By: Patrick Ouellette, ALR Senior Editor, 2021
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. has been one of the most widely used and potent cases for arbitration since it was decided by the Supreme Court in 1983.[1] This case expressed that the legal system favors arbitration, and that where an arbitration agreement contains broad language, any ambiguity about whether a claim must be arbitrated should be resolved in favor of the arbitration.[2] This has lead to arbitration exploding in use, as parties attempting to avoid arbitration are frequently funneled back to arbitration using the reasoning from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital.
However, a case that was recently decided in the second circuit has shown that the ruling in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, while expansive, is not necessarily a catchall. In Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., the second circuit reversed a decision from the district court, saying that a dispute over the employee profit-sharing account was outside the purview of arbitration agreement.[3] The facts of the case are as follows: Cooper is an employee with DST Systems, Inc. (“DST”), a company that has an employee profit sharing account with a third party supplier, Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb, Inc. (“Ruane”). For his employment with DST, Cooper signed an employment agreement with DST, which included an arbitration agreement. During Cooper’s employment, Ruane invested a large portion of the profit sharing account into a single stock. The stock lost a significant amount of money, greatly reducing the value of the profit-sharing account. Cooper brought a putative class action against Ruane, who looked to avoid by compelling arbitration based on the nature of the dispute being related to Cooper’s employment.
The district court ruled that the arbitration was appropriate due to equitable estoppel doctrine. The district court reasoned that the dispute was related to Cooper’s employment at DST. However, the second circuit reversed, stating that the employment agreement does not pertain to Ruane’s handling of the profit sharing account.[4] Although the arbitration agreement covered any legal claims “arising out of or relating to employment,” the second circuit ruled that there must be some sort of direct relationship between the parties who signed the arbitration agreement.[5]
The implications of this case can be very interesting for arbitration in the future. While this case is certainly outside the normal course of arbitration agreements, it still shows that there is a limit to the broad power of Moses H. Cone. I believe that the court correctly ruled to reverse the district court decision. Similar to the second circuit, I believe that if there was not a limit placed on the broad mandate to arbitrate, an arbitration agreement could govern any dispute that occurs between an either party that signs the agreement and a third party.
[1] Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
[2] Id.
[3] Cooper v. Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb Inc., 990 F.3d 173, 175 (2d Cir 2021)
[4] Id. at 185
[5] Id. at 184