It is funny how the addition of a single word to a statement can completely change its meaning.  Yet, that is exactly what Van Fraassen does in order to solidify the realists’ point of view.  To be clear, the word “aims” changes a sentence from a na�ve statement to the correct statement.  “Science gives us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true (1066).”  This is not a valid claim, and Van Fraassen states that the correct statement for the realist to agree to is: “Science aims to give us, in its, theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true (1066).”  Van Fraassen goes on to discuss that by adding the word “aim” to the statement, we define what would classify as success.  Additionally, this statement does not discount that other aims may exist. 

Now, it is clear that the realists believe that scientific theories tell a story about the world that is literally true.  However, there is more to their position than the literal truth of a statement: epistemology.  In order for a realist to accept that a theory is true, they must believe that it is true.  Van Fraassen goes on to discuss that “if acceptance of a theory is the belief that that it is true, then tentative acceptance involves the tentative adoption of the belief that it is true.  If a belief comes in degrees, so does acceptance, and we may then speak of a degree of acceptance involving a certain degree of belief that the theory is true (1067).”  So, it has been discussed that when accepting a theory as being true, the realist “puts their foot down” and says yes, this is true.  If there are varying degrees of acceptance, can the realists have varying degrees of “putting their foot down?”

            When dealing with scientific theories in which there may be varying degrees of acceptance, perhaps the better position may be on the side of the anti-realist.  As Van Fraassen puts it, “the proposer does not assert the theory; he displays it, and claims certain virtues of it (1067).”  However, the language of a theory can divide the anti-realist stance into two positions.  Either the proposed theory should not be taken literally; or the theory should be taken literally, but the theory does not need to be entirely true to be considered successful.  This division provides the basis for Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism.  Constructive Empiricism aligns itself with the latter of the two anti-realist divisions by replacing the realists’ “true” with “empirically adequate.”  In other words, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and the acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate (1069).” 

            Empirically adequate?  This idea opens up the debate we had regarding observables and un-observables.  As one might imagine, observables are those objects, events, or things that can be seen with our senses.  Conversely, un-observables are those proposed objects, events, or things that we cannot see with our senses.  So how does the observable/ un-observable debate distinguish between the realist and constructive empiricism positions?  The answer lies in the acknowledgement of un-observables and the use of inferences.

            Realists can use observations in conjunction with logic and inferences to accept theories regarding unobservable.  However, the anti-realist that follows constructive empiricism does not acknowledge un-observables.  Rather, while the observations, logic, and inferences made by the realist may allow them to accept an un-observable to be “true,” to the constructive empiricist, the theory is “empirically adequate.”  Van Fraassen’s example about the mouse in wainscoting on pages 1076-1077 provides a clearer picture of how the realists’ “true” and the anti-realists’ “empirically adequate” are equivalent.  “I hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears (1076).”  Now, through the use of logic and inferences, the realist would say that there is a mouse and believe it to be true.  The anti-realist/ constructive empiricist would say that the events taking place are empirically adequate, but not necessarily true.

            Another key distinction that Van Fraassen discusses is the difference between “observing” and “observing that.”  For a concrete example, we could refer to page 1072 and read his discussion about a person from the stone-age throwing a tennis ball or witnessing a car crash.  However, I’ll refer back to our discussion of wind as an observable or un-observable.  For the sake of the debate between “observing” and “observing that,” let’s assume that we know wind is an observable thing/event.  But, when we see a flag blowing in the air, we assume that we are “observing that” it is the wind that is causing that.  Our experiences and contextual knowledge allow us to make this assumption.  However, if someone who has no knowledge of wind sees the same event, they would simply be “observing” a flag whipping in the air, not knowing why or what is causing it to do so.  So why is this important?

            The distinction between “observing” and “observing that” is more important to the realist rather than the anti-realist because of the realist’s use of logic and inference to accept a scientific theory as being true.  Could a realist accept a theory about un-observables without the use of contextual knowledge to form inferences?  No.  Let us assume that we know what a mouse is if we observe it, but have no knowledge about the phenomena of an un-observable mouse.    Using the mouse in wainscoting example, what if we had no knowledge of mice or their behaviors?  In other words, what if we could not “observe that,” but could only “observe?”  If this was the case, we could only see that something was scratching the wall, something was causing the cheese to disappear, and something’s feet were pattering at midnight.  Yet, we could not accept that a theory about a mouse was true from the realist’s point of view.  However, the anti-realist/ constructive empiricist could accept a theory about the presence of a mouse that was based on these phenomena.  For instance, even without contextual knowledge about the behavior of mice, if someone said that a mouse exhibits these behaviors, the constructive empiricist could accept the theory as being “empirically adequate,” but not necessarily true.

            After attempting to dissect the positions of the realist and anti-realist, specifically the Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricist, I find that I am both a realist and a constructive empiricist.  I know this may sound weird, but I think it depends on the circumstances.  I will admit that I am sometimes a realist and accept some theories about un-observables that are based on logic and inferences constructed from observable objects, events, and things.  Yet, there are other theories that I accept, but do not necessarily believe to be true.

            When dealing with everyday life events, I feel that my thinking and acceptance of theories are more like those of a realist.  As we discussed in class, I will use the “robbery” of our apartment as an example.  We comeback from class one day and find that our door is open, the knob and lock are broken, our television and laptop are gone, and our room has been completely rummaged through, with clothes all over the place.  As a realist, I would infer that I was robbed.  Yet, as we discussed in class, there are an infinite number of possibilities that could explain what happened: someone walking by accidently bumped the door and broke the door, then a friend came by to borrow your laptop, then your roommate took the television to get it fixed, and finally, your enraged ex wanted his/her stuff back and trashed your room.  As a realist in this situation, I may acknowledge the fact that the other things could have happened, but the likelihood of all of those events taking place is highly improbable.  As a result, I infer that a robbery is the most probable situation that provides the most truth about what happened.  Further, based on the observations and contextual knowledge, I can infer and accept that the theory about a robbery is indeed “true.”

            However, Fine claims that “realism is dead (1186).”  Theoretically, there are an infinite number of theories to explain how the world is and why it is the way that it is.  In light of this, the realist constrains himself/herself to a “small handful” of theories.  Personally, I think Fine is right to a certain degree.  That degree is when trying to explain the way the world works.  There are things about this world and the way it works, both observable and un-observable, that we do not know the “truth” about.  As such, there are an infinite number of theories that could explain these phenomena.  However, in the case of a proposed robbery, how a car works, how our brains signal our bodies to work, etc., the realist point of view is more applicable.  In these instances, there are only a small handful of theories that can be accepted as “true.”  Fine’s infinite number of theories is more likely to be accepted as “empirically adequate.”  In short, realism is not dead.

            As science continues to discover, rather than invent, I fail to see how we can completely discount a position.  As humans, we naturally have contextual knowledge, use logic, and make inferences.  As a result, we cannot completely accept everything we know about the world around us without at least once seeing it from the realists’ point of view.  Similarly, we will except every theory ever proposed to us to be “true.”  We may accept these theories to be “empirically adequate” and accept them as a result of the fact that there are no other proposed theories to explain certain phenomena, but we may not admit nor accept that the theory is true.  For example, I may believe that the orbit of the Earth is elliptical, which explains why it is hotter in summer than in winter.  However, science teaches that the orbit is a concentric circle.  Based on the information provided and my lack of ability to empirically test the orbit of the Earth, I can accept the theory of a circular orbit as being “empirically adequate,” but not necessarily true.  This would classify me as a constructive empiricist. 

            In the end, perhaps I best fit into position of the NOA, the Natural Ontological Attitude.  The “core position” is the simple “acceptance of truths” (1199).  From here, based on a particular circumstance or event, I become a realist and simply “put my foot down” and say yes, this really is the truth.  Or, I become an anti-realist or constructive empiricist and add a special analysis of concepts.  For now, I will not confine myself to being a realist, anti-realist, constructive empiricist, or a devout follower of NOA.  Rather, I think I will continue to allow myself and my beliefs roam freely between them.

          What a scientist deems truth has significant impact on the creation of theories.  There exist two main fields of thought among philosophers: realism and anti-realism.  Within anti-realism there is a branch termed, constructive empiricism, which was outline by Bas van Frassen in his essay, Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism.  The differences and similarities of these two viewpoints in philosophy will become clearer as we interpret various philosophers’ positions on realism and constructive empiricism.

According to realists, “Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like: and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true.” (pg. 1066).  Realists place a large focus on the truth.  In order for a realist to accept a theory he/she must also consider that theory to be a true, empirically adequate way to view the world.  Their goal is to get the world right.

            Constructive empiricism, also places an emphasis on empirical adequacy (as the title would suggest).  They feel, “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.” (pg. 1069).  The difference here is what each discipline of philosophy thinks constitutes truth.

            Philosophers categorize objects as either observable or unobservable.  Realists and constructive empiricists, using their definition of truth feel that observables and unobservables have different roles in theories.  According to realists, both observables and unobservables exist and can be used to form true theories.  Anti-realists are of the opposing opinion that unobservables do not exist and cannot be used to create theories.  Constructive empiricists do not want theories to be true, per se, they instead want theories to fit the observables that exist in our world.

            The division between observables and unobservables, according to Grover Maxwell, is not important enough to gripe about.  He says this because he feels there is no clear criteria that distinguishes observables and unobseravables. “The important consequence is that, so far, we are left without criteria which would enable us to draw a non arbitrary line between observation and theory.” (pg.1072).  However, scientists do agree that there are certain things in this world that are observables and those that are not.

            Initially, I want to side with the constructive empiricists and say that only observables can be used to create theories, but then I think of all the examples in science that use unobservables, but are successful theories.  For example, theories in physics and chemistry that use atoms, electrons, quarks, etc. are successful in explaining phenomena in the world.  I found a reason for employing unobservables within Maxwell’s article, The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities.

            He uses an example of a Pasteur-like scientist by the name of Jones to help illustrate how scientists try to explain phenomena (pg.1053).  In this scenario, Jones hypothesizes based on the germ theory that there is an unobservable organism, he terms crobes, that is causing infection and making people sick.  In his plan of action to stop the spread of disease he employs what he knows about the transmission of head lice to try and stop the transmission of this new disease (that is caused by crobes).  By following similar protocol the disease seems to be under control. 

            As a scientist and a scholar, I completely support and utilize models to understand the world.   I believe one of the chief goals of science is truth.  Models can help us to get closer to the truth by giving us a concrete way to think about a phenomena.  This allows us to get close to our goal of understanding the natural world we live in and the phenomena around us. This brings me to the instrumentalist view of realism.  Instrumentalists define truth as a useful tool for the practice of science.

            However, the real question Maxwell is posing here is just because the spread of the disease has been controlled does that mean we should accept this theory as true?  Are crobes observable or unobservable objects?  Following the realists, I would say yes, we can accept this theory as true.  The theory does a good job of explaining our world.  Since realists accept both observables and unobservables as objects used to create theories it does not matter if crobes do or do not exist.  What matters to the realist is that the phenomena has been explained with a degree of empirical adequacy and there is truth to the theory, meaning it explains a phenomena.

            Constructive empiricists, on the other hand, would not accept Jones’ theory about crobes as a true interpretation of the phenomena.  They would reject the theory because crobes are considered an unobservable object.  Even though the theory is empirically adequate because the spread of the disease has been stopped, there is no proof that crobes exist.

             This example brings me back to instrumentalism.  Instrumentalists believe that unobservables, like crobes, serve as meaningless (neither true nor false) entities or tools to help scientists organize their knowledge of observables, which in turn helps them to explain the world and phenomena.  However, going back to Musgrave, since the hypothesis about crobes offers the best explanation for the disease I would tend to follow the realists and accept that theory because it adequately explained the disease. 

            I would like to think that after research and the development of more advanced technology that the existence of crobes could be substantiated fully making the theory even more steadfast.  Similarly once new advances were made in microscope technology scientists were able to view cells and microorganisms and possibly one day they will be able to view electrons.  I find myself steering away from the anti-realist position because like Musgrave, I don’t believe we could, “say that a theory adequately explained many phenomena even though it is false.” (pg. 1102).

            I do not believe we could use a theory that is false to accurately explain our world.  If we used false theories to explain our world how are we ever going to understand the world we live in and the phenomena around us.  Without understanding there can be no advancement of the sciences.  And without advances in science man will never move forward. 

            When examining realism and constructive empiricism I would consider myself a realist.  Summarizing what Musgrave says, if the risks of anti-realism and realism are both the same, but realism offers more rewards by being able to distinguish truth, choose realism (pg. 1241-1242).  I agree with Musgrave. 

            Constructive empiricists and realists both take a risk in accepting a theory is true because there is no way to know what is true beyond what we know at any given point in time.  Hundreds of years from now something scientists knew to be true could no longer be true because of a new discovery.  Something similar has happened in our lifetime, the “planet” Pluto is no longer considered a planet.

            Since constructive empiricists place such an emphasis on empirical adequacy, which is so difficult to completely establish, Musgrave (and myself) feels that a claim to empirical adequacy is less valuable than a claim to the truth.  As truth is one of the ultimate aims of science, I would rather have truth than empirical adequacy as provided by constructive empiricism.

Now that the semester’s over and we’ve all had a little time to mentally digest all the positions and arguments we have been debating, I thought it might be interesting to see what everybody took away from the class.  From reading the blog, I know that how I interpreted the various topics differed from the way many others have.  It doesn’t have to long or thorough (we all have a busy week), but I would like to know if anyone else had something from one of the readings that really stuck out to them, something that maybe changed how they view science.To start things off, the lesson from this class that stood out to me the most was how important the psychological components of science are to its achievements.  Previously, I thought that opinions and “human” elements in science were flaws or imperfections that scientists would ever seek to eradicate.  However, I have come to realize, building off of Kuhn’s writings, that without our ideas, which are fundamentally psychological and always impacted by opinion, world view, etc., we could not have science at all.  I am starting to realize that the grand view of Science as an epistemological ivory tower devoid of opinions has some serious flaws, and that is changing how I understand science.

When trying to discover the aims and reach of science and scientific theories, one must hold a stance regarding the way in which they believe entities to be true. This distinction which consists of realism and antirealism are two sides of a philosophical debate behind the whole basis of accepted truth. These opposing views determine how the scientist’s observations and theories are applied to the world as well as accepted by society. Many people who are not very familiar with philosophy of science usually adopt the realist position and believe that science equals truth. The premise of the realist approach is the relationship between “observable” and “unobservable” entities, and that they are both real and exist. For example, scientists have never actually observed a black hole, but theory provides predictions based off observations of clouds of dust and light swirling around a super-dense object that is unobservable. Realist will accept the theory of black holes and believe that they are true.

On the other hand, anti realists take an opposite view, in which they believe a theory should not be regarded as truth and that unobservable objects do not exist. Anti realist believe that science is full of theories that are proved incorrect, and that the majority of theories ultimately are rejected or refined. They understand some theories provide valid empirical data to support a particular theory to be true, but an anti realist would say it is just merely a useful tool. The realism and antirealism debate is very complex and, as with most philosophy, there is a vast grey area followed by many sub categories of each approach.

Van Fraassen provides us with an alternative version of anti realism called “constructive empiricism.” he agrees with the realist that scientific theories ought to be construed literally, but disagrees with them when he asserts that a scientific theory does not have to be true to be successful. This view holds that  science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and that acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is empirically adequate rather than to be literally “true”.

For example a scientist who states that “There are electrons” means literally that there are electrons, and in Van Fraasen’s approach to anti-realism this statement should be taken as the literal meaning and truth. However, treating scientific arguments as literally true is not the same as believing they are true. He states “the distinction I have drawn between realism and anti realism, in so far pertains to the acceptance, concerns only how much belief is involved therein” (p.1069). Instead, treating them as literally true helps us to avoid treating scientific statements as metaphors. Treating scientific statements this way, according to Van Fraasen, accomplishes the goal of logical simplicity.

Van Fraasen says, “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory involves a belief only that it is empirically adequate” (1069). In other words, Van Fraassen’s anti-realism advocates an approach to science that values things other than simply phenomena being “true”. Theories must fit into the empirical observable world and make sense within that world. Theories must make sense within the observable world, and this is a higher value than merely being “true”. Van Fraassen argues that there is no reason to believe that an anti realist can provide a less good account of a theory’s usefulness than can a realist. It is a realist leap to believe that the regularities and deeper explanations of scientific theories must involve things that are unobservable and still believe that particular theory to be true. Van Fraassen states “the belief that a theory is true, or that it is empirically adequate, does not imply, and is not implied by, belief that full acceptance of a theory will be vindicated (p.1070). He goes on to say “a theory which is empirically adequate will not combine easily with some other theories which we have accepted in fact…” (p.1070)

However, Grover Maxwell argues against the distinction between observables and unobservable entities. He states “The important consequence is that, so far, we are left without criteria which would enable us to draw a non arbitrary line between observation and theory” (p.1072) He goes on to argue that what constitutes observable can be skewed differently, what about objects that need special tools to be observed?  The boundary between observable and unobservable entities is vague. At what point should the smallest things visible using a particular instrument count as observable? Van Fraassen’s answer is that observable is a vague predicate like “tall.” There are clear cases when a person is tall or not tall, but there are also many cases in between where it is not clear on which side of the line the person falls.

Similarly, we are not able to draw a precise line that separates the observable from the unobservable, this doesn’t mean that the notion has no content, since there are entities that clearly fall on one side or the other of the distinction, but lacks overall validity when trying to draw a finite line between the two separate entities.

Furthermore, Alan Musgrave’s article outlines two arguments implying that constructive empiricism is only minimally effective as an anti realist position. His first argument eradicates some of the distinctions between truth and empirical adequacy made by van Fraassen. The second argument points out a fatal contradiction in the logic used to uphold the observational-theoretical distinction necessary.  As I mentioned above   scientific theories rest on either observable entities, or more commonly, a combination of observable and unobservable entities. Appraisals of truth and empirical adequacy coincide with regard to observable entities.

With constructive empiricism, Van Fraassen attempts to avoid skeptical claims against realism that the truth value in cases of unobservable entities cannot be decisively determined. He argues that scientific theories need not be true to be accepted, only empirically adequate. Musgrave does not see this subtle distinction as an adequate evasion. In a way Van Fraassen’s case takes the same risks as the realist by accepting a theory which extends beyond what we can know at any given time and it may be proven wrong on empirical grounds. Musgrave then weighs realism against constructive empiricism. They entail the same risks, but the realist stands more to gain by taking the epistemic leap.

Musgrave’s next attack against constructive empiricism points out van Fraassen’s logically invalid argument for the existence of an observational-theoretical distinction. This distinction is crucial for maintaining any antirealist theory. Even so, van Fraassen admits the distinction cannot be made ontologically; things that humans cannot observe may nonetheless exist and, furthermore, there are such things as unobservable, regardless of how vague the term may be in some circumstances. Musgrave comments that these limitations are person-relative, species-specific and subject to evolutionary change (p.1094).

Van Fraassen sought to uphold an observational-theoretical distinction while freely admitting that it has no ontological significance. Musgrave states that constructive empiricism try’s to hold its epistemological position in two ways. First, a methodological prescription that prefers evidence pointing to the existence of observables rather than unobservable. Musgrave finds this implausible because it does not factor in the weight of available evidence. “Is the evidence for the existence of electrons better or worse than the evidence for the existence of the yeti,” (1096). Second are empirical claims that scientists only infer the empirical adequacy of theories regarding unobservable, never truth.  This argument is also absurd as one only detects electrons and measures charges when operating on the belief that the objects of their detections and measurements exist.

In conclusion we can now understand why this is one of the most widely debated philosophical topic’s in the philosophy of science. Each position has flaws that the other side tears wide open, while having similar flaws on their own side as well. I personally feel that this debate will continue on for ages if the practitioners rely on only trying to refute their opposition’s flaws instead of working together to truly understand and examine the values, aims, and goals of science. As a comparison I argue the same for modern politics, all sides are supposed to be working for the people. The public is supposed to be the main priority when debating laws and and writing legislation, but all too many times we just see a fight between Democrats and Republicans’ minuscule differences regarding the topic at hand. All is lost when there is no true vision in sight.

If you have never been to the website www.ted.com, I would highly suggest checking it out.  They have a ton of talks by people from all over the world about science, politics, technology and other topics.  I was looking at it earlier today and found this video and it reminded me of the discussion we had on Tuesday about inferences in science.  He explains the gaps in our knowledge and describes what we think we know versus what we really do know.  If you have a few minutes, check it out and leave comments with your ideas!
TED – What We Think We Know

As we learned the 3 key points of antirealism today, I tried to think of applicable examples aside from Copernicus of scientific theories.  The one I came up with is arguably evolutionary theory.  Before I possibly upset people, just hear me out.

Personally, I have no disposition in regarding evolutionary theory as being true or false and frankly I don’t care if it is or isn’t; this is not a debate about the possible truth of evolution, but its relation to anti-realism if treated as a theory.  Yes I am a Christian and it would be obnoxious for me to not admit that this affects my judgment on the possible truth to the theory, but nevertheless I regard evolution as a theory (I am not saying its false; it could be true). 
Anyways, Evolutionary theory is a very useful scientifc theory that explains a lot about our world – I can admit this without actually putting my faith into the theory.  Therefore, I can use this model and effectively explain a lot in the world, such as to explain behaviors, genetic variation, etc.  But as stated, I do not have any faith in the theory, but can still use it to explain things because it produces the most results.

The only flaw I found with this  rationale is that in todays lecture, we were told that fictionalism, instructionism, and reductivism all assume that the theory is false but use it anyways.  I do not assume evolution is false, I just don’t regard it as the truth or a proven fact.  I am not sure if this makes me an anti-realist or not, because it is slightly dissimilar.  Please comment

In the first section of her article, Nancy Cartwright seems to attack some laws of physics that would seem fundamental to the description of the forces between two bodies. Cartwright seems to state that neither the law of gravitation or Coulomb’s law correctly define the force between two objects. She states: “neither law by itself truly describes how the bodies behave”(pg. 868). She does go on to accept the laws independently but only if there are no other forces acting on the objects other than the chosen independent law. Cartwright points out this is where the trade-off comes in as she claims that in that previous situation there is truth involved, but the explanatory power is diminished.

Schedule for Remaining Five Weeks.docx

Struggling to grasp the concepts between ontological view, and the epistemological I stumbled upon some of Rene Descartes works that I thought help me work out the way in which we think or maybe except one of the two different approaches. One of his famous sayings is cogito ergo sum (“I think, therefore I am”) more interesting is the Wax Argument. He considers a piece of wax; his senses inform him that it has certain characteristics, such as shape, texture, size, color, smell, and so forth. When he brings the wax towards a flame, these characteristics change completely. However, it seems that it is still the same thing: it is still a piece of wax, even though the data of the senses inform him that all of its characteristics are different. Therefore, in order to properly grasp the nature of the wax, he cannot use the senses. He must use his mind (Wikipedia). Could this apply to the way in which we must consider what a “fact” is, or in what way we view facts of arising. Could we fact totally disengage ourselves from are senses and still be able to adequately understand the true nature of facts or our existence? Or do we just take what is in front of us, oberservations, experiments, etc and disregard the unknown?

Just some notes from the in-class discussion…

General Consensus:

Did a world exist without human beings?  Yes.
Was that world governed by law?  Yes.
Then the laws of nature must exist independently of human knowledge.  This supports the ontological view.

Dretske agrees:  If regularity was right, there would have been no laws pre-humans, and there would be no laws that we do not know right now.

Necessitarian:  IF there were F’s, there would be G’s.  This allows us to handle vacuous laws, either about things that don’t exist, or about counter-factual claims.  Does not simply make statements about what IS, but can make statements about what WOULD BE under different conditions.

Alternate Worlds:  Another possible description for the way things turned out in this world.  There are potentially several different ways that this world could have turned out.

Necessary: T in all possible worlds.
Possible: T in some possible worlds.
Impossible: Not T in all possible worlds.