The Biden Administration’s Middle East Policy 100-Days In

During the campaign trail, President Biden highlighted three matters his administration would immediately pursue in the Middle East: withdrawing American support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, recalibrating the Saudi-American partnership, and re-joining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) addressing Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

As the Biden Administration nears the end of its first 100-days in office, it is worth considering why it prioritizes these topics, how it has engaged with them, and what it has achieved thus far.

The War in Yemen

President Biden’s remarks surrounding Yemen as a humanitarian catastrophe and a moral failure of the international community make clear where he stands. In contrast to the Trump Administration, he has blamed both sides of the conflict for the surmounting carnage placing five million people on the brink of famine, displacing four million,[i] and resulting in the death of 233,000 individuals.[ii]

Based on the administration’s actions thus far, Yemen represents a clear priority. A seasoned career foreign service officer with substantial experience in the Arabian Peninsula, Tim Lenderking, was appointed as U.S. Special Envoy to Yemen within two weeks of entering Biden’s office.

Lenderking has wasted no time on the job, immediately visiting Saudi Arabia, and Oman where he met a Houthi delegation.[iii] He has devised the United States ceasefire plan to broker peace between Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition, and, undoubtedly, played a role in the Saudi proposal. Despite the Houthi’s initial rejection of the latter offer, they have now backtracked and appear susceptible to negotiations.

Additionally, the State Department has expeditiously delisted the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization following the advice of multiple non-governmental organizations who argued that maintaining it would inflame the already dire humanitarian situation.[iv]

This begs the question of why the Biden Administration is prioritizing Yemen. Part of the reason could be from a sense of complicity in the country’s destruction. Additionally, the administration’s unambiguous remarks of seeking to reintegrate ethics and values in American foreign policy not only convey a sense of moral obligation, but make for good domestic politics too. There is, also, a practical and strategic reason underlying newfound American resolve.

Minimizing its participation enables the United States to draw down its commitments in the Middle East and redirect efforts at counterbalancing its two principal threats. As astute scholars have vigorously argued, such as John Mearsheimer, vital American national security interests lie in regions where great powers compete;[v] the Middle East clearly does not meet this situation. Nor does the United States’ continued participation therein enable it to counteract its principal enemies and their actions – such as Russian advances in Eastern Europe and its election interference, nor Chinese dominance of East Asia and its expanding technological and geopolitical clout.

Saudi-American Relations

Unlike prior presidential candidates looking to avoid burning bridges with foreign states during the campaign trail, candidate Biden did not pull his punches. He has, for example, unambiguously stated his intent to re-assess American-Saudi relations and put the Saudis on notice.[vi]

When asked what the United States would do about Saudi Arabia following the case of Jamal Khashoggi, he went further and announced that his administration would “make them pay the price, and make them in fact the pariah that they are.”[vii]

As president, Biden has kept his promise – up to a point. He has ended the United States’ support of the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive capabilities but maintained its defensive ones safeguarding Saudi Arabia’s national security.[viii] In addition, he has declassified the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) report on Jamal Khashoggi’s death describing the Crown Prince’s culpability despite the absence of any tangible evidence. And yet, White House officials continue to describe Saudi Arabia as a strategic partner rather than a pariah.

The Department of State’s spokesperson, Ned Price, explained why in a recent briefing: because of Saudi Arabia’s influential role in the region and its importance to the United States.[ix] The administration is very clearly trying to backtrack its prior position with Price clarifying that it seeks to “recalibrate” rather than rupture relations – the inevitable result had the Biden Administration followed through with its former announcements.

This was expected. Most analysts in the Middle East knew that Biden would not follow through once in office. While Biden’s campaign statements may have unnerved some and put into perspective the changing environment across Western capitals, it was clear from the get-go that Biden’s pronouncements were aimed for domestic consumption rather than be taken as foreign policy commitments. Following through would not have led to any tangible gains and resulted instead in needless loss.

Some American commentators, like Nicholas Kristof, have called for sending a clear message by sanctioning the Crown Prince.[x] In Kristof’s perspective, the action would make the Crown Prince toxic and supposedly force King Salman to replace him with another to preserve bilateral relations. Such demands are not grounded in reality.

Understanding the current Saudi context helps us understand why. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ascension to power has been accompanied with a series of policies restructuring the Saudi socio-political system. Not only has he consolidated power for himself and established a new inner-circle in the process, but he has spearheaded a series of widely-popular initiatives across all segments of society. Nor would King Salman replace the Crown Prince considering how he has groomed him for the throne from his youth.

Of course, the United States could sanction the Crown Prince despite this not affecting his rise to the throne. But in such a situation, the United States would be sanctioning an expected head of state. As U.S. law prevents Americans from engaging with sanctioned individuals, bilateral relations would become quite complicated. Would such an outcome be desirable or even worthwhile?

Iran and the JCPOA

Last but certainly not least is Iran and the JCPOA. Having been endorsed by Security Council resolution 2231, the agreement, and the corresponding rights and obligations of its signatories, carry with them the weight of international law.[xi] The essence of the agreement can be summarized as removing sanctions placed on Iran and re-integrating the country into the global economy in exchange for Iran downgrading its nuclear activities and placing its facilities under international monitoring.

While celebrated at the time and hailed as the Obama Administration’s crowning jewel, the Trump Administration left no doubt about its intent to walk away from “the worst deal ever negotiated.”[xii] In response to the Trump Administration’s unilateral withdrawal, re-imposition of prior sanctions, and addition of new ones, Iran has increased its uranium enrichment while remaining a participant in the pact.

In doing so, Iran sought to send a clear signal to other signatories of the necessity of bringing back the United States. Iran’s delicate balancing act at home between the growing hardline opposition demanding it walk away from the deal and the reformers pushing for its continued compliance, conducive European engagement, as well as Candidate Biden’s unequivocal intent to re-enter the agreement have maintained the JCPOA’s viability.

Biden’s desire to re-enter the compact should come as no surprise. He was, after all, part of the administration that helped broker it. More importantly, however, is his foreign policy approach, one that is best characterized as a liberal internationalist approach believing in the utility – and necessity – of multilateral institutions in addressing global problems, such as climate change and weapons of mass destruction.

Since entering office, progress in this area has been slow but steady. On April 6^th, indirect talks to salvage the deal began in Vienna.[xiii] In a PBS NewsHour interview, U.S. Special Envoy to Iran Robert Malley explained that the substance of the talks would be about establishing a roadmap to bring back both the United States and Iran into compliance.[xiv]

Here, it is important to reflect on what the JCPOA represents. The JCPOA’s short-term objective is designed to address nuclear weapons proliferation. Over the long-term, however, lies a desire to construct an alternative regional security order led by local states with the United States no longer playing a central pillar. This is the signal President Biden is communicating when calling for successive rounds of negotiations built on the JCPOA aimed at addressing thematic issues of concern held by Middle Eastern states with participation from the Gulf states and Iran.

This is why the JCPOA prominently figures in the Biden Administration’s Middle East foreign policy calculus and why it will occupy much of his attention over the following years. It represents a farewell to a highly militarized, paternalistic U.S. Middle East foreign policy, transitioning instead to one that plays a facilitatory role in a new system where diplomacy and dialogue are the currency of the game. The Biden Administration’s challenge will be getting local actors on board and working together despite their differences and grievances.

Where To From Here?

Following President Obama’s pivot to Asia policy, the United States continued to find itself entrenched in the Middle East where the region occupied much of its political capital and diplomacy. For example, it continued dealing with the fallout of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, participated in Gaddafi’s removal alongside NATO forces in 2011, established the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to counter Islamic State in 2014, and brokered the JCPOA in 2015.

As we look to the dawn of a new decade, the United States’ current priorities in the Middle East are designed to reduce its role and efforts therein. After 30 years of active involvement, one wonders whether this is what the region needs.

Citations

[i] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Yemen Crisis Explained, (2021), https://www.unrefugees.org/news/yemen-crisis-explained/#:~:text=More%20than%20four%20million%20Yemenis,majority%20remain%20inside%20the%20country

[ii] United Nations, UN humanitarian office puts Yemen war dead at 233,000, mostly from ‘indirect causes’, (December 1 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/12/1078972#:~:text=UN%20Podcasts-,UN%20humanitarian%20office%20puts%20Yemen%20war%20dead,%2C%20mostly%20from%20’indirect%20causes’&text=Millions%20of%20children%20across%20Yemen,the%20country%20(file%20photo).

[iii] Aziz El Yaakoubi, U.S officials have met Yemen’s Houthis as Washington seeks end to war – sources, Reuters (March 3 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-usa/u-s-officials-have-met-yemens-houthis-as-washington-seeks-end-to-war-sources-idUSKBN2AV1VH

[iv] International Crisis Group, The U.S. Should Reverse Its Huthi Terror Designation, (January 13 2021), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/us-should-reverse-its-huthi-terror-designation

[v] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001)

[vi] Council on Foreign Relations, The Presidential Candidates on Saudi Arabia, (July 30 2019), https://www.cfr.org/article/presidential-candidates-saudi-arabia

[vii] Alex Emmons, Aída Chávez, and Akela Lacy, Joe Biden, In Departure From Obama Policy, Says He Would Make Saudi Arabia A “Pariah,” The Intercept, (November 21 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/11/21/democratic-debate-joe-biden-saudi-arabia/

[viii] Jonathan Landay and Jarrett Renshaw, Biden ends U.S. support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, says war ‘has to end’, Reuters (February 4 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-biden-yemen-int/biden-ends-u-s-support-for-saudi-arabia-in-yemen-says-war-has-to-end-idUSKBN2A4268

[ix] Ellen Knickmeyer, Analysis: Biden retreats from vow to make pariah of Saudis, Associated Press (March 2 2021), https://apnews.com/article/biden-retreats-saudi-arabia-sanctions-khashoggi-killing-d91d31edece5db07112d1c2d4dd3be33

[x] Nicholas Kristof, Opinion President Biden Lets a Saudi Murderer Walk, New York Times (2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/26/opinion/sunday/saudi-arabia-biden-khashoggi.html

[xi] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2231 (2015), (20 July 2015), https://undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015)

[xii] Yeganeh Torbati, Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground, Reuters (November 6 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E

[xiii] BBC, Iran nuclear deal: US joins Vienna talks aimed at reviving accord, (April 6, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-56643178

[xiv] PBS NewsHour, U.S. and Iran agree to talks on returning to the 2015 nuclear deal, YouTube (April 2 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABP1L8V-vhA