Persuasion and Propaganda in Ancient China (textbook chapter draft), part 3

Confucian Rhetoric:

Among the Hundred Schools of Thought, Confucianism, also known as Ru xue (lit. “humanism”) or Ruism, arguably played the most significant role in shaping the Chinese rhetorical tradition. This is in part due to the fact that Confucianism was established as the official state ideology throughout most of Imperial Chinese history.

Originated from the writings and teaching of Confucius and his disciples, most notably Mencius (Mengzi) Xun Kuang (Xunzi), its philosophy can be characterized as humanistic and rationalistic, and a tendency to emphasize the importance of ritual and upholding traditions. After multiple centuries of continuous development and official endorsement, Confucianism expanded into an umbrella that covers a range of philosophical, moral, literary, religious, and legal traditions. To this day, Confucian ethics remains a defining element of Chinese culture.

Confucian writings tend to see the purpose of rhetoric as means to dispel falsehood, to maintain propriety and social harmony, and most importantly, to achieve zhèng míng (“rectification of names”). The term zhèng míng merits further consideration. Sometimes translated as “rectification of names,” it is a key Confucian rhetorical concept pertaining to the notion that a person or organization’s words and writings must be consistent with their formally established status and position. It assumes that to persuade others, one must first acquire legitimacy by placing themselves behind good faith, speaking truthfully, and through proper channels which the audience recognizes as legitimate. As Confucius himself noted in his Analects:

“Those who are virtuous will be sure to possess proper rhetoric, but those who are skilled in rhetoric may not always be virtuous.”[1]

Roughly one century after the death of Confucius, Plato, the pivotal Athenian philosopher, expressed similar sentiment on the proper use of rhetoric in his Socratic dialogue Phaedrus: “He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?”[2]

The doctrine of zhèng míng is closely tied with the Confucian view that our beliefs and behaviors are predominately shaped by our family upbringing, our education, and our role models and peers. You might think of the term “respectability” as a loosely related concept. When applied in the art of persuasion, it might be helpful to understand zhèng míng as a mode of rhetoric which primarily focuses on appeals to propriety.  Confucian writings generally hold that a given audience would judge an argument first and foremost by its conformity to shared norms, beliefs, and family values. The intrinsic logic and artistry of a speech (míng) are only considered worthy of evaluation when the speech is delivered by the appropriate rhetor, through the appropriate channel, and at the appropriate place and occasion.[3] Thus, rhetoricians from the Confucian tradition tend to place a greater emphasis on maintaining rén – a state of which through the practice kè jǐ-fù lǐ (lit. “self-control and return to rituals”):

“One should see nothing improper, hear nothing improper, say nothing improper, do nothing improper”[4]

Daoist Rhetoric:

Owes its origin to the classical Chinese text Tao Te Ching, philosophical Daoism, (sometimes spelled “Taoism”) became fully developed through the writings of Zhuang Zhou (commonly known as Zhuangzi) and Yang Zhu during the Warring States period. It has long been recognized alongside Confucianism as the two great philosophical systems of China.

Like its Confucian counterpart, Daoism encompasses a wide range of philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions, and profoundly influenced Chinese art, poetry, and spiritual practices. While it is impossible to capture its expansive philosophical system within a few lines, Daoist writings are characterized by their detached, ironic, and often playful prose style, skeptical attitude towards authority and tradition, and reflective inquiry into nature, spontaneity, and the process (or the “dao”) of change. The Daoist preoccupation with the philosophy of change means that its approach to the art of persuasion is ruo shui – “like water.” Thus, dynamically adapting to different occasions, audiences, and the everchanging realities is central to the Daoist rhetorical tradition.

While philosophers from both Confucian and Daoist traditions generally agree that the art of persuasion is necessary to establish trustworthiness, Daoist writings tend to place greater emphasis on the conflict resolution aspects of rhetoric – specifically through the notions of wu wei (“inexertion”), bù zhēng (“no-conflict”). The concept of wu wei (lit.: “no action”), often translated as “inaction” or “inexertion,” appears in numerous Chinese philosophical traditions, and bears multiple, often contradictory interpretations. In classical Confucian literature, wu wei serves as a metaphor for the ideal political community, of which the society achieved a homogenous state of collective virtue and excellence so that its sage king could govern without the need for any coercive measure. In Daoism, however, wu wei is an art or technique that allows the practitioner to achieve greater influence over human affairs.^[5] Consider the following lines from the writings of Wenzi, a key figure of philosophical Daoism during Early Imperial China, where he explains the rhetorical utility of wu wei:

“Those who are Wu wei are without voice and shape, and those without voice and shape can see without being seen, hear without being heard. How splendid!”^[6]

To think carefully about this question: how effective would a piece of propaganda be if its target audience could easily recognize it as propaganda? This question is fundamental to how wu wei and bù zhēng operate as Daoist rhetorical principles. simplest terms, wu wei can be understood as persuasion without letting the target audience realize they are being persuaded. It is about strategically altering human behavior in ways that appear ziran, or “natural and spontaneous,” to the target audience. As Daoist writings consider human beliefs and behaviors emerge from our animalistic or biological drives and are largely shaped by our daily repetitions, it would be far more effective to influence human affairs by targeting more subtle behavioral cues rather than engaging in explicit persuasion. Likewise, the point of bù zhēng (“no-conflict”) is not seen as a display of weakness; rather, it is a strategy of ruo shui, or to go with the flow “like water,” priming the target audience by avoiding triggering their psychological resistance.

However, unlike their Confucian counterparts, the Daoist philosophical tradition is far less concerned with propriety and social harmony. In Daoist rhetoric, the fundamental objective for practicing bù zhēng and qí wù is to achieve the ideal of xiāo yáo, or a state of untroubled ease and freedom, and the best way to achieve good rhetoric is through wu wei.

Rhetoric in the Legalist tradition:

On both a theoretical and practical level, Legalist philosophers contributed significantly to the building of Chinese imperial institutions, and their political thought remained influential in shaping governance practices throughout China’s history. Nonetheless, the imperial literati formally denounced Legalist thinkers for their philosophical anti-humanism and their cynical attitude towards Confucian moral discourse.

When it comes to rhetorical strategies, Legalist thinkers are more inclined to write in clear, concrete terms, favoring actionable solutions over philosophical abstractions. Legalist philosophy, exemplified by the writings of Guan Zhong, Shang Yang, and Han Fei, tend to gravitate toward the subject of statecraft. Consequently, its engagement with rhetoric often revolves around its utility in governance and inter-state competition. Stemming from its “realist” analytical impulse, Legalist writers see plenty of opportunities for the art of persuasion to aid yang quan (“power projection”), geng fa (“institutional reform”), huà cè (“strategic planning”), wèn-biàn (“inquisition”), and shì xié (“whitewash shortcomings”).

A defining element of Legalist thought would be its characterization of human nature as yín yì, or a state of “insatiable desire and greed” and therefore holding that humans are primarily driven by self-interest and the need for self-preservation. From this premise, a rhetorician from the Legalist tradition would consider the appeal to our fear and to our want to be the most effective approach to persuasion and propaganda. Shang Yang, a key architect of the Chinese imperial system and one of the most prolific Legalist writers of the Warring States period, made the following observation in his political treatise The Book of Lord Shang:

“Indeed, people abide by their avocations and obey the regulations even to death, when the honorific titles which the ruler has instituted, and the rewards and penalties which he has established, are clear, and when, instead of employing sophists and intriguers, men of merit are set up. The result will be that the people will take pleasure in farming and enjoy warfare, because they see that the ruler honours farmers and soldiers, looks down upon sophists and artisans, and despises itinerant scholars.”^[7]

Under the Legalist tradition, when structures of shǎng-xíng (“reward and punishment”) and jìn-shǐ (“incentives and disincentives”) are implemented with yi yan (“uniform words/speech”) and jìn lìng (“strict implementation of rules”), it is possible to persuade people to accept even the most unpalatable condition.

The rhetorical concept of zòng-héng, originally emerged from the School of Diplomacy and writings of Warring States era strategist Guigu Zi, became incorporated into the Legalist philosophical system through the writings of Han Fei (c. 280 – 233 BCE). Literarily translated as “verticality and horizontality,” it is a concept of forming and breaking up strategic relationship networks by dynamically adapting between two modes of alliances. An alliance network is considered héng or “vertical/longitudinal” when it is centered around a powerful core, commanding a group of less powerful allies around its periphery, thus forming a hierarchically ordered lián (“company”). A zòng or “horizontal/latitudinal” alliance is a decentralized network where numerous less powerful individuals or groups band together to form a united front known as hé (“aggregate”), in order to gain leverage against a powerful common rival. ^[8]

To understand how zòng-héng tactics would operate, imagine an instance in which the university leadership would like to prevent student workers from unionizing. Acting from the position of power, the university leadership may resort to the tactic of lián héng, or creating a “vertical company,” to fracture the student worker population. This may involve coercing vulnerable segments of the student population into the leadership’s interest network, such as threatening international students to vote against unionization or face the possibility of losing their student visas. The university leadership may also “sweeten” the deal by adding positive incentives, such as promising a small pay raise or tuition deduction as rewards for cooperating with the leadership.

Student labor organizers may counter the university leadership’s “vertical company” with the tactic of hé zòng, or forming a “horizontal aggregate.” This could be done by reaching out to other groups of overworked and underpaid university workers – support staff, graduate assistants, adjunct lecturers, and so on – into a united front. These groups may not know or strongly associate with each other, except they all happen to experience frustrating labor conditions under the same employer. Whereas each individual group may be powerless to persuade the university leadership, when joined together into a “horizontal aggregate,” their collective economic clout would translate into highly persuasive leverage when negotiating for better work conditions. Thus, a rhetorician who practices the art of zòng-héng understands the advantages and weaknesses of modalities alliance networks and would exploit their weak points for their gain.

NOTES:

[1] Confucius, The Analects : Xian Wen – translation by 7 Sturgeon Donald,  Chinese Text Project,” accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/analects/xian-wen.

[2] Plato (c. 379 BC). Phaedrus. Translation by Benjamin Jowett. Available: https://www.fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedrus.pdf

[3] Confucius (C. 479 BC). The Analects – Book of Zi Lu. Available: https://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu/zh?searchu=%E6%AD%A3%E5%90%8D&searchmode=showall#result

[4] Bo Mou, The Routledge History of Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2008).

[5] 顾伟列, 中国文化通论 (Beijing: East China Normal UniversityPress, 2005).

[6] Wenzi, “精_誠,” in Wenzi, accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/wenzi/jing-cheng.

[7] Shang Yang,   English translation: J. J. L. Duyvendak,   Shang   Jun       Shu,     338AD, https://ctext.org/shang-jun-shu.

[8] Sturgeon Donald, “Hanfeizi : 忠_孝 – 橫 – Chinese Text Project,” accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/hanfeizi/zhong-xiao.