It is funny how the addition of a single word to a statement can completely change its meaning. Yet, that is exactly what Van Fraassen does in order to solidify the realists’ point of view. To be clear, the word “aims” changes a sentence from a na�ve statement to the correct statement. “Science gives us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true (1066).” This is not a valid claim, and Van Fraassen states that the correct statement for the realist to agree to is: “Science aims to give us, in its, theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true (1066).” Van Fraassen goes on to discuss that by adding the word “aim” to the statement, we define what would classify as success. Additionally, this statement does not discount that other aims may exist.
Now, it is clear that the realists believe that scientific theories tell a story about the world that is literally true. However, there is more to their position than the literal truth of a statement: epistemology. In order for a realist to accept that a theory is true, they must believe that it is true. Van Fraassen goes on to discuss that “if acceptance of a theory is the belief that that it is true, then tentative acceptance involves the tentative adoption of the belief that it is true. If a belief comes in degrees, so does acceptance, and we may then speak of a degree of acceptance involving a certain degree of belief that the theory is true (1067).” So, it has been discussed that when accepting a theory as being true, the realist “puts their foot down” and says yes, this is true. If there are varying degrees of acceptance, can the realists have varying degrees of “putting their foot down?”
When dealing with scientific theories in which there may be varying degrees of acceptance, perhaps the better position may be on the side of the anti-realist. As Van Fraassen puts it, “the proposer does not assert the theory; he displays it, and claims certain virtues of it (1067).” However, the language of a theory can divide the anti-realist stance into two positions. Either the proposed theory should not be taken literally; or the theory should be taken literally, but the theory does not need to be entirely true to be considered successful. This division provides the basis for Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. Constructive Empiricism aligns itself with the latter of the two anti-realist divisions by replacing the realists’ “true” with “empirically adequate.” In other words, “science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and the acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate (1069).”
Empirically adequate? This idea opens up the debate we had regarding observables and un-observables. As one might imagine, observables are those objects, events, or things that can be seen with our senses. Conversely, un-observables are those proposed objects, events, or things that we cannot see with our senses. So how does the observable/ un-observable debate distinguish between the realist and constructive empiricism positions? The answer lies in the acknowledgement of un-observables and the use of inferences.
Realists can use observations in conjunction with logic and inferences to accept theories regarding unobservable. However, the anti-realist that follows constructive empiricism does not acknowledge un-observables. Rather, while the observations, logic, and inferences made by the realist may allow them to accept an un-observable to be “true,” to the constructive empiricist, the theory is “empirically adequate.” Van Fraassen’s example about the mouse in wainscoting on pages 1076-1077 provides a clearer picture of how the realists’ “true” and the anti-realists’ “empirically adequate” are equivalent. “I hear scratching in the wall, the patter of little feet at midnight, my cheese disappears (1076).” Now, through the use of logic and inferences, the realist would say that there is a mouse and believe it to be true. The anti-realist/ constructive empiricist would say that the events taking place are empirically adequate, but not necessarily true.
Another key distinction that Van Fraassen discusses is the difference between “observing” and “observing that.” For a concrete example, we could refer to page 1072 and read his discussion about a person from the stone-age throwing a tennis ball or witnessing a car crash. However, I’ll refer back to our discussion of wind as an observable or un-observable. For the sake of the debate between “observing” and “observing that,” let’s assume that we know wind is an observable thing/event. But, when we see a flag blowing in the air, we assume that we are “observing that” it is the wind that is causing that. Our experiences and contextual knowledge allow us to make this assumption. However, if someone who has no knowledge of wind sees the same event, they would simply be “observing” a flag whipping in the air, not knowing why or what is causing it to do so. So why is this important?
The distinction between “observing” and “observing that” is more important to the realist rather than the anti-realist because of the realist’s use of logic and inference to accept a scientific theory as being true. Could a realist accept a theory about un-observables without the use of contextual knowledge to form inferences? No. Let us assume that we know what a mouse is if we observe it, but have no knowledge about the phenomena of an un-observable mouse. Using the mouse in wainscoting example, what if we had no knowledge of mice or their behaviors? In other words, what if we could not “observe that,” but could only “observe?” If this was the case, we could only see that something was scratching the wall, something was causing the cheese to disappear, and something’s feet were pattering at midnight. Yet, we could not accept that a theory about a mouse was true from the realist’s point of view. However, the anti-realist/ constructive empiricist could accept a theory about the presence of a mouse that was based on these phenomena. For instance, even without contextual knowledge about the behavior of mice, if someone said that a mouse exhibits these behaviors, the constructive empiricist could accept the theory as being “empirically adequate,” but not necessarily true.
After attempting to dissect the positions of the realist and anti-realist, specifically the Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricist, I find that I am both a realist and a constructive empiricist. I know this may sound weird, but I think it depends on the circumstances. I will admit that I am sometimes a realist and accept some theories about un-observables that are based on logic and inferences constructed from observable objects, events, and things. Yet, there are other theories that I accept, but do not necessarily believe to be true.
When dealing with everyday life events, I feel that my thinking and acceptance of theories are more like those of a realist. As we discussed in class, I will use the “robbery” of our apartment as an example. We comeback from class one day and find that our door is open, the knob and lock are broken, our television and laptop are gone, and our room has been completely rummaged through, with clothes all over the place. As a realist, I would infer that I was robbed. Yet, as we discussed in class, there are an infinite number of possibilities that could explain what happened: someone walking by accidently bumped the door and broke the door, then a friend came by to borrow your laptop, then your roommate took the television to get it fixed, and finally, your enraged ex wanted his/her stuff back and trashed your room. As a realist in this situation, I may acknowledge the fact that the other things could have happened, but the likelihood of all of those events taking place is highly improbable. As a result, I infer that a robbery is the most probable situation that provides the most truth about what happened. Further, based on the observations and contextual knowledge, I can infer and accept that the theory about a robbery is indeed “true.”
However, Fine claims that “realism is dead (1186).” Theoretically, there are an infinite number of theories to explain how the world is and why it is the way that it is. In light of this, the realist constrains himself/herself to a “small handful” of theories. Personally, I think Fine is right to a certain degree. That degree is when trying to explain the way the world works. There are things about this world and the way it works, both observable and un-observable, that we do not know the “truth” about. As such, there are an infinite number of theories that could explain these phenomena. However, in the case of a proposed robbery, how a car works, how our brains signal our bodies to work, etc., the realist point of view is more applicable. In these instances, there are only a small handful of theories that can be accepted as “true.” Fine’s infinite number of theories is more likely to be accepted as “empirically adequate.” In short, realism is not dead.
As science continues to discover, rather than invent, I fail to see how we can completely discount a position. As humans, we naturally have contextual knowledge, use logic, and make inferences. As a result, we cannot completely accept everything we know about the world around us without at least once seeing it from the realists’ point of view. Similarly, we will except every theory ever proposed to us to be “true.” We may accept these theories to be “empirically adequate” and accept them as a result of the fact that there are no other proposed theories to explain certain phenomena, but we may not admit nor accept that the theory is true. For example, I may believe that the orbit of the Earth is elliptical, which explains why it is hotter in summer than in winter. However, science teaches that the orbit is a concentric circle. Based on the information provided and my lack of ability to empirically test the orbit of the Earth, I can accept the theory of a circular orbit as being “empirically adequate,” but not necessarily true. This would classify me as a constructive empiricist.
In the end, perhaps I best fit into position of the NOA, the Natural Ontological Attitude. The “core position” is the simple “acceptance of truths” (1199). From here, based on a particular circumstance or event, I become a realist and simply “put my foot down” and say yes, this really is the truth. Or, I become an anti-realist or constructive empiricist and add a special analysis of concepts. For now, I will not confine myself to being a realist, anti-realist, constructive empiricist, or a devout follower of NOA. Rather, I think I will continue to allow myself and my beliefs roam freely between them.