April 6, eight soldiers and one civilian described as the main culprits were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion, according to an April 7 government statement. These included Lt. Brahim Abakar Koumba and a civilian, Tamat Abdel Kerom, who was released from prison by the conspirators and allegedly asked to participate. The statement added that one of the plotters, Sgt. Maj. Abdelaziz Iesso, was still at large (United Press International, 1977c).

Coding rationale: The government communiqué “contained nothing to indicate the identity or political views of the men who launched the attack” (Guardian, 1977). However, Keesing’s World News Archive (1977) later reported that “Sub-Lieutenant Koumba was a Moslem and had organized the attempt to draw attention to alleged injustices suf-

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ferred by Moslems in the Army”. Similarly, Roessler (2011) coded the plotters’ ethnicity as Arab, a powerless ethnic group in Chad at this time. EPR codes the regime leader, Malloum, as Sara, the senior partner ethnic group. Nolutshungu (1995, 93) also states this event was “an attempted military coup involving Northern soldiers.” According to Decalo (1980, 52), “This attempted uprising was yet another testimonial to the rapid deflation of authority, legitimacy, and popularity of the military regime. The mutiny was dealt with harshly (with summary executions), although Malloum was to admit that ‘injustices prevailing in the army’ itself had triggered the upheaval”. Relevant in this regard, Decalo noted that “Only 20 percent of the armed forces (and two officers) were Muslim, and discrimination was rife”. McGowan (2007) similarly argues that “The North-South, Moslem-Christian conflict was the source of the discontent that led to the attack.” Because Arabs were powerless in Chad at the time of the coup attempt, we code this as a failed regime change coup.

• # 483-1989-4-1: CHAD, HISSÈNE HABRÉ

Category: coup plot

Event: On April 4, 1989, news broke that Interior Minister Ibrahim Mahamat Itno had been arrested on the night of April 2 after he and associates allegedly attempted a coup against Habré (Paris Domestic Service, 1989b). Over the previous weekend, various sources reported seeing “movement of troops” in the Chadian capital. Hassan Djamous, commander in chief of the Chadian Armed Forces (FANT), and his predecessor in that position Idriss Déby, then a military advisor to President Habré, were missing and rumored to have fled the capital (Agence France-Presse, 1989a). On April 8, Djamous and Déby issued a communiqué saying that “they are no longer able to tolerate tribalism, intimidation, injustices, disorganization, and the nonobservance of elementary freedoms and have decided to leave Ndjamena in order to prevent armed confrontation in the capital”. They stated their commitment to reorganizing armed opposition (Paris Domestic Service, 1989a). On April 13, Djamous was wounded and taken prisoner by Chadian soldiers who had pursued him into Darfur. Déby managed to escape capture. They were accused of “fomenting a plot against Chadian President Hissein Habre, a plot that was foiled in the night
of 1 to 2 April” (Agence France-Presse, 1989c). On April 14, a presidential statement said that Djamous, Déby, and Itno “rose in rebellion against state authorities” before dawn on April 2 but were “wiped out” (Agence France-Presse, 1989b). It was also reported that loyal forces and 2,000 rebels clashed at Ina and Arfankul as the plotters fled to Sudan (BBC World Service, 1989).

Coding rationale: We are unable to find evidence of any concrete actions the alleged plotters took on April 1-2. Press accounts characterized the events variably as a coup attempt (e.g. United Press International, 1989), rebellion (e.g. Reuters, 1989), or assassination attempt (du Continent, 1989). But all that is known for certain is that Djamous and Déby fled the capital and entered into an open and violent rebellion against Habré after April 1-2. More circumspect press reports said only that there was a coup plot which apparently involved “a plan to assassinate Habré” (BBC World Service, 1989). Similarly, on April 19 Jeune Afrique (1989) reported that “The word in Ndjamena today is that they and others were preparing a plot against Hissein Habré”. One of the more detailed accounts indicates that after Sidik Fadoul (a Zaghawa and Djamous’ brother-in-law) was killed in February 1989, a group of Zagahwas “decided to kill Hissein Habre but their plot was uncovered, and they fled, destroying all military roadblocks (over 100 killed)” (du Continent, 1989). Djamous and Déby evidently escaped the capital without a fight because security men “had orders to let them flee in order to avoid gunfire in the capital which might degenerate into rioting and aggravate an already tense situation” (Jeune Afrique, 1989). No gunfire, fighting, or seizures of government buildings was reported on April 1-2; the first news reports of events did not break until 2-3 days after the alleged coup/assassination attempt took place.

Decalo (1997, 139) argues that what Habré touted as a coup attempt on April 1-2, 1989 was “in reality a preemptive strike by Habré prior to a possible power-grab by the Zaghawa.” He also says that Habré’s purge of his Zaghawa relatives “drove Djamous into a conspiracy, which Habré nipped in the bud when he ordered a purge and arrest of many Zaghawa leaders, including Djamous, Ibrahim Itno, and Déby” (Decalo, 1997, 155)). He further says that “in April 1989, as Habré’s paranoid swath of destruction decimated the Zaghawa who had originally sustained him, Déby was accused of plotting a coup. Déby and
some of his Zaghawa colleagues fled N’Djamena, with Habré’s troops in hot pursuit” (Decalo, 1997, 148). We interpret this evidence to suggest that the “movement of troops” observed in the capital on April 1-2 was not part of a coup attempt but a Zaghawa evacuation. Because we can find no well-documented evidence of plotters’ concrete actions on April 1-2, we code this as a coup plot, not an attempt. By contrast, both Marshall and Marshall (2014) and McGowan (2007) codes this as a coup attempt. However, the basis for the latter’s coding appears to be Gershoni (1996, 239), who claims that “On the night of 1 April 1989, army units led by the ex-Chief of Staff, Idriss Debby, tried to topple Habre by taking over key positions in N’Djamena, only to be swiftly repelled by government forces”. Gershoni’s source, in turn, is “Coup Attempt Crushed,” Africa Research Bulletin 26, 4 (15 May 1989: 9255). This is the sole source which makes this claim. Meanwhile, one of McGowan’s other sources, Wang (1997), codes Chad as experiencing a coup plot, not a coup attempt, in 1989. Because most sources do not confirm Gershoni’s account, we side with Decalo.

If one accepted the view that this was a coup attempt, we would code it as a failed regime change coup, despite the fact that it was led by three leading regime insiders. The event followed a period of growing disaffection of rebel inclusion and ethnic narrowing at the expense of first the Hadjerai and then the Zaghawa, the shared ethnicity of the plotters Joffe (1990, 176). Habré’s Anakaza tribe (a branch of the Toubou) had attempted to take key administrative and military posts (United Press International, 1989). Meanwhile, another key grievance of the ‘April 1 Group’, all members of Habré’s original armed faction (the FAN), appears to have been concessions and appointments for rebels made in the name of national reconciliation (Atlas and Licklider, 1999, 45-6). The April 1 group believed these rebel “crossover” appointments deprived them of “the fruits of victory” Joffe (1990, 176). Thus, the appointment on March 3 of Acheik Ibn Oumar, an ex-rebel leader, as Foreign Minister was reported as one contributing triggering factor, particularly for Itno who resented this prize going to his former enemy (Charlton and May, 1989).

After April 2, Déby fled to Libya and launched a Libya-backed rebellion, toppling Habré by December 1990, leading to a regime change according to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). The rebellion oust-
ing Habré is coded as a regime change. The evidence suggests that the coup leaders (Déby): (a) wanted to prevent the incumbent leader (Habré) from including former rebels (e.g. rebels fighting with Libya) in the coalition (e.g. cabinet positions); and (b) had an ethnic exclusion motivation. Habré’s Anakaza tribe is part of the Toubou ethnic group, which was excluded from power under the Déby regime, which in turn was initially an alliance between the Hadjarai Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad (MOSANAT) and Déby’s Zaghawa ethnic group. Thus we use this evidence to assume that the 1989 coup plotters intended to exclude Habré’s ethnic group from a new regime.

• # 483-1991-10-13: CHAD, IDRIS DÉBY

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Sunday, October 13, 1991, sources reported a “very confused situation in Ndjamen” in which it appeared “a small part of the army attacked an ammunition depot” that morning, resulting in a clash with guards and a number of injuries and deaths, including three assailants. Units loyal to Idriss D’éby were seen patrolling the capital (Radio France International, 1991c). Interior Minister Col. Maldoum Bada Abbas, the second ranking member of the ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS), was arrested (Agence France-Presse, 1991). On October 14, Chad’s government published a communique condemning the previous day’s events as a coup attempt led by Abbas. It said a coup plot had been in the making for several weeks, originally set for October 10 after a clandestine meeting on October 9. It was allegedly delayed after Déby tried to dissuade Abbas. The plan allegedly involved attacking simultaneously the Presidency, the airport, and a third site, but they only attacked the airport after allegedly being deterred by security measures at the other two sites. The airport attack allegedly began at 4 a.m., with the assailants allegedly fleeing in two groups. Residences of the alleged leaders–Abbas, Lt. Col. [Kaffine], and Major Gadekou–were then surrounded. The latter two escaped. The action, said the government, “aimed at undermining democratic processes” (RNT Radio, 1991a). Sources said “the victims were mostly civilians killed in apparent reprisals after fighting between soldiers of rival ethnic groups” (USA Today, 1991). On Monday, sources saw a column of army vehicles 200 km east of N’Djamena. On Tuesday and
Wednesday, armed clashes were reported at Bitkine, which is “400km east of N’Djamena in the mountainous region of Guera, in Hadjarai country”. Some compared these clashes with “clashes that occurred in N’Djamena on Sunday between Zaghawa and Hadjarai units” (Radio France International, 1991a).

Coding rationale: Much controversy surrounds whether the events of October 13 constituted a genuine coup attempt. The official version, expressed by Déby in a speech on October 21, claimed that Abbas masterminded the airport attack because he resented attempts to abolish the post of the vice presidency; Kaffine Chadallah, deputy chief of Army staff, was allegedly motivated by his opposition to being reassigned to head the Officers’ School. Déby said “The guilt of the personalities arrested in connection with the organization of this coup is established because of their participation in meetings, their involvement in the attack on the airport, and the gathering at their homes of hundreds of armed men who took part in the airport attack” (RNT Radio, 1991b). In his address, Déby blamed some people carrying French passports with inciting some troops to act on behalf of Maldoum. He also said he had heard reports of a coup plot since early October, but Maldoum denied any such conspiratorial meetings. “It was only on the eve of the coup that he informed President Déby that a coup against him was in the pipeline. And it was for this attitude not logically befitting an interior minister that he was arrested” (Africa No 1, 1991).

Meanwhile, many politicians and some independent papers maintained Maldoum’s innocence, called the October 13 events “a mystery”, and said that Déby “merely wanted to get rid of a companion who had become too burdensome” (Africa No 1, 1991). According to one reporter’s investigation, “Tension was rising for several weeks between some Hadjarai people, who come from the center of the country, and some Zaghawa, from the northeast. On the Hadjarai side, Colonel (Kafin) could not bear his expulsion from the general staff, and on the Zaghawa side, several fighters, who were arrested for theft, feared judgement and execution at Maldoum’s orders. However, when the airport armory was attacked in the early hours of 13 October, this sparked it all. Idriss Déby gathered people close to him at the palace, Zaghwa in particular. Whether right or wrong, their suspicions fell upon the Hadjarai, on Maldoum and (Kafin), in particular, and he decided to
arrest them. However, Maldoum was arrested without resistance. The scene took place, according to several testimonies, at the presidency, where he was reported to have been summoned. However, this remains difficult to prove. As for (Kafin), he remained at home several hours, refusing to go to the presidency, and ended up fleeing amid gunfire. In brief, the two mean appeared, then, totally unorganized and even surprised by the events. This is why one week later, public opinion here remains skeptical and is still waiting for proof of their guilt, revelations of the real identity of the attackers...or documents bearing proof that there was a real coup attempt” (Radio France International, 1991b). From exile, Col. Kaffine always maintained there had never been a coup attempt, saying the events of October 13 were staged by Déby “to keep away a potential rival” (Radio France International, 1991d; Agence France-Press, 1992b).

The Historical Dictionary of Chad agrees with the skeptics, calling the October 13 events a “Spurious coup attempt claim by Idriss Déby used to eliminate the rising ambitions of a rival, Maldoum Bada Abbas...There may have been an attack on the arms depot by rowdy elements of his entourage, but Abbas was not involved in a coup bid, though he was arrested and framed for mounting one” (Decalo, 1997, 140). Although there is plenty of reason to doubt the Abbas had masterminded a coup attempt, we interpret the evidence that his associates may have indeed attacked the airport on October 13 to mean they took a concrete action targeting the regime leader. We believe this attack and subsequent armed clashes are sufficient to code a coup attempt rather than simply a coup plot.

The alleged coup attempt leader, Maldoum Bada Abbas, had led the Hadjarai Mouvement pour le Salut National du Tchad (MOSANAT) that allied with other rebel groups, which together constituted the MPS headed by Idriss Déby, to overthrow Hissène Habré in December 1989 (Debos, 2011, 423-24) – an event that Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code as a regime change. The new regime that came to power in 1989 was therefore an alliance between Déby (Zaghawa) and Abbas (Hadjarai). President Déby and Interior Minister Maldoum Bada, the second most powerful leader in government, had “worked closely when Mr Déby’s forces seized the capital in December from President Hissène Habré, but ethnic rivalries surfaced between Mr Déby’s Za-
ghawa fighters and Mr Abbas’s smaller force of Hadjerai” (Reuters, 1991a). After October 1991, the Hadjerai rebels again went into opposition, until they signed an agreement in 1992 to return to the army and were granted amnesty (Debos, 2011, 424). Abbas would later be given amnesty and a position in the Déby government (Lanne, 2004, 221). This coup attempt targeted the regime leader, who was a member of the senior partner ethnic group (Zaghawa) and the attempt was led by a regime insider who was a member of the junior partner ethnic group (Hadjarai). Had Abbas’ Hadjerai troops defeated Déby’s forces on October 13, we assume they would have prevented ethnic narrowing around the Zaghawa. Thus we code this event as a failed regime change attempt. STAGED COUP ATTEMPT

• # 483-1993-1-27: CHAD, IDRIS DÉBY

  Category: coup plot

  Event: According to the BBC (1993), “There was a coup attempt in Chad on the night of 24th-25th January by associates of former President Hisssein Habrê, Radio France Internationale (Paris) reported on the 27th, citing Chadian Prime Minister Joseph Yoyoym. The plotters had taken advantage of the trip to France by President Idriss Déby. About 10 people had been arrested, Yoyoym told the radio, adding that the government had the situation under control.” The coup event came only two weeks after a national conference had convened to help pave the way for multi-party elections in 1994. According to Europa World Year Book (2004), the coup attempt by troops loyal to Habrê was thwarted by the government and Prime Minister Yoyoym. The coup event was allegedly led by Col. Kokoï Toke while the National Conference was in session (Nolutshungu, 1995, 250-251).

  Coding rationale: The little documentary evidence for this case does not confirm whether any concrete actions were taken or clarify whether the plotters were current or former members of the military. According to Yoyoym, Déby knew about the plot before his departure for France on January 20 (Agence France-Presse, 1993a). However, on the same day, January 27, the Defense Minister Col. Hinassou said he had spoken to the alleged coup leader Kokoï but that did not know anything about a coup plot, saying he learned of it from RFI (BBC
World Service, 1993). The Movement for Democracy and Development (MDD), which was the new pro-Habré, anti-Déby rebel faction, denied any involvement in the coup, saying it is possible the government was preparing arrests in response to its taking control of Liwa (Agence France-Presse, 1993b). The 10 civilians arrested allegedly attended planning meetings. Neither McGowan (2007) nor Roessler (2011) code any coup event for Chad in 1993. Because we cannot confirm any concrete actions took place, we code this as a coup plot. Had the coup attempt actually taken place rather than be preempted, we would code this an attempted regime change, on the assumption that the plotters sought to restore a Toubou-led Habré regime, and prevent ethnic narrowing around the Zaghawa and Bideyat.\textsuperscript{20} Europa attributes the plot to “troops”. Nolutshungu (1995, 25-51) notes this coup attempt but also writes of two additional coup attempts in 1992 that are not recorded in the Powell-Thyne data set.

- \# 483-2006-4-13: Chad, Idriss Déby

**Category:** prior defection

**Event:** “Taking advantage of the Chadian army’s vulnerability with the majority of its troops massed on the eastern border, between 9 and 13 April, the FUC launched an offensive, making a lighting assault from Darfur and the Central African Republic (CAR) to N’Djamena (Massey and Roy, 2006, 445). Chad’s army was able to repel the incursion into the capital in fierce fighting on Thursday, April 13, with black smoke seen above the city center. The United Front for Democratic Change (FUC), made up of former commanders in Chad’s army, vowed to continue its struggle to overthrow Déby before the presidential election called for May 3 (Lacey, 2006b). After sending an additional 200 troops to Chad on Wednesday, “French jets flew reconnaissance missions, fired “warning shots” near rebel positions, and provided logistical support to Chadian troops” to help beat back the rebel attack (Thibodeaux, 2006). On Friday, April 14, Chad said that 350 died in the fighting. Chad also broke off diplomatic relations with Sudan.

\textsuperscript{20}As Atlas and Licklider (1999, 45) noted, since Habré fled in December 1990, “With Déby in and Habré out, the two men and their followers switched roles. Now, Habré’s former loyalists (particularly those opposed to Déby and Zaghawa rule) became the rebels, and the Déby regime fought to subdue them”.

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and threatened to oust 200,000 Sudanese refugees, calling the rebels nothing more than “mercenaries” of Sudan. Some captured rebels told reporters they were Sudanese recruits (Lacey, 2006a).

Coding rationale: The rebel attack was reportedly aided by “a colonel in the Chadian Army who provided intelligence on the location of government troops, said a diplomat whose country had not cleared him to speak on the record. That colonel was eventually discovered, the diplomat said” (Lacey, 2006c). However, the April 13 attack was led by Mahmoud Nour, a former army captain and “military confidant of the president” (Wax, 2006b). Nour was “a veteran of the campaign that brought Déby to power” and a member of the minority Tama ethnic group. He defected in 1994, then rallied to the government in 2003. By October 2005, with the support of Sudan, Nour established a new rebel group called the Rassamblement pour la démocratie et les libertés (RDL). In December 2005, Nour formed the RUF coalition with the RDL and seven other rebel groups. Nour was known for his loyalty to Sudan, and had reportedly worked with the Janjaweed to recruit Tama in the ethnic cleansing of Darfur (Massey and Roy, 2006, 444). Some of the 200 captured rebels told African Union investigators that Nour was “recruiting young boys from refugee camps in Darfur and fighters from Central African Republic” (CAR) (Wax, 2006a). One of those CAR recruits, rebel commander Adoum Maratis, said that Nour recruited him four months previously in Khartoum (Washington Post, 2006). Despite the alleged participation of a current member of Chad’s army, we code this event as a case of prior defection as it was almost exclusively led by the RUF and had substantial foreign (Sudanese and CAR) participation. If we had conclusive evidence of army involvement, we would code this as a failed regime change coup, on the assumption that the RUF rebels would have excluded the ruling Zaghawa ethnic elite from their ruling coalition.

• # 484-1970-3-22: CONGO BRAZZAVILLE, MARIEN NGOUABI

**Category: failed regime change coup**

**Event:** On Monday, March 23, 1970, about 50 rebels, calling themselves the “National Liberation Committee”, seized the Brazzaville radio station and announced the overthrow of the Ngouabi government (Reuters,
1970c). Under rebel control, Lt. Pierre Kikanga used the Brazzaville radio station to appeal for military help from the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and the Central African Republic (Hoagland, 1970). But then loyalist troops led by the president, a former paratrooper, recaptured the radio station and crushed the rebels after a brief machine-gun battle.21 The rebel leader, Pierre Kikanga, was killed and his body put on public display. Ngouabi gave a radio broadcast saying the rebels had crossed the Congo River from Congo Kinshasa (Reuters, 1970c).

Coding rationale: On March 29, an all-night court martial sentenced eight men to death, including former Defense Minister Capt. Augustin Poignet (in absentia), and three others to life in prison in connection with the coup attempt (Agence France-Presse, 1970a). Three men were executed: Cap. Albert Miaouma, adjutant in chief of the gendarmerie Andre Nkoutou, and Sgt. Jean-Marie Mengo (Washington Post, 1970). On April 1, the government announced that it was replacing the police force with a militia, saying the coup attempt was only possible because of the complicity of the gendarmerie stationed in Brazzaville (Guardian, 1970). On April 18, the government announced that one of the ring-leaders, an official identified only as J. Kiyindou, was shot and killed, saying that only one ringleader, Capt. Augustin Poignet, was still alive (United Press International, 1970).

The rebel leader, Pierre Kikanga22, “was regarded as a supporter of ex-President Youlou, and fled to Kinshasa in February, 1969, following a speech by Ngouabi denouncing the activities of ‘certain reactionary officers’ ” (Cronje, 1970). Kikanga then “joined the opponents of the regime, recruited in large measure from the Lari, his own tribe, who also represented Bakongo aspirations...The abortive coups cannot be explained solely in terms of anti-socialist sentiment...Lieutenant Kikanga’s men were welcome in the “heartland” of the Lari tribe which had been the centre of Youlou’s power” (Lee, 1971, 42-46). The gen-

21 According to an initial press report, at 4am on March 23 Maj. Joachim Hyombi, the army chief of staff, arranged the arrest of Maj. Marien Ngouabi (Agence France-Presse, 1970b). However, no subsequent reports corroborate this rumor.

22 Decalo (1976, 159) implicates Kikanga in an earlier coup plot: “[t]he first plot against the Ngouabi regime was the allegedly Youlonist February 1969 scheme of Major Mouza-bakani (who at the time was minister of interior) and his aid Lieutenant Pierre Kikanga, the Lari paratroop instructor.”

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The gendarmerie, which was dismantled after the coup attempt, was also “long considered a supporter of Fulbert Youlou” (Reuters, 1970a). The gendarmerie “at that time was still staffed by Kongo elements, and was chafing under the northern military regime” (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 121). Although Kikanga was a prior defector at the time of the attack (he had fled to Kinshasa in December 1968 (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 230)), Decalo (1976, 162) states that “[m]any gendarmerie officers and NCOs were aware in advance of Kikanga’s assault.” We interpret the evidence as suggesting that members of the gendarmerie knew of or participated in the attack. As such, we code this as a failed regime change coup, as it was launched by pro-Youlou elements representing powerless Lari-Bakongo ethnic groups. Had they succeeded, we assume they would have ruled without the dominant ethnic group (the Mbochi), inaugurating a major shift in ethnic power relations.

• # 484-1972-2-22: CONGO BRAZZAVILLE, MARIEN NGOUBABI

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On February 22, 1972, while President Ngouabi was in the coastal center of Pointe Noire some 240 miles southwest of the capital in Brazzaville, an infantry battalion temporarily seized the Brazzaville radio station. After the coup fizzled out, Ngouabi returned to the capital and in a radio speech identified paratrooper Lt. Ange Diawara as the coup leader (Reuters, 1972a). During his attempt, Diawara had “cunningly proclaimed that he was protecting the regime by forestalling an alleged right-wing coup by (then-Major) Joachim Yhombi-Opango...His power grab was blocked by Yhombi-Opango’s decisive military action, although at the time an order for his arrest had been issued by Ngouabi, who had been misled by Diawara’s ploy” (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 122).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt leader, Ange Diawara, had been appointed political commissar of the people’s army in February 1969. He was later credited with defeating the March 1970 coup attempt by Youlou supporters, after which he “became a pillar of the regime,” an important member of ruling Congolese Party of Labor (PCT), and one of the party’s leading Maoists. However, he was purged of his cabinet portfolio in December 1971 for his constant prodding to move the regime to the left and “excessive ideological zeal”, though he was re-

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portedly too powerful to be removed from his army post (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 133-134,271). Diawara was “was supported by student and union radicals” (Howe, 1972). Several Diawara supporters were implicated as leaders in the failed coup attempt, including secretary of state for health and labor Elie Theophile Itsoumou, who was killed during the attempt, and Lt. Prosper Matoumba-Mpolo, a minister of youth and information who was killed by government troops on February 27 (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 222,271). A number of other members of the regime were sentenced for their alleged involvement in the coup attempt.23

Diawara happened to be a member of the the Lari/Bakonga, a powerless ethnic group according to Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010). However, we find no evidence that Diawara sought to prevent ethnic narrowing, and none of the sources mention ethnic grievances. Decalo (1973a) argues “in Congo-Brazzaville the original Ngouabi coup, and all attempted coups since, are better seen as personal attempts to seize power within a textbook example of a praetorian state- with the ethnic cleavages and the Left-Right tug-of-war only complicating rather than explaining events there.” Because the coup attempt appears to have been made on behalf of the left-wing ideological faction of the PCT and sought to restore Diawara’s position in the regime, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 490-2004-3-28: CONGO KINSHASA, JOSEPH KABILA

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On Sunday, March 28, 2004, unidentified assailants carried out simultaneous attacks on several military posts and two radio and tele-

23These include Claude-Ernest Ndalla, the first secretary of the PCT and thus second-ranking person in the regime (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 307); Maj. Nkaya Kimbouala, the commander of the Pointe Noire military zone, who was tricked into joining the coup attempt (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 231); Maxime NDebeka, the director-general of cultural affairs and popularly known as the “poet of the Congolese revolution” (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 308); Ambroise Edouard Noumazalaye, second secretary of the PCT (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 321); Lecas Atondi-Momondjo, editor in chief of Etumba and founding member of PCT (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 52); Bernard Combo-Matsiona, who was purged from the PCT central committee in December 1971 (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 104); and Alfred Raoul, who lost the vice presidency and his trade portfolio for siding with Ngouabi’s opponents in the PCT in December 1971 (Clark and Decalo, 2012, 385-6).
vision stations. Heavy artillery fire was heard in the capital about 2 a.m., witnesses said, though calm had returned by mid-morning. A western diplomat said the home of President Joseph Kabila was one of the targets. Diplomats and Congolese government officials said forces loyal to the late ruler Mobutu Sese Seko, known as the Zairean Armed Forces (FAZ), were implicated in the attack. The British ambassador reported a “very senior government official” had described the attack as a coup attempt (Sengupta, 2004).

Coding rationale: While the regime officially blamed former members of Mobutu’s military (FAZ) for both this event and the coup attempt on June 11, Wolters (2004, 9) implicates regime insiders who were upset with the new “transition” government that forced elites in Kabila’s government to share power with former rebels. To undermine the peace agreement and the transition government, these insiders instigated a coup attempt: “[i]t is this group that [is] also widely blamed for the two coup attempts which have taken place over the last six months. The 28 March coup, which was blamed on a group of exiled former elements of the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) the army of the late President Mobutu Sese Seko, failed when the 20-odd soldiers involved failed to consolidate their hold on several key military installations. The government sought to place the blame on exiled politicians from the Mobutu regime, but the theory that members of the presidential camp orchestrated the events in order to be able to slow down the transition process has now been commonly accepted and seems the most plausible... Meanwhile, when the government presented the captured suspects to the media several days after the coup attempt, the suspects

24 Reyntjens (2009, 263) restates the government’s description of this event: “several military barracks in Kinshasa were attacked by assailants, which the government claimed were elements of Mobutu’s old DSP who had fled to Congo after the AFDL captured Kinshasa in May 1997.” If the latter part of this account is true – i.e. the assailants had previously fled the country after the Kabila regime took power – then this case would not be coded as a coup attempt because the perpetrators were prior defectors.

25 “Transition” at this point is the formation of a new government, still led by J. Kabila, that included members of former rebel groups: “representatives of the three main belligerent groups, the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-G), the Ugandan-backed Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and the ex-government of Joseph Kabila (henceforth to be identified as members of the Parti Pour la Reconstruction et le Développement (PPRD))” (Wolters, 2004, 2).
themselves did not seem to understand what they were being charged with. One of the accused stated that he had actually already been in prison for some time, indicating either that he could not have participated in the coup attempt, or that the organisers used imprisoned men to stage the coup.” (Wolters, 2004, 9). We use this evidence to assume that had these coups been successful, they would have replaced Kabila with insiders from his own regime and prevented new groups that had recently been (officially) incorporated into the government as part of the peace agreement from de facto joining the regime coalition. Ethnicity clearly played a role in this case, but (a) we do not know the exact identity of the coup leaders to determine if the coup leaders were from junior partner ethnic groups (Mbandja, Ngbaka, Ngbani, or Tutsi-Banyamulenge); and (b) the coup attempt appears to be a play at preventing ethnic expansion, not narrowing. Finally, (Wolters, 2004, 8) argues that these coup attempts were executed by “actors [who] are dissatisfied both with having to share power during the transition, as well as at the prospect of losing power in the future.” She indicates that the identity of these “key actors” as: “Katumba Mwanke, who hails from the same ethnic group as the late President Kabila,” and “Evariste Boshab... the president’s chief of staff and Samba Kaputo... the presidential advisor on security matter... [a]long with others such as General John Numbi, the head of the air force, and Didier Kazadi, a key security official” (Wolters, 2004, 8). This suggests that key figures in the coup plotting group were not only close to the regime leader but also many were from the same ethnic group.

STAGED COUP ATTEMPT

• # 490-2004-6-11: CONGO KINSHASA, JOSEPH KABILA

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On Friday, June 11, 2004, explosions and artillery fire echoed

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26 Kaputo was born in Katanga but grew up in South Kivu. Evariste Boshab is from Kasai Occidental and from the Bakuba tribe. John Numbi is from L. Kabila’s Luba group. Africa Confidential (2010) describes Kazadi as: “Didier Kazadi Nyembwe, a member of Parliament who has long, close connections to the presidential family since they all lived in Tanzania. Kazadi is like a second father to President Joseph Kabila. He was head of the National Security Council (1997-2003), then of the national oil company, the Congolaise des Hydrocarbures, and the intelligence agency, the Agence Nationale des Renseignements.”
across the capital and residents reported automatic gunfire in several districts (New York Times, 2004). Rebels briefly seized the state radio station, overtook the power station, and took out the electricity in the capital. Then they went to a military base near the airport, where government forces surrounded them. Lengue and followers escaped in jeeps and the government later said it sent a helicopter in pursuit (Lacey, 2004). Loyalists soon regained control of the radio station and the government announced that it had put down a coup attempt by members of Joseph Kabila’s personal guard.

Coding rationale: See Case 490-2004-3-28 above. Reyntjens (2009, 263) states: “on 11 June, a bizarre coup attempt was staged by a few dozens elements of Kabila’s own presidential guard under the command of Major Eric Lenge... They [the coup plotters] were routed by loyalist forces and withdrew to the Bas-Congo, where they ‘vanished’. No attempts were made to trace them and no inquiry was conducted on what had happened, and it was suggested – but never proved – that this had been an attempt by hard-line elements belonging to Kabila’s inner circle to derail the transition.” The New York Times (2004) also reports: “there were some suggestions that the coup attempt might have been staged to demonstrate the president’s grip on power. ‘This could well be a piece of theater to show that the presidential guard is strong enough to put down an uprising if it happens,’ one military analyst in Kinshasa said.” STAGED COUP ATTEMPT

• # 500-1974-3-23: Uganda, Idi Amin Dada

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On the night of March 23, 1974 through the next morning, Lugbaras from the Malire battalion stormed the Makindye military police headquarters and prison, where they believed Brig. General Arrube was being held. Fighting between the Lugbara dissidents and troops loyal to Amin broke out at the battalion headquarters; the rebels were crushed by the morning of March 24. See Associated Press (1974); New York Times (1974).

Coding rationale: Although the coup plotters, Lugbaras, had supported Amin’s coup in 1971 again Obote, Amin had begun to purge them from the military at the time of the coup attempt. Brig. Gen-
eral Arrube (though a co-ethnic Kakwa of Amin’s) was a close ally of the Lugbara and had recently been imprisoned by Amin: “[a]bout ten days ago, Brig. Charles Arrube, the Army Chief of Staff and a Kakwa, but friendly towards the Lugbaras, disappeared” (New York Times, 1974). It appears that the Lugbara battalion attempted to free him (Associated Press, 1974). Gutteridge (1975, 162) describes the event as a “counter-coup” in relation to the 1971 coup that brought Amin to power: “[l]ong before the abortive counter-coup of March 1974, Amin’s reliance on a power base in the West Nile Province and on Nubian soldiers from inside and outside Uganda had begun to turn sour on him. He had to purge senior Lugubra elements from the army because of signs of unrest and it was clearly more significant that Brigadier Charles Arrube, who ‘died’ in the clash on 24 March 1974, was a Christian from Amin’s own tribe the Kakwa, than that he had been training for a year in Russia.” We interpret this evidence to assume that the coup plotters were attempting to prevent further personalization of the regime. We therefore code this case as regime change coup attempt because had the coup succeeded, we assume that the new regime leader would not have narrowed the military ranks and instead included the Lugbara.

• # 500-1974-11-11: Uganda, Idi Amin Dada

  Category: failed regime change coup

  Event: On November 10, 1974, it was reported that Ugandan commandos attempted but failed to overthrow President Amin the previous week (on Wednesday, November 6). At least 15 soldiers of the special commando division created by Amin were killed and several wounded in fighting at Kampala’s Mbuya barracks (United Press International, 1974).

  Coding rationale: Diplomatic sources said the revolt started when commandos complained they had not been paid for three months and hadn’t received full food rations (United Press International, 1974). Diplo-

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27 Hansen (1977, 116) notes that Arrube was “admittedly a Kakwa but also a Christian and therefore closely associated with the Lugbra.” After Arrube was arrested, “Lugbra soldiers in the capital reacted with riots that developed the character of an attempted coup.” Africa Contemporary Record (1975, 310) writes that “In protest [to sacking Arube] a number of Lugbara troops were reported to have forced their way into one of Amin’s homes in Kampala with the intention of killing him.”
matic sources also said that “several hundred members of the Ugandan airborne division have also deserted in the last few weeks, prior to the attempted coup, in protest over pay and food” (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1974f). We are unable to find documentation of the identity, rank, or ethnicity of any of the mutineers. However, Lindemann (2011, 21) writes that “Other [in addition to the March 1974 coup] coup attempts can be attributed to relatively isolated Baganda or Busoga elements in the Air Force who perceived the escalating bias in favour of the “NubianKakwa” core group as a threat to their own position.” Africa Contemporary Record (1975, 311) states that “Elements in the air force, especially some of the Baganda officers, mad two attempts on Amin’s life in 1974.”

Although the responsible commando unit had been created by Amin himself and news reports indicate soldiers’ grievances were about a pay dispute, we interpret the statement from Lindemann and evidence from the African Contemporary Record as evidence that this coup was an attempt to prevent ethnic narrowing. As such, we code this as a failed regime change coup.

- # 501-1982-8-1: Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** On Sunday, August 1, 1982, “[a]t the three main air-bases, Nannyuki, Embakasi, and Eastleigh, the KAF mutinied at around 2:00 a.m. Rebel soldiers took the GPO, the International Airport, Wilson Airport and by 5:00 a.m. they had seized the Central Bank of Kenya, the Voice of Kenya radio station, and other communication installations. KAF rebels woke up students in the residence blocks of Nairobi University, adjacent to the radio station, and called for their support” (Currie and Ray, 1986, 52-53). The rebel air force NCOs called themselves “The Aug. 1 Revolution” and said a “People’s Redemption Council” had taken control. The timing was reportedly meant to coincide with military exercises that had kept some army battalions in remote areas for the previous week (Associated Press, 1982d). Students at the nation’s two universities seemed to support the coup in

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28 However, the description of the November event is: “A similar protest was staged at the Bugolobi barracks in Kampala where men of the Special Commando Division were said by one source to have attempted a coup” Africa Contemporary Record (1975, 311). That source was a news report from the London Telegraph.
the streets, and looting occurred as the slogan of the coup attempt became “Power” with a clenched-fist salute. The rebels promised to replace the regime with a socialist-leaning one (Cowell, 1982c). The plot failed when loyalist army troops retook the government radio station in downtown Nairobi and routed the plotters around noon (New York Times, 1982a).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt was directed by air force NCOs (rather than commissioned officers), and most of the almost 1,000 airmen who were prosecuted were NCOs (53-54 Currie and Ray, 1986; Reuters, 1983a). Sgt. Pancra Oteyo Okumu, a member of the abortive People’s Redemption Council (PRC), said in his extradition testimony that the main coup leader was an air force private, Senior Pvt. Hezekiah Ochuka (Cowell, 1982b). Both men fled to Tanzania, where they were granted asylum (Worrall, 1982). More than 3,000 people, including the entire 2,000 member air force, were arrested (Cowell, 1982a). The delay in the counter-attack until 9:30 a.m. led to speculation that the air force may have expected the support of the army or police which never came (Currie and Ray, 1986, 56-57). The government disbanded the air force and organized a new one (Associated Press, 1982c).

During their revolution, the air force rebels “accused the Government of imposing a one-party state, censuring the press, violating human rights by arresting people arbitrarily and carrying out “ruthless repression reminiscent of the colonial days” (Associated Press, 1982d). They also charged the government with corruption and inefficiency (New York Times, 1982b). All but one member of the abortive PRC were Luo, a discriminated ethnic minority (Currie and Ray, 1986, 54). We assume that had the coup succeeded, the air force officers would have established a Luo-led military regime to the exclusion of Moi’s incumbent KANU party; thus we code this as a failed regime change coup.

• # 516-2001-4-18: Burundi, Pierre Buyoya

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: At around 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 2001, a truckload of 30-40 soldiers of the Gakumbo barracks seized Radio Burundi. They transmitted their message in local language every five minutes until about 5 p.m. “According to this communiqué, the Patriotic Youth
Front is taking over power because Burundians continue to be massacred by armed gangs that enjoy the support of some members of the government and parliament. The communique condemns the secret negotiations of Pierre Buyoya’s government with armed movements. It accuses the same government of doing nothing to improve the country’s economy, which is currently in a state of bankruptcy. The spokesman for the putschists said that the front was not against the Arusha peace talks, but, indicated, however, that it was opposed to the idea of negotiating with the rebels” (Radio France Internationale, 2001). The mutineers said they had suspended parliament, imposed a curfew, and closed the airport (New York Times, 2001). After being surrounded by the army, the Minister of Defense Cyrille Ndayirukiye held negotiations with the coup’s leader, Lt. Gaston Ntakarutimana, which lasted until 2 a.m., when the mutineers surrendered (Burundi Net Press News, 2001).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt “appeared to be the work of ethnic Tutsi army officers unhappy with the leadership of Pierre Buyoya, who is also Tutsi. Mr. Buyoya, who seized power in a 1996 coup, had angered many hard-line Tutsi by negotiating with Hutu rebels. He was, in fact, in the West African nation of Gabon to meet with one of the chief Hutu rebels when his own officers took the radio station” (New York Times, 2001). The Minister of Information and chairman of the negotiating pro-Buyoya faction of the Union for National Progress (Uprona), Luc Rukingama, said he believed the coup attempt “was an action targeting the peace process with the aim of destabilizing diplomatic relations between Burundi, the UN and citizens of countries currently taking part in Bujumbura in a meeting on security in central Africa” (Burundi Net Press News, 2001). South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma similarly condemned the coup attempt for undermining prospects of a peaceful solution to the civil war (South African News Agency, 2001). Meanwhile, several opposition politicians suspected the government of staging the coup attempt to crack down on opponents (Burundi Net Press News, 2001). However, the Minister of Justice later said that “There is no political party behind this attempted putsch,” attempting to allay fears that the government would target opposition (Azania News Agency, 2001a). We interpret this evidence as suggesting the Tutsi mutineers sought to strengthen a Tutsi-dominated regime and prevent the incorporation of rebel Hutu elites into the regime. We
therefore code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 516-2001-7-22: Burundi, Pierre Buyoya

Category: **failed reshuffling coup**

**Event:** On the night of Sunday, July 22, 2001, a group of at least 60 junior officers, NCOs, and cadets led the second army mutiny in three months. They allegedly cut telephone lines in the capital of Bujumbura; took army chief of staff Gen. Libere Hicuburundi hostage; and then tried to storm the Mpimba Central Prison to free the soldiers who launched the April 18 coup attempt. This set off a battle with assault rifles and grenades. Two of the mutineers died. After they failed, the remaining mutineers commandeered private cars to escape towards Kayanza. A total of 11 junior officers were reportedly arrested, including one of the alleged coup leaders, Lt. Kamenyero. See Azania News Agency (2001b); Lost Angeles Times (2001).

Coding rationale: Maj. Gen. Cyrille Ndayirukiye, the Minister of Defence, said the coup attempt resembled the earlier April 18 coup attempt (Radio Burundi, 2001a). Minister of Communication Luc Rukingama said the mutineers “attempted to destabilize institutions with the aim of stopping the efforts aimed at restoring peace and unity” (Radio Burundi, 2001b). Hours after the coup attempt, President Buyoya agreed to a power-sharing deal at a regional summit in Arusha, Tanzania designed to end the ongoing civil war. Under the plan, Buyoya, a Tutsi, would lead for 18 months, with a Hutu as vice president. A Hutu would be president for the next 18 months, and then elections would then be held (Lost Angeles Times, 2001). As in the April 18 case, we interpret this coup event as an attempt to prevent a new transitional government from forming and thus blocking the entry of Hutus into the regime. We code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 520-1978-4-9: Somalia, Mohammed Siyad Barre

Category: **failed regime change coup**

**Event:** On April 9, 1978, gunfire broke out at about 8:15 a.m. in the village of Afgoy, eight miles south of the capital of Mogadishu, and continued for two hours. Diplomatic sources also heard small arms fire and explosions on the outskirts of the capital (Associated Press, 1978a).
Gunfire also broke out at the Ministry of Defense and the residence of President Siad Barre (Iraq News Agency, 1978a). Soldiers reportedly tried to seize the Somali radio station in Mogadishu, leading to an exchange of fire with troops stationed at the radio station, which led broadcasts to be briefly suspended (Iraq News Agency, 1978b). President Barre “crushed the uprising before lunch with the help of a Soviet trained intelligence network run by his son-in-law and several thousand fellow Darod Marehan tribesman he keeps close to Mogadishu” (Lamb, 1978). Several mutineers defected to Kenya, including one of the coup leaders, Col. Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed. Ahmed said the plot failed partly because Mr. Barre escaped from his villa next to the Mogadishu airport and “took refuge in a slum and the plotters could not find him” (United Press International, 1978a).

Coding rationale: Barre announced that the coup attempt had been by “a lackey unit” of the army which was “serving foreign interests” (apparently a reference to the Soviet Union), resulting in 20 dead and 34 wounded (Mogadiscio Domestic Service, 1978; Washington Post, 1978b; Associated Press, 1978a). 21 military officers were sentenced to death, including one of the alleged leaders, Col. Mohamed Sheikh Osman, the commander of an air defense force near Mogadishu (Schultz, Margolis and Rundblad, 1978, 27). Mohamed Sheikh Osman, from the Murursade/Hawiye clan (Makina, 2013, 4), was one of the original 25 members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council that ousted the civilian president in 1969, establishing the Barre regime. The other leader, Ahmed, was a member of the Majerteen clan. He was imprisoned for six years after 1969 for not supporting Barre’s coup, but he was released in 1975 and given a government post. In 1977, Ahmed was reinstated as commander of the southern front in Sidamo Ethiopia. After the failed coup attempt, Ahmed escaped to Kenya and would go on to lead the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in opposition to the Barre government (Mukhtar and Castagno, 2003, 15-16).

Diplomatic sources in Kenya said “there had been strong resentment among army units which withdrew from the Ogaden after suffering major defeats at the hands of Cuban and Ethiopian troops” (Reuters, 1978). “Resentment of the president seems to divide this country along regional and tribal lines”, with rumors that the radio station in the northern capital Hargeisa criticized the regime (Kraft, 1978). Although
EPR does not code ethnicity as a politically-relevant cleavage in Somali politics under Barre, clan politics was a relevant factor. The Somali defeat in Ogaden “led to widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’ as different groups sought scapegoats to explain the debacle. Thus, hard on the heels of the Somali retreat, an unsuccessful attempted coup was mounted against the regime in April 1978. This was led by military officers of the Majerteyn (Darod) clan who had played a dominant role in the old civilian governments” (Lewis, 1989, 575). Samater (1991, 13) describes one manifestation of clan politics under Barre: “General Siyad Barré, who used the scare resources of the state to reward and punish entire clans collectively. This has in fact been the fate of the Isaaq and Majeerteen clans who suffered fearful persecutions under Barré’s regime.”

While this evidence suggests that the coup attempt was triggered by dissatisfaction with the president over a military failure, this dissatisfaction manifested itself along clan lines. The coup leaders were from subordinate or junior partner clans (i.e. not from the regime leader’s clan). Laitin (1979, 96) notes that the coup “conspirators were mostly of the Majeerteen clan, which had considerable power before the Siyaad regime, but then ‘lost out’ in the present Marexaan-Dhulbahante coalition.” We therefore interpret this evidence to code the event as a regime change coup because had Barre been ousted, the clan structure of the regime would have been altered, presumably restoring power to the excluded Majerteen clan that had dominated politics prior to the 1969 SRC coup.

| # 530-1989-5-16: ETHIOPIA, MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM |

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29Prior to military defeat and the 1978 coup attempt, Laitin (1976, 457-58) describes how the clan coalition under Barre’s regime had been previously excluded under the pre-1969 civilian government: “Somalis from all over the country are aware that the three prominent leaders who were accused of counter-revolution each came from an important clan outside the ruling coalition. Siyad [Barre] himself is from the Marayxan branch of the predominant Darood clan; Marayxan, as the legend goes, was told that he would never live in peace, and indeed this sub-clan is surrounded by non-Darood. But Siyad made a key alliance through the appointment of his Dulbahante son-in-law as head of the National Security Service, for this very powerful Darood sub-clan had been disappointed in its less-than-dominant role in the years of civilian rule.” Laitin (1976, 456) writes that “[a]n intricate clan system pervades the Somali social structure, and this had been the basis of party formation, political recruitment, and coalition-building in modern Somalia.”
Event: Before dawn on Tuesday, May 16, 1989, heavy fighting with tanks and artillery broke out at army barracks on the edge of the capital of Addis Adaba (Perlez, 1989a). The coup attempt began when a group of senior military officers, including the second in command of the large northern army, arrived at the Ministry of Defense in the belief Mengitsu’s Defense Minister would join their cause. When he did not, they shot Maj. Gen. Haile Giorgi Habte Mariam (Battiata, 1989). They were immediately surrounded by internal security members. A brief shootout at the Ministry of Defense was reported in the middle of the afternoon (Perlez, 1989b). A radio broadcast announced that “[t]he dictator has been overthrown” (Perlez, 1989b). Two army units, supported by the air force, moved against the palace guard as helicopters dropped leaflets calling for the overthrow of Mengitsu (Perlez, 1989b). While the government restored calm to the capital by afternoon’s end, a mutiny in the north continued.

In Asmara, the northern capital and Ethiopia’s second largest city, the 2nd Army (consisting of 150,000 troops) seized the government radio station and broadcast denunciations of Mengitsu (Harden, 1989b). They reportedly had reached a kind of rapprochement with the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. The First Army in Harar, in the east, also declared support for the coup, as did officers at the two main air force bases in Asmara and Debra Zeit, south of the capital (Perlez, 1989a). The military chief of staff Maj. Gen. Merid Negusie and air force commander Maj. Gen. Amha Desta led the attempt but were killed in the fighting; the other officers involved surrendered (Harden, 1989a). Mengitsu cut his state visit to East Germany short and returned to Ethiopia on Wednesday night (Perlez, 1989b). On Thursday, May 18, Mengitsu announced that the government had crushed the rebellion and retaken the radio station in Asmara (Battiata, 1989).

Coding rationale: On May 21, 1990, 12 generals were executed for participating in the coup attempt (Shinn and Ofcansky, 2013, 108). Initial reports pointed out the coup attempt came after Mengitsu ordered the conscription of over 100,000 draftees (the largest forced conscription of soldiers in Ethiopia’s history) (Harden, 1989b). On May 18, the list of demands broadcast by the dissident army officers in Asmara included a
negotiated settlement of the 28-year old civil war in Eritrea (Battiata, 1989). Intelligence sources said the generals who led the coup “were simply fed up with the dreadful situation in the country”. Army chief of staff Gen. Merid Negussie “was suffering from depression brought on by the death of his wife, a life-long companion, by the military disasters of recent months and by certain knowledge that 14-year-old children were not going to win the war. He conceived the idea for a coup.” He brought in Gen. Amha Desta and Gen. Demissie Bulto. Then they brought in Gen. Tesfaye Wolde, who cut the telephone wires to the ministry of defense and dispatched loyalist troops to the airport and the Defense Ministry. The mutineers cheered their arrival thinking they were reinforcements, but were arrested (Harwood, 1989).

Tareke (2004, 270) describes the coup leaders motivations as: “the real and paramount motive was probably political.... The conspirators wanted to halt the process [fighting the rebels] by negotiating a peaceful end to the civil wars.” In the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, “the dictator robbed the military of most of its senior and some of its most able leaders, further crippling and ensuring its downfall. A year later, it disintegrated and with it disappeared the military dictatorship” (Tareke, 2004, 271). Haile-Selassie (1997, 295) attributes the coup by senior officers to fear they would be blamed and purged for military losses. “The conspiracy was kept a secret among a few senior officers for the obvious reason that most of the junior officers... were loyal cadres of the leadership” (Haile-Selassie, 1997, 295).

We interpret this evidence as suggesting the dissident generals did not seek to abandon military rule, but chart a new course in the Eritrean civil war. We therefore code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 540-1977-5-27: ANGOLA, AGOSTINHO NETO

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On May 27, 1977, shooting and explosions were heard in the capital from 3-8:30 a.m. Rebels took the Luanda radio station (Associated Press, 1977b). At 7:30 a.m., an unidentified speaker said the station was under the control of “the action committee of the Popular Movement.” Meanwhile, another group attacked the Sao Paulo prison. After 8 a.m., the prison was captured and many prisoners freed. The
rebels announced on the radio: “Liberty for Comrade van Dunen, death to the reactionaries”. For the next 2-3 hours, various speakers including army commanders called for a mass demonstration in front of the presidential palace (which never materialized). At 10:45 a.m., the radio announced that forces loyal to Neto had retaken the station (Kaufman, 1977). Two hours later, President Neto announced that his forces had put down a coup attempt by army extremists led by Nito Alves, a former Interior Minister, and Jose Van Dunen, a former political commissar (Associated Press, 1977b). In early June, the provincial arms of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola were suspended in Luanda, Kuanza Sul, and Benguela provinces, saying that the May 27 coup attempt occurred because of the “passive attitude of collaboration” shown by provincial groups (Washington Post, 1977a). Cuban units played a key role in suppressing the coup attempt (Kaufman, 1977). Alves was captured on July 7 (Washington Post, 1977b).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt was the culmination of “[f]ierce inter-factional struggles” within the the governing Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) (Hodges, 2001, 46). In October 1976, the MPLA Central Committee set up a commission of inquiry to investigate factionalism, which issued its report on May 20 and 21, 1977. It accused Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem of leading factionalism and stripped them of their central committee membership (Birmingham, 1978, 555). The two men were jailed. The two men were reportedly “pro-Moscow hardliners opposed to President Neto’s plans for attracting Western investments and reducing dependence on the Soviet bloc” (Associated Press, 1977b). Alves “was an African leader in a party that consisted of whites, miscos, and assimilados. He advocated ‘people’s power’ in the slums of Luanda, where he was a hero” (James, 2011). Neto called the rebels a “black racist faction” that “wanted all the whites and mulattos removed from the power structure, leaving all posts in the hands of blacks” (Murphy, 1977b; United Press Interna-

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30 Alves had already been relieved of his ministerial post in October; he “attempted to create his own power base outside the party among the urban dwellers of Luanda and in the countryside northeast of Luanda, where he fought as a guerilla...In clandestinely printed leaflets, Alves’ faction criticized Neto’s government for not being closer to the Soviet Union, for its continued dependence on Cuban military and political aid and for the continued presence of Angolan-born whites and mulattos in the government” (Murphy, 1977b)
The rebels demanded the release of Alves and Van Dunen. Rebels’ radio broadcast that their action “was not an attempt at a coup but that its participants merely wanted to acquaint the government with some of their demands”. A rebel speaker said that “the prisons in Luanda are waiting for corrupt ministers who have done nothing but exploit the people” (Murphy, 1977b). Alves and van Dunen were joined by two members of the army chief of staff, Jacob Caetano and Bakalov. The minister of commerce, David Aires Machado, and five of the 16 provincial governors were also implicated in the plot. Also conspiring was “a small group of Portuguese and white Angolans”, including van Dunen’s Angola-born Portuguese wife Cita Valles. The rift between Neto and Alves appeared as early as 1974, when Alves opposed giving automatic citizenship to any Angola-born Portuguese. According to captured plotters, Alves would have been president had the coup succeeded (Murphy, 1977a). Caetano was reportedly expected to become the Minister of Defense (Birmingham, 1978, 560). In a speech, Neto said the rebels included “political commissars, members of the army women’s section, the Organization for Angolan Women, and the youth wings of the armed forces and military police” (Associated Press, 1977a). Birmingham (1978, 558) argues that the ongoing food crisis was a fundamental cause of the attempted coup. Fauvet (1977, 95-96) writes that had the coup succeeded, the plotters decided that “[a] new government was to be formed with Nito Alves as President, Jose Van Dunem as Prime Minister and Machado remaining as Trade Minister. Bakalov would become Chief of Staff, Monstro Imortal Minister of Defence, and Sianouk Director of Security... As for the MPLA Central Committee, this would be abolished. A 'Politico-Military Revolutionary Committee’ would take its place.” We interpret the evidence to mean the coup attempt was rooted in factionalism within the MPLA, and that had the coup succeeded Alves would have taken power but still preserved many in the core group of the MPLA. We therefore see this as a failed reshuffling coup, assuming that the rulers would rule as head of reconstituted party regime.

- 551-1980-10-16: Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda

Category: coup plot
Event: “On Oct. 15, policemen searching for robbers stumbled on a gang of up to 200 armed men on a farm at Chilanga, south of Lusaka. There was a gun battle and two of the gangs were killed. One of them carried maps and notes which indicated that on the following day State House (the President’s official residence), the Lusaka radio station and the international airport were to be attacked.” Details did not emerge until later. Kaunda said the armed gang was recruited by dissidents in Zaire’s Shaba province. Up to 100 were arrested (The Economist, 1980).

Coding rationale: On October 27, 1980, Kaunda accused South Africa of attempting to overthrow his government but said his security forces had broken up the plot. Authorities reportedly arrested 50 people or more, including high-ranking military officers and several former government officials (Murphy, 1980). Kaunda said most of the armed gang were Katangese rebels, though some Zambians including 3 members of the defense force were involved; he said that two nights before the planned attack, South Africa brought in two boats and ferries to support the plotters (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1980). Later historical accounts of this participants and motivations of the plotters also indicate that this plot was preempted just prior to its execution (Larmer, 2008, 2010). We therefore code this as a coup plot rather than a coup attempt.

- # 551-1990-6-30: ZAMBIA, KENNETH KAUNDA

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: At 3:30 a.m. Saturday June 30, a dissident army officer, Lieutenant Mwambala Luchembe, seized control of the state radio station Radio Zambia during the night and announced a coup, saying repeatedly over three hours that Kaunda had been overthrown. The announcement said that “Due to food price riots the army has taken over Zambia”. Then army troops moved in and arrested the officer and declared that order was restored. But then the BBC correspondent in Lusaka reported that heavy firing broke out in the vicinity of the state house, the residence of President Kaunda (Ottaway, 1990). Kaunda defended IMF-recommended price increases, saying “Coups do not help anything but but beget other coups,” said Kaunda. Two other sol-
diers in addition to Luchembe were arrested in connection with the coup attempt. By 7 a.m., he was arrested. Kaunda claimed that the coup attempt was the work of “one misguided soldier with the help of maybe one or two colleagues” (Henry, 1990a). Crowds cheered when they thought the coup was successful (Perlez, 1990a; Henry, 1990b).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt was preceded by food price riots which were prompted by an IMF structural adjustment program that had just been introduced (Otway, 1990). “The mastermind of the coup attempt, Lt. Luchembe, was among the platoons of soldiers who were flown in from Luena barracks in Kaoma in Western Province to help stop the rioting in Lusaka. Lt. Luchembe attempted a coup on 30 June 1990 which was crushed. The significance of the coup attempt was that it was a catalyst for the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Zambia” (Tembo, 2012, 348). According to Phiri (2001, 238), “It was this coup attempt that effectively broke President Kaunda’s grip on power and led to the formation of a pressure group, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).” Indeed, amidst the turmoil Kaunda agreed to a referendum on multi-party democracy for October 17 (Perlez, 1990b). The coup attempt was therefore set against a broader struggle for democracy (Meldrum, 1990; Henry, 1990b). Since the coup attempt was led by a junior officer and targeted a civilian regime leader, we code this as an attempted regime change coup against the one-party regime that had ruled since 1967.

- # 551-1997-10-28: Zambia, Frederick Chiluba

  **Category:** failed regime change coup

  **Event:** Before dawn on Tuesday, October 28, 1997, a group of junior officers seized the national radio studio. At 7 a.m. a man who identified himself as Captain Solo announced on Zambian state radio that a “National Redemption Council” had ousted President Chiluba in a campaign called “Operation Born Again”. Solo said “We are here to protect people. We have surrounded the radio station and we are armed” and “I saw an angel and the message was the Government had to be overthrown” (Associated Press, 1997). There was no public uprising or support from the rest of the armed forces. According to a senior American source in the U.S. Embassy, there were no more than two
dozen plotters. By about 10 a.m., the army retook the radio station, and captured Solo, whose real name was Capt. Steve Lungu, as well as several other participants (Duke, 1997; McNeil, 1997).

Coding rationale: Afterwards, Chiluba declared a state of emergency and jailed more than 90 soldiers and several opposition positions, including Dean Mungomba, a presidential candidate and the leader of the Zambian Democratic Congress.31

Sources say the coup attempt was “a foray by a few captains and majors who had been drinking and were bitter about their low pay and their generals’ handsome lifestyles” (McNeil, 1998b). One coup leader, Capt. Lungu, was a former headmaster who joined the army’s political education program when Kaunda was President. He was reportedly about to be dismissed. Some journalists say Lungu sounded drunk (McNeil, 1997). However, Haantobolo (2008, 212) argues that “the 1997 coup attempt should not be regarded as the act of some disgruntled soldiers only but as a barometer of the feelings of many ordinary Zambians who wanted peace and food, and not empty assurances.” Lindemann (2011, 17) notes that Nyanja speakers from Eastern Province (which was the only remaining UNIP stronghold in the country) were prominent among the plotters. Cap. Lungu said he would have appointed a cabinet of military men. Regardless of whether the plotters were simply ambitious junior officers or were UNIP loyalists, this coup event was executed by junior officers targeting a civilian regime leader. We assume these junior officers would not have ruled through the ruling MDD party-regime, and code this as a failed regime change coup.

- # 580-1974-12-31: MADAGASCAR, GABRIEL RAMANANTSOA

  Category: coup plot

31Former President Kaunda was arrested on December 25, 1997, and charged with “misprision of treason” for backing the coup attempt on January 10, 1998. During the coup attempt, Kaunda was in South Africa. Kaunda denied any involvement, and accused Chiluba of staging the coup to crackdown on the opposition. Many outside experts and Zambians doubted his involvement. One of the two accused coup leaders, Capt. Jackson Chiti, testified on January 15, 1998 that the police had tortured him and forced him to implicate Mr. Kaunda. But he denied that the former President was involved and tearfully apologized to him in court. Kaunda was set free on June 1, 1998, after prosecutors dropped the charges as part of a deal brokered by Nelson Mandela (Donald G. Jr. McNeil, 1998). See McKinley (1997); Reuters (1998a); McNeil (1998b); Reuters (1998b); McNeil (1998a).
Event: On January 21, 1975, the leading daily newspaper Madagascar Matin reportedly carried a six-column analysis written by Latimer Rangers of a “failed coup of December 31”. A January 23 U.S. Embassy cable from Madagascar reporting on that article said that the armed forces went on alert at 11 p.m. on December 31 following an emergency meeting of General Ramantsoa and Chief of Staff General Ramarolahy. The “GHDR reportedly was successful in dismantling network of conspirators by arresting eleven officers and twenty-some NCO’s. Of several officers named in article as participants in coup attempt all but one were at company-grade level”. That article suggested that the failure of the coup was “perhaps attributable to division among conspirators on whether or not to seek political support of PSM which was still being debated when plot uncovered” (U.S. Embassy, 1975b). The western press also picked up the story of a failed coup attempt on January 23 (Agence France-Presse, 1975).

Coding rationale: Many sources report on this incident as a coup attempt or failed coup, but we find no evidence that the December 31 plot ever made it past the planning stages. Commenting on the failure of the plot, the Latimer Rangers article that broke the story suggested that the failure of the coup was “perhaps attributable to division among conspirators on whether or not to seek political support of PSM which was still being debated when plot uncovered” (U.S. Embassy, 1975b). Similarly, Chauvet (1975) reported on January 25 that “it seems certain that a handful of officers had prepared a coup near the end of last year. The coup never got beyond the planning stage, but it broke down the military unity”. On January 30, Col. Brechard Rajaonarison, the cotier military officer who would reportedly have headed a new government had the December 31 coup plot succeeded, criticized a minority (that is, the merina) of destroying national unity “by maneuvering to eliminate provincial elite (cotier) by implicating it in “imaginary coup d’état against former Ramantsoa government”” (U.S. Embassy, 1975c). Although also calling this event a coup attempt at various points, the account in Allen and Covell (2005, 227) summarizes political developments as follows: “At the end of 1974, disquieted by nationalist economic policies and the putative Merina domination of the (increasingly discredited) Ramanantsoa Interregnum, Rajaonarison began plans for a coup d’état. His plot was discovered by Rabetafika’s intelligence
services, and he fled to the Antanimoro military camp outside Antananarivo.” Based on this evidence, we consider the December 31, 1974, event to be a coup plot, not coup attempt. However, the plot did generate a political crisis which led to Gabriel Ramantsoa’s resignation on January 25 as well as a coup event on February 11, 1975, involving the assassination of his successor Richard Ratsimandrava. We code this event (580-1975-2-11) in the next section since it is not included in Powell and Thyne (2011).

• # 580-1992-7-29: MADAGASCAR, DIDIER RATSIRAKA

**Category:** not exist

**Event:** On Wednesday, July 29, 1992, a group of armed men seized control of state radio and claimed they had staged a coup and set up a “Committee to Rescue the Nation”. They said they would respect the democratic process Didier Ratsiraka launched last year following violent opposition to his rule, which involved a transitional government including key opposition leaders but left Ratsiraka as head of state as a new constitution was drafted (Reuters, 1992\textsuperscript{a,b}). The rebels broadcast a taped message several times by a preacher, Michael Fety, who criticized the government, declared himself leader, and said the coup was necessary to “put an end to the procrastination of the Forces Vives and give back hope to a disappointed population” (Associated Press, 1992\textsuperscript{a}; Agence France-Presse, 1992\textsuperscript{a}). After three hours, they gave up and several participants were escorted to jail by armed security forces (Africa Report, 1992). By midday, life in the capital had returned to normal.

**Coding rationale:** Initial reports said “soldiers” had seized the radio station (e.g. Reuters, 1992\textsuperscript{a,b}). But subsequent accounts clarified that it was actually “a small group of armed civilians” that were responsible (e.g. Allen and Covell, 2005, 106). Although the names of those arrested was not disclosed, witnesses say they were young men between 20 and 30 years old. Witnesses said the “commando members” who seized the radio station included six to ten armed civilians from the Rally for National Unity (RUN), an extreme faction or splinter group of the FV (France-Presse, 1992). Witnesses said one of the group of six to ten people seen leaving the radio station around 10 a.m. was Liva
Ramahozomanana, a woman that took part in a previous seizure of the radio station on May 13, 1990 which Ratsiraka also claimed was a coup attempt (Agence France-Presse, 1992a).³² On July 30, Prime Minister Razanamasy said that the Army, the gendarmerie, and the police were all “law-abiding” and that “the Army stood firm as a single bloc yesterday” in obeying government orders. The government said lots of money was in circulation to buy people off to prevent the constitutional referendum on August 19 (Antananarivo Radio Madagascar Network, 1992). We find no evidence that current members of the military participated in this coup event, only a group of armed civilians and opposition politicians. As such, we code this as a case of not exist.

• # 600-1971-7-10: MOROCCO, HASSAN II

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** On July 10, 1971, King Hassan II was celebrating his 42nd birthday and had invited some 400 elites as guests to his seaside palace in Skhirat near Rabat. More than 1,000 army troops/cadets briefly took control of Rabat radio and attacked the summer palace. Rebel-controlled radio stations in Rabat and Casablanca announced that a revolution was under way. “All responsibilities are deferred to the local military authorities,” the Rabat broadcast said. It appealed to the Moroccan people “not to execute antirevolutionary and antipopular orders” and ended with the words, “Long live the republic”. The Casablanca radio said “Attention. The army has just conducted a revolution for the people. The royal regime is abolished. Remain vigilant.” The King was held prisoner for two hours (New York Times, 1971). The coup failed, the King said, when its main leader, Gen. Mohammed Medbouh, was accidentally killed by a rebel lieutenant at the beginning and because the leaderless young rebels then spared his life (Hess, 1971c). Hassan hid in a bathroom until the shooting died down. Loyalist troops then crushed the mutiny, killing 150 rebels and capturing 900 (Gregory, 1999).

**Coding rationale:** On July 10, Hassan said that 1,400 mutinous troops

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³²Ramahozomanana was also identified as the coup leader by the premier’s son, Ndriana Razanamasy, a businessman in Paris (Associated Press, 1992c). Ramahozomanana was the leader of an opposition group called the Salvation Living Forces that spearheaded major anti-government protests the previous summer (Associated Press, 1992b).
were led by no more than 10 officers, led by Gen. Mohammed Medbouh, Minister of the Royal Household. In an interview, Hassan said the uprising was limited to two groups of cadets (New York Times, 1971). On July 11, King Hassan said that four generals had mounted a “Libyan-style coup” and would be shot. According to Park and Boum (2006, 89-90), “The leaders were motivated by their conviction that the government was incurably corrupt, but the cadets did not know what was going on”. Similarly, unrest among senior officers related “directly to the conventional system of royal patronage, clan politics, and corruption,” and was fueled by “status insecurity” that patronage could not compensate for. All the senior officers came from the Berber nobility (Braun, 1978, 64-65). Berbers are powerless in Morocco, according to Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010). Because the coup leaders would have broken the rule of the Arab Alouite dynasty, we consider this event a failed regime change coup.

• # 600-1972-8-16: MOROCCO, HASSAN II

  Category: failed regime change coup

  Event: On August 16, 1972, four Royal Moroccan Air Force jets tried to shoot down the Boeing 727 airliner carrying King Hassan II home from a visit to France. The “rebels also strafed the Rabat airport and the royal palace here, but the revolt seemed limited to that party of the air force based at Kenitra, 25 miles to the north. The base was surrounded by the army under General Oufkir’s orders” that night. Prince Moulay Abdullah, the King’s brother, said in a radio interview that the King escaped assassination because “after the airliner had been badly damaged by two firing passes, Hassan seized a microphone and said to the attackers: ‘This is the mechanic speaking.’ He then said, that the pilot had been killed and the King ‘mortally wounded’ and asked that the attacks be halted to spare the lives of the other passengers. The appeal succeeded, the Prince said, and the plane flew into Rabat’s airport on one engine.” The Kenitra air base was then surrounded on the orders of Minister of Defense Gen. Mohammed Oufkir (Giniger,

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Gen. Oufkir identified the real leader of the coup attempt as the commandant of the cadet school, Col. Mohamed Ababou, saying he had planned it for a year (Hess, 1971a).

The Libyan regime had issued support for the coup attempt, and in response the Moroccan embassy occupied the Libyan embassy (Hess, 1971b).
Coding rationale: By August 18, almost the entire operational air corps was reportedly under arrest, including Maj. Kouera el-Ouafi and seven other officers (Giniger, 1972a,e). By then, the government said that Gen. Oufkir, who was found dead August 16 shot in the head and wounded several times (officially of suicide), was the coup leader (Giniger, 1972c). Oufkir was implicated by Col. Mohammed Amoukrane, the deputy chief of the air force, and Maj. Kouera el-Ouafi, commander of the Kenitra base. In their trial, they said they were “outraged by corruption and immorality in the royal regime” and had acted on orders from Gen. Oufkir (New York Times, 1973). On August 21, Hassan said that Oufkir had begun plotting July 14, 1971, four days after the coup attempt at his summer palace that Oufkir was allegedly secretly involved in as well (Giniger, 1972d; Gregory, 1999). Oufkir, like much of the officer corps, was a Berber (Entelis, 1996, 78). Oufkir’s motivations were unclear. Observers speculated that he “intended to become the major figure in the regency that would have followed the King’s death and the succession of nine-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed to the throne; the implication is that General Oufkir hungered for more power and prestige than he was able to enjoy as Hassan’s eminence grise. But no one can be sure” (Giniger, 1972b). As for Amoukrane, the principal organizer, he “was probably motivated by incidents of corruption associated with four government ministers that became public in this year, and who had received very mild sentences for their misconduct”. The coup attempt was also supported by a faction of the opposition UNFP, which had given up on a negotiated settlement in their conflict with the monarchy (Sater, 2010, 36). Although Oufkir was previously the most powerful official in government, since he was not a relative of King Hassan and was a Berber, we code this as an attempted regime change, assuming that had he succeeded, he would have broken the rule of the Arab Alouite dynasty. EPR codes Berbers as a powerless group.

• # 620-1975-8-5: LIBYA, MUAMMAR AL-QADDAFI

Category: coup plot
Event: On August 5, 1975, 1975, Egyptian newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah
reported that Libyan authorities arrested Maj. 'Abd al-Fattah Yunis, commander of the republican guard in Benghazi, and 20 officers of the guard after they “foiled a plot” to topple Qaddafi (Ad-Dustor, 1975). Maj. Bashir Hawadi, 1 of 10 members of Libya’s Ruling Command Council (RCC), was arrested. Another RCC member, planning minister Maj. Omar Meheishi, fled to Tunisia. A new law imposing the death penalty for plotting against the Libyan government was published the following day (Elizur, 1975). Another RCC member, Awad Hamza, was also arrested for leading the plot against Qaddafi, which apparently involved many officers from Misurata (Cooley, 1982, 167). On April 5 1977, 22 military officers implicated in the abortive August coup were publicly executed (St. John, 2014, xxxi).

Coding rationale: Sources disagree about whether this event was a coup plot or coup attempt. Marshall and Marshall (2014), for example, codes this as a coup plot. Many sources call this event a coup attempt, but without providing evidence or details of any concrete actions by the plotters. The Libyan daily al Jihad simply said that “hostile alliances which gathered together various forces in an attempt to strike the revolution” (Elizur, 1975). The only report of any concrete action was issued by the Egyptian press: “There were several explosions which indicated this coup, one of which took place in As-Saytunah port and led to the deaths of four people” east of Tripoli on August 4 (Middle East News Agency, 1975b; Al-Ahram, 1975). However, no other sources confirmed these explosions ever occurred or were related to a coup. By contrast, sources in Beirut said that reports of a coup attempt were exaggerated. Arrests of 126 soldiers came after “the discovery of a meeting critical of alleged financial mismanagement by the Government”, particularly by Major Jallud (the Prime Minister). In this account, Major Meheishi fled to Tunisia when the holding of the meeting become known to the Government (Randal, 1975). This accords with the account of western diplomats in Beirut, which said Egypt “tipped off the Libyan leader about the plot. As a result the Libyan authorities were able to take swift counteraction which resulted in the flight to Tunisia of the plot’s ring leader, Planning Minister Omar Mahayshi” (Fitchett, 1975).

What’s more, the Historical Dictionary of Libya and subsequent histories date the coup attempt to August 13 (e.g. St. John, 2014, xxxi),
over a week after the Egyptian press broke the first stories of a coup attempt and when the reported explosions tied to the coup attempt apparently occurred. A recent news retrospective reported that the conspirators Meheishi, Hawadi, and Abdel Moneim Al-Houni “were opposed to Gaddafi’s increasingly pronounced tyrannical tendencies - their action was triggered by Gaddafi’s suspension of the constitution in 1975. Before they could act, however, Gaddafi arrested Hawadi and Al-Houni. Al-Mahishi managed to escape and to resume opposition activity firstly from Egypt and then from Morocco until Rabat turned him over to the Libyan authorities in 1983” (Abdallah, 2014). We therefore interpret the evidence as indicating that the events of August 1975 really constitute a preempted coup plot, not a coup attempt.

Had we been able to uncover evidence of concrete actions, we would code the event as a failed reshuffling coup because the supposed coup leaders, Muheishi and Hamza, were RCC officers, an integral part of the coalition that helped Gaddafi execute the coup against King Idris in 1969. Vandewalle (1998, 87) argues that “[t]he catalyst of the August 1975 attempted coup, led by RCC members Bashir Hawadi and ’Umar al-Muhayshi, centered precisely on the haphazard allocation of the country’s financial resources. While the government could not pay its bills, it was supporting several costly foreign adventures Muhayshi and his supporters objected to. Muhayshi, who was minister of planning at the time, refused to give up funds that had been earmarked for local development projects and fled with his supporters to Tunis in the aftermath of the attempted coup.” Gaub (2013, 226) argues that “ideological rifts appeared in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Both sides of the RCC reached out into the armed forces soliciting support: troops loyal to Gaddafi surrounded Tripoli in July 1975, but an actual coup attempt by the two RCC members, Bashir Hawadi and Umar al-Muhayshi was uncovered a month later.” We interpret this evidence to mean that the coup planners were not trying to prevent ethnic narrowing, but rather had a policy disagreement with Gaddafi.

- # 620-1993-10-23: Libya, Muammar al-Qaddafi

  Category: failed regime change coup

  Event: Reuters (1993) reported that “[t]he commander of Libya’s forces in Chad had attempted to overthrow Qaddafi the previous week, ABC
news reported on October 24, 1994. He pushed towards Tripoli with armored units from Chad, but was thwarted by the air force”.

Coding rationale: The coup plotters appear to have been from Libya’s largest tribe, the Warfallah tribe: “In the case of the Warfalla, however, this support has been inconsistent, most notably in the mounting of a coup attempt by Warfalla members of Qaddafi’s government in 1993, as a result of their rivalry with the Magarha for top positions within the government. The failure of the coup attempt to overthrow Qaddafi resulted in a temporary decline of Warfalla influence in the Libyan power structure, as many leading members were purged and eventually executed” (Reuters, 2001). Another source states: “The October 1993 coup attempt was spearheaded by Warfalla officers at the Bani Walid region 120 km south-east of Tripoli. The main reason for the coup attempt was that, despite its size, this tribe was poorly represented in the regime and only occupied second-echelon posts in the officers’ corps. Moreover, Warfalla tribal officers have been excluded from the air force... The air force is reserved almost exclusively to the Qadhadhfa tribe, to which Qadhafi belongs. It was the air force which crushed the coup attempt in October 1993” (Arab Press Service, 2001). While the Warfalla were one of the tribes loyal to Gaddafi, they did not hold key positions in the air force or the internal security apparatus.35 We use this evidence to assume that had the rebellion succeeded, a new regime would have taken hold in which the Qadhadhfa would not have sole control over the internal security forces. Thus we treat the Warfallah

35Gaub (2013, 229) argues that “[a]ttempts to overthrow the regime originated almost exclusively in the armed forces: in 1983, five officers were executed for plotting a coup, in 1984, fighting broke out in barracks over a similar plan, leading to the arrest of several thousand soldiers. In 1985, 60 officers were arrested for a similar cause. The same year, Colonel Hassan Ishkal, the military governor of Surt, was executed for disagreeing over the role of the revolutionary guards within the armed forces. In 1993, another attempt failed. As a result, Gaddafi resorted to the Revolutionary Guard Corps rather than the military to crush riots and Islamist activism in the early 1990s.” On the tribal make-up of the security forces under Gaddafi, she writes “[p]art of his tactics included the promotion of junior officers from Gaddafi’s own tribe, the Qadadfa and allocation of sensitive posts such as the responsibility for the Cyrenaica region; military security; responsibility for the Benghazi sector; command of armaments and munitions, of domestic security and many others. The air force was staffed almost exclusively by members of this tribe. But other tribes that were considered loyal to the regime, such as the Warfalla and Maqarha received preferential (though secondary) treatment as well (Gaub, 2013, 232).
as a junior partner ethnic (tribal) group even though EPR does not code ethnic groups in Libya.

• # 625-1971-7-19: SUDAN, JAAFAR EL-NEMERYI

Category: failed reshuffling coup


Coding rationale: The brief seizure of the coup plotters, led by al-Atta, appears to be an attempt to reassert formerly demoted officers’ (including many with close ties to the Communist Party\(^{36}\)) influence in the regime. While Nimeiri had been purging communists from various positions in the government prior to July 1971, including dismissing\(^ {37}\) Hashim al-Atta from his leadership position in the Revolutionary Command Council, there appears to be little evidence that coup attempt was an effort to prevent *ethnic narrowing* of the regime coalition. On the assumption that this coup event was an attempt to reassert the power of demoted officers, we code this event as a failed reshuffling coup attempt.

• # 625-1975-9-5: SUDAN, JAAFAR EL-NEMERY

Category: failed regime change coup

\(^{36}\)Ofcansky (1991) writes that prior to July 1971, “Nimeiri moved against the SCP. He ordered the deportation of Abd al Khaliq Mahjub. Then, when the SCP secretary general returned to Sudan illegally after several months abroad, Nimeiri placed him under house arrest. In March 1971, Nimeiri indicated that trade unions, a traditional communist stronghold, would be placed under government control. The RCC also banned communist-affiliated student, women’s, and professional organizations. Additionally, Nimeiri announced the planned formation of a national political movement called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), which would assume control of all political parties, including the SCP. After this speech, the government arrested the SCP’s central committee and other leading communists. The SCP, however, retained a covert organization that was not damaged in the sweep. Before further action could be taken against the party, the SCP launched a coup against Nimeiri... Atta named a seven-member revolutionary council, in which communists ranked prominently, to serve as the national government.”

\(^{37}\)Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005, xvii) state that the coup was “led by Hashim al-Atta (one of the officers removed from office in November 1970)” but Onwumechili (1998, 52) states that al-Atta was only removed from the RCC, not the military.
Event: On September 5, 1975, mutinous troops backed by the National Front captured the radio station in Omdurman long enough to attack Nemery’s government as “suffocating strugglers against imperialism”. Sudan News Agency said the coup attempt leader was Lt. Col. Hassan Hussein Osman. He broadcast demands for freedom of the press, judiciary, and university and dissolution of the Nemery government. Some plotters released prisoners from Kobar prison and seized a number of cabinet ministers. Nemery announced in a nationwide radio address that the rebellion led by junior officers, including about 70 troops, was crushed in a couple of hours (Reuters, 1975a; Associated Press, 1975; Omdurman Domestic Service, 1975a). On November 17, Nemery ordered trials for 141 people in connection with the coup plot, including army officers, soldiers, and civilians (United Press International, 1975d). Executions occurred through February 1976 (Associated Press, 1976c).

Coding rationale: Government officials blamed the attempted coup on university radicals, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the National Front, including the disbanded rightist Umma Party that shared power in a coalition government before the 1969 military coup (Ottaway, 1975; Cairo Domestic Service, 1975). On September 6, Vice President Abel Alier said the plotters goal was to “seize the authority of the May revolution and undermine its achievements in solving the southern problem” (Omdurman Domestic Service, 1975d). On September 8, Nemery insinuated that Libyan President Qaddafi funded the coup attempt, saying that Qaddafi was hosting many National Front leaders, that the plotters were found with unusually large amounts of cash, and that caches of weapons were found in a raid on Khartoum University. Nemery said “Their first aim was to dissolve the People’s Assembly and our political organization”. He closed Khartoum University and called on amendments to the constitution to ensure the security of the May revolution (News Dispatches, 1975a; Omdurman Domestic Service, 1975c). These amendments were indeed enacted. The coup attempt, Leach (2012, 68,113) notes, “began a period in which Nimeiri would focus on enhancing his personal power over the state” and “continued his increasing personalization of power and his dependence on security forces.” According to Natsios (2012, 53), “The Addis Ababa peace agreement caused resentment in Darfur and led to an unsuccessful coup attempt in
1975 by Darfuri officers in the Sudanese army who resented the South getting autonomy when their region had not”. One plotter who escaped was captured in October at a checkpoint just north of Darfur (Middle East News Agency, 1975c). At trial, some but not all of the accused said the coup attempt was on behalf of western Sudan and was led by the Nationalist Front (Middle East News Agency, 1975a). On January 6, 1976, deputy secretary general of the Socialist Union Maj Abu Al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim claimed the coup leaders had “pretended to belong to west Sudan to make the conspiracy appear racial”, saying West Sudan was loyal (Omdurman Domestic Service, 1975b). Based on this evidence, we code this as a failed regime change coup, since the perpetators were from a powerless ethnic group38 and assuming that the new regime would likely have included politicians from banned opposition parties (from the National Front) and thus prevented the continued personalization of the Nemery regime.

• # 625-1976-7-2: Sudan, Jaafar el-Nemery

Category: prior defection

Event: Natsios (2012, 53) summarizes the event as follows: “On July 2, 1976, a coup unfolded at the Khartoum airport as [Numaryi] was returning to Sudan from a trip to the United States. The coup leaders had intended to kill the Sudanese government officials assembled at the airport to greet Numayri’s plane, but his plane arrived early, throwing off the timing of the plot. Numayri and the officials escaped unharmed, mobilized the army, and within three days crushed the revolt with a heavy loss of life.”

Coding rationale: Initial press reports said that the identity of the plotters was unknown, but they cited diplomatic sources and local media indicating that army units or “elements of the armed forces” appeared to be responsible (United Press International, 1976a; Tanner, 1976; Associated Press, 1976d). But on July 4, Nemery appealed to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) to discuss a “foreign invasion” that moved through the desert that he accused of being behind the coup.

38Roessler (2011) codes the coup attempt leaders as being members of “other Arab groups”, which Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) code as being powerless from 1969 to 1985.
attempt (United Press International, 1976b). The aid-memoire sent to the UNSC added that “no Sudanese in active service had been party to the attempt” (Reuters, 1976c). On July 6, Sudan broke off diplomatic relations with Libya over their alleged sponsorship of the coup attempt (Reuters, 1976d). Nemery charged that the attack had been by mercenaries recruited from non-Arab nations such as Ethiopia, Mali, Chad, and Tanzania, and sent across the border from Libya (Pace, 1976a). On July 7, Nemery claimed Libya hoped to install former Prime Minister Sadik al-Mahdi in power. Nemery said a plane carrying Mahdi from exile had circled Khartoum during the coup attempt hoping to land in triumph (Pace, 1976b).

On August 4, two special military tribunals executed 81 rebels and named former Premier Sadik Mahdi and former Finance Minister Sharif Hussein al-Hindi as the leaders of the rebellion. Some defendants reported being visited by these exiled politicians at their training camps in Ethiopian border regions prior to being transferred to Libya right before the rebellion (Associated Press, 1976a). The verdicts against those executed said they had received military training in a “foreign state”. At a news conference on August 4, Mahdi, a member of the Muslim Ansar sect and leader of the National Front, accepted responsibility for organizing the attempted coup but denied that it was carried out by mercenaries (New York Times, 1976b). On August 5, 17 more rebels were executed, including former Brig. Mohammed Nur Saeed, the alleged military commander of the plot (New York Times, 1976a). On August 7, Soviet arms that were found in use by the rebels were put on display (Darnton, 1976f). Rather than mercenaries, reports indicated the bulk of the rebel force was Sudanese emigrés affiliated with Mahdists led by Sadik Mahdi (Darnton, 1976a).

Subsequent histories support the view that exiles rather than current members of the military were responsible for the coup attempt, contrary to the first news reports. For example, Natsios (2012, 53-54) noted that “The coup leaders were an unholy alliance of all the enemies Numayri had collected over the preceding seven years of his presidency. The Soviet Union, Colonel Gaddafi’s Libyan government, Sadiq al Mahdi, and Mengitsu Haile Mariam’s Ethiopian government had provided the weapons, funding, and base of operations to support the coup. The ground troops came from two sources: first, Sadiq al-Mahdi’s Ansar
Army from Darfur, and second, the Arab Legion (also called the Islamic Legion), recruited and organized by Qaddafi—and trained and armed by the Soviet Union—to spearhead Gaddafi’s grand strategy for expanding Libyan (and Arab) influence in the region. These Legion recruits mainly came from the Baqqara Rizaqat tribe from Darfur, Arab cattle herders whose way of life was slowly disappearing.” Leach (2012, 22,114) similarly argues that “another coup attempt in 1976 almost certainly impressed upon [Nemery] that the National Front could pose a constant threat to his rule. Exiled sectarians like Sadiq Al-Mahdi were key instigators of the 2 July 1976 revolt, but Libya, the Soviet Union, and the Muslim Brothers were also complicit.” Based on this evidence, we code this as a case of prior defection. Unlike the previous coup attempt of September 1976, we find no evidence of participation by the current military.

- # 625-1977-2-3: Sudan, Jaafar el-Nemery

**Category:** not regime leader

**Event:** On Wednesday, February 2, 1977, rebel air-defense units tried to seize the airport in Juba, the capital of the southern province of Equatoria (750 miles south of Khartoum). Sudanese authorities reported that 10 people died in fighting by the First Sudanese Command assisted by security forces to crush the attempt. The statement said the rebels’ goal was to “destroy property, morale, and national unity” (Associated Press, 1977e). On February 3, Vice President Alier issued a statement saying the government had arrested 28 people for the Juba conspiracy on January 28 while they were meeting, but this arrest did not deter the remaining conspirators, which led to the attack on February 2 at about 2 p.m. (Omdurman Domestic Service, 1977b). On February 5, the Sudanese News Agency reported that 17 rebel soldiers involved in the attempt to seize the Juba airport were caught the previous day in the bush near Juba (United Press International, 1977d).

**Coding rationale:** The alleged leader of the “sabotage attack operation” was Sgt. Paul Soki (Omdurman Domestic Service, 1977a). Al-Ayyam reported that those arrested confessed that the exiled former parliamentary deputy Philip Abbas Gaboash, a native of western Sudan, was the plot’s mastermind (Agence France-Presse, 1977a). On
February 6, Alier accused foreign powers of engineering the Juba attack (Associated Press, 1977f). On February 8, Nemery dismissed his cabinet in a move seen as an attempt to consolidate his power. Nemery said other uprisings were also intended in other towns. He said the attack was “aimed at creating unrest among the masses”, but was put down in three hours. Sudanese newspapers reported that the rebels “planned to assassinate a number of ministers and the divide the Sudan in half” (Associated Press, 1977g).

Sudanese officials also said that the Juba plot was another Libyan (and Ethiopian) bid to “install a rightist government with close ties to Libya”. Southern Sudanese sources said the rebels’ aim was to “establish a base in the south from which to launch an attack on the Nimeri government in the north” and destroy the Addis Ababa agreement. In addition to 35 arrested or caught in Juba in connection with the plot by March 10, others were arrested in Wau and Malakal, two other principal towns in the south, which suggests the plot was not limited to seizing Juba. Gen. Lagu, who put down the plot, said that over half of those involved were northerners in the pay of rightist politicians who had been in power before May 1969. The regional minister of culture, Marding de Garang, said that Libya and Ethiopia had provided four planes to fly in from Ethiopia once Juba airport was under rebel control, which would bring in Sadik al-Mahdi and another opposition leader Philip Abbas. Garang said the northerners behind the plot had recruited some disgruntled southern soldiers (but no officers) by promising them higher ranks and salaries. He said the plan called for eliminating the entire regional leadership and dividing the country into four states, each with the autonomy the south enjoyed at the time. The southern state was allegedly to be named the Imatong Republic and headed by Joseph Oduhu, a top southern rebel leader during the civil war who had been jailed in 1976 for plotting. He was known to oppose the 1972 accord for not giving the south enough autonomy (Ottaway, 1977).

Asked specifically whether the Juba airport attack was a coup attempt or a rebellion, Nemery said “What happened Juba airport in February cannot be described as a coup attempt or even as a mere rebellion. What happened, simply, is that an isolated minority was tempted by money to carry out a stupid act which had no purpose other than to
cause a minor disturbance to disrupt Sudan’s festivities on the fifth unity anniversary”, adding that “Two men and two states were behind this little plan, which was foiled in 1 hour. The first man was Philip Abbas Ghabbush, who was backed by Israel. The Israeli papers said that he was working to establish a state in Sudan which would have the closest associations with Israel. The second man was Husayn al-Hindi, who was financed by Libya and supported by Ethiopia” (Middle East News Agency, 1977).

Powell and Thyne (2011), Roessler (2011), and McGowan (2007) all code this event as a coup attempt. However, the evidence reviewed above does not give us a strong basis for believing the Juba attack targeted the regime leader. The little available evidence suggests the plot actually targeted the regional ministers in southern Sudan, not the executive power in Khartoum, and sought greater autonomy or independence from Khartoum for southern Sudan. As such, we code this event as not regime leader.

• # 645-1970-1-20: IRAQ, AHMED AL-BAKR

Category: **failed regime change coup**

*Event:* On January 20, 1970, Col. Salah Mahdi Samarrai led troops from the Rashid Camp to the Republican palace, but the regime had uncovered the plot and ambushed the coup plotters once they were in motion. The attempt was foiled when loyalist forces arrested them (Karsh and Rautsi, 1991, 44). After hearing news of the failure, co-conspirator and Aref loyalist Maj. Gen. Abd Al-Ghani Al-Rawi fled to Iran (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008, 118-19).

*Coding rationale:* The coup event was an attempt to oust al-Bakr, who had ousted the Aref regime in a 1968 coup. Multiple sources argue that al-Bakr installed a regime dominated by Ba’thist military officers and ruled through the Revolutionary Command Council of the Ba’th party’s military section (Haddad, 1971, 138-40, 143-4, 157-64; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, 15-17, 120). Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code the Aref and al-Bakr governments as two distinct autocratic regimes because the former excluded the Ba’thists while the party was the regime in the latter.\(^{39}\) The 1970 coup attempt leaders

\(^{39}\)For example, Baram (1989, 450) writes: “\textcolor{red}{|}less than a fortnight after the ouster of Abd
were retired military officers, Major-General 'Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarra’i (Karsh and Rautsi, 1991, 44), though the coup involved current military officers also. Karsh and Rautsi (1991, 44) describes al-Rawi as “a protege of the Aref brothers”, who had been ousted in the 1968 regime change coup led by al-Bakr; and Al-Marashi and Salama (2008, 118-19) also refer to him as an Aref loyalist. And Ghareeb and Dougherty (2004, 708) records 'Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi as one of 4 Vice Premiers in the Aref government in 1967. Using this evidence, we assume that had the January 1970 coup been successful the new government would have returned power to Aref loyalists, again excluding the Ba’thists (including al-Bakr and Hussein) from power. Therefore we code this case a failed regime change coup.

• # 645-1973-6-30: IRAQ, AHMED AL-BAKR

Category: failed regime change coup

Event On June 30, 1973, the chief of internal security Col. Nazem Kazzar reportedly engineered an assassination of the Defense Minister (Lt. Gen. Hammad Shihab) and the Interior Minister (Lt. Gen. Sadoun Ghaidan), both of which were members of the 15-man RCC. Kazzar realized that for his coup to succeed, he would have to eliminate the two generals, the only other remaining officer politicians. Afterwards, he had planned to assassinate Al-Bakr at the airport after arriving from a trip to Poland. When his plan was delayed, Kazzar’s men at the airport dispersed fearing the coup had been discovered, but failed to inform Kazzar (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008, 119).

Coding rationale: Col. Nazem Kazzar had co-led the special court which ordered the execution of the plotters in the 1970 coup attempt. He had served as Director of the General Security Service since 1969, an appointee of Saddam Hussein. “By 1973, Kazzar feared that Al-Bakr and Hussein would no longer allow him to develop an independent power base in the security services. Kazzar, himself a Shia, appar-

al-Rahman ’Arif on 17 July 1968, two of the four officers who made the coup possible... were removed from power by the Ba’th party. From 30 July, Iraq was ruled by a small RCC consisting of the generals Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (who became a field marshal in 1969), Salih Mahdi ’Ammash, Hardan, ’Abd al-Ghaffar al-Tikriti, Sa’dun Ghaydan, and Hammad Shihab. This group was compact and monolithic; its members were all career officers with only a military education and all its members were born before 1930.”
ently said during his attempted coup that he would ‘wipe Takrit off the map,’ acknowledging his umbrage at the Takriti domination in the military and higher echelons of the state” (Al-Marashi and Salama, 2008, 119). Kechichian (1988, 243) states that on “June 1973, a plot by Nazim Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to assassinate President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was foiled. Kazzar, who resented both Sunni and Tikriti domination of the Baath Party, had taken a prominent part in organizing the massacre of communists in the anarchy that followed the military’s seizure of power in February 1963.” While the coup leader, Kazzar, was a regime insider as the Director of the GSS, we use the references to ethnic animosity as evidence that had the coup succeeded, the al-Bakr regime would have been removed, including the dominance of the Tikriti clan.40 Thus we interpret this evidence as constituting an attempt to prevent the ethnic narrowing of the al-Bakr regime,41 which constitutes a regime change coup attempt.

• # 645-1991-9-23: IRAQ, SADDAM HUSSEIN

Category: coup plot
Event: An Associated Press (1991a) report states that “IRNA [Iran’s official Islamic Republic News Agency] said Free Iraq attributed its information on the 76 executions to unidentified Iraqi military sources. The broadcast reported “a state of anxiety and revolt” in the army in the wake of a failed coup... The report did not provide the ranks or

40 Lewis (1988) writes that “by 1968 close family and tribal ties bound the Baath’s ruling clique. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis–Sunni Arabs from the northwest town of Tikrit–related to Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. Three of the five members of the Baath’s Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were Tikritis; two, Bakr and Hammad Shihab, were related to each other. The cabinet posts of president, prime minister, and defense minister went to Tikritis. Saddam Husayn, a key leader behind the scenes, also was a Tikriti and a relative of Bakr.”

41 An alternative interpretation is that Kazzar merely had policy disputes with the al-Bakr government: “General Kazar over-reached himself when with a small group of fellow Shias, he attempted his own coup d’état by kidnapping the ministers of defence and interior and trying to kill president al-Bakr... Kazar tried to negotiate with the ruling Ba’ath party, of which he was a prominent member... His populist, hardline demands to conduct more assertive anti-Israeli policies, stronger anti-Kurdish measures, support for Palestinian groups, and purging of the Ba’ath party were not accepted” (Bennett, 2006, 17). Even this description, however, notes that the coup attempt leaders were Shia, in contrast the Sunni Tikriti of the al-Bakr regime.
other details on the identity of the officers allegedly executed, IRNA said. The Iraqi president sacked Hammadi as prime minister on Sept. 14 and also removed him from the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. Hammadi, the highest-ranking Shiite Muslim in the Sunni-dominated Arab Baath Socialist Party, was replaced as prime minister by another Shiite, Mohammed al-Zubaidi, but his seat on the council was left vacant. The surprise move followed other purges in the government and the military during which Saddam clearly sought to tighten his inner circle. However, reports of Hammadi’s involvement in a coup attempt were never confirmed by western sources. Hammadi would not be arrested or executed following the coup attempt, and he was restored to the RCC in 1994. Ghareeb and Dougherty (2004, 392), which would suggest he was not involved. U.S. intelligence agencies were unable to confirm reports by Iraqi exiles of coup attempts since the Gulf War ended at the end of 1991 (Smith and John, 1991).

Coding rationale: Because we cannot find a source that identifies the coup plotters or a concrete action by coup plotters, we code this event as a coup plot. Hussein opponents in exile had alleged coup attempts to create the perception that Hussein was weak because military officers were attempting to oust him. The only source for this coup attempt in the Powell-Thyne data is the Polity project’s coup data set, which lists Hammadi as the coup attempt leader. An obituary of Hammadi states “[i]n his drive to stay in power after the Kuwait defeat, Mr. Hussein sought to portray himself as more politically flexible and gave up the prime minister’s post to install Mr. Hammadi in it. But he fired Mr. Hammadi within six months, after the new prime minister spoke up for change and democracy, and publicly humiliated him by demoting him to the lowest party ranks. Mr. Hammadi accepted the move without complaint and continued to be loyal” (Associated Press, 2007). Lansford (2013, 669) confirms that in January 1992, “80 military officers charged with participating in a coup attempt were executed along with 76 antiregime demonstrators.” A Human Rights Watch report states that ‘[t]he dismissal in mid-September of Saadoun Hammadi as prime minister, and his removal from the RCC, was viewed as a setback for the putative effort at political reform... In April, Hammadi, a Shi’a and Baath Party loyalist known for his pragmatic views, had openly advocated “the importance of strengthening the rule of law through the
reform of the legal system, press freedom, and pluralism in all spheres, as well as through the change of revolutionary institutions into democratic and constitutional ones,” according to the state-controlled Iraqi News Agency. One Western authority on the Arab world explained: “It was after he had expressed these views at a congress of the Baath party in Baghdad on 13 September that Hammadi was sacked.” Some saw the move as a precursor to additional purges of reformers in the bureaucracy and the military and security establishments. The significance of Hammadi’s later partial rehabilitation, through his appointment on November 6 as a presidential adviser with cabinet rank, remains to be seen” (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Hammadi was also the Iraqi Parliament speaker from 1996 to 2003 in Hussein’s regime. This evidence suggests that Hammadi was demoted prior to the coup event. However, these reports do not provide any evidence of Hammadi executing a coup attempt.

- # 645-1992-6-15: IRAQ, SADDAM HUSSEIN
  
  **Category:** coup plot
  
  **Event:** On Thursday July 2, 1992, it was reported that “Iraqi military forces may have tried to stage a coup against President Saddam Hussein on Monday [June 29], and intelligence reports have indicated that an armed revolt was crushed by presidential security forces, Bush administration officials and Iraqi opposition leaders said Thursday. Initial reports about a coup attempt were sketchy at best. One Administration official would say only that the coup plotters were intercepted early.” An Iraqi opposition leader, Ahmad Chalabi, said that he had received reports that a mechanized brigade of Iraqi Republican Guards led by Brig. Sabri Mahmoud was issuing ammunition to their men and preparing to mount an assault on Baghdad when the brigade was “pounced on” by several battalions of security forces (Tyler, 1992b). By contrast, the statement by the London-based Iraqi National Congress said that Mahmoud’s brigade actually “had pushed toward Baghdad but was thwarted in its advance at an unnamed location on the northwestern outskirts”, where Mahmoud was killed by loyal Takriti Republican Guards led by Gen. Kamal Mustafa, a relative of Saddam Hussein (Boustany, 1992a).

However, on July 3, U.S. officials said the intelligence community found
no evidence to support the claim that Sabri Mahmoud led a coup attempt as claimed by the INC, saying that the “tale of a firefight” was “implausible” given there was no report of an accompanying assassination attempt by someone close to Saddam, which would have been needed for a single brigade to attempt to attack the highly guarded capital. Rather, a confidential intelligence report not from exiles indicated that in “a closed meeting of several hundred senior military officers from units around the nation” Saddam himself had concocted claims of a coup attempt “as a pretext for purging unwanted officers” (Smith, 1992).

By July 6, U.S. officials reported a military purge in Baghdad, set off by “Hussein’s discovery of a plot that, in a meeting with officers, he attributed to the United States and Jordan...Another American official said that the attempt was to have been coordinated with other units, but that Mr. Hussein broke it up before it could get under way. One official said the United States was involved in the plot but would not provide any details. Mr. Hussein reportedly told his officers that a group of conspirators in the upper reaches of the military had been detected, arrested and tortured” (Tyler, 1992a). Jordan’s King Hussein denied being part of a coup plot. A western diplomat in Washington said that, contrary to initial press reports, “a mechanized brigade did not move on Baghdad on June 29 to seize power, but rather was ‘pounced on’ by Saddam’s forces as part of the crackdown that led to the executions” of some 140 Iraqi officers in recent days (Boustany, 1992b). One intelligence report reportedly said “There are accounts of exchanges of gunfire, but the Iraqi brigade [led by Sabri Mahmoud] apparently never moved out of its compound.” The U.S. State Department took an agnostic view of whether there was a genuine or staged coup attempt, while the Defense Department interpreted intelligence as indicating a coup attempt was stopped before it was a serious threat. A senior pentagon official also said that after the abortive coup, “elements in the military and security forces in Baghdad and in the northern city of Kirkuk engaged in factional fighting from June 30 to July 2” (Gordon, 1992).

Coding rationale: Because of a lack of reliable sources in country following the Gulf War, conflicting reports emerged (see above) and thus it is virtually impossible to confirm any details on this and other alleged
coup attempts.\textsuperscript{42} Based on this evidence, we assume there was a coup plot, but not necessarily a coup attempt. The claim that there was any movement of troops or fighting on the outskirts of Baghdad on June 29 came from the initial INC statement of July 1, a claim which was never publicly corroborated by western intelligence or other sources. By almost all subsequent accounts, Saddam’s loyalist forces preempted (or concocted) a plot before Sabri’s forces ever left their compound at Taji. All that is known for certain is that there was a purge following the alleged incident, which may have been staged.

Had a coup attempt occurred as initially reported, we would code this event as a failed reshuffling coup because the Republican Guard was a central component to Hussein’s security apparatus, controlled by Qusay Hussein, head of the Special Security Organization. Al-Marashi (2003) argues that the “Republican Guard is used as a screen between the army and Baghdad, to prevent any coup attempts. Despite Saddam’s high-profile use of the Republican Guard, they are strategically deployed outside Baghdad so as not to facilitate or allow any one of the Guard units to act against the regime.” Further, the Republican Guard was comprised mostly of Sunnis and were not conscripts.\textsuperscript{43} Hirst (1993) reports that “In July [1992] Colonel Sabri Mahmoud, a commander of the loyalist Republican Guard, attempted the last known military coup. After having him shot, Saddam went to the colonel’s birthplace, Shaagat, near Mosul. There, around the grave, he performed a traditional Bedouin sword dance. What Iraqis who saw it on their television screens did not realize, or not at first, was that it was the colonel’s own father and nearest of kin, from the Jiburi clan, who were forced to dance with the Iraqi president...The Jiburis, a large Sunni clan, have

\textsuperscript{42}Cordesman (1999, 26) further details reports of at least four other alleged coup attempts, followed by military purges in the remainder of 1992 and 1993.

\textsuperscript{43}Baram (1997, 5) explains that Republican Guard recruitment was also tribal: “[a]t least since he became president, Saddam Hussein has also recruited people for security positions mainly from certain tribes, notably his own (Al-bu Nasir), the Jubbir, and the ‘Ubayd. During the Iran-Iraq War, after the retreat from Khorramshahr in May 1982, Saddam stepped up and expanded this policy to other Arab tribes from various parts of Iraq, most of them Sunni but also some Shia. Reportedly, from the Jubbir alone (mainly near Tikrit) 50,000 young men were recruited for the president’s personal guard, the Republican, and the Special Republican Guards. All these are units where loyalty to the president was of particular importance, because they were assigned the duty ‘of protecting him [Saddam Hussein] from the army.’ ”
been a traditional bulwark of the regime. Luckily for Saddam, they are far from united, but one can well imagine what feelings lie behind that mask of joyous allegiance which the late Col Mahmoud’s branch of it affect.” Although not a member of Hussein’s al-Nasir tribe, Todd (2006, 6) confirms that the Jibur in Shaagat (neighboring Tikrit) was an allied Sunni tribe. Thus we do not interpret this event as an attempt to prevent the ethnic narrowing of the regime. STAGED COUP PLOT

- # 645-1995-6-15: IRAQ, SADDAM HUSSEIN

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On Wednesday, June 14, 1995, Republican Guard armored tank troops mutinied, attacking a government radio transmitter in Abu Ghraib 12 miles west of Baghdad, but were crushed by other loyal Republican Guard units. Reports said the unrest began after the authorities sent home the body of the brother of Brig. Turki ismail al-Dulaimi, commander of the July 14 Tank Battalion. The brother, an air force general, had been executed on charges of trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Brig. Dulaimi took his tank unit from the western town of Ramadi to Abu Ghraib “in an effort to free hundreds of people from the vast prison complex there” (Reuters, 1995), but he was killed or committed suicide as his forces were defeated (Agence France-Presse, 1995c).

**Coding rationale:** Initial news reports of the event relied on Iraqi opposition spokesmen in exile, which led some to doubt whether a coup attempt actually occurred. U.S. officials said they believed that a mutiny did occur. However, western press did verify from local residents, refugees, and Arab diplomats that riots in al-Ramadi had broken out in mid-May, apparently after the tortured body of Maj. Gen. Mohammed Mazlum al-Dulaymi, the former commander of al-Bakr air...

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44 The State Department’s Nicholas Burns acknowledged that the U.S. conclusion that the Dulaimi clan provoked the mutiny, however, was based on an inference. However, a Baghdad-based Reuters correspondent who visited the Abu Ghraib area and the spokesman for the UN Special Commission on Iraq said they were unable to find any evidence of fighting or a coup attempt (Smith and Thomas, 1995). Kenneth Katzman, a former CIA analyst then working for the Congressional Research Service, said the clash may have been nothing more than a feud boiling over among officers, saying he saw no evidence of an organized plot. Iraq denied the reports of unrest (Reuters, 1995).
base in Karkuk, was returned to his family (Agence France-Presse, 1995b). Clashes between the rioters and loyal security forces led to a rising death toll through mid-June (Agence France-Presse, 1995a,d). By June 20, Iraqi opposition and Arab diplomats in Europe said that Iraq had begun a major purge, arresting and executing as many as 150 soldiers and officers associated with the mutiny, involving some 1,000 soldiers. Air support from helicopters did not materialize once it was clear the government was on to the plot. Opposition officials said the plan was based on the hopes that other units would rebel and support them once word of the uprising spread (Ibrahim, 1995).

The Dulaymi rebels were Sunnis and “all traditionally loyal to Saddam Husayn and once formed the backbone of his support” (Agence France-Presse, 1995e). However, “The growing incidence of coup attempts by Dulaymi, Ubyadi, and Jiburi officers...contributed to the unraveling of Saddam’s ties to the tribes. Moreover, Saddam’s ruthlessness and viciousness the mutilation of the bodies of coup plotters merely inflamed the tribes’ thirst for vengeance. The return of the mutilated body of a Dulaymi officer, General Mahammad Madhloum Al-Dulaymi, who had participated in a coup attempt in May 1995, led to serious disturbances among members of the Dulaymi tribe outside the city of Ramadi” (Hashim, 2003, 32). Based on this evidence, we assume there is a coup attempt and not merely a plot. Given the participation of Sunnis and Republican guards, we do not interpret this event as an attempt to prevent the ethnic narrowing of the regime, and code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 652-1982-1-31: SYRIA, HAFeZ Al-ASSAD

Category: coup plot

Event: On January 20, 1982, an Abu Dhabi newspaper, Al-Khalij, reported foreign and Arab diplomatic sources in Beirut as saying that some 20 Syrian Air Force pilots and several officers of the armoured corps stationed around Damascus had taken part in an abortive coup (Agence France-Presse, 1982a). Those same sources said the plot was supposed to involve Syrian planes bombing the meeting place of the Ba’ath party’s central committee as well as the houses of al-Assad and his brother followed by the armoured corps moving into Damascas. However they said that “at the last moment Syrian authorities ar-
rested all those involved in the plot” (Al-Khalij, 1982). Powell and Thyne (2011) do not report a coup attempt until January 31, which is the day that the major U.S. press first picked up the story, even though the alleged event evidently took place earlier in the month.

Coding rationale: On January 24, local radio reported that “Salah Ja-did’s group” had been accused of attempting the abortive coup, leading to the arrest of 117 officers (Voice of Lebanon, 1982c). On that day, Syrian army units reportedly surrounded Aleppo in search of officers who took part in the recent coup plot, leading to clashes with the Muslim Brotherhood (Voice of Lebanon, 1982a). On January 26, it was reported that four Alawite officers among those who had planned the coup attempt revealed the plot to the intelligence chief 24 hours in advance, which enabled authorities to make large-scale preemptive arrests (Voice of Lebanon, 1982b). The western media picked up on the story on January 31, saying that former Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Naji Jamil (who resigned in April 1978) was executed as a conspirator in an “attempted coup” (Associated Press, 1982f). As of February 6, 25 officers had been executed and at least 175 arrested, though Syrian officials denied any coup attempt. Reports also noted that Syrian security forces blocked the coup early in January while the plotters were still planning their operation (New York Times, 1982c; Associated Press, 1982e) As such, we code this event as a coup plot rather than a coup attempt.

• # 678-1978-10-15: YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC, ALI ABDULLAH SALIH

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Sunday, October 15, 1978, nine high-ranking army officers were killed in an abortive coup attempt. Rebel officers from four battalions of the army and military police shelled the presidential palace while Saleh was visiting the Red Sea port of Hodeida (Washington Post, 1978a). Burrowes (2005, 256) states that the coup attempt was "put down violently only after it was already well in motion."

Coding rationale: Salih took power as President of North Yemen in July 1978 after his predecessor was assassinated by an emissary from the South the month before (Dresch, 2000, 147). Salih began almost immediately to change the identity of those who could influence pol-
icy, reducing the military’s role and incorporating sheikhs. Beginning in late 1978, he purged important officers, narrowing the faction of the military included in the inner circle. He brought back to influence sheikhs who had been excluded since 1974 and gave his family and tribe a privileged place in decision making, distribution, and command positions in the military (Burrowes, 1987, 94-130; Dresch, 2000, 149; Clark, 2010, 122). Burrowes (2010, xxxii) characterizes the coup event as an “attempt by pro-Hamdi “Nasirites” against President Salih.” The leader of the failed coup attempt, Major Mujahid al-Kuhali, escaped into exile in the PDYR and joined an anti-Salih rebellion with the National Democratic Front (Gause, 1990, 131; Burrowes, 2005, 210). Using this evidence, we assume that if the coup attempt had been successful, the pro-Hamdi forces would have been restored to power and the narrowing of the coalition around Salih’s family would not have occurred. Thus we code the event as a failed regime change coup attempt.

• # 696-1972-1-25: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, SHEIKH ZAID IBN SULTAN AL NAHAYAN

Category: not regime leader

Event: On Monday, January 25, 1972, the ruling family of the emirate of Sharja elected an interim ruler to succeed the emir Sheik Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, who was shot to death in an attempted coup d'état. He was found dead in the palace with a single shot through the heart. The cousin of the slain ruler, Sheik Saqr bin Sultan, reportedly led the plot and was arrested along with 18 followers. The cousin was a former ruler who had been deposed and had returned secretly and seized the palace with an armed party. He had expected strong support for his coup and was surprised when it did not materialize. Instead, Sharja police units surrounded the palace and exchanged fire with the rebels until the latter surrendered. The new leader was Sheik

45 For example, Dresch (2000, 149) notes that “[Salih] placed his trust first of all in his own half-brother, Ali Salih, whom he posted to Hizyaz... Muhammad Salih also became prominent. The president’s full brother, Muhammad Abdullah Salih, emerged as chief of Central Security, and other obvious relatives, such as Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, soon appears on the list of senior officers, as did members of families... related to the president’s family by marriage.”

Coding rationale: The coup attempt was against Sheik Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, the emir of Sharja, not Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan, who was the emir of Abu Dhabi and the first president of the UAE from 1971-2004. That is, the coup attempt was not against the leader of the UAE, but rather the leader of one of the seven emirates which make up the UAE. Because the coup action targets an executive who is not the regime leader, this case is coded as not regime leader.

- # 696-1987-6-16: United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Zaid ibn Sultan Al Nahayan

**Category:** not regime leader

**Event:** Between June 17-23, 1987, an attempted coup led by the Sheik’s brother Sheikh Abdel-Aziz bin Muhammad al-Qasimi took place and temporarily unseated the emir of Sharja. On June 17, Sharja state radio said the Sheik Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qasimi had abdicated because of “financial difficulties” in favor of his brother, but others reported he had been ousted in a palace coup. Members of the national guard deployed to Sharja (Associated Press, 1987a). The abdication statement was purportedly made on his behalf giving power to his older brother, the commander of the national guard. But Dubai radio said this was “an unacceptable move to take over government by force”, and called on the federation government to intervene (Associated Press, 1987c). On June 18, Sheik Abdel Aziz barricaded himself in the royal palace with hundreds of national guardsmen and rejected pleas from a delegation of the the Supreme Council of the URA to call off the coup. Aziz reportedly had the support of Sharja’s business community, which accused Qassimi of ruining the economy (Washington Post, 1987b). On June 19, Aziz held out against threats of intervention by Dubai on Sultan’s behalf. On June 20, the UAE Supreme Council reinstated the ruler of Sharja and named the coup leader as crown prince of the emirate. Abdel Aziz said he replaced his brother with the backing of the Qassimi clan (Associated Press, 1987b). On June 21, UAE President Zayed bin Sultan Naheyan commenced power-sharing talks. Aziz would have no specific powers as crown prince unless bestowed by the
ruling family; he reportedly wanted to be confirmed as commander of Sharja’s national guard and to influence the budget, which he accused his brother of mismanaging (Associated Press, 1987d). On June 23, Aziz finally ended his coup attempt and agreed to be deputy to his brother and to attend UAE Supreme Council meetings (Washington Post, 1987c).

Coding rationale: The coup attempt was against Sheik Sultan bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, the emir of Sharja, not Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan, who was the emir of Abu Dhabi and the first president of the UAE from 1971-2004. That is, the coup attempt was not against the leader of the UAE, but rather the leader of one of the seven emirates which make up the UAE. Because the coup action targets an executive who is not the regime leader, this case is coded as not regime leader.

• # 700-1990-3-7: Afghanistan, Mohammed Najibullah

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On Tuesday, March 6, 1990, the Afghan government reported a coup attempt by Defense Minister Shanawaz Tanai after a day of heavy fighting with troops attacking the Presidential palace in Kabul by air and fighting loyalist forces around the capital city. U.S. officials said 20 aerial sorties were launched against the palace (Rosenthal, 1990). The coup was publicly supported by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who told reporters in Islamabad he urged mujaheddin to join the coup. But Sibghatullah Mojaddidi, President of the Pakistan-based rebel government, refused. The plot coincided on the day that trials began for those arrested in December 1988 for spying for Hekmatyar, in which Tanai was implicated but not arrested (Coll, 1990a). On March 7, Tanai and 16 others, including 13 senior military officers, his wife, and children reportedly flew to Pakistan, but Tanai later went back to direct the coup effort. Street fighting and air raids in and near Kabul continued. Initial reports said two army divisions and a large portion of the air force sided with Tanai or waited to take sides. After initial hesitation, mujaheddin leaders seized the opportunity to launch attacks against government installations near Kabul (Reuters, 1990a; Coll, 1990b). By March 8, loyal troops pushed the rebels out of Kabul, though fighting continued at an air base north of the city (Coll, 1990c). On March
9, despite quiet in Kabul, Tanai issued a radio broadcast calling on rebels to intensify fighting, saying to “contact the nearby mujaheddin commanders and along with them overthrow the hated regime of Najib and accomplish the hope of the Moslem nation of Afghanistan, which is to establish a national Islamic government” (Reuters, 1990c). Interior Minister General Mohammad Alsam Watjanar was crucial to foiling the coup attempt, ordering the sarandoi paramilitary police force to intercept the army’s 15th Tank Brigade dispatched by Tanai (Burns, 1990).

Coding rationale: Tanai, considered one of the most hardline Khalq members of the ruling People’s Democratic Party, was known as a strong opponent of efforts to negotiate a settlement of fighting between the Afghan government and the mujaheddin (Rosenthal, 1990). It therefore surprised most observers when Hekmatyar supported the coup (other mujaheddin did not despite pressure from the Pakistan military and U.S. embassy) (Coll and Rupert, 1990). Tanai stated he sought to install a Muslim regime, the stated goal of Hekmatyar. Both Tanai and Hekmatyar were Pashtun. The alliance between Hekmatyar and Tanai led some to suspect a role for Pakistan’s ISI in the attempt (Coll, 1990c). Indeed, Coll (2004) later revealed that ISI had helped Tanai and Hekmatyar hold secret talks about a coup attempt since at least December 1989. Coll says CIA reports at the time said the money needed to buy off Afghan army units and win support of rebel commanders came at least in part from Osama bin Laden. Hekmatyar and Tanai had announced they had formed a new Revolutionary Council, though Hekmatyar’s Army of Sacrifice was never able to make it to Kabul from the Pakistani border, despite Tanai’s drive south in an attempt to open a cordon. Coll surmised that Tanai may have moved the coup attempt ahead of schedule because a military treason trial under way that winter threatened to expose his plotting. Tanai later said he was forced to attempt a coup because “Najibullah kept plotting against him – arresting friends, pressuring him, and finally calling out Presidential guards to pin him down in the Ministry of Defense, a possible presage to his arrest” (Coll, 2012).

Suhrke (1990, 243) describes the coup motivations as “deep divisions within the PDPA had produced repeated coup attempts against the ruling faction. The more serious one in March 1990 was endorsed by a rad-
ical rebel leader in Pakistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who represented the originally most irreconcilable Islamists among the mujahedin. The coup was led by Shah Nawaz Tanai, an army general from the originally most radically Marxist faction of the PDPA. But the rebel leader and the rebellious general shared a common opposition to the conciliatory line of the ruling party faction in Kabul, which threatened to marginalize both of them. Moreover, both the rebel and the general were united by a tribal bond; they were Ghilzai Pashtun who historically had competed with the ruling Durrani Pashtun.” The regime leader (Najibullah), the coup leader (Tanai) and the main rebel leader allied with the coup leader (Hekmatyar) were all Pashtun, which EPR codes as the senior partner ethnic group. However, Najibullah was a Parchami Ghilzai Pashtun from Paktia, and Tanai was a Khalqi Pashtun from Paktia (Rubin, 2002; Sinno, 2008, 152, various pages). The coup attempt came after Najibullah increased the power of the Parcham and decreased the number of Khalqis in the Central Committee; after the failed coup in the Soviet Union in 1991, many Khalqi leaders joined Hekmatyar in rebellion (Rubin, 2002, 152). After the failed coup bid, Tanai and many Khalqi officers joined Hekmatyar. “Tanai is said to have joined the Taliban in November 1995” (Adamec, 2012, 412). The ISI-backed Taliban are the next autocratic regime coded by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), ruling from Kabul starting in 1996.

Because the coup attempt was sponsored by Pakistani ISI and supported by a mujahideen leader, we code this as failed regime change coup attempt, on the assumption that Tanai’s regime would have included the rebel Hekmatyar in the new government and excluded senior Durrani Pashtun’s from the ruling coalition.

• # 771-1977-10-2: BANGLADESH, ZIAUR RAHMAN

Category: **failed regime change coup**

**Event:** On September 30, 1977, a mutiny broke out at an army base at Bogra north of Dacca. This mutiny spread to Dacca on October 2, coinciding with a Japan Airlines hijacking by the Japanese Red Army which began September 28. At midnight on October 2, a group of non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the air force and army tried to overpower presidential guard and defense perimeter at the president’s house. The 46th Brigade stationed in Dacca turned back the rebels,
ensuring the coup’s failure (Khan, 1981, 556). Subsequently, a group of rebels briefly seized Bangladesh Radio for two hours or so. In a radio broadcast, the rebels called themselves a “people’s army”, announcing on the radio that “an armed revolution” was under way by the military, students, peasants, and workers. Rebels fought loyalist troops at the airport for several hours, where senior officers were negotiating with the hijackers (United Press International, 1977a; Associated Press, 1977d). Rebels executed 11 air force officers at the airport before the 9th Division reinforced the 46th Brigade and put an end to the rebellion (Khan, 1981, 557). President Ziaur Rahman then went on the radio to announce a revolt by “disgruntled elements” and “some undisciplined soldiers” had been put down (News Dispatches, 1977).

Coding rationale: Some early news reports dismissed the mutiny as simply a spontaneous effort to back up claims for more pay and better working conditions (e.g. Chinoy, 1977). Yet the political fallout after the coup attempt suggests it was more than a pay dispute. Heitzman and Worden (1989) notes that “Zia promptly dismissed both the military and the civilian intelligence chiefs. Three of the aspirants to the army chief of staff post, at the time held by Zia, were also removed; in 1981 one of them, Major General Muhammad Manzur Ahmed, was to lead the coup that resulted in the assassination of Zia.” By November 4, 1977, Rahman also had banned three political parties, including the Communist Party of Bangladesh and the main opposition party, a radical “Trotskyist” party called the Jatiya Samaj Dantrik Dal (JSD-Socialist Nationalist Party). This raised suspicions that these parties had infiltrated the armed forces and one or more masterminded the coup attempt (Christian Science Monitor, 1977). Indeed, most accounts implicate left-wing radicals.

To start, Rashiduzzaman (1978, 131) observes that “The liberation legacy and the upheavals of 1975 left the marks of disunity among the soldiers. Hard core followers of JSD and the Marxists were known to be working among the rank and file...Leftists elements have sought to radicalize the soldiers, but personal vendettas are also at work...The rhetoric of the rebels indicates that radicals were behind the uprising.” In addition, the Bogra mutiny, which some accounts characterize as the first phase of the October 2 coup attempt (e.g. Rahman and Baxter, 2010, 55), had itself been preceded by a series of seemingly un-
related mutinies at bases in Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Rangpur. Khan (1981, 555-558) argues these mutinies were all guided by “the hand of an ideological group the same as or at least similar to Taher’s”, a clear reference to the JSD. Khan argues that JSD “clandestine revolutionary cells” used these mutinies to test the strength and will of the officer class and Zia loyalists as a prelude to a coup. Khan concludes the coup was “not an isolated incident, but rather the climax of all the efforts...to establish a classless armed force with corresponding implications for the entire Bengali society.”

Based on this evidence, we code this as a failed regime change coup. Had it succeeded, we assume the radical NCOs and junior officers would not have ruled through Zia’s ruling Jagadal/BNP party but another set of opposition left-wing politicians (from one of the subsequently banned parties).

• # 771-1981-5-30: Bangladesh, Zia ur-Rahman

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: On Saturday, May 30, 1981, Ziaur Rahman was killed in the southern city of Chittagong; Vice President Abdus Sattar took over as acting president (Ledbetter, 1981). Rebels announced on Chittagong Radio that they were taking over the government. The government declared a state of emergency. President Zia was reportedly asleep in a guest house when he, two aides, and several body guards were assassinated by what the government first called “miscreants” and later identified as a group of mutinous troops from the 24th Division stationed in Chittagong led by Major General Manzur Ahmed. In a broadcast on Sunday morning from Chittagong, Manzur announced that his seven-member revolutionary council would provide “a clean and uncorruptible administration”, but he did not list specific reasons for the coup attempt. Lt. Gen. H.M. Ershad, the army chief of staff, said the rebels were confined to the Chittagong radio station but other troops remained loyal. The rebels said they had abrogated Bangladesh’s 1972

46Initial reports noted that the area around Bogra was known for its support of the JSD (United Press International, 1977a). The Bogra mutiny was also reported as an effort of an army tank regiment to seize the base in order to negotiate the release of Lt. Col. Farook Rahman, one of the majors who led the August 1975 coup (Rahman and Baxter, 2010, 55)
treaty of friendship with India and planned to retake a small island in the Ganges river that India had occupied in an ongoing territorial dispute (Honsa, 1981; Rangan, 1981; Branigin, 1981).

On Sunday, H.M. Ershad issued a broadcast giving the mutineers until 6 a.m. to surrender. The rebels reportedly offered to negotiate, but the government refused. By Monday, the government announced that Maj. Gen. Manzur Ahmed and some officers fled to the surrounding countryside and that it had regained control of Chittagong and crushed the rebellion (Borders, 1981b). On June 2, the government said that shortly after he surrendered and was taken into custody, Manzur was killed in an exchange of gunfire between their guards and “angry soldiers” or “agitated armed people” (Borders, 1981a; Slavin and Freudenhelm, 1981).

Coding rationale: Much controversy and mystery still surrounds the coup attempt, the assassination of Zia, and the murder of Manzur. According to Gen. Ershad, “Manzur was always known as an ambitious officer who considered himself the only competent man to run the government” (France-Press, 1981). It was alleged that Manzur chafed at being assigned to Chittagong, and that he was incensed at plans for him to be reassigned to become head of the new army staff college, a non-command job in Dacca (e.g. Borders, 1981a; Slavin and Freudenhelm, 1981). The government issued a White Paper in early August 1981 which did not provide any evidence that Manzur had actually ordered or organized the coup attempt of the Zia assassination, only that he began to direct the coup after Zia was killed (Dacca Domestic Service, 1981a,b).

But speculation began immediately that Manzur had been killed to prevent him from implicating other top-ranking army officers in trial (Borders, 1981c). As Khan (1982, 163-165) reported, “Some believe Zia had sought too critical a change in the traditional power relationships. Perhaps he wanted to shift his power base from a military-bureaucratic-industrial combine to a mass-oriented institutional frame. According to this interpretation, the deaths of Zia and Manzoor can be attributed to a much larger conspiracy. This view suggests that opponents of critical change are determined to maintain the status quo, that is, the domination of political life by the combined military, bureaucratic, and
Bertocci (1982, 996) suggests that the coup attempt was a bid for power by Freedom Fighters in the military relative to Pakistan-returned officers, who consolidated their control after the failed coup: “Zia relied increasingly on Pakistan-returned officers to whom he assigned the helmsmen’s posts at the top of the services; by the time of his death, only two or three of the top fifty army officers were Freedom Fighters...By early 1981 all regular military units numbered 77,000, with Freedom Fighter elements estimated to account for not more than 15% of all personnel. Ironically, then, what may have been the last gasp of the Freedom Fighter elements for some semblance of power seems to have been one of the factors involved in Zia’s assassination, occurring during an ill-conceived and ill-fated coup attempt led by one of the last remaining top officers with liberation war experience. A full and satisfying account of this coup effort remains to be published, but whatever the final conclusion, its aftermath seems to have left the Pakistan-returned officer group in command of military affairs.”

Others have suggested an alternative interpretation of events in which the Pakistan-returned officers, i.e. Ershad, orchestrated the assassination of Zia in order to delegitimize and decimate the remaining Freedom Fighters. This version accuses Ershad and his associates for the murder of Manzur on June 2. Manzur’s brother made this allegation against Ershad in 1995, leading to a still ongoing legal case. The investigative journalist Lifschultz (2014) uncovered witnesses and reviewed evidence which indicate that the Manzur family’s allegations against Ershad are true, and argues that Ershad launched a well-orchestrated disinformation campaign to implicate Manzur in Zia’s death as a “stepping stone” to consolidate his power. Conveniently, all 12 officers that were executed for the coup attempt were also “freedom fighters”.

Based on this evidence, we code this event as a failed reshuffling coup. Both Manzur and Ershad were leading military figures in the regime. Regardless of whether Manzur or Ershad (or his associates) was the mastermind, there is no evidence that either man sought to prevent ethnic narrowing or lead to the empowerment of an opposition party. Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code the March 1982 coup by Ershad as a regime change coup because Ershad initially ruled without a
political party, unlike Zia, who created the BNP (Blood, 1988).  

- # 775-1976-7-2: MYANMAR, NE WIN

**Category:** coup plot

**Event:** On July 20, 1976, the western press reported on Rangoon Radio broadcasts saying the government announced that earlier in the month three young Burmese military colonels had been arrested for trying to kill President Ne Win, Defense Minister San Yu, and the intelligence chief Tin U in an attempted coup. The rebels were allegedly “prompted by personal admiration for unnamed persons and personal ambition” (Associated Press, 1976a). The government announced that arrests had begun on July 2. On that day, a man who claimed to have been part of an uncovered coup plot sought but was denied asylum at the U.S. Embassy, according to Ambassador David Osborn. The man was presumed to be Capt. Kyaw Myint, the conspiracy’s leader (New York Times, 1976c).

**Coding rationale:** The initial government statement offered few details, but evidence from the subsequent trial indicates that this event was in fact a coup plot, not a coup attempt. On September 10, it was reported that eight men, including former Defense Minister Tin U who resigned in March 1976, had gone on trial for the assassination attempt (Guardian, 1976). Capt. Ohn Kyaw Myint and Capt Win Thein were tried for high treason and sedition. Five other junior officers were charged with abetting them, while Tin U was charged with knowing about the plot but not informing authorities about it. The charges claimed that Capt. Ohn Kyaw Myint began plotting after Defense Minister Gen. Tin U resigned on March 6, 1976, out of “personal admiration and expecting personal benefit”. He allegedly held meetings and collected firearms first with the intention of assassinating state leaders at the March 27 Armed Forces Day dinner party and taking power. Capt. Win Thein, secretary to the commander of the western command, reportedly joined the plot in April 1976. The young officers allegedly then “held discussions and plotted” to assassinate state leaders.

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47 After Zia was assassinated, his successor was from the BNP. Ershad relaxed martial law and partially civilianized the military regime in 1986 by creating a pro-regime party from which he could contest presidential elections. Throughout the 1990s, the BNP and Awami League still opposed his rule (Blood, 1988).
leaders at the party central committee meeting in June 1976 (Rangoon Domestic Service, 1976b). The order against Capt. Ohn Kyaw Myint read that he “was found to have conspired, incited and prepared to assassinate the country’s leaders by the use of firearms and to abolish the country’s organs of power, together with other military officers on 6 March and 3 July 1976 in Rangoon division. He also incited and plotted to make this conspiracy possible, which amounted to high treason” (Rangoon Domestic Service, 1976a). Death sentences were issued in January 1977 to Cap. Ohn Kyaw Myint and long terms were given to five other army officers including the former Defense minister Gen. Tin U. We do have some evidence on the plotters motivations: “the plot evidently was a climax to the long-standing rivalry between General Tin Oo and General San Yu, the secretary-general of the Burmese Socialist Programme party. Each of the two army leaders were keen to get the better of the other in the hope of getting into the dominant position in the political setup after the passing away of the ageing president” (Times of India, 1977). According to Seekins (2006, 155), the young army plotters denounced the “socialist economic system” and “admired Tin U’s reformist tendencies and wished to change Burma’s one-party regime and socialist economic system”. But we find no evidence that any of the planned assassination attempts were actually carried out. We therefore consider this as a coup plot, not a coup attempt.

• # 800-1977-3-26: THAILAND, THANIN KRAVIXIAN

Category: failed reshuffling coup

Event: Before dawn on Saturday, March 26, 1977, about 300 troops from the Royal Thai Army’s Ninth Division, led by Major Sawin Hiranyasiri and two other junior officers, entered Bangkok from their base in Kanchanaburi Province on the Kwai River. They seized several key positions, including the Internal Security Operations Command, Supreme Command headquarters, and the public relations department where the government radio was housed. After 9 a.m., an anonymous voice announced on Radio Thailand that a “Revolutionary Party” had assumed control of the government since “general conditions of national security, the economy, and social conditions have been deteriorating.” By 11 a.m., government loyalists began broadcasting competing broadcasts on another radio station and over television that the government
remained in power. Shortly after noon, the government cut the electricity to the radio transmitter and surrounded the rebel troops there, who quickly surrendered. Other rebel positions fell throughout the day. Loyal troops surrounded the last rebel outpost at the headquarters of the Internal Security Operations Command, where all but 10 of the 100 troops guarding the building surrendered peacefully. The rebel leaders then negotiated their exile with Gen. Serm na Nakhorn in exchange for releasing two hostages: Gen. Pralong Virapli, the army Chief of Staff, and Gen. Prasert Thammasiri, the army deputy commander-in-chief. By 10 p.m., Prime Minister Thanin Kravixian announced that the rebel leaders, Gen. Chalard Hiranyasiri, his son Sawin, two other majors, and a colonel, would be allowed to leave the country to avoid bloodshed. See Simons (1977b,a); Andelman (1977a); McArthur (1977a).

Coding rationale: After a country could not be found who would accept the five coup leaders (Andelman, 1977c; McArthur, 1977c), Gen. Chalard Hiranyasiri was executed on April 21, 1977, while the others younger leaders were ordered jailed for life (Washington Post, 1977e; McArthur, 1977b; Andelman, 1977b). Gen. Chalard had “long been the leader of many young officers known for right-wing views and late-night drinking sessions. When he was passed over promotion in the last days of the civilian government, a group of these officers created a minor uproar by appearing at former Prime Minister Seni Pramoj’s residence and forcing an audience. At the time of his dismissal by fellow generals last October, Chalard quoted an old Thai proverb of warning to them: “Never cut off the tail of a snake.” It means to do it right or not at all. He had evidently been plotting since then” (McArthur, 1977a). Based on this evidence, we assume the coup attempt led by ex-general Chalard was motivated mainly by personal ambition. Although he had previously been forced into retirement, we do not consider this a case of prior defection since the other conspirators were current members of the military. We assume that had the coup attempt succeeded, Chalard and his followers would have continued to rule through the military. This does not appear to be an attempt to prevent personalization, so we consider this a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 800-1981-4-1: THAILAND, PREM

Category: failed reshuffling coup
Event: At 5 a.m. on Wednesday, April 1, 1981, Thailand radio announced that the army had overthrown the Prem government and established a revolutionary committee headed by Gen. Sant Chitpatima, deputy commander in chief of the army. The rebel broadcast cited “the deteriorating situation” for the takeover and said that “Several political parties are undermining the stability of the Government with an intention of taking over the country and changing it into a dictatorial state.” The constitution was abolished and the Cabinet and Parliament dissolved by the revolutionary committee, which the broadcast said took over at 2 a.m. (Associated Press, 1981).

On Thursday, April 2, Prem broadcast from Nakhon Ratchasima in central Thailand that he was still prime minister and that he had the support of King Phumiphol Aduldet and most leaders of the armed forces. He added that he had the royal family under his protection. General Sant said he had more troop support, and tried to reassure that the change in government would not affect Thailand’s foreign relations. Their broadcast denounced Prem for daring “to extend his military term and even changed the law so he could stay in power.” They said they seized power to “eliminate the state of lawlessness and internal unrest” disrupting the country (New York Times, 1981). The coup floundered once the rebels were denied an audience with the King, whose popularity makes his support critical for legitimacy. Over night, the head of the national police force, Gen. Montachai Punkongchuen, defected to Prem. The naval chief of staff, Adm. Samut Sahanavin, also disassociated himself with the rebels. On April 3, loyalist troops moved unopposed into Bangkok after Sant and his main supporter, the head of one of Thailand’s four regional armies, Lt. Gen. Vasin Israngkul Na Ayuttaya, fled the country. Rebel control of Radio Thailand ended at 9:40 a.m. (Associated Press, 1981). On April 4, Prem safely re-entered Bangkok (Associated Press, 1981).

Coding rationale: Initial reports implied that Gen. Sant was driven largely by personal ambition. They noted Gen. Sant was a friend of Gen. Prem, and had been slated to take over Prem’s duties as army commander the previous October when Prem became 60 (the mandatory retirement age for that post), but top military officers decided to give Prem one more year as army chief (Associated Press, 1981). But most analysts believe Sant was a figurehead for a group of young officers.
known as the Young Turks, whose names dominated the Revolutionary Council (Branigin and Burgess, 1981). The Young Turks were a group of “promising majors and lieutenant colonels, all from the 1960 class of the Chulachomklao Military Academy” (Moritz, 1981). The Young Turks had supported Prem’s rise to the premiership in 1980 because of his image as a ‘clean’ professional soldier (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005, 232), and Prem had “close personal relationships” with Young Turk leaders Manoon Roopkachorn and Chamlong Srimuang (Handley, 2006, 281). But by 1981 the Young Turks reportedly “felt that the prime minister was not adequately decisive in dealing with critical economic and corruption issues” (Fry et al., 2013, 39).

According to Handley (2006, 281-3), the so-called April Fools’ coup “wasn’t at first a coup against Prem, but against Prem’s having to depend on unsavory military officers to survive the rebellion in parliament. The Young Turks and allied officers were unhappy as well over the promotion of more political and corrupt officers, including certain palace favorites like General Arthit. According to various accounts, Manoon and General Sant Chitpatima approached Prem on March 31, asking him to abrogate parliament and the constitution and take control in the manner of Sarit in 1958. It appears that Prem first agreed. As the coup leaders mustered their forces to control Bangkok, however, the queen intervened and summoned Prem to Chitrlada. According to some accounts, her main interest was to protect Arthit. Sirikit reportedly held lengthy phone discussions with the coup leaders, demanding that they come to the palace for talks. When they refused, she supposedly persuaded Prem and the king to withdraw their support for the coup. The coup leaders went ahead and declared a takeover early on April 1...A royal amnesty was rapidly granted to nearly all the coup participants, as if it had been a misunderstanding among the king’s children”.

Based on this evidence, we do not view this event as an attempt to prevent ethnic narrowing or personalization. Had it succeeded, we assume that military rule would continue, and thus code this as a failed reshuffling coup.

• # 800-1985-9-9: THAILAND, PREM

Category: failed reshuffling coup

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Event: On Monday, September 9, 1985, while Prime Minister Prem was on a state visit to Indonesia and Gen. Arthit was in Europe, about 500 troops with 22 tanks led by the Young Turks seized the armed forces headquarters. At 7 a.m., they announced on Radio Thailand that their faction had overthrown the government, revoked the constitution, and dissolved parliament. Claiming loyalty to the throne, the plotters reported that the Thai royal family had been taken into protective custody in southern Thailand. Gen. Serm Na Nakorn, a retired former supreme commander of the Thai armed forces, said he would act as temporary supreme commander of a provisional “revolutionary party”. He said the coup was staged since the civilian government couldn’t deal with economic problems, unemployment, and crime, and had failed to “maintain the unity and integrity of Thailand” (Crossette, 1985; New York Times, 1985). Serm said the revolutionary party’s top priority was boosting exports and improving the economy, which had been under stress due to tough austerity measures (Branigin, 1985b,a).

A tank battle ensued in Bangkok, and by mid-morning Prem loyalists led by Gen. Tien Chai Sirisumpun, the Thai army’s assistant commander in chief, announced on armed forces radio and television that they had regained control and had the support of almost all military commanders (Crossette, 1985). They gave the rebels a deadline of 3 p.m. to surrender. By early afternoon, rebel broadcasts had ended (New York Times, 1985). Both the apparent ringleader, Manoon Rupekachorn, and his brother Manat were allowed to leave the country.

Coding rationale: Like the April Fools’ coup attempt of 1981, this coup attempt was allegedly led by the Young Turks. Former colonel Manoon Rupekachorn, who was cashiered after the failed 1981 coup, still reportedly commanded the loyalty of his old 4th tank regiment, who spearheaded the coup attempt (Branigin, 1985a). He was joined by his brother Manat, a serving air force officer. Four retired generals, including former Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan and General Serm, were among the 40 charged and tried as co-conspirators (Reuters, 1985g). At least one of these co-conspirators, the deputy supreme commander of the armed forces Arun Promthep, was a current military officer. So too were Lt. Dendaung Pimwatana and Lt. Nakarintara Nakathit, the two rebel tank commanders charged with ordering the firing which led to the deaths of two foreign journalists (United Press
International, 1985b). As such, we do not consider this a case of prior defection, despite the prominent role of the formerly dismissed Young Turks and retired generals.

Most observers also believe the official version of events has covered up the involvement of other, still unidentified, high-ranking military officers. Handley (2006, 310), for example, argues that the attempt “was explained as another impetuous transgression by the Young Turks alone. But there was far more behind it than that, and far more players at the planning stage. Co-conspirators were never exposed, but fingers pointed in many directions: Arthit, Pichit, whose future had been hurt by Arthits promotion; and Class 5. Some suspect that the Young Turks were the victims of a setup. Prem put 40 plotters on trial for rebellion, but in court it became clear that no one wanted the truth to surface. One key witness, tiring of lawyers’ questions, abruptly threatened to reveal the real story if he was forced to continue.”

Rumors and allegations could not be suppressed. Deputy army commander Gen. Thienchai Sirisaphan reported that “numerous leaflets had been distributed anonymously at Army units and press offices in Bangkok accusing two leading active officers of having plotted the Sept. 9 coup”, but denounced this as a smear campaign (Branigin, 1985d). The army reportedly issued a White Paper on October 5, 1985, to dispel such rumors, but the paper raised more questions than it answered. As put Chinwanno (1986, 318-319) notes, “Firstly, it was difficult to believe that Colonel Manoon, known as one of the most capable young officers before his dismissal, would have attempted such an escapade without some strong promise of wider support. Secondly, it was possible that there was a deeper conspiracy involving a wider circle of elements in the Army who ultimately dropped out because of a disparity of interests. Or, it might have been that the leading suspects were duped into launching the coup as part of an elaborate plot to bring Prem’s opponents out into the open. The truth of the whole incident is yet to be unravelled”.

Several supposed initial plotters suggest a wider conspiracy. Colonel Prachak, a Young Turk associated with Col. Manoon Roopkachorn, said he helped plan the coup but backed out before its execution due to differences with one of its senior leaders. He argued that “There must have been some very big VIP behind the scenes” that backed out at the
last minute. Prachak also said Manoon “was pinning his hopes on the outcome of the annual military promotions” to gain support for a coup (Paul, 1985). In the account of another plotter, who spoke on condition of anonymity, the coup failed when two key senior officials withdrew support because of conflicts over the spoils in a future government. As planned, Kriangsak would become the new prime minister, Serm Na Nakhon would be deputy premier, and Yos Thephadin would become interior minister. But hours before the coup, conflict erupted over who would be interior minister and army commander. The three retired generals were found with Manoon’s rebels when loyalists captured the Supreme Compound, but they said they were forced to join the coup against their will (Branigin, 1985c).

As for the Young Turks, it is known they had tried to be allowed back into the military after being dismissed in 1981.48 By 1985, it is possible the Young Turks saw a coup attempt as the only route back to power. We interpret this evidence as indicating the coup attempt grew out of factional power struggles within the military. We therefore code this event as a failed reshuffling coup, assuming that had it succeeded military rule would continue.

- # 811-1978-5-15: CAMBODIA, POL POT

**Category:** failed reshuffling coup

**Event:** On June 25, Cambodia reported that it had thwarted a coup plot at the end of May 1978 allegedly backed by Vietnam and the U.S. CIA. Had they succeeded in toppling the Pol Pot regime and incorporating Cambodia into the Indochina federation, Cambodia said...
the plotters planned to take control of the eastern region as a springboard for more attacks. According to the Cambodian communiqué, six members of the Vietnamese Communist Party were arrested the previous month, and allegedly held several planning meetings in Kampong Cham and Svay Rieng provinces since February (Phnom Penh Domestic Service, 1978; United Press International, 1978b). In December 1978, Major Preab, former commander of Battalion 305, said that Heng Samrin had attempted a coup in April “when he commanded the Fourth Division based at Kompong Cham, 80 kilometers (50 miles) northeast of Phnom Penh. The second in command, a Major Tang, warned the central government and the plotters were crushed, Major Preab went on. The rebels blew up the munition dump at Kompong Cham, causing many deaths and leaving a crater 30 meters (100 feet) across. Heng Samrin fled eastwards with many weapons and part of the Fourth Division’s troops, the major said” (Agence France-Presse, 1978).

Coding rationale: On June 14, 1978, the Cambodian government had accused Vietnam and the U.S. of supporting three failed coup attempts against the Khmer Rouge since it seized power in April 1975 (Associated Press, 1978b). Although details are sketchy, the evidence does suggest there was a coup attempt of some kind in April or May 1978. According McCormack (1980, 110), “A military rebellion did occur in Kampuchea’s eastern “Military Region 203”, in which a former Vice-Premier, So Phim lost his life, and after which another officer, Heng Samrin, led the survivors across to Vietnam. It was Heng Samrin and survivors of the coup attempt that returned to Kampuchea with the Vietnamese armies in December 1978 to overthrow the Pol Pot regime.” Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) use this latter event to code the end
Ross (1987) reports that a sectional cleavage may have been present: “The Eastern Zone apparently remained largely unaffected by the purge until May 1978, when So Phim led a revolt that provoked massive retaliation by Pol Pot and his Southwestern henchmen.” Martin (1994, 196) notes that “In the east, zone chief So Phim and his companions, exposed, perished for attempting to overthrow Pol Pot and his entourage...Soldiers in So Phim’s army who had joined him in rebellion confirmed that he was plotting against the regime and established contacts for this purpose with the Vietnamese, whose support he needed.” Etcheson (2005, 88) argues that the revolt was part of an internal struggle for control within the party: “troops under the command of Eastern Zone CPK Secretary So Phim attempted to pursue a policy of cooperation and friendship with Vietnamese communist forces, who had done so much to help the Cambodian revolutionaries in the early stages of their war against Lon Nol. This fact alone made So Phim and his Eastern Zone forces suspect in the eyes of Pol Pot and his allies, who viewed Vietnam as the historic enemy. Through a complex series of maneuvers, forces loyal to Pol Pot staged a creeping coup against personnel loyal to So Phim, gradually purging region-level cadre and replacing them with cadre chosen by Pol Pot and his inner circle of confidants. This series of aggressive maneuvers culminated in Eastern Zone Secretary So Phim’s death in May 1978 and the military rout of his remaining Eastern Zone forces.” Kiernan (2002, 396-99) notes that So Phim and Heng Samrin met in person between May 25 and May 27 to discuss their response to Pol Pot’s purges of regional commanders and commissars. They agreed that So Phim would travel to Phnom Penh and if he did not return to the East in 3 days, Heng Samrin would attack Pol Pot’s forces. This meeting appears to be the event where defection was first decided by leaders of the Eastern Zone forces. Because Phim was one of the highest ranking officials in the government, and because there is no evidence that him or his followers sought to prevent ethnic narrowing, we code this as a failed reshuffling coup. By the time Heng Samrin returned to Cambodia in December 1978, he was a regime outsider. But in April 1978, Phim’s forces were still
within the regime fold.

1.3.2 Failed coup attempt events not identified in Powell-Thyne data

- 482-1976-2-1: Central African Republic, Bokassa

Category: failed regime change coup

Event: On February 3, 1976, as Bokassa was preparing to leave for a hunting retreat, three military men threw a grenade in his direction at the Bangui airport (Agence France-Presse, 1976d). After the grenade misfired, the three men retreated to an airplane hangar. “After a six hour battle with loyal airport guards, the leader of the band of attackers killed himself. He and two accomplices, who escaped in the confusion, were reported attached to Odrou. After Odrou’s disappearance the next day, he was charged with masterminding the assassination attempt. Radio Bangui characterized the plot as a personal attack on Bokassa by foreign plotters, not a coup attempt from within.” Yet Major Fidel Odrou was Bokassa’s “informally adopted son” “who is married to a young woman thought at one time to have been Bokassa’s daughter by a Vietnamese woman.” Eight military men and two foreigners, including Odrou and his brother, were executed (Schultz and Rundblad, 1976, 31). The president was reportedly saved by a bodyguard and uninjured. Airline companies confirmed that the freight hangars were seriously damaged in the shootout. Police checks in Bangui were reinforced and the airport reopened to traffic later that day (Agence France-Presse, 1976c). On February 14, a military tribunal sentenced eight men to death, including Odrou (Agence France-Presse, 1976a). Fidel Odrou, an air force battalion commander, was joined by his brother Martin Meya, a director at the Ministry of Tourism, Waters and Forests, and army officer Lt. Satao (Agence France-Presse, 1976b).

Coding rationale: Both McGowan (2007) and Roessler (2011) include a coup attempt in February 1976 in Central African Republic (CAR) but not in Chad. The Powell-Thyne data appear to include a mistake switching these two countries based on an Agence France-Presse (1976b) article reported from Chad but covering a coup attempt in the CAR. Observers suspected that it was “a real coup attempt carried out by
the most progressive elements of the army and police, who are discontented over the situation currently prevailing in the country, despite the efforts of the Central African chief of state and his government to strengthen an extremely tottering economy” (Agence France-Presse, 1976c). Although Fidel Oudrou was Bokassa’s son-in-law, he came from a powerless northern ethnic group, not one of Bokassa’s dominant riverine ethnic groups (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). As such, we interpret this coup attempt as an effort to prevent further ethnic narrowing and personalization of the regime, on the assumption that they would rule with a northern elite. We therefore code this as a failed regime change coup.50

• 483-2006-3-15: CHAD, IDRISS DÉBY

Category: coup plot

Event: On Wednesday, March 15, 2006, Chad said it had foiled a coup attempt by a group of soldiers that had been plotting to shoot down Deby’s plane on Tuesday March 14 as he returned from a summit meeting of central African leaders held in Equatorial Guinea. A colonel and commander were reportedly arrested as the rest fled towards eastern Chad (Reuters, 2006). On March 16, “this was denied by Deby’s former cabinet director Tom Erdimi, who has been accused by the authorities of being one of the suspected masterminds of the coup plot; saying that there has never been any question of trying to shoot down the president’s aircraft or any other action of that type. According to him, it was desertion of the Chadian army” (Radio France International, 2006). On March 21, Chad’s government arrested “100 military officers and soldiers implicated in a failed assassination plot against President Idriss Deby last week”, the security minister said (Times Wire Services, 2006).

Coding rationale: The sources used by Powell and Thyne (2011) to allegedly verify the April 14, 2006, rebel incursion in Chad (see case 483-2006-4-13 above, which we code as a case of prior defection) actually verifies a coup event on March 15, 2006. Although Powell and Thyne (2011) only includes the April event in their dataset, we consider the

50In a similar way, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code David Dacko’s rule before and after Bokassa to be distinct regimes even though Dacko was Bokassa’s cousin.
two events as potentially two distinct coup events and therefore code the March event here. Marshall and Marshall (2014) codes this event as a coup plot. Since the plot to shoot down the plane was apparently foiled before it was actually attempted, we also consider this a coup plot, as no concrete actions had taken place.

- **580-1975-2-11: MADAGASCAR, RICHARD RATSIMANDRAVA**

**Category:** failed regime change coup

**Event:** Following the failure of the December 31, 1974, coup plot (see 580-1974-12-31 in the previous section), the alleged December coup plot leader Col. Brechard Rajaonarison fled to the Groupe mobile de la police (GMP) headquarters outside Antananarivo, where the mainly cotier GMP protected the highest ranking cotier military officer. Rajaonarison was formally dismissed from the military on February 1, which was believed to make an amnesty easier. Rajaonarison would form a “provisional committee of military, gendarmes and police for preservation of national unity of Madagascar” and issued demands for a new government based on proportional representation of provinces (thus favoring cotiers). On February 10, the dissident troops issued a communiqué calling for the formation of a “national committee of public safety” to organize new elections, a line similar to that taken by opposition (PSM) politicians ex-President Philbert Tsiranana and ex-Vice President Andre Resampa (U.S. Embassy, 1975a). On February 11, GMP rebels assassinated new president Richard Ratsimandrava, even though he promised decentralized rule consistent with GMP demands. This led to a siege of the GMP headquarters on February 12 leading rebels to surrender (Reuters, 1975d).

**Coding rationale:** Powell and Thyne (2011) do not code this event as a coup attempt, on the grounds that it is better characterized as an assassination attempt. However, both McGowan (2007) and Roessler (2011) include this event as a coup attempt in their datasets. We consider this event to be a coup attempt because it appears to be an attempt by members of the security apparatus to unseat the sitting incumbent using unconstitutional means. Le Monde said Ratsimandrava “was the victim of ethnic confrontations” (Reuters, 1975c). The U.S. State Department similarly argued that merina-cotier rivalry was the
most important driver of the political crisis that led to Ratsimandrava’s assassination (U.S. Embassy, 1975c).51

Rajaonarison was one of three colonels in the Malagasy armed forces at the time of the May 1972 Revolution that brought the military regime to power. “Unlike the other colonels – Roland Rabetafika, who became Ramanantsoa’s second-in-command, and Richard Ratsimandrava, minister of the interior – Rajaonarison was given a largely honorific post as inspector-general of the army. He attributed this slight to his Côtier origins (he is Antaisaka) and to his low status as a former noncommissioned officer promoted to the officer corps at the time of independence.” He was “disquieted by nationalist economic policies and the putative Merina domination” of the military regime (Allen and Covell, 2005, 227). Based on this evidence, had the GMP defeated government troops, we assume that cotiers, which had been junior partners in the military regime (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010), would become dominant or senior partners. As a case of a coup attempt by an ethnic junior partner, we therefore code this case as a failed regime change coup.

51 See Covell (1987, 56, Appendix) for more details on this assassination.
2 Archigos leader data

As described in the text, we use the Archigos data set to code a slightly different dependent variable that measures whether irregular leadership failures in dictatorships result from regime insiders or regime outsiders. We start with all irregular exits of autocratic leaders that held power on January 1 in a given year in the Archigos data set. We identify autocratic leaders using the data collected by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). (Note that irregular exits in the Archigos data set exclude foreign ousters, such as the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989.) Next, we code all irregular exits which Svolik and Akcinaroglu (2007) codes as military coups as constituting insider irregular exits. Of the remaining irregular exits – which Svolik and Akcinaroglu (2007) codes as missing, other, assassinations, revolts, and civil wars – we determine whether the leader was ousted by a regime insider or a regime outsider. Regime insiders include: family members of the leader; current military officers; body guards; government ministers; and other regime elite. Military officers who defect from the regime and start an insurgency at a prior date are coded as outsiders. We code situations where the military refuses to use violence against anti-regime protesters and the regime leader flees as ouster by outsiders, even if factions of the military are sympathetic to the protesters. Because we coded these latter cases ourselves, we list each type of irregular exit that Svolik does not code as a military coup in the following tables.

There are six cases where an insider irregular leader change occurs during a regime failure calendar year but which occurs prior to the regime failure event: (1) General Ramanantsoa handed power to a fellow officer after an attempted coup in Madagascar (February 5, 1975); (2) a coup in Ghana in which the junta leader, General Akuffo, was executed and replaced by a fellow junta member (June 4, 1979); (3) the Bolivian junta’s replacement of Torrelio Villa (July 19, 1982) with a fellow junta member; (4) the Soviet military coup that ousted Gorbachev (August 21, 1991); (5) the coup that ousted Strasser in Sierra Leone (January 17, 1996); and (6) the assassination of Mainassara in Niger (April 11, 1999). We retain these events as insider coups because they are not part of regime collapse event.
## Table 3: Irregular leader failure, ousted by regime outsider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ouster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>78-92</td>
<td>Najibullah</td>
<td>ousted by Taliban allied with prior military defectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>96-01</td>
<td>Mullah Omar</td>
<td>U.S. military invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>82-90</td>
<td>Ershad</td>
<td>ousted by popular demonstrations against regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>Lon Nol</td>
<td>fled after civil war defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>Malloum</td>
<td>fled after civil war defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>82-90</td>
<td>Habre</td>
<td>fled after civil war defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo/Zaire</td>
<td>60-97</td>
<td>Mobutu</td>
<td>fled after civil war defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>74-91</td>
<td>Mengistu Marriam</td>
<td>fled after civil war defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>92-03</td>
<td>Shevardnadze</td>
<td>resigned amidst popular demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>80-99</td>
<td>Vieira</td>
<td>ousted by an ex-Brigadier General Mane, who defected from the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>57-86</td>
<td>Duvalier, Jean-</td>
<td>resigned and fled amidst popular protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>88-90</td>
<td>Avril</td>
<td>[could possibly be coded as a coup by Namphy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>99-04</td>
<td>Aristide</td>
<td>resigned and fled amidst popular protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>25-79</td>
<td>Mohammad Reza</td>
<td>fled amid popular demonstration against regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>99-00</td>
<td>Guei</td>
<td>fled amid popular demonstration against regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>80-90</td>
<td>Doe</td>
<td>killed by rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>60-72</td>
<td>Tsiranana</td>
<td>handed power to military during protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>36-79</td>
<td>Anastasio Somoza Deb.</td>
<td>resigned after defeat by rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>77-88</td>
<td>Zia</td>
<td>killed in a suspicious plane crash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>72-86</td>
<td>Marcos</td>
<td>fled amid popular demonstrations against the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>45-89</td>
<td>Ceausescu</td>
<td>popular demonstrations against the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>73-94</td>
<td>Habyarimana</td>
<td>ousted by either Hutu extremists or Kagame’s RPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>69-91</td>
<td>Siad Barre</td>
<td>ousted by rebels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>78-94</td>
<td>Premadasa</td>
<td>suicide bombing assassination by LTTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>91-NA</td>
<td>Nabiyev</td>
<td>armed demonstrators forced resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>57-73</td>
<td>Thanon Kittakachorn</td>
<td>demonstrations forced resignation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>74-78</td>
<td>Al-Ghashmi</td>
<td>fled when military refused more violent measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>disputed; likely militant wing of the S. Yemen govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Ouster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan 78-92</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Taraki</td>
<td>killed by second in command of the Khalq faction of the PDPA, Hafizullah Amin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh 75-82</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Ziaur Rahman</td>
<td>assassinated by military officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia 53-70</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Sihanouk</td>
<td>deposed by PM Lon Nol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo/Zaire 97-NA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Laurent Kabila</td>
<td>assassinated by body guard in failed coup attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brz 68-91</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Ngouabi</td>
<td>assassinated by a military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 52-NA</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Sadat</td>
<td>assassinated by a military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia 74-91</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Banti</td>
<td>killed in fight with Mengitsu’s supporters but no prior rebellion by Mengitsu; Banti was figurehead for the ruling council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia 91-92</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Gamsakhurdia</td>
<td>ousted by faction of the national guard and militias that had been incorporated into the regime’s military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala 85-95</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Serrano Elias</td>
<td>autogolpe turned into a coup when Serrano used military to abolish congress but then military ousted him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Biss. 02-03</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Kumba Iala</td>
<td>ousted in coup led by defense minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South 61-87</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Hee Park</td>
<td>killed by military intelligence commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria 66-70</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Ramat Mohammed</td>
<td>assassinated by military officers in a coup attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan 75-77</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Bhutto</td>
<td>ousted in a coup led by Zia, military officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.i Arabia 27-NA</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Faisal</td>
<td>assassinated by family member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda 80-85</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Obote</td>
<td>ousted in coup by military officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen 74-78</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Al-Hamadi</td>
<td>killed by YAR military officers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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