This essay is going to be unique in its format. Currently I am struggling to fully grasp the concepts of the regularity approach and the necessitarian approach. I do not have any bias to either approach; the discussions in class of each view made sense to me, and due to my lack of understanding both approaches in an overall manner, I do not know if I perceive laws in the perspective of a necessitarian or regularist viewpoint. The purpose of this essay is to show the progress and development in my understanding of scientific laws as I go back through the course material in the same order as assigned. This essay will display my current understanding of the material (including my probable misconceptions) and follow my process of understanding the material as I go through it (this is not retrospective; the essay is being written as I review the material), expectantly showing the transition from my current neutral standpoint to hopefully one of the two approaches. The regularity approach of understanding laws of nature states that laws describe how things actually behave, a compilation of observances of the manner in which things have behaved in the past and will continue to behave. The necessitarian approach takes this definition one step further, stating that laws do not only describe the behavior of things but how they must behave, implying that laws are a revelation of a “written code” that things actually and must act in accordance with because it is the basis of how everything functions. There is appeal to both approaches because laws are seldom derived without observation of their behavior, and continued observation of consistent behaviors lets science progress its theories into laws, thus supporting the regularity approach. However, there is no reason to doubt that these observed tendencies that become laws are not a revelation of the true manner that our world functions and things must behave in accordance with, thus also supporting the necessitarian approach. From this perspective, it seems reasonable that the two theories are compatible, which is odd and most likely inferring a misconception of the two approaches because they are typically mutually exclusive.
The debate upon which approach, necessitarian or regularity, better answers what laws are begins with A.J. Ayer defending the regularity approach. Ayer opens up the regularity approach by discussing David Hume’s theories on causation, where he defines it as nothing more than the conjunction of one event following another event. This means there is no objective necessity in the relationship between the events, meaning any necessity found would be derived purely subjectively; it is our feelings that cause the expectation of an event to follow from another. Also he argues that any necessary correlation between cause and effect would have to be logical or non-logical. If the correlation were a logical necessity, then we could deduce effects prior to experience; Hume states this is not possible, thus it cannot be a logical necessity.
The regularity approach can be defined then as simply true universal generalizations, and the objective content of laws is detailed by what actually happens in the world. The regularity approach is then hit by several problems, specifically vacuous laws, non-instantial laws, functional laws, and accidental generalizations. The regularity theory can be adapted to satisfy such proposed dilemmas by adding subjective conditionals. Ayer then proposes his Epistemic Regularity Theory, in which laws are equal to universal truths plus the variable X, which is comprised of several subjective conditions that are dependant on the attitude of the scientists. Ayer’s theory also does not solve the missing values problem related to functional laws nor accidental generalizations, does not provide any necessary conditions for something to be a law, and inevitably never really states what laws are.
The regularity approach initially has its appeal by pointing out that any necessary perceived causation is subjective because it cannot be logically derived. However, pointing out a flaw of the necessitarian approach is not sufficient for the regularity approach to be embraced, as its many problems are addressed. Ayer develops a theory to make the regularity approach moderately possible, but fails to address some key problems and lacks an ability to truly define laws, leaving one unsatisfied with the theory. The next philosopher, Fred I. Dretzke, points out the most fatal error in Ayer’s Epistemic Regularity theory; the law-like status of a generalization it is dependant upon the subjective attitude of scientists and whether or not treats it as a law. This infers that there are no unknown laws because scientists cannot treat a generalization as a law if it is not yet discovered. This also implies that laws would not have existed prior to our awareness of them in terms of human existence.
Dretzke supports the necessitarian approach by proposing his version, in which it regards laws as the relationship of properties, differing from the traditional view of a necessary causal relationship between events or objects. Dretzke calls his version of the necessitarian approach the Universals Theory because properties are considered universals. His theory then defines laws as single statements about universals instead of universal generalizations about particulars. Problems arise with Dretzke’s theory because it does not exhibit laws as having necessary relations between properties but contingent ones.
The Universals Theory may be applicable, but it does not hold strongly to its necessitarian roots by foregoing the necessary relationship of causation. The theory encounters two problems noted by Mellor, which are the identification problem and the inference problem, which basically ask how Dretzke’s theory invokes a necessary relationship or the statement of one event must follow another. Mellor then spends the better part of his writings providing adequate negations to Kripke and Putnum, who try to defend the necessity relationship of natural laws (specifically identification claims).
Initially I was hoping for a feeling of enlightenment after reviewing the material, but instead feel pessimistic about the available options. The regularity theory does not seem remotely rationale if one must approve of the notion that laws did not exist before we could subject them to our attitudes. The necessitarian approach becomes moderately plausible once its key element of necessitation between two events is removed. Looking back at my previous understanding of the two approaches, it seems that I fairly understood the general concept except for the involvement of observation, or better stated empiricism. It has become clear that there is an empiricist nature in both approaches, as well as a lack there of in both in cases of non-instantial problems. I would have preferred more articles about the necessitarian approach as the article of Dretzke seemed to deviate from what the core belief of it, the necessary relationship in causation. I would prefer not to pick a side between either approaches, but there is hardly ever a time when one must agree whole-heartedly to one side of an argument and rather which side you are more inclined to believe in than the other. On that notion, I would side with the necessitarian approach. Hume may have showed that the necessity may be subjective, but (in accordance with the first section’s material) science is largely influenced by subjectivism anyways. I do believe that laws are derived in an empiricist manner, yet imagine there must be some scenario that refutes Hume where an effect could be predicted prior to experiencing it. Even if such were possible, I still believe it would be considered a theory until observed. It would be irrational to believe that science is not objective but its underlying laws purely are. Also the regularity approach seems to contain more drastic flaws in comparison to the necessitarian approach, making it the less favorable theory when regarding what the laws of nature are.