American economist Alan Blinder famously characterized the rhetorical style of bureaucrats – an umbrella term denoting unelected officials holding administrative, technical, and managerial positions – as “secretive, cryptic, [sic] using numerous and complicated words to convey little of any meaning.” Think of a career government worker who talks in jargon-filled canned statements with little substance. While it may be counterintuitive to associate bureaucracy with the art of persuasion, history tells us quite a different story. Not only did bureaucracy itself emerge as a rhetorical response to the exigencies of record-keeping and resolving disputes, but it also provides a powerful platform for propaganda, sometimes making unpalatable measures appear proper and necessary.
In this case study, we will examine official narratives on involuntary servitude (slavery) in Early Imperial China, and focus on how the imperial bureaucracy justified its institutions of forced labor despite having officially abolished slavery. We approach this through a historical lens, the role of bureaucracy in persuasion and propaganda, and reflect on how authorities of power would employ subtle rhetorical strategies to make dehumanizing, exploitative structures appear legitimate and necessary.
Zhèngmíng 正名：Rectifying the Names
“The Imperial Academy is rectified, and schools and studies are thriving. So grand are the rituals and court hymns, so elegant and proper are the ceremonial robes and official processions. The well-field system and the rule of law are restored, slavery is abolished. Such is a return to the ancient ideal!”
Quote by Yang Xiong in 8 CE (English translation from Classical Chinese by Keren Wang) [1]
The quote above was made by Han dynasty literati, rhetorician, and Confucian philosopher Yang Xiong (53 BCE–18 CE), in his essay written in 8 CE commemorating the two hundred and tenth anniversary of the founding of the Han dynast. Known for his expertise in the classical literary form known as fu, Yang Xiong was appointed by Emperor Cheng of Han as the Undersecretary of the Imperial Archive, whose official duties include composing poems and hymns praising the virtue and glory of the imperial court. Writing as emperor’s personal propagandist, Yang Xiong credited the Han court for abolishing slavery, along with other great deeds that conform to Confucian notions of an ideal ruler.
Confucian ethics strongly opposes chattel slavery, (known as rén-yì ) in Classical Chinese). Mencius, known in Confucianism as the “Second Sage” after only Confucius himself, famously characterized rén-yì as “the antithesis of ren (benevolence), rejection of zhi (wisdom), deprived of li (propriety), and devoid of yi (morality).” The Han court adopted Confucianism and its ideal of meritocracy as the official imperial philosophy, a move which was followed by all subsequent Chinese dynasties. To maintain its political legitimacy, the Han laws and the official imperial narrative on slavery had to conform to Confucian ethics. The Han emperor’s power was bound by its Confucian laws because those laws represented the set of fundamental values the emperor relied on to rule legitimately. It’s similar to how the legitimacy of the U.S. government relies on the ability of its government officials to adhere to the U.S. Constitution. This constraint reflects the Confucian rhetorical concept of zhèng míng we have covered in the earlier chapter on ancient Chinese rhetorical traditions. [2]
Responding to the rhetorical exigence of zhèng míng, or “rectification of name,” the official historical record of the Han court presents a narrative portraying its predecessor, the Qin dynasty, in a critical light. According to the Han, the Qin dynasty as a period dominated by ruthless tyrants who enslaved countless civilians to build vanity projects for the emperor. Therefore, the Qin Empire lost its Mandate to rule China, and was rightfully overthrown by the founding emperor of the Han dynasty who embraced enlightened Confucian ideals of governance. Quite the contrast – yet it is mostly one in words. In reality, both Qin and Han dynasties operated in a virtually identical manner.
Indeed, there is little evidence suggesting that Qin emperors acted more brutally than their Han counterparts. Nevertheless, to “rectify” its name, the Han rulers furnished a founding narrative which injected a moral dimension to its military victory over its predecessors. As an example of this propaganda technique, consider the popular narratives of American Independence found in U.S. history textbooks. Most will tell a popular revolution against tyrannical oppressions, driven by Enlightenment ideals of human rights and civil liberties. Whereas in history classrooms outside of the U.S., American Independence is often taught as just one proxy battleground within the larger conflict between Great Britain and France for global dominance. This reflects the technique previously discussed: establishing a founding myth to make the victor appear more moral and enlightened.
Under its official founding narrative, the Han court claimed credit for “abolishing slavery” to achieve zhèng míng and become rightful holder of the Mandate of Heaven. In practice, however, the Han dynasty relied on a constant stream of involuntary labor to maintain its vast imperial domain and its complex bureaucratic system for more than four hundred years. The Han imperial authority was able to maintain this contradictory position through the workings of its bureaucracy, which holds the power to draft and implement laws based on its interpretation of Confucian classics. These Confucian canons serve as the constitution of Han law. However, as they are comprised of philosophical and historical texts written many centuries prior to the founding of Han dynasty, their vagueness provides significant leeway for Han scholar-bureaucrats to adaptively interpret the law in ways that suit the needs of the Empire. One may consider the U.S. Supreme Court justices as modern-day equivalent of scholar-officials holding similar rhetorical power of legal truth-making, through a process known as constitutional interpretation. For example, Korematsu v. United States (1944), the Supreme Court of the United States declared that the internment of Japanese American citizens was constitutional despite such a measure appearing to blatantly violate the Fifth Amendment. In the 2008 landmark ruling Trump v. Hawaii, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Korematsu v. United States decision, thereby changing the legal “truth.” Again the Confucian rhetorical principle of zhèng míng also applies here. For the American public, the Supreme Court was able to legitimately contradict its earlier interpretation of the U.S. Constitution not because of the intrinsic artistry of its overruling arguments, but because they are delivered by the appropriate rhetors, through the appropriate channel, and at the appropriate place and occasion according to the established rule of law.
Shìxié 飾邪：Decorating the Iniquitous
Qin and Han dynasties inherited two main forms of involuntary labor systems from the Warring States Period (403 BC – 221 BC): yáoyì (“labor tax”) and guān-núbì (“prisoner labor”). Institutions of yáoyì and guān-núbì in fact persisted throughout Imperial Chinese history (only to be formally abolished in the early 20th century). Furthermore, yáoyì conscript service and literati bureaucracy altogether formed the backbone of Chinese imperial power structure.
Recall the Legalist rhetorical doctrine of shì xié (“whitewashing”) discussed in the previous ancient Chinese rhetoric chapter. Here, we focus on shì xié as deploying new definitions to neutralize a controversial subject or taboo practice. Redefining “torture” as “enhanced interrogation technique” is good example of shì xié. Likewise, we often hear unscrupulous employers use terms such as “unpaid internship,” “free exposure,” and “experiential education” to whitewash what is effectively unpaid labor for their own profit.
Chinese historians often characterize Han political rhetoric as “Confucian in form, Legalist in practice.” It means that the imperial authority relied on Confucian teachings of filial piety and humanistic benevolence as moral endorsements of its rule, whereas its administrative apparatus were designed primarily based Legalist realpolitik principles. The Han imperial bureaucracy was able to “rectify the name” what is effectively state-managed slavery in part through the rhetorical strategy of shì xié. The Han law redefines “slavery-proper” as a small sub-set of involuntary servitudes that the imperial authority did not benefit from. Only zìmài-rén, or indentured servitude, and sī-núbì or private chattel slavery are considered “slavery-proper” and therefore are prohibited under the Han law. Through their artful use of words, they could pick and choose what benefited them. Thus, the forms of involuntary servitude that met the needs of the empire were relabeled as yáoyì or “labor tax”, and guān-núbì or “prisoner labor,” and therefore made perfectly “legitimate.” This is one way propaganda works—by defining and redefining things to serve the needs of the propagandist.
Yáoyì is a state-managed conscript labor system that emerged during the Spring and Autumn period (776 BC – 403 BC) and was adopted by virtually all subsequent Chinese dynasties. Officially, yáoyì has always been framed as a form of taxation rather than involuntary servitude. Under this official narrative, yáoyì during the Han dynasty was enforced as a civic duty of which all male shùmín (“commoners”) in good standing are expected to perform. If you are wondering what about those who are not “in good standing,” they are of course covered by penal labor systems which I will get to later. Now back to yáoyì, it is considered one of the three main forms of taxes collected by the state. The following quote from Mengzi succinctly captures the official narrative endorsed by the Han court:
“Master Meng said, ‘There are three types of taxes, there is the taxation of textile and silk, the taxation of grain, and taxation of labor service. When the prince collects one type of tax, he shall defer the collection of the other two taxes. If he collects two types of taxes at once, then his people will suffer from hunger. If he collects all three taxes at once, then the basic social cohesion will be disrupted.’” [3]
As its name suggests, yáoyì laborers are conscripts, it is involuntary in nature, but nonetheless they are paid and are usually provided with adequate housing and food. It was used to provide the necessary workforce for the Imperial military and for various infrastructure projects such as canals, roads, dams, and city walls. Han official records claims that its preceding Qin dynasty operated a much harsher yáoyì system with mostly unpaid laborers with subhuman living conditions, and that the Han founders transformed yáoyì into an enlightened “civic duty.” Current archaeological findings reveal that the yáoyì system during the early Han period was almost identical to the supposedly “tyrannical” version used by its Qin predecessors. Therefore, the official Han narrative on its predecessor’s conscript labor system of was most propaganda.
Shǎng-xíng 賞刑 & Jìn-shǐ 禁使： Reward-punishment / Incentives-disincentives
Ironically, while the Han literati formally denounced proponents of the Legalist philosophy for their critical attitude towards Confucian moral discourse, they embraced Legalist rhetorical principles in terms of statecraft. While the tactic of shì xié may be helpful to provide a cosmetic cover for coercive labor, it is not a sustainable public rhetoric by itself. As the unpleasant experience of involuntary servitude does not change irrespective of the legal label, people would quickly see the “scam” behind the false advertisement. Therefore, the Han bureaucracy had to deploy additional rhetorical tactics to make its state-sanctioned involuntary servitude self-sustaining and justifiable under Confucian ethics. To achieve this, Han officials utilized Legalist rhetorical strategies of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives).
As propaganda strategies, shǎng-xíng and jìn-shǐ are specifically designed by Legalist rhetoricians to operate within bureaucratic settings. These concepts were formulated by Shang Yang (390 – 338 BCE), the architect of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy and one of the most prolific Legalist writers of the Warring States period. In his political and, The Book of Lord Shang, Shang Yang raised this rhetorical dilemma concerning raising military: It is often necessary to use conscription to raise a large army because it is difficult to persuade people to voluntarily put themselves in harm’s way. However, Shang notes, a conscript army is rarely effective because it would be even more difficult to persuade people to fully commit themselves to a job they are forced into. Stemming from on the Legalist premise that the appeals to our fear and to our wants are the most effective approach to propaganda, Shang proposes using tactics of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives) to raise a large army of enthusiastic volunteers. Most importantly, for these tactics to work, they had to be deployed through a well-designed bureaucracy rather than individual rhetors. Shang Yang argues that unlike an individual rhetor, a bureaucracy is faceless, de-humanized, mimics “force of nature” in its yi yan (consistent words) and jìn lìng (strict implementation of rules), and thus offers the necessary credibility. The State of Qin adopted Shang Yang’s recommendation and implemented an incentive-driven conscription system which proved to be phenomenally successful. For convicted criminals or their family members (as punishments were typically applied to an entire household), they could avoid punishment by joining the military and kill or capture a prespecified number of enemy soldiers corresponding to their crime. For civilians who joined the military, they will receive inheritable land and noble title as rewards corresponding to the number of enemy soldiers they have kills or capture.
In practice, Han officials adopted similar Legalist tactics of shǎng-xíng (reward and punishment) and jìn-shǐ (incentives and disincentives) for its conscripted labor services. First, the imperial bureaucracy assumes the monopoly over the penal system and the legitimate use of prisoner labor, proclaiming it as part of the scholar-official’s duties to apply the Confucian doctrines of Three Fundamental Bonds and Five Constant Virtues in administering justice.
Convicts and their family members were sentenced to serve as guān-núbì (prisoner labor) as “proper” means to rectify their crime. Shùmín, or civilians in good standing, are offered the “opportunity” to serve extra yáoyì (draft service) terms to write off their outstanding grain and linen tax balance.
So how do people become slaves during the Han period? According to the official narrative from The Book of Han, there are three sources (translation from Classical Chinese by Keren Wang):
- “Those convicted of serious crime, their fellow Wu members and household members will be held by the state as guān-núbì”
- “Those displaced civilians from borderlands fled to interior provinces and sold as privately owned núbì”
- “Those civilians due to hunger and poverty, sold themselves into indentured servitude as zìmài-rén. [4]
In practice, to ensure a steady stream of penal slaves, the Han criminal penal system works on a “circle of accountability” basis. Under the Han law when a person is convicted of a crime, the entire household (barring those older than sixty or younger than ten years of age) and sometimes the entire Wu, the smallest administrative unit under Han law composed of five neighboring households, will be condemned into penal labor. The male members of the convicted “circle of accountability” are usually assigned to hard labor in places considered too harsh for regular yáoyì conscripts, such as state operated metal and salt mines, military posts near the frontline, construction projects in remote, disease-ridden areas. Female and child convicts are usually
assigned to work as servants at all levels of imperial governance.
Han government records show a pattern of periodic ramping-up rhetoric of yi yan and jìn lìng (sweeping campaigns against illegal activities) to temporarily expand criminal prosecutions as means to provide a steady stream of penal labors for the state. Vice versa, records from early Han period show that Imperial decrees had to be issued from time to time ordering the crackdown of “slavery-proper”, to maintain an appearance of the state’s commitment to uphold Confucian humanistic values.
A Brief Conclusion
Finally, the Han law broadly divides its people into four classes or sì-mín. They are shi or literati (the administerial elites forming the backbone of imperial governance),” gong or artisans, nong or farmers, and shang or merchants. The four classes of people are supposed to be equal on paper, but in practice that is far from true. Members of the literati class are exempt from yaoyi or draft service altogether, justified under the narrative that they already perform their “equivalent” draft service duty as scholar-officials. Whereas during the later Han period, many members of the merchant class were able to accumulate great wealth and political influence with the expansion of the Silk Road trading and were able purchase supposedly illegal private slaves with impunity.
Late Han poet and minister Xu Gan, in his political essay collection Zhong Lun records one representative exhortative letter from an anonymous local official addressed to the Imperial Chancellor Cao Cao, voicing his moral outrage over the fact that it has become a common sight to see members of the landed gentry parading their private slaves in public with immunity, and advices stricter enforcement of prohibitions against chattel slavery:
“It is increasingly common to see rich landowners, merchants, and artisans from the interior provinces, having accumulated insurmountable personal wealth, appearing in public with an entourage of privately owned slaves, typically numbered in dozens, but occasionally as many as more than a hundred. How could we allow such blatant affront to the rites and institutions set forth by our ancestral King? It has always been said that all four classes of people of our realm—the literati, artisans, farmers, and merchants—are equal from one to the other, differentiated only by their trades. I would therefore humbly advice your excellency to strictly enforce laws against privately slave ownership, and require all private laborers be paid fixed term workers.”
Xu Gan’s letter was written during the final years of the Han dynasty. It was a time marked by the crumbling of imperial bureaucracy due to rampant corruption and political infighting. The practice of involuntary servitude continued to expand during this period, but without the rhetoric of a functioning bureaucracy which manufactures formal legitimacy, popular uprisings such as the Yellow Turban Rebellion started to emerge across the Han domain, quickly ending what is popularly known as the first golden age of Chinese history.
In conclusion, Imperial China has been relatively successful in maintaining highly centralized governance across vast territories, as long as there was a well-maintained system of roads, canals, post stations, and most importantly, extensive systems conscript labor and slavery which were sustained and managed by the imperial bureaucracy. Not only did the Chinese bureaucratic system emerged as a rhetorical response to the demands of record-keeping and establishing public infrastructures, but it also served as a powerful propaganda platform for making slavery and involuntary servitude appear necessary, just, and even “enlightened.”
Notes
- Xiong Yang. 《揚子法言, 孝至卷第十三》(8 AD) . https://ctext.org/yangzi-fayan/juan-shi-san/zh#n61323
- Mencius.《孟子 – 公孫丑上》(c. 340 BC). Available: https://ctext.org/mengzi/gong-sun-chou-i/zh.
- Mencius. 《孟子 – 盡心下》(c. 340 BC). Available: https://ctext.org/mengzi/jin-xin-ii/zh.
- Ban Gu (ed.). Han Shu《漢書 – 王莽傳中》(92 AD) – Chinese Text Project (ctext.org)