Legitimacy and Efficiency of Olympic Bans 

By Sydney Newby

Introduction  

Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) has used Olympic bans to punish countries for their political stances. Its latest decision is the banning of Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine. These bans take place when a nation is found to have violated the Olympic Charter [1]. The Olympic Charter sets out the administrative parts of the Olympics, such as how it is chosen to be held and the makeup of the IOC [2]. However, it also states that the “Olympic Movement shall apply political neutrality” [3]. Therefore, it has been debated whether the IOC can ban countries from the Olympics due to political viewpoints. Furthermore, it has been debated that if it is determined that the IOC can do so, if it is fair, and if it is effective. Former IOC Executive Vice President, Anita DeFrantz, stated that bans are meant to “impel the banned nation to amend their sport practices so they are in accordance with the Olympic Charter” [4]. However, it is unclear if this is all that the Olympic bans truly do.  

Legitimacy of Bans  

Olympic bans have a long history with some of the most prominent being the bans of South Africa during apartheid, Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule, and Germany following World War I [5]. The IOC has justified these bans by stating that the countries violated the Olympic Charter. For example, when Afghanistan was banned, the IOC stated that as part of the Olympic Charter, every nation must have a National Olympic Committee (“NOC”) that oversees the Olympics and the athletes in each nation [6]. When the Taliban took rule of Afghanistan, it was stated that it overthrew the recognized NOC of Afghanistan and made one of its own. Since the Taliban created a NOC that was not recognized by the IOC, it was in violation of the Olympic Charter and thus Afghanistan was banned from competing [7]. However, while this is the official reason that the IOC gave for Afghanistan’s ban, the Taliban was also implementing many inhumane policies and the IOC was experiencing immense international pressure to place a ban on them [8].  

As previously mentioned, the most recently banned country is Russia for the 2024 Summer Olympics. This ban is due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, for the ban to be legitimate, it must be tied to a violation of the Olympic Charter. The IOC has stated that by invading Ukraine, Russia violated the Olympic Charter because it “violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine’s NOC” [9]. Since rendering this complete ban, the IOC has now pulled back a bit allowing Russian athletes to compete as independent individuals [10]. The independent athletes will not have their nation’s flag nor anthem [11]. The IOC has upheld the ban stating that no Russian teams will be able to compete in team events [12]. Overall, as long as an Olympic ban is tied back to a violation of the Olympic Charter, it is legitimate. However, it is not final as countries can appeal these bans. 

Appellate Process of Olympic Bans  

The Olympic Charter permits the IOC to ban a nation for breaking the Charter, but the nation can appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) [13]. The CAS has the jurisdiction to hear “an appeal against the decision of a . . . sport-related-body” [14]. This adds another level of legitimacy to the process as the case is being heard in front of a neutral decision maker. Russia recently appealed its Olympic ban, and the CAS upheld the ban [15]. In the case ROC v. IOC, the court ruled that the IOC ban against Russia was lawful [16]. In this appeal, the ROC brought four main reasons why the ban should not be upheld [17]. They claimed the ban violated “the Principle of Legality, the Principle of Equality, the Principle of Predictability, and the Principle of Proportionality” [18]. All four of these claims centered around the idea that the ROC does not believe they violated the Olympic Charter, and that the IOC has not issued bans against countries in similar situations [19]. In response, the IOC claimed that the ROC did violate the Olympic Charter and that they cannot always be predictable, as bans must be decided on a case-by-case basis [20].  

In its decision, the CAS responded to each of the ROC’s four claims, concluding that the IOC did not violate any of the claims brought forward [21]. The CAS held that the ROC’s appeal be dismissed, stating that the IOC is within the limits of its decision and that the “IOC is free to adopt rules defining the territorial jurisdiction of an NOC that it recognizes” [22]. This supports the original claim the IOC brought that the ROC violated the Olympic Charter by violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine’s NOC. However, the CAS goes on to state that its decision is simply about the ruling of the IOC, not whether the takeover of Ukraine was lawful [23]. The CAS states that it doesn’t, nor does the IOC, answer questions of politics [24]. Overall, the Olympics and the IOC have a longstanding, well-respected appellate system. This adds an extra level of transparency and validity to IOC decisions. While the IOC’s capability to ban countries from the Olympics and the possibility of appealing such bans are established, there has been ongoing debate regarding the effectiveness of these measures.  

Efficiency of Olympic Bans  

Case study:  

              Despite their long history and legitimacy, there is little confidence that Olympic bans create any action. In looking at the ban on South Africa from 1964 to 1988 due to apartheid, it is unlikely that it did anything to affect the South African government [25]. The IOC banned South Africa due to its refusal to have a multiracial team as this violated part of the Olympic Charter that prevents discrimination [26]. In response to this ongoing ban, South Africa stated that they were changing policy so it would no longer be illegal to participate in integrated sports [27]. However, reports from those in South Africa stated that this was not the case and those who were participating in integrated sports were being arrested [28]. Furthermore, this was a performative action that did nothing to help in ending apartheid, thus effectively having no impact [29]. The Olympic ban on South Africa slightly decreased citizens’ compliance with apartheid systems [30]. The citizens were upset with these bans and sought measures to end them [31]. However, this was not enough action to make actual, meaningful change. Therefore, the Olympic Ban of South Africa proved not to be efficient in ending apartheid.  

Analysis of possible outcomes of Russia’s ban:  

               It is unlikely that the IOC ban will have a meaningful effect on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia and its athletes have long been subjected to Olympic sanctions due to doping scandals [32]. These sanctions have not proven to be effective against Russia as it continues to be involved in doping scandals [33]. Furthermore, Vladimir Putin has not been receptive to international action. The International Court for Justice has ruled that Russia has violated its policy with the invasion of Ukraine, but Russia has taken no action in response to this [34]. Furthermore, unlike South Africa where citizens increasingly opposed apartheid due to the Olympic ban, a similar outcome in Russia is improbable. Due to the IOC’s decision to allow Russian athletes to compete as independents, citizens will still watch and have someone to cheer for in the Olympics. This is a stark difference from the complete ban issued on South Africa. Finally, due to the dangerous political climate of Russia, even if citizens did disagree, it is unlikely they would advocate for this change. Russia has a history of killing those who disagree with its leaders, so to speak up against the invasion of Ukraine may be very dangerous. Overall, due to Russia’s lack of response to other international action against the invasion of Ukraine, the ability of Russian athletes to compete in the Olympics, and the harsh political climate of the nation, it is highly unlikely that the Olympic Ban will have a meaningful effect on Russia.  

Conclusion  

In conclusion, the IOC has issued several Olympic bans in the past years. The IOC can issue these bans if they are tied back to a violation of the Olympic Charter. Furthermore, the nations can appeal these bans to the CAS. However, it is unlikely that these bans will impact international politics. Russia is the most recent country to face an Olympic ban, resulting from its invasion of Ukraine. The IOC issued this ban due to the invasion violating the territory of Ukraine’s NOC and thus violating the Olympic Charter. The CAS upheld this ban in an appeal hearing. However, while this ban is likely to remain in place for the 2024 Olympics, it is unlikely to impact Russia and its invasion of Ukraine.  

[1] See Todd Carney, Looking to International Law to Solve Human Rights Issues in Sports, 28 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Dispute Res. 65 (2021).  

[2] Id. at 69. 

[3] Olympic Charter, International Olympic Committee, Oct. 15, 2023.   

[4] Scott Rosner & Deborah Low, The Efficacy of Olympic Bans and Boycotts on Effectuating International Political and Economic Change, 11 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 27, 73 (2009).  

[5] See generally id.   

[6] Id. at 70.  

[7] Id.  

[8] Id. at 71-72.  

[9] Reuters, Russian appeal against Olympic sanctions set to be heard by top sports court, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2024, 1:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/sports/russian-appeal-against-olympic-sanctions-set-be-heard-by-top-sports-court-2024-01-26/.  

[10] Graham Dunbar, IOC confirms Russian athletes can compete at Paris Olympics with approved neutral status, AP NEWS (Dec. 8, 2023, 12:40 PM), https://apnews.com/article/olympics-ioc-russia-paris-efdcf4d8f17a12693ecdfd239e954fe5.   

[11] Id.   

[12] Id.   

[13] See generally Carney, supra note 1.  

[14] Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), CAS 2023/A/10093, Decision on the ROC’s appeal to the IOC’s Olympic Sanctions, ¶ 38, (Court of Arbitration for Sport Feb. 23, 2024).  

[15] Id. at ¶ 129.  

[16] Id.   

[17] Id. at ¶ 36.  

[18] Id.  

[19] Id.  

[20] Id. at ¶ 37.   

[21] Id. at ¶ 129.   

[22] Id. at ¶ 54.  

[23] Id. at ¶ 129.  

[24] Id.   

[25] See generally Rosner & Low, supra note 4.  

[26] Id. at 62.  

[27] Id. at 67.   

[28] Id.  

[29] Id.   

[30] Id. at 68-69.  

[31] Id.   

[32] See generally Carney, supra note 1.  

[33] See generally id.   

[34] See Oona A. Hathaway, Taking Stock of ICJ Decisions in the ‘Ukraine v. Russia’ Cases – And Implications for South Africa’s Case against Israel, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 5, 2024), https://www.justsecurity.org/91781/taking-stock-of-icj-decisions-in-ukraine-v-russia-cases-and-implications-for-south-africas-case-against-israel/.