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Persuasion and Propaganda new digital text case study draft – Bureaucratic Rhetoric and Institutions of Involuntary Labor in Early Imperial China

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American economist Alan Blinder famously characterized the rhetorical style of bureaucrats – an umbrella term denoting unelected officials holding administrative, technical, and managerial positions – as “secretive, cryptic, [sic] using numerous and complicated words to convey little of any meaning.” Think of a career government worker who talks in jargon-filled canned statements with little substance. While it may be counterintuitive to associate bureaucracy with the art of persuasion, history tells us quite a different story. Not only did bureaucracy itself emerge as a rhetorical response to the exigencies of record-keeping and resolving disputes, but it also provides a powerful platform for propaganda, sometimes making unpalatable measures appear proper and necessary.

In this case study, we will examine official narratives on involuntary servitude (slavery) in Early Imperial China, and focus on how the imperial bureaucracy justified its institutions of forced labor despite having officially abolished slavery.  We approach this through a historical lens, the role of bureaucracy in persuasion and propaganda, and reflect on how authorities of power would employ subtle rhetorical strategies to make dehumanizing, exploitative structures appear legitimate and necessary.

Zhèngmíng 正名：Rectifying the Names

“The Imperial Academy is rectified, and schools and studies are thriving. So grand are the rituals and court hymns, so elegant and proper are the ceremonial robes and official processions. The well-field system and the rule of law are restored, slavery is abolished. Such is a return to the ancient ideal!”

Quote by Yang Xiong in 8 CE (English translation from Classical Chinese by Keren Wang) [1]

The quote above was made by Han dynasty literati, rhetorician, and Confucian philosopher Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE), in his essay written in 8 CE commemorating the two hundred and tenth anniversary of the founding of the Han dynast. Known for his expertise in the classical literary form known as fu, Yang Xiong was appointed by Emperor Cheng of Han as the Undersecretary of the Imperial Archive, whose official duties include composing poems and hymns praising the virtue and glory of the imperial court.  Writing as emperor’s personal propagandist, Yang Xiong credited the Han court for abolishing slavery, along with other great deeds that conform to Confucian notions of an ideal ruler.

Confucian ethics strongly opposes chattel slavery, (known as rén-yì ) in Classical Chinese). Mencius, known in Confucianism as  the “Second Sage” after only Confucius himself, famously characterized rén-yì as “the antithesis of ren (benevolence), rejection of zhi (wisdom), deprived of li (propriety), and devoid of yi (morality).” The Han court adopted Confucianism and its ideal of meritocracy as the official imperial philosophy, a move which was followed by all subsequent Chinese dynasties. To maintain its political legitimacy, the Han laws and the official imperial narrative on slavery had to conform to Confucian ethics. The Han emperor’s power was bound by its Confucian laws because those laws represented the set of fundamental values the emperor relied on to rule legitimately. It’s similar to how the legitimacy of the U.S. government relies on the ability of its government officials to adhere to the U.S. Constitution. This constraint reflects the Confucian rhetorical concept of zhèng míng we have covered in the earlier chapter on ancient Chinese rhetorical traditions. [2]

Responding to the rhetorical exigence of zhèng míng, or “rectification of name,”  the official historical record of the Han court presents a narrative portraying  its predecessor, the  Qin dynasty, in a critical light. According to the Han, the Qin dynasty as a period dominated by ruthless tyrants who enslaved countless civilians to build vanity projects for the emperor. Therefore, the Qin Empire lost its Mandate to rule China, and was rightfully overthrown by the founding emperor of the Han dynasty who embraced enlightened Confucian ideals of governance. Quite the contrast – yet it is mostly one in words. In reality, both Qin and Han dynasties operated in a virtually identical manner.

Indeed, there is little evidence suggesting that Qin emperors acted more brutally than their Han counterparts. Nevertheless, to “rectify” its name, the Han rulers furnished a founding narrative which injected a moral dimension to its military victory over its predecessors. As an example of this propaganda technique, consider the popular narratives of American Independence found in U.S. history textbooks. Most will tell a popular revolution against tyrannical oppressions, driven by Enlightenment ideals of human rights and civil liberties. Whereas in history classrooms outside of the U.S., American Independence is often taught as just one proxy battleground within the larger conflict between Great Britain and France for global dominance. This reflects the technique previously discussed: establishing a founding myth to make the victor appear more moral and enlightened.

Under its official founding narrative, the Han court claimed credit for “abolishing slavery” to achieve zhèng míng and become rightful holder of the Mandate of Heaven. In practice, however, the Han dynasty relied on a constant stream of involuntary labor to maintain its vast imperial domain and its complex bureaucratic system for more than four hundred years. The Han imperial authority was able to maintain this contradictory position through the workings of its bureaucracy, which holds the power to draft and implement laws based on its interpretation of Confucian classics.  These Confucian canons serve as the constitution of Han law. However, as they are comprised of philosophical and historical texts written many centuries prior to the founding of Han dynasty, their vagueness provides significant leeway for Han scholar-bureaucrats to adaptively interpret the law in ways that suit the needs of the Empire. One may consider the U.S. Supreme Court justices as modern-day equivalent of scholar-officials holding similar rhetorical power of legal truth-making, through a process known as constitutional interpretation. For example, Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that the internment of Japanese American citizens was constitutional despite such a measure appearing to blatantly violate the Fifth Amendment. In the 2008 landmark ruling Trump v. Hawaii, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Korematsu v. United States decision, thereby changing the legal “truth.” Again the Confucian rhetorical principle of zhèng míng also applies here. For the American public, the Supreme Court was able to legitimately contradict its earlier interpretation of the U.S. Constitution not because of the intrinsic artistry of its overruling arguments, but because they are delivered by the appropriate rhetors, through the appropriate channel, and at the appropriate place and occasion according to the established rule of law. 

 

Shìxié 飾邪：Decorating the Iniquitous

Qin and Han dynasties inherited two main forms of involuntary labor systems from the Warring States Period (403 BC – 221 BC): yáoyì (“labor tax”) and guān-núbì (“prisoner labor”). Institutions of yáoyì and guān-núbì in fact persisted throughout Imperial Chinese history (only to be formally abolished in the early 20th century). Furthermore, yáoyì conscript service and literati bureaucracy altogether formed the backbone of Chinese imperial power structure.

Recall the Legalist rhetorical doctrine of shì xié  (“whitewashing”) discussed in the previous ancient Chinese rhetoric chapter. Here, we focus on shì xié  as deploying new definitions to neutralize a controversial subject or taboo practice. Redefining “torture” as “enhanced interrogation technique” is good example of shì xié. Likewise, we often hear unscrupulous employers use terms such as “unpaid internship,” “free exposure,” and “experiential education” to whitewash what is effectively unpaid labor for their own profit.

Chinese historians often characterize Han political rhetoric as “Confucian in form, Legalist in practice.” It means that the imperial authority relied on Confucian teachings of filial piety and humanistic benevolence as moral endorsements of its rule, whereas its administrative apparatus were designed primarily based Legalist realpolitik principles.  The Han imperial bureaucracy was able to “rectify the name” what is effectively state-managed slavery in part through the rhetorical strategy of shì xié. The Han law redefines “slavery-proper” as a small sub-set of involuntary servitudes that the imperial authority did not benefit from.  Only zìmài-rén, or indentured servitude, and sī-núbì or private chattel slavery are considered “slavery-proper” and therefore are prohibited under the Han law. Through their artful use of words, they could pick and choose what benefited them. Thus, the forms of involuntary servitude that met the needs of the empire were relabeled as yáoyì or “labor tax”, and guān-núbì or “prisoner labor,” and therefore made perfectly “legitimate.” This is one way propaganda works—by defining and redefining things to serve the needs of the propagandist.

Yáoyì is a state-managed conscript labor system that emerged during the Spring and Autumn period (776 BC – 403 BC) and was adopted by virtually all subsequent Chinese dynasties.  Officially, yáoyì has always been framed as a form of taxation rather than involuntary servitude. Under this official narrative, yáoyì during the Han dynasty was enforced as a civic duty of which all male shùmín (“commoners”) in good standing are expected to perform. If you are wondering what about those who are not “in good standing,” they are of course covered by penal labor systems which I will get to later. Now back to yáoyì, it is considered one of the three main forms of taxes collected by the state.  The following quote from Mengzi succinctly captures the official narrative endorsed by the Han court:

“Master Meng said, ‘There are three types of taxes, there is the taxation of textile and silk, the taxation of grain, and taxation of labor service. When the prince collects one type of tax, he shall defer the collection of the other two taxes.  If he collects two types of taxes at once, then his people will suffer from hunger. If he collects all three taxes at once, then the basic social cohesion will be disrupted.’” [3]

As its name suggests, yáoyì laborers are conscripts, it is involuntary in nature, but nonetheless they are paid and are usually provided with adequate housing and food. It was used to provide the necessary workforce for the Imperial military and for various infrastructure projects such as canals, roads, dams, and city walls. Han official records claims that its preceding Qin dynasty operated a much harsher yáoyì system with mostly unpaid laborers with subhuman living conditions, and that the Han founders transformed yáoyì into an enlightened “civic duty.” Current archaeological findings reveal that the yáoyì system during the early Han period was almost identical to the supposedly “tyrannical” version used by its Qin predecessors. Therefore, the official Han narrative on its predecessor’s conscript labor system of was most propaganda. 

 

Shǎng-xíng 賞刑 & Jìn-shǐ 禁使： Reward-punishment / Incentives-disincentives

Ironically, while the Han literati formally denounced proponents of the Legalist philosophy for their critical attitude towards Confucian moral discourse, they embraced Legalist rhetorical principles in terms of statecraft. While the tactic of shì xié may be helpful to provide a cosmetic cover for coercive labor, it is not a sustainable public rhetoric by itself. As the unpleasant experience of involuntary servitude does not change irrespective of the legal label, people would quickly see the “scam” behind the false advertisement. Therefore, the Han bureaucracy had to deploy additional rhetorical tactics to make its state-sanctioned involuntary servitude self-sustaining and justifiable under Confucian ethics.  To achieve this, Han officials utilized Legalist rhetorical strategies of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives).

As propaganda strategies, shǎng-xíng and jìn-shǐ are specifically designed by Legalist rhetoricians to operate within bureaucratic settings. These concepts were formulated by Shang Yang (390 – 338 BCE), the architect of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy and one of the most prolific Legalist writers of the Warring States period. In his political and, The Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang raised this rhetorical dilemma concerning raising military:  It is often necessary to use conscription to raise a large army because it is difficult to persuade people to voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way. However, Shang notes, a conscript army is rarely effective because it would be even more difficult to persuade people to fully commit themselves to a job they are forced into. Stemming from on the Legalist premise that the appeals to our fear and to our wants are the most effective approach to propaganda, Shang proposes using tactics of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives) to raise a large army of enthusiastic volunteers. Most importantly, for these tactics to work, they had to be deployed through a well-designed bureaucracy rather than individual rhetors. Shang Yang argues that unlike an individual rhetor, a bureaucracy is faceless, de-humanized,  mimics “force of nature” in its yi yan (consistent words) and jìn lìng (strict implementation of rules), and thus offers the necessary credibility. The State of Qin adopted Shang Yang’s recommendation and implemented an incentive-driven conscription system which proved to be phenomenally successful. For convicted criminals or their family members (as punishments were typically applied to an entire household), they could avoid punishment by joining the military and kill or capture a prespecified number of enemy soldiers corresponding to their crime.  For civilians who joined the military, they will receive inheritable land and noble title as rewards corresponding to the number of enemy soldiers they have kills or capture.

In practice, Han officials adopted similar Legalist tactics of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives) for its conscripted labor services. First, the imperial bureaucracy assumes the monopoly over the penal system and the legitimate use of prisoner labor, proclaiming it as part of the scholar-official’s duties to apply the Confucian doctrines of Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues in administering justice.

Convicts and their family members were sentenced to serve as guān-núbì (prisoner labor) as “proper” means to rectify their crime. Shùmín, or civilians in good standing, are offered the “opportunity” to serve extra yáoyì (draft service) terms to write off their outstanding grain and linen tax balance.

So how do people become slaves during the Han period? According to the official narrative from The Book of Han, there are three sources (translation from Classical Chinese by Keren Wang):

  1. “Those convicted of serious crime, their fellow Wu members and household members will be held by the state as guān-núbì”
  2. “Those displaced civilians from borderlands fled to interior provinces and sold as privately owned núbì”
  3. “Those civilians due to hunger and poverty, sold themselves into indentured servitude as zìmài-rén. [4]

In practice, to ensure a steady stream of penal slaves, the Han criminal penal system works on a “circle of accountability” basis. Under the Han law when a person is convicted of a crime, the entire household (barring those older than sixty or younger than ten years of age) and sometimes the entire Wu, the smallest administrative unit under Han law composed of five neighboring households, will be condemned into penal labor. The male members of the convicted “circle of accountability” are usually assigned to hard labor in places considered too harsh for regular yáoyì conscripts, such as state operated metal and salt mines, military posts near the frontline, construction projects in remote, disease-ridden areas. Female and child convicts are usually

assigned to work as servants at all levels of imperial governance.

Han government records show a pattern of periodic ramping-up rhetoric of yi yan and jìn lìng (sweeping campaigns against illegal activities) to temporarily expand criminal prosecutions as means to provide a steady stream of penal labors for the state.  Vice versa, records from early Han period show that Imperial decrees had to be issued from time to time ordering the crackdown of “slavery-proper”, to maintain an appearance of the state’s commitment to uphold Confucian humanistic values.

A Brief Conclusion

Finally, the Han law broadly divides its people into four classes or sì-mín. They are shi or literati (the administerial elites forming the backbone of imperial governance),” gong or artisans, nong or farmers, and shang or merchants. The four classes of people are supposed to be equal on paper, but in practice that is far from true. Members of the literati class are exempt from yaoyi or draft service altogether, justified under the narrative that they already perform their “equivalent” draft service duty as scholar-officials. Whereas during the later Han period, many members of the merchant class were able to accumulate great wealth and political influence with the expansion of the Silk Road trading and were able purchase supposedly illegal private slaves with impunity.

Late Han poet and minister Xu Gan, in his political essay collection Zhong Lun records one representative exhortative letter from an anonymous local official addressed to the Imperial Chancellor Cao Cao, voicing his moral outrage over the fact that it has become a common sight to see members of the landed gentry parading their private slaves in public with immunity, and advices stricter enforcement of prohibitions against chattel slavery:

“It is increasingly common to see rich landowners, merchants, and artisans from the interior provinces, having accumulated insurmountable personal wealth, appearing in public with an entourage of privately owned slaves, typically numbered in dozens, but occasionally as many as more than a hundred. How could we allow such blatant affront to the rites and institutions set forth by our ancestral King? It has always been said that all four classes of people of our realm—the literati, artisans, farmers, and merchants—are equal from one to the other, differentiated only by their trades. I would therefore humbly advice your excellency to strictly enforce laws against privately slave ownership, and require all private laborers be paid fixed term workers.”

Xu Gan’s letter was written during the final years of the Han dynasty. It was a time marked by the crumbling of imperial bureaucracy due to rampant corruption and political infighting. The practice of involuntary servitude continued to expand during this period, but without the rhetoric of a functioning bureaucracy which manufactures formal legitimacy, popular uprisings such as the Yellow Turban Rebellion started to emerge across the Han domain, quickly ending what is popularly known as the first golden age of Chinese history.

In conclusion, Imperial China has been relatively successful in maintaining highly centralized governance across vast territories, as long as there was a well-maintained system of roads, canals, post stations, and most importantly, extensive systems conscript labor and slavery which were sustained and managed by the imperial bureaucracy. Not only did the Chinese bureaucratic system emerged as a rhetorical response to the demands of record-keeping and establishing public infrastructures, but it also served as a powerful propaganda platform for making slavery and  involuntary servitude appear necessary, just, and even “enlightened.”

 

Notes

  1. Xiong Yang. 《揚子法言, 孝至卷第十三》(8 AD) . https://ctext.org/yangzi-fayan/juan-shi-san/zh#n61323
  2. Mencius.《孟子 –  公孫丑上》(c. 340 BC). Available: https://ctext.org/mengzi/gong-sun-chou-i/zh.
  3. Mencius. 《孟子 – 盡心下》(c. 340 BC). Available: https://ctext.org/mengzi/jin-xin-ii/zh.
  4. Ban Gu (ed.). Han Shu《漢書 – 王莽傳中》(92 AD) – Chinese Text Project (ctext.org)

Persuasion and Propaganda in Ancient China (textbook chapter draft), part 3

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Confucian Rhetoric:

Among the Hundred Schools of Thought, Confucianism, also known as Ru xue (lit. “humanism”) or Ruism, arguably played the most significant role in shaping the Chinese rhetorical tradition. This is in part due to the fact that Confucianism was established as the official state ideology throughout most of Imperial Chinese history.

Originated from the writings and teaching of Confucius and his disciples, most notably Mencius (Mengzi) Xun Kuang (Xunzi), its philosophy can be characterized as humanistic and rationalistic, and a tendency to emphasize the importance of ritual and upholding traditions. After multiple centuries of continuous development and official endorsement, Confucianism expanded into an umbrella that covers a range of philosophical, moral, literary, religious, and legal traditions. To this day, Confucian ethics remains a defining element of Chinese culture.

Confucian writings tend to see the purpose of rhetoric as means to dispel falsehood, to maintain propriety and social harmony, and most importantly, to achieve zhèng míng (“rectification of names”). The term zhèng míng merits further consideration. Sometimes translated as “rectification of names,” it is a key Confucian rhetorical concept pertaining to the notion that a person or organization’s words and writings must be consistent with their formally established status and position. It assumes that to persuade others, one must first acquire legitimacy by placing themselves behind good faith, speaking truthfully, and through proper channels which the audience recognizes as legitimate. As Confucius himself noted in his Analects:

“Those who are virtuous will be sure to possess proper rhetoric, but those who are skilled in rhetoric may not always be virtuous.”[1]

Roughly one century after the death of Confucius, Plato, the pivotal Athenian philosopher, expressed similar sentiment on the proper use of rhetoric in his Socratic dialogue Phaedrus: “He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?”[2]

The doctrine of zhèng míng is closely tied with the Confucian view that our beliefs and behaviors are predominately shaped by our family upbringing, our education, and our role models and peers. You might think of the term “respectability” as a loosely related concept. When applied in the art of persuasion, it might be helpful to understand zhèng míng as a mode of rhetoric which primarily focuses on appeals to propriety.  Confucian writings generally hold that a given audience would judge an argument first and foremost by its conformity to shared norms, beliefs, and family values. The intrinsic logic and artistry of a speech (míng) are only considered worthy of evaluation when the speech is delivered by the appropriate rhetor, through the appropriate channel, and at the appropriate place and occasion.[3] Thus, rhetoricians from the Confucian tradition tend to place a greater emphasis on maintaining rén – a state of which through the practice kè jǐ-fù lǐ (lit. “self-control and return to rituals”):

“One should see nothing improper, hear nothing improper, say nothing improper, do nothing improper”[4]

Fig.4: Visitors offer incense at the Qufu Confucian Temple, 2009. Every year around the time of the National College Entrance Examination, it is quite common to see large crowds of parents and students at Confucian temples throughout China praying for good exam result.

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons on the public domain, 2009)

Daoist Rhetoric:

Owes its origin to the classical Chinese text Tao Te Ching, philosophical Daoism, (sometimes spelled “Taoism”) became fully developed through the writings of Zhuang Zhou (commonly known as Zhuangzi) and Yang Zhu during the Warring States period. It has long been recognized alongside Confucianism as the two great philosophical systems of China.

Like its Confucian counterpart, Daoism encompasses a wide range of philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions, and profoundly influenced Chinese art, poetry, and spiritual practices. While it is impossible to capture its expansive philosophical system within a few lines, Daoist writings are characterized by their detached, ironic, and often playful prose style, skeptical attitude towards authority and tradition, and reflective inquiry into nature, spontaneity, and the process (or the “dao”) of change. The Daoist preoccupation with the philosophy of change means that its approach to the art of persuasion is ruo shui – “like water.” Thus, dynamically adapting to different occasions, audiences, and the everchanging realities is central to the Daoist rhetorical tradition.

While philosophers from both Confucian and Daoist traditions generally agree that the art of persuasion is necessary to establish trustworthiness, Daoist writings tend to place greater emphasis on the conflict resolution aspects of rhetoric – specifically through the notions of wu wei (“inexertion”), bù zhēng (“no-conflict”). The concept of wu wei (lit.: “no action”), often translated as “inaction” or “inexertion,” appears in numerous Chinese philosophical traditions, and bears multiple, often contradictory interpretations. In classical Confucian literature, wu wei serves as a metaphor for the ideal political community, of which the society achieved a homogenous state of collective virtue and excellence so that its sage king could govern without the need for any coercive measure. In Daoism, however, wu wei is an art or technique that allows the practitioner to achieve greater influence over human affairs.[5] Consider the following lines from the writings of Wenzi, a key figure of philosophical Daoism during Early Imperial China, where he explains the rhetorical utility of wu wei:

“Those who are Wu wei are without voice and shape, and those without voice and shape can see without being seen, hear without being heard. How splendid!”[6]

To think carefully about this question: how effective would a piece of propaganda be if its target audience could easily recognize it as propaganda? This question is fundamental to how wu wei and bù zhēng operate as Daoist rhetorical principles. simplest terms, wu wei can be understood as persuasion without letting the target audience realize they are being persuaded. It is about strategically altering human behavior in ways that appear ziran, or “natural and spontaneous,” to the target audience. As Daoist writings consider human beliefs and behaviors emerge from our animalistic or biological drives and are largely shaped by our daily repetitions, it would be far more effective to influence human affairs by targeting more subtle behavioral cues rather than engaging in explicit persuasion. Likewise, the point of bù zhēng (“no-conflict”) is not seen as a display of weakness; rather, it is a strategy of ruo shui, or to go with the flow “like water,” priming the target audience by avoiding triggering their psychological resistance.

However, unlike their Confucian counterparts, the Daoist philosophical tradition is far less concerned with propriety and social harmony. In Daoist rhetoric, the fundamental objective for practicing bù zhēng and qí wù is to achieve the ideal of xiāo yáo, or a state of untroubled ease and freedom, and the best way to achieve good rhetoric is through wu wei.

Rhetoric in the Legalist tradition:

On both a theoretical and practical level, Legalist philosophers contributed significantly to the building of Chinese imperial institutions, and their political thought remained influential in shaping governance practices throughout China’s history. Nonetheless, the imperial literati formally denounced Legalist thinkers for their philosophical anti-humanism and their cynical attitude towards Confucian moral discourse.

When it comes to rhetorical strategies, Legalist thinkers are more inclined to write in clear, concrete terms, favoring actionable solutions over philosophical abstractions. Legalist philosophy, exemplified by the writings of Guan Zhong, Shang Yang, and Han Fei, tend to gravitate toward the subject of statecraft. Consequently, its engagement with rhetoric often revolves around its utility in governance and inter-state competition. Stemming from its “realist” analytical impulse, Legalist writers see plenty of opportunities for the art of persuasion to aid yang quan (“power projection”), geng fa (“institutional reform”), huà cè (“strategic planning”), wèn-biàn (“inquisition”), and shì xié (“whitewash shortcomings”).

A defining element of Legalist thought would be its characterization of human nature as yín yì, or a state of “insatiable desire and greed” and therefore holding that humans are primarily driven by self-interest and the need for self-preservation. From this premise, a rhetorician from the Legalist tradition would consider the appeal to our fear and to our want to be the most effective approach to persuasion and propaganda. Shang Yang, a key architect of the Chinese imperial system and one of the most prolific Legalist writers of the Warring States period, made the following observation in his political treatise The Book of Lord Shang:

“Indeed, people abide by their avocations and obey the regulations even to death, when the honorific titles which the ruler has instituted, and the rewards and penalties which he has established, are clear, and when, instead of employing sophists and intriguers, men of merit are set up. The result will be that the people will take pleasure in farming and enjoy warfare, because they see that the ruler honours farmers and soldiers, looks down upon sophists and artisans, and despises itinerant scholars.”[7]

Under the Legalist tradition, when structures of shǎng-xíng (“reward and punishment”) and jìn-shǐ (“incentives and disincentives”) are implemented with yi yan (“uniform words/speech”) and jìn lìng (“strict implementation of rules”), it is possible to persuade people to accept even the most unpalatable condition.

The rhetorical concept of zòng-héng, originally emerged from the School of Diplomacy and writings of Warring States era strategist Guigu Zi, became incorporated into the Legalist philosophical system through the writings of Han Fei (c. 280 – 233 BCE). Literarily translated as “verticality and horizontality,” it is a concept of forming and breaking up strategic relationship networks by dynamically adapting between two modes of alliances. An alliance network is considered héng or “vertical/longitudinal” when it is centered around a powerful core, commanding a group of less powerful allies around its periphery, thus forming a hierarchically ordered lián (“company”). A zòng or “horizontal/latitudinal” alliance is a decentralized network where numerous less powerful individuals or groups band together to form a united front known as hé (“aggregate”), in order to gain leverage against a powerful common rival. [8]

To understand how zòng-héng tactics would operate, imagine an instance in which the university leadership would like to prevent student workers from unionizing. Acting from the position of power, the university leadership may resort to the tactic of lián héng, or creating a “vertical company,” to fracture the student worker population. This may involve coercing vulnerable segments of the student population into the leadership’s interest network, such as threatening international students to vote against unionization or face the possibility of losing their student visas. The university leadership may also “sweeten” the deal by adding positive incentives, such as promising a small pay raise or tuition deduction as rewards for cooperating with the leadership.

Student labor organizers may counter the university leadership’s “vertical company” with the tactic of hé zòng, or forming a “horizontal aggregate.” This could be done by reaching out to other groups of overworked and underpaid university workers – support staff, graduate assistants, adjunct lecturers, and so on – into a united front. These groups may not know or strongly associate with each other, except they all happen to experience frustrating labor conditions under the same employer. Whereas each individual group may be powerless to persuade the university leadership, when joined together into a “horizontal aggregate,” their collective economic clout would translate into highly persuasive leverage when negotiating for better work conditions. Thus, a rhetorician who practices the art of zòng-héng understands the advantages and weaknesses of modalities alliance networks and would exploit their weak points for their gain.

NOTES:

[1] Confucius, The Analects : Xian Wen – translation by 7 Sturgeon Donald,  Chinese Text Project,” accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/analects/xian-wen.

[2] Plato (c. 379 BC). Phaedrus. Translation by Benjamin Jowett. Available: https://www.fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Phaedrus.pdf

[3] Confucius (C. 479 BC). The Analects – Book of Zi Lu. Available: https://ctext.org/analects/zi-lu/zh?searchu=%E6%AD%A3%E5%90%8D&searchmode=showall#result

[4] Bo Mou, The Routledge History of Chinese Philosophy (Routledge, 2008).

[5] 顾伟列, 中国文化通论 (Beijing: East China Normal UniversityPress, 2005).

[6] Wenzi, “精誠,” in Wenzi, accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/wenzi/jing-cheng.

[7] Shang Yang,   English translation: J. J. L. Duyvendak,   Shang   Jun       Shu,     338AD, https://ctext.org/shang-jun-shu.

[8] Sturgeon Donald, “Hanfeizi : 忠孝 – 橫 – Chinese Text Project,” accessed November 12, 2021, https://ctext.org/hanfeizi/zhong-xiao.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Persuasion and Propaganda Ancient China (chapter draft), part 2: the Hundred Schools of Thought

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The Warring States and the Hundred Schools of Thought

 

The core of classical Chinese philosophical tradition emerged during a tumultuous period of ancient Chinese history, during which the civilization transitioned from a decentralized feudal system into a unified empire. We begin this section with a brief and high-altitude overview of the historical background for those who are not familiar with ancient Chinese history. The time frame would be the Chunqiu-Zhanguo era (lit., “Periods of Spring and Autumn and the Warring States”) which lasted from c.770 to 221 BCE  

The Spring and Autumn period of Classical Chinese history, from approximately 771 to 476 BCE. The nominal seat of dynastic power, Zhou Tianzi (lit “Son of Heaven”) had rapidly declined, and in Confucious’ own words, that the “ancient feudal rite and hymns have crumbled （禮樂崩壞）.” It was a time when former Zhou feudal domains became de-facto independent sovereign states. Larger states swallow smaller ones. Rapid land reforms and power restructurings took place across major Chinese states in order to claim economic and military supremacy over their peers. Various great powers rose and fell throughout this period, constantly at war against one other for achieving hegemony over Tianxia.

The Warring States period is also when the coin-based cash economy rapidly took off throughout China-proper. Of course this did not happen overnight, but based on ample material evidence, the cash economy did intensify within a relatively short period, as major states began to implement similar types of sweeping bureaucratic governance reforms and centrally managed crop buy-out policies to remain competitive. By the time of the late Warring States era, your “average” peasant say in the state of Wei or Zhao or any major power, not only was paid by the central government, in cash, to purchase his grains for strategic reserve, he is also likely to be drafted every so often, for a fixed term, to perform infrastructure labor or serve in the military, and paid a stipend at least in part in the form of cash coins.

Consequently, old feudal aristocratic powers were displaced by an emerging class of scholar-officials, many of whom came from humble, non-noble backgrounds including Confucious and his disciples. Members of this new literati class often traveled throughout China and offered their knowledge and service to the most promising state sponsor.   

Because of the intense interstate competition and the increasing demand for scholar-officials, philosophies flourished throughout the Chunqiu-Zhanguo era.  Early Han historian Sima Qian used the term zhūzǐ bǎijiā (諸子百家), or “Hundred Schools of Thought” to describe this unprecedented expansion and diversification of Chinese intellectual outputs. Many philosophical texts from this historical moment – such as the Analects, Tao Te Ching, and Sun Tzu’s Art of War have become widely known outside of China. See the timeline in figure 2 below for a partial list of key figures from the Hundred Schools of Thought (top row). The timeline also includes contemporaneous Indo-European thinkers at the bottom row for clearer time reference:

Fig.2: Select key figures from the Hundred Schools of Thought. Top row from the left (order based on est. y.o.b.): Duke Wen of Zhou, Guan Zhong, Laozi, Sun Wu (Sun Tzu), Confucius, Mo Di (Mozi) , Xun Kuang (Xunzi), Sima Qian. (Images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

 

Although technically from a time three centuries prior to the Hundred Schools of Thought, Duke Wen of Zhou (周公旦,  top-leftmost on the timeline) influenced virtually all subsequent figures of classical Chinese philosophy. He is credited with authoring Zhōu Lǐ (周禮, “Rites of Zhou) which served as the foundational constitutional text for all subsequent Chinese dynasties. He is also credited for compiling the foundational philosophical treatise known in Chinese simply as Shū (書, “the Book”) or Shang Shu (尚書, “Esteemed Book”). It is a collection of rhetorical prose attributed to various historical figures from early Chinese Antiquity and semi-mythological sage kings, which formalizes Heaven Worship and the concept of the Mandate of Heaven. It is difficult to overstate the importance of Heaven Worship in traditional Chinese political theology. Being the one and only officially recognized imperial cult, it provided the ideological basis for the legitimacy of the imperial system up until the early 20th century. 

Fig.3: Photo of the last Heaven Worship ceremony in Chinese history performed by a ruling emperor at the Temple of Heaven in Peking, December 23, 1914.

Yuan Shikai (first from left), the 1st President of the Republic of China, made the controversial reinstitution of the imperial rite and proclaimed himself as Emperor Hongxian of the Chinese Empire on Dec. 11, 1915. The new emperor is seen here dressed in Mianfu regalia while preparing sacrificial offerings to Heaven atop of the Circular Mound Altar. Emperor Hongxian’s reign only lasted 83 days before his forced abdication on 22 March 1916 by republican rebel forces. 

(Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons on the public domain) 

 

It is impossible to accurately explain any single philosophical school within the Hundred Schools of Thought without gross oversimplification and/or misrepresentation within this chapter, let alone covering all of them. However, it might be worthwhile to limit the scope of our overview on three schools of thought widely considered by Chinese historians to be the most influential – Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism – and focus only on their most representative concepts specifically relating to the art of persuasion. The table below provides a quick beginner’s guide in this regard, and feel free to click on the text links to learn more about these concepts:

School of Classical Chinese Philosophy

 Key Figures Purpose of rhetoric   Sources of human beliefs & behaviors? Best ways to persuade and influence others?
CONFUCIANISM  Confucius

Mencius (Mengzi)

Xun Kuang (Xunzi)

 To promote virtue

Dispel falsehood

Zheng ming  (rectification of names)

Maintaining propriety and harmony 

 Heaven

Family upbringing & education 

Role models & peer influence

Xìng shàn 性善 – instinct to value human life

Sense of shame

 

 Rén  (humanistic care and benevolence)

Kèjǐ-fùlǐ (self-control and return to rituals)

Zhōng yōng 中庸 – Doctrine of the Mean (self-discipline, tolerance, good faith)

Maintaining proper appearance
DAOISM Laozi

Zhuang Zhou (Zhuangzi)

Yang Zhu 

 

 Establish trustworthiness

 Bu zheng (avoid conflict)

Xiao yao (enjoyment of untroubled freedom)

Qi wu (alignment of substance)

 

 Xìng  (Natural drives)

Habits and repetitions

Spontaneous outbursts

 Wu wei   (inexertion, hiding behind veil of the mystery)

Ruo shui  (“like water,” adaptability to changing situations) 

Zi ran (spontaneity, appearance of natural) 
LEGALISM Guan Zhong 

Shang Yang 

Han Fei 

 Yang quan (power projection)

Geng fa (reform the law)

Huà cè (policy planning) 

Wèn-biàn (inquisition & judgement)

Shì xié (whitewash shortcomings)

 

 Fear

Self-interest

Need for safety and order

Yínyì (insatiable desire and greed)

 Yi yan (unification of words)

Jìn lìng (strict rules)

Shǎng-xíng (reward & punishment)

Jìn-shǐ (incentives & disincentives

Zōng héng (verticality & horizontality) 
MOHISM Mo Di (Mozi)  Qin shi (promote learned society)

Fa yi  (establish necessary standards)

Economy of expenditures

Collective defense

 Jian’ai  (universal values)

Guiju (measurement and observation)

Renyiyi (individuation)

Practical utility

 Suǒ rǎn (Doctrine of Dyeing, social influence)

Qiǎo gōng (display of skill and precision) 

Shàng xián  (exaltation of the virtuous)

Shang tong 尚同 – Identification with the Superior

Click here to continue: Persuasion and Propaganda in Ancient China (chapter draft) Part 3: Confucian, Daoist, and Legalist Rhetoric

Persuasion and Propaganda Ancient China (chapter draft), part 1: Pyromancy and the Invention of the Chinese Writing System

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Persuasion and Propaganda Ancient China

（chapter draft, part 1）

 

by Keren Wang, kuw148@psu.edu 

 

There are increasing calls to give rhetorics that are historically overlooked within Western academia their overdue consideration.[1] Despite growing interest in comparative and alternative rhetorics, insufficient attention has been paid to one category of crucial contribution to the intellectual history of persuasion and propaganda: the study of nonwestern ancient rhetorical traditions.[2] This chapter provides a sneak preview of the intellectual history of persuasion and propaganda in Ancient China, where a rich and distinct rhetorical tradition flourished for more than three millennia. 

We begin this chapter by addressing the question of why it is necessary to examine comparative perspectives, followed by looking briefly into the historical origin of Chinese characters – the oldest writing system still in use.  Our discussion then proceeds to a high-altitude overview of the hundred schools of thought that emerged during a pivotal moment of Chinese intellectual history and profoundly shaped the arc of Sinic civilizational development.

Why Study Comparative Perspectives? 

There are many reasons for why it is necessary to examine comparative historical perspectives when studying persuasion and propaganda. The first and perhaps most obvious would be the need for historical accuracy and completeness of our understanding of the subject matter. Despite increased interest in alternative rhetorics of gender, race, ethnicities, and class, the topic of ancient rhetoric in American university classrooms remains firmly entrenched in a narrow band of Greco-Roman classics.  

See “a brief history of persuasion and propaganda” timeline below for better visualization of the need to fill the gaps in rhetorical history before and beyond ancient Greeks and Romans:

Fig.1: a brief history of persuasion & propaganda (from left): Cave of Altamira, Venus of Willendorf, Göbekli Tepe, Urfa Man, Narmer Palette, Archaic cuneiform, Code of Hammurabi, Old Attic script, Gautama Buddha, Dead Sea Scrolls, Augustus, Emperor Wu of Han, Signing of the US DOI, Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima (images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Engaging comparative/alternative histories of rhetorics also helps us to expand our present knowledge of the ways the exchange of meaning works in both theory and practice. By better understanding how rhetorical practices operate across divergent cultural and historical contexts, we broaden and deepen our current understanding of the communication process.

Finally, comparative scholarship is necessary because it illuminates our tacit misconceptions. By encountering the unfamiliar other, we must reevaluate our internalized assumptions and preoccupations, thereby enabling us to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of human communicative practices. For example, we cannot start from some theory or concept on the ancient Hellenistic (Greek) world, say the Aristotelian notion of logos, and automatically assume there will be a Chinese equivalent. When engaging in comparative studies, we must contextualize a given theory or concept within the knowledge and language system in which it operates.  It’s interesting  to consider  how ancient Chinese rhetoricians got along without a central preoccupation around the Aristotelian concept of logos. What kinds of problems did ancient Chinese and Greek philosophers try to solve, to which they gave divergent solutions and theoretical preoccupations? Such inquiry would be necessary to shed light on what is truly “universal” and what is historically and culturally specific.

Pyromancy and the Invention of the Chinese Writing System

The circumstances in which the art of persuasion was developed and practiced differ considerably in different ancient civilizations. It would be best to proceed with attempts to compare and contrast divergent rhetorical traditions by deeply immersing oneself in the historical, cultural, and linguistic life-worlds from which these traditions emerged. To make sense of Chinese intellectual history, it is particularly important to first become aware of the historical context of its writing system – Hanzi (“Chinese characters”) – and why it operates on fundamentally distinct principles from virtually all other writing systems in the world. 

The vast majority of languages still in use, English included, use a phonemic writing system in which the text, typically written in alphabets or syllabaries, corresponds to the spoken sound of the language. While it may be tempting for English speakers (as with users of any phonemic writing systems) to assume that writing systems were invented to transcribe the spoken language, it is not the case for Hanzi. Like many earliest known writings systems such as Anatolian hieroglyphs and archaic cuneiform, Chinese writing uses a logographic system that encodes meaning without relying on phonetic representation.[3] While many ancient civilizations have developed their own logograms, virtually all of them have fallen into disuse. Hanzi is the only major logographic writing system still in use, and it is an orthographic “living fossil” that gives valuable insights on how literacy functions under fundamentally different linguistic rules. 

Being a logographic writing system means that often taken-for-granted writing concepts such as spelling, and alphabet do not apply to written Chinese at all.  Furthermore, unlike alphabetical and syllabary writing systems, the same Hanzi system can be adopted by completely different spoken languages without changing their encoded meanings. For example, the spoken word for “moon” is yuè in Mandarin Chinese and tsuki in Japanese, but in both languages, it is written with the same Hanzi character “月”. Likewise, a Cantonese and a Shanghainese speaker could read the same newspaper article written in Chinese without any gap of understanding, yet they could not understand each other when hearing the other person reading the article’s content aloud in their respective local “dialect.”

Finally, in contrast to phonemic writing systems, Hanzi characters tend to remain incredibly stable in form and usage even across several thousands of years of timespan, as logograms do not change with the ever-evolving spoken tongue on the ground. Despite its age, the earliest known Chinese characters remain closely related in form and syntax with the Hanzi system still in use and are remarkably accessible for modern scholars. See the table below for a clearer visualization of how the same Hanzi work across different spoken languages, and how the characters remain mostly the same across 3,200 years of continuous usage: 

Hanzi character

Meaning

Pronunciation
c.1,200 BCE
Modern 
Mandarin

Cantonese
Japanese

米

 rice grain mǐ máih kome

火

 fire huǒ fó hi / ka

羊

 goat/sheep yáng yèuhng hitsuji

人

 person rén yàhn hito

王

 king/prince wáng wòhng ō

The Hanzi system consists of thousands of unique individual glyphs, each one comes with its prescribed composition, stroke order, and complex set of usage rules. The exceptionally long-time commitment required to gain proficiency in Hanzi means that prior to the introduction of modern compulsory education, only an exceedingly small percentage of the population was able to acquire literacy. Thus, in ancient China, its writing system perpetuated a self-reproducing class of literati ruling elites and formed a powerful barrier preventing the common population from participating and engaging in the communication process of the power structure.

While the Hanzi system played a vital role in imperial governance, its history precedes Imperial China by more than a thousand years, during a period of the Chinese Bronze Age known as the Shang dynasty. The earliest fully-developed Hanzi system, known as the oracle bone script, was invented as a tool for pyromancy – esoteric divination rituals by means of fire.

The Shang dynasty ruled over the fertile Yellow River basin from c. 1,600 BCE to 1046 BCE.

Traditional Chinese historiography has divided periods of Chinese history into ‘dynasties’ – a formal historical term referring to periods of “unified rule” (Tianxia gongzhu, lit. “One sovereign uniting the world under one Heaven”), where the area we now know of as “China” was ruled by a single sovereign clan.[i][ii] The change of imperial ruling clan signaled a change in dynasty, and also signified a change in Heaven’s Mandate. Officially, imperial rule of China only started with the Qin dynasty under Emperor Shi Huangdi in 221 BCE. Prior to the establishment of the Qin dynasty, the previous dynasties – Xia, Zhou, and Shang – were organized in the form of a confederate feudal state system, in which the state that managed to acquire hegemony via military supremacy will be recognized by other feudal clans as their tributary overlord, and the monarch of that state would be referred to as Tianzi, literally translates as “Heaven’s son.” The title Tianzi, which once referred to those kings of the hegemonic feudal domains during pre-Imperial dynasties, was adopted as the honorific title of the emperor throughout imperial China, which lasted from 221 BCE until the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912.[iii]

Current understanding of religious practices of the Shang society reveals that the invention of the Hanzi writing system was deeply intertwined with the establishment of the Shang state cult – a set of officially endorsed rituals and mythological narratives designed provide a divine justification of ruler’s absolute authority over the state. The Roman imperial cult and the Incan Sapa Inca imperial mythology are other historical examples of state cult.

The state rite practiced by Shang rulers was distinctly monotheistic and, of which the Shangdi (lit., “the lord above”) being the omnipotent and all-encompassing supreme being who bestows the Shang king their divine authority to rule. While the Shang people viewed the spiritual domain (e.g., spirit of dead ancestors) as an extension of the human world that is readily accessible via folk religious rituals, words of Shangdi, however, are inaccessible to all except through the Shang king via the oracle bone script. The Shang king claimed the exclusive power to communicate with the high god Shangdi via means of oracle bone pyromancy, and the difficulty of mastering the oracle bone logograms helped Shang rulers to maintain their claim.

Thus, the Hanzi was not invented to transcribe the spoken language, nor was it intended to facilitate communication among the masses. Quite the opposite, it was painstakingly cryptographic by design – keeping access to the divine will of Shangdi exclusively to a small

group of literati elites, thereby legitimizing their claim to the divine right of kings.

Written artifacts excavated from Shang archaeological sites were predominantly in the form of oracle bone script. These inscriptions were used specifically during state divination rituals where the Shang ruler, both acting as the king and the high priest, would carve questions concerning matters of state importance (e.g., military campaigns, prayers for a bountiful harvest, and matters concerning sacrificial offerings to Shangdi, include human sacrifice) onto oracle bones mostly commonly prepared from tortoise plastrons or ox shoulder bones. The Shang king would then prod the oracle bones with a bronze rod heat to red-hot, which would cause the bones to crack under the intense heat, indicating that Shangdi had answered the questions inscribed on the oracle bones. The Shang king would conclude the pyromancy by interpreting the oracle bone inscriptions along with the pattern of the pyromantic cracks, and issue decrees “on Shangdi’s behalf.”

Specifically, studies found that Shang dynasty human sacrifice functioned as prayers to Shangdi to “bail out” the Shang people from major calamities and would only take place during periods of severe food shortage or in the aftermath of major military conflict. Hundreds of captured slaves or war prisoners might be executed during a ritual sacrifice ceremony by means of mass decapitation and/or bloodletting. The corpses of the victims, along with their severed heads, were buried in mass sacrificial pits or collectively incinerated.During these exceptional occasions, the oracle bone script and pyromancy were deployed to help legitimize the use of violence by the Shang rulers.

Throughout the subsequent Zhou and Imperial Chinese periods, Hanzi, being a logographic writing system developed independently from the spoken language, allowed the imperial authority to govern its population under a unified literacy irrespective of the different spoken languages of its subjects.[4] This means that written decrees and official communications could be sent to the furthest reaches of the empire without the need for translation and localization, provided there is a class of highly educated literati scholar-officials to conduct imperial edicts. Therefore, compared to its European and Mesoamerican counterparts, Imperial China has been relatively successful in sustaining highly centralized governance across vast territories, as long as there was a well-maintained system of roads, canals, draft laborers, post stations, and most importantly, highly developed literati. Not only did the Chinese bureaucratic system historically emerged as a rhetorical response to the demands of record-keeping and conflict resolution, but it also serves as a powerful platform for propaganda for examining the abilities and loyalty of ministers and holding them accountable according to their responsibilities. [v]

 

Click here to continue: Persuasion and Propaganda Ancient China (chapter draft), part 2: the Hundred Schools of Thought

 

[i] 启云 Qiyun 陈 Chen, “封建与大一统之间——关于中国传统政体的理论和史实,” 学术月刊, no.

[ii] –2 (2007).

[iii] Zhe Sun, Tianming Wangchao Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Publishing, 2008.

[iv] Institute of Archaeology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 殷墟与商文化－殷墟科学发掘８０周年纪念文集 (Beijing: Kexue Chubanshe, 2011).

[v] Han Fei (c. 280 – 233 BC), Han Feizi, Chapter XLIII “Deciding Between Two Legalistic Doctrines.” Available: https://ctext.org/hanfeizi/ding-fa/zh