Tag: China

“Constitutional Dynamics in China-Taiwan Relations: A Historical and Comparative Analysis” Presentation at Emory International Law Review Symposium on Disputed Territories Across the Globe, 13 April 2024

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I would like to start by extending my heartfelt gratitude to Angelica Paquette, Editor-in-Chief of the Emory International Law Review, and Grayson Walker for their outstanding organization of this special symposium on Disputed Territories across the Globe: A Future of Peace or Change, and particularly this panel on China-Taiwan relations. A special thank you to Hallie Ludsin from Emory’s Center for International and Comparative Law for her valuable insights as our panel respondent today. I’m also grateful to see Professor Larry Catá Backer among us and would like to acknowledge Professor Martha Albertson Fineman for her invaluable guidance on my comparative and critical-legal research. My work is further supported by the American Council of Learned Societies Emerging Voices Fellowship, for which I am profoundly thankful.

Please direct your attention to this photo on the slide, of a large portrait of Sun Yat-sen at Tienanmen Square, featured prominently during China’s National Holiday celebrations every year around October 1st. Those familiar with Taiwan will recognize similar portraits of Sun Yat-sen in various governmental buildings throughout the island, such as the National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei. This common reverence for Sun Yat-sen as the founder of modern China underpins the constitutional spirit shared between the Mainland China and Taiwan, despite their political divergences.

Slide 1: Introduction

 

Examining the present cross-strait relations through the lens of their constitutional history is important because constitutional narratives in China and Taiwan play critical roles in shaping their approaches to national sovereignty and cross-strait relations. It is also crucial to help us unravel recent legislative and judicial developments in Taiwan and the PRC, especially those related to questions of citizenship and political identities that significantly impact their bilateral and international relations.

Two Chinese Constitutions from a Single Convention

The constitutions of both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) originated from the same event: the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) of 1946, convened in Chongqing. Representatives included the major political factions of the time—the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party (CPC), along with various allied minor parties.

Slide 2: One Constitutional Convention, Two Constitutions
The outcomes of the PCC were interpreted differently by the KMT and CPC, each claiming leadership and legitimacy in drafting the post-WWII Chinese constitution. The ROC Constitution was ratified on December 25, 1946, incorporating ‘Additional Articles’ in 1991. Meanwhile, the PRC adopted its first constitution, known as the Common Program of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, on September 29, 1949, undergoing several newer versions adopted in 1954, 1975, 1978, and with the most recent in 1982.
Slide 3: Historical Context
This table lists significant constitutional conferences, dates, participants, and outcomes leading to the formation of the PRC and ROC constitutions. Starting with the 1936 Constitution Drafting Committee, primarily KMT-driven, to the inclusion of the CPC and other parties in subsequent drafts leading to the contested sessions of 1946.
Despite originating from the same draft, the CPC and KMT’s final constitutional claims diverged significantly, particularly in their views on national unification and governance, influencing present-day cross-strait relations.

Constitutional Analysis: Convergences

Slide 4 - Constitutional Analysis: Convergences

Both the ROC (Taiwan) and PRC Constitutions start from a common historical and ideological baseline, claiming to be influenced by Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary vision. This vision, articulated in their preambles, emphasizes the transformation from the imperial system to a modern Chinese state under popular sovereignty. It underscores a shared commitment to uphold Sun Yat-sen’s ideals, which aimed to modernize China and establish a government that reflects the will and needs of its people.

A critical aspect of both constitutions is their proclamation of the notion of “China” as a singular sovereign state entity, which is to be governed as a multi-party unitary republic. This framework is essential as it delineates the political structure envisioned by both governments, notwithstanding their separate governance and administrative practices.

Interestingly, both constitutions acknowledge “Taiwan” as a province of China. This is explicitly stated in the ROC’s Constitution with the “Additional Articles” introduced in 1991, which refer to Taiwan as the “Province of Taiwan,” along with portions of Fujian Province that remain under ROC’s direct control. In writing, this designation by the ROC Constitution aligns with the PRC’s constitutional view of Taiwan, reinforcing the notion of a singular China inclusive of Taiwan, albeit under different interpretations of “One China” which I will discuss later.

Furthermore, both the “Additional Articles” of the ROC or Taiwanese Constitution and the current PRC Constitution explicitly state that national unification is the ultimate goal. This shared objective highlights the ongoing constitutional and political drive towards a reunified China, despite the complex and often contentious nature of cross-strait relations.

In addition to these convergences related to sovereignty, both the ROC and PRC Constitutions offer similar protections in terms of human rights and civil liberties. These include gender, racial, and ethnic equality; protection of private property; and freedoms concerning speech, press, religion, assembly, and association. Both constitutions also guarantee the citizen’s right to vote and run for election, alongside due process protections. These similarities are not coincidental but are based on the same foundational draft from the 1946 Political Consultative Conference, reflecting a shared starting point for these two political entities. This historical connection underpins the continued importance of constitutional dialogue in understanding and potentially resolving cross-strait tensions.

Constitutional Analysis: Rifts

Slide 5: rifts between ROC and PRC constitutions

The constitutions of the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exhibit significant differences, particularly in how they interpret the concept of “One China,” which both claim to represent exclusively.

In the ROC Constitution, the “Additional Articles” adopted in 1991 introduce the notion of “One country, two areas.” This framework describes the “Free area” comprising Taiwan and a few smaller territories, contrasted against the “Mainland area,” which, according to the current ROC constitution, includes areas under PRC control but viewed as temporarily occupied by “rebel forces.” This narrative underscores the ROC’s view of a divided yet singular Chinese nation under temporary political fragmentation.

The two constitutional texts diverge sharply in their depiction of the basic political system. The ROC Constitution (Article 1) declares a “democratic republic of the people,” emphasizing democratic governance and public participation in government. Conversely, the PRC Constitution’s preamble describes its political system as a “multi-party political consultative system under CPC leadership,” highlighting a model where multiple parties exist but under the dominant influence and direction of the Communist Party of China.

Another point of divergence lies in the proclaimed state ideologies. The ROC Constitution articulates the “Three Principles of the People” as the foundation of its governance—principles that also represent the official party ideology of the KMT. On the other hand, the PRC Constitution (Article 1) enshrines “socialism” as its state ideology, setting a fundamentally different philosophical and practical governance path focused on socialist principles and objectives.

Finally, in terms of Constitutional Territoriality, the differences between the two constitutions are profound and complex. The ROC’s constitution, particularly through its historical claims reaffirmed by the “Additional Articles” of 1991, asserts a claim over a territory significantly larger than that of the PRC. Officially, the ROC maintains its claim over all territories it governed as of December 1946, which includes not only the territories currently administered by and claimed by the PRC (including the South China Sea) but also territories like Outer Mongolia (now an independent nation) and other areas formally ceded by the PRC since 1949, as shown in the map below. These claims, though largely symbolic today, reflect a broad historical view of China’s territorial extent as seen from the ROC perspective.

Source: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E4%B8%AD%E8%8F%AF%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B%E8%A1%8C%E6%94%BF%E5%8D%80%E5%8A%83#/media/File:Zhonghua_Minguo_Quhua_Fanti.svg

(Map courtesy of Wikimedia Commons available here)

These constitutional rifts highlight the complex, layered nature of the constitutional and political discourses between the ROC and PRC, embodying distinct visions for governance, sovereignty, and national identity within the framework of “One China.” These constitutional differences are crucial in understanding the ongoing tensions and the challenging dynamics of cross-strait relations.

Current Debates on Citizenship and Identity

The intricate dynamics of citizenship and identity between the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) underscore the profound constitutional and legal complexities in cross-strait relations. Both the ROC and PRC maintain a staunch “One China” narrative within their constitutions, neither formally acknowledging the legitimacy or even the existence of their counterpart across the Taiwan Strait. This stance significantly influences the legal and administrative approaches to citizenship and identity, as well as the practicalities of cross-strait travel and interaction.

Due to the non-recognition of each other’s passports, both the ROC and PRC have devised specialized travel documents (as shown in the slide below) and established dedicated government agencies to handle cross-strait travel and exchanges. These mechanisms allow for movement and interaction between the two sides without officially recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the other, maintaining a delicate balance in cross-strait relations.

Slide 7

The definition of citizenship under both the ROC and PRC constitutions continues to evolve, particularly within Taiwan, as reflected in its case law history and administrative interpretations:

  • 1982 ROC Supreme Court Decision (#8219): This ruling asserted that although the mainland territories are temporarily occupied by communist forces, the residents there remain citizens of the ROC, highlighting the enduring concept of a singular Chinese nation divided only by political control.
  • 1993 ROC Ministry of Justice Legal Interpretation Letter (No. 16337): It further clarified that people from the mainland area are also considered citizens of the ROC, reinforcing the inclusive definition of national identity under ROC law.
  • 2002 Taipei High Administrative Court Decision (#4636): This decision affirmed that individuals from the mainland area are still recognized as ROC citizens in accordance with the Constitution, thereby not considered foreigners.
  • 2023 Taiwan High Court, Kaohsiung – State Compensation Case for a Mainland Tourist: This highly publicized case affirmed the lower court’s judgment that mainland individuals are citizens of the ROC. The case is currently pending review by the ROC Supreme Court, indicating the ongoing legal and constitutional deliberations concerning citizenship across the strait.

These legal interpretations and decisions illustrate the ongoing complexity of defining citizenship in a context where constitutional narratives conflict yet overlap in their claims of sovereignty over China. The contentious point of mainland residents being recognized as ROC nationals carries significant implications for identity, political rights, and the broader socio-political relationship across the strait. This area remains a critical aspect of the legal and diplomatic discourse, reflecting the deeply intertwined yet politically divergent identities that characterize Taiwan-PRC relations.

Conclusion

In conclusion, understanding the constitutional dynamics is crucial for comprehending the intricate relations between China and Taiwan, where historical legacies continue to shape contemporary political realities. This historical and comparative analysis not only enlightens us on the constitutional foundations but also underscores the potential for dialogue or constitutional reform, which might pave the way for future peaceful resolutions or continued stalemate in China-Taiwan relations.

Event Announcement: China’s Data Governance and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations, Sept 26th at The Carter Center

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We are pleased to announce an upcoming hybrid symposium titled “China’s Data Governance and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations” organized by The Carter Center, Emory University, China Research Center, Georgia State University, and Spellman College. 

Event Details:

Date: September 26, 2023 Time: 1:30 pm to 4:00 pm

Location (in-person): Cyprus Room, The Carter Center , 453 John Lewis Freedom Parkway NE | Atlanta, GA 30307

Virtual Attendance Registration: Register Here

Event Description:

The relationship between the United States and China is currently facing significant challenges, particularly in the areas of technology and national security. Unfortunately, many misconceptions surround the development of the Chinese data governance system, often exacerbated by sensationalized discussions in the public discourse on US-China relations. This symposium aims to dispel these myths and provide a nuanced understanding of Chinese data governance and its implications for US-China relations. It seeks to foster open and critical dialogue among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners, offering an in-depth update on the topic.

Speakers:

  • Obse Ababiya, Associate Director, Office of Global Strategy and Initiatives at Emory University
  • Larry Catá Backer, Professor of Law and International Affairs, Penn State Law School
  • Jamie Horsley, Senior Fellow, Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School | John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings Institution
  • Aynne Kokas, C.K. Yen Professor at the Miller Center and Associate Professor of Media Studies, University of Virginia
  • Maria Repnikova, Associate Professor in Global Communication, Georgia State University
  • Keren Wang, ACLS Emerging Voices Fellow, Emory University Department of Russian and East Asian Languages and Cultures

The symposium is being convened by Dr. Yawei Liu, Senior Advisor on China at The Carter Center and Dr. Keren Wang of Emory University Department of Russian and East Asian Languages and Cultures

Agenda:

1:30 pm: Ms. Obse Ababiya opens the meeting, introducing the organizers and sponsors

1:35 pm: Opening remarks by Dr. Maria Repnikova

1:40 pm to 2:10 pm: Dr. Aynne Kokas – “Is China Winning the Battle for Digital Sovereignty?”

2:10 pm to 3:20 pm: Discussion: Demystifying China’s Data Governance, Moderated by Dr. Aynne Kokas, presentations by Dr. Larry Catá Backer, Ms. Jamie Horsley and Dr. Keren Wang

3:20 pm to 3:50 pm: Q&A

3:50 pm to 4:00 pm: Concluding remarks by Jamie Horsley

 

We encourage you to attend this important event, either in person or virtually, to gain a deeper understanding of this critical issue and engage in meaningful discussions with experts in the field.

Join us for this symposium on September 26, 2023, 1:30 pm to 4:00 pm.  To attend in person, please visit Cyprus Room, The Carter Center , 453 John Lewis Freedom Parkway NE | Atlanta, GA 30307. To attend virtually, please register here.

Ritualism and the Ethos of Chinese Legal Order: presentation at Penn State Law

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“Ritualism and the Ethos of Chinese Legal Order,” presented at International  Conference: New  International  Trade  and  Investment  Rules between  Globalization  and  Anti-­Globalization, Penn State University, University Park, PA (April 22, 2017)

 

 

倬彼雲漢 昭回于天

 

王曰於乎 何辜今之人

 

天降喪亂 饑饉薦臻

 

靡神不舉 靡愛斯牲

 

圭璧既卒 寧莫我聽

 

 Majestic is that Milky Way, brightly afloat in the firmament of the heaven.

 

The King said, O! What crime is chargeable on us now?

 

That Heaven thus sends down death and disorder, unrelenting famine and hunger grapple us!

 

No spirit would dishonor, no living sacrifice would spare.

 

Exhausted are the sacrificial vessels, how is it that Heaven heareth not my prayers?

 

— Book of Odes: Major Court Hymns, Decade of Dang

 

 

In this presentation I discuss ritualism, or the role of formal rituals in the historical development of Chinese legal order. In this project I would like to examine state rituals as a modality of mytho-political speech. “Mytho-political speech” refers to political discourse that possess certain formal characters of mythical speech. Note that mytho-political speech not only articulates itself in explicit voices and writings, but but also in its rituals, its ceremonies, its liturgies and sacraments. The mythical speech component can be understood in the Burkean sense, that the realm of myths and theology is neither beyond or prior to language, but within the logos of language. See, Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).

The term “ritualism” in this presentation was originally conceived in Chinese as yinsi-sheji (禋祀社稷) – a compound vocabulary joining two classical Chinese concepts: yinsi (禋祀, or burned sacrifice) and sheji (社稷, or alters of soil and grain). The literal translation for yinsi is “burnt sacrifice.”  Yinsi traditionally refers to state-organized sacrifices that were performed first by the feudal rulers during the Ancient Period (c.1600 BCE – 221 BCE), and later by the emperor during the Imperial Period (221 BCE – 1915 CE). The last imperial yinsi ceremony was performed in 1915 by the self-declared “Hongxian Emperor” (Yuan Shikai) at Peking’s Temple of Heaven. More generally, the concept refers to a specific form of Heaven worship involving the complete destruction of offerings via burning. Heaven worship has been the only recognized state religion in pre-modern China, and yinsi was performed exclusively by the emperor during major state ceremonies.

Sheji is an ancient political-theological expression which appeared no later than the Warring States period (476 BCE – 221 BCE), and remains in common use in China as a term for the state.  The first character “she” (社) in sheji refers to the Altar of the Land; and the second character “ji” signifies the Altar of the Grain. The two altars had to be built adjacent to the ancestral temple of the ruling clan, and were used for solemn state rites praying for fecund land and good harvest. The two characters making up the word sheji explicitly channel the two-fold significations of the state. That the concept of the state is both materially grounded vis-à-vis necessities and labor, and also theologically maintained through faith and ritual. Thus, the constitutive order of the state understood as yinsi-sheji deals with those rituals sanctioned by the sovereign power and are performed in public contexts.

In theology, ecclesia (ἐκκλησία, “ministry”) is used to describe local ministries as well as in broader sense all members of a faith organized under a common religious institution. Here I would like to borrow the theological term ecclesia precisely because a full-fledged constitutional society functions similarly to religious institutions – both requires the inter-dependent presence of formal doctrines and practicing believers. Consider the following example: imagine you are trying to establish a new local Zen Buddhist Temple in your local community, the temple you build must first adopt the basic form of a Buddhist institution — it must ensure its physical design, core missions statement, teachings, and rituals practices adhere to the commonly recognized premises of Zen Buddhism, for a failure to do so would result in the Zen monastery being seen as illegitimate by its peers. Finally, even when the temple is designed and organized in ways that perfectly conforms to Zen Buddhist doctrines, it is not a functional Temple without any visiting patrons and attending abbots. Similarly, secular institutions, however perfectly designed, cannot be considered a fully functional without a corresponding community that actually believes and practices its legitimacy. The ecclesia or legal order of a polity thus represents the integration of constitutional doxa with societal pistis.

Indeed, organized religious community and secular rule-of-law society are organized around similar operating principles. Their proper functioning is dependent on two conditions: The first is the “good faith” of the commons – that personal ego and habits are restrained under a self-referencing set of collective core values and beliefs. The second condition is the repetition of rituals – that those shared core values maintained via enforcing laws that reflect the material condition and pressing needs of the community. The authority of both the ecclesiastical body and the constitutional state are bound by their laws precisely because the laws themselves reflect the set of basic principles that the authority organizes itself upon.

Now let us look at the classical Chinese institution of Sheji again. It is originally proscribed in the classical Confucian text Li Ji, or The Book of Rites  — 《禮·祭義》:「建國之神位, 右社稷而左宗廟」《周礼·小宗伯》:「掌建国之神位,右社稷, 左宗」庙。” For English translation of this text, see Confucius, trans. James Legge, Chu Zhai, and Winberg Chai, Li chi: Book of rites: An encyclopedia of ancient ceremonial usages, religious creeds, and social institutions (New Hyde Park, N.Y: University Books, 1967). However, when closely examine its content, the Book or Rites is far more than simply a “religious” text in a narrow sense. Consider the following passages:

司寇正刑明辟以聽獄訟  必三刺  有旨無簡不聽  附從輕  赦從重

“The Minister of Crime shall made the laws clear and punishment appropriate when hearing criminal cases. Three direct evidences are necessary for conviction. No hearing shall be granted for those charges without written summary of evidence. More lenient punishments are appropriate for crimes with mitigating factors. More severe punishments are appropriate for crimes with aggravating factors.”

– Book of Rites – Institutions of the King《禮記· 王制》

and…

治官之屬：大宰，卿一人; 小宰，中大夫二人; 宰夫，下大夫四人

上士八人，中士十有六人，旅下士三十有二人；府六人，史十有二人，胥十有二人，徒百有二十人。

Governing ministers shall be arranged as follows: There shall be one Prime Minister in the rank of Qing; two vice Prime Ministers in the rank of Zhong-Dafu, four Assistant Ministers in the rank of Xia-Dafu;

There shall be eight Senior Deputies, six Junior Deputies, and thirty-two Assistant Junior Deputies. There shall be six Senior Managers, twelve Scribes, twelve Clerks, and one-hundred-twenty unranked servicemen.

– Book of Rites – Institutions of the King《禮記· 王制》

These passages demonstrate that the rituals proscribed in Li Ji also concurrently function as constitutional provisions and criminal codes. This unity of legal and ritual rhetoric is also reflected in historical Chinese ritual artifacts. Note the Spring and Autumn period bronze artifact, depicting a provision from the Rites of Zhou 《周禮》: “He who received foot-amputation punishment shall be re-assigned to guard the garden” (刖人使守囿) :

This ritualist conception of legal order from feudal-period China was later enshrined as a core tenant of Confucian political philosophy:

子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格。」

“The Master said, ‘Should one governs via political measures, and uniformity sought by punishments, the people would have no shame but driven by the need to avoid penalty.  If one instead governs via virtue, and uniformity sought by rituals, (the people) will have the sense of shame and act with conformity.’”

– The Anelects, “On Governance”

Whereas Zhou dynasty sacrificial rites are no longer recognizable in their original form, much of their rhetorical undertones remain relevant in the present political discourse. The Confucian ethic of “governs via virtue, and uniformity sought by rituals” remains a forceful framework in the present Chinese political and legal practices. Consider the iconic gate of Zhongnanhai, the seat of the current Chinese central government shown in the picture below. The gate is open, but the view of the inside is being obscured by a screen wall, or yinbi (影壁; literally “shadow wall”) with the text “Serving the People” inscribed on the wall:

This overt architecture gesture of maintaining a proper “façade” may seem inauthentic to many, but in fact is typically received as an appropriate if not virtuous ritual practice under the Confucian ethics, where the formalized “face” of individuals, communities, and institutions are privileged over their “authentic interiors”.

And with that, allow me to briefly conclude with the amusing-yet-somewhat-embarrassing example of ritual face-politics shown below:

And lastly, on a more serious note…

Law at the End of the Day: Keren Wang on “Religion in China: Historical and Legal Context” and Chinese-Vatican Relations

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The study of the relationship between the state and religion—especially organized and institutional religion originating in the West and Middle East–is grounded in an important and often overlooked premise. That premise is based on a very specific view of religion and a very historically contextualized understanding of the relationship between the state and religious institutions. Both are grounded in the primacy of the model of religious organization and of state-religion relations developed in the Middle East and Europe (and later spread elsewhere in the globe) centering around Judaism, Jewish state organization and its important evolution under Christianity and Islam, the religions that emerged from it. Much of the national and international discussion of the last several centuries has effectively centered on the way in each of these variants of so-called “Abrahamic” religions (and thier contests for domination within social, cultural and economic space) be manifested, and their relations with states legitimated. Other religious traditions are then folded into the master narrative of law-religion discourse, or treated as exceptions or variations within it.

That has been the basis on which the grounding premise fo Abrahamic religions have been universalized and then offered to the international community as the sole basis on which to understand, manage and “protect” the interests of these legal and theological systems, each with substantial designs on the control of the social, political and economic orders of its adherents. It is into that construct that non-Western or Abrahamic traditions–state and religious–are now required to mold themselves. That molding, of course, can sometimes highlight the differences between the founding premises of non-Abrahamic political orders, and the difficulties of transposing the universalizing project of Abrahamic state-religious organization outside of its context.The essay that follows, Keren Wang, Religion in China: Historical and Legal Context, Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Paper 9/1 (Sept. 2014), provides an introduction to those issues. The abstract follows. The essay may be access HERE.  On the Coalition for Peace & Ethics, see HERE.

 There follows an excerpt from a Vatican sponsored conference on the life of the Catholic Church in China, Holy See, Comunicato: Riunione Plenaria Della Commissione Per La Chiesa Cattolica In Cina (Press Release: Plenary Meeting of the Commission of Catholic Church inChina), Holy See Bulletin April 26, 2012.

Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 9/1
(September 2014)Religion in China-Historical and Legal Context
Keren Wang

Abstract:

The complex and quite rich discourse centered on the three “Abrahamic” religions does not suggest the only way in which one can approach the issue of religious “liberty” or understand the relation among religion and the state. China offers an important and distinctive path that is in its own way more difficult to square with the Western focused discourse that has now become a global standard. Thus is it necessary, before exploring the technical legal details about the interaction of religion and the state in China. It is perhaps not too much of an exaggeration to say that “religion” signifies the character of the entire Western Civilization– from the Council of Nicaea to the Crusades, and unto the 17th century Enlightenment and the rise of capitalism, Judeo-Christian religions have always played dominant role in the evolution (and devolution) of what is known as the “West”. China provides a substantially different “story” and that difference is foundational to China’s approach to the legitimacy of the boundaries for religious regulation. This essay offers a brief glimpse at a complex problem, and suggests the basis for the quite substantial difficulties of communicating between systems.

__________

The relations between China and the Catholic Church have been strained since the execution and imprisonment of several of its priests in the early 1950s. Current tensions revolve around the power of the Chinese authority to appoint and control the Catholic Church hierarchy in China. Consider in that respect the following News Release issued on the meeting of a Vatican sponsored conference on the life of the Catholic Church in China, Holy See, Comunicato: Riunione Plenaria Della Commissione Per La Chiesa Cattolica In Cina (Press Release: Plenary Meeting of the Commission of Catholic Church inChina), Holy See Bulletin April 26, 2012, an excerpt form which follows:

The Commission which Pope Benedict XVI established in 2007 to study questions of major importance regarding the life of the Catholic Church in China met in the Vatican for the fifth time from 23 to 25 April.

* * * * * *

In the course of the Meeting, attention then focussed on the Pastors, in particular on Bishops and priests who are detained or who are suffering unjust limitations on the performance of their mission. Admiration was expressed for the strength of their faith and for their union with the Holy Father. They need the Church’s prayer in a special way so as to face their difficulties with serenity and in fidelity to Christ.

The Church needs good Bishops. They are a gift of God to his people, for the benefit of whom they exercise the office of teaching, sanctifying and governing. They are also called to provide reasons for life and hope to all whom they meet. They receive from Christ, through the Church, their task and authority, which they exercise in union with the Roman Pontiff and with all the Bishops throughout the world.

Concerning the particular situation of the Church in China, it was noted that the claim of the entities, called “One Association and One Conference”, to place themselves above the Bishops and to guide the life of the ecclesial community, persists. In this regard, the instructions given in the Letter of Pope Benedict XVI (cf. Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China, 7), remain current and provide direction. It is important to observe them so that the face of the Church may shine forth with clarity in the midst of the noble Chinese people.

This clarity has been obfuscated by those clerics who have illegitimately received episcopal ordination and by those illegitimate Bishops who have carried out acts of jurisdiction or who have administered the Sacraments. In so doing, they usurp a power which the Church has not conferred upon them. In recent days, some of them have participated in episcopal ordinations which were authorized by the Church. The behaviour of these Bishops, in addition to aggravating their canonical status, has disturbed the faithful and often has violated the consciences of the priests and lay faithful who were involved.

Furthermore, this clarity has been obfuscated by legitimate Bishops who have participated in illegitimate episcopal ordinations. Many of these Bishops have since clarified their position and have requested pardon; the Holy Father has benevolently forgiven them. Others, however, who also took part in these illegitimate ordinations, have not yet made this clarification, and thus are encouraged to do so as soon as possible.

The participants in the Plenary Meeting follow these painful events with attention and in a spirit of charity. Though they are aware of the particular difficulties of the present situation, they recall that evangelization cannot be achieved by sacrificing essential elements of the Catholic faith and discipline. Obedience to Christ and to the Successor of Peter is the presupposition of every true renewal and this applies to every category within the People of God. Lay people themselves are sensitive to the clear ecclesial fidelity of their own Pastors.

Can the premise embraced by China of the separation of religious theology and practice, one the one hand, and religious hierarchy and institutions, on the other, be defended? Are religious institutions inherently political? Those are some of the questions that might be answered in this century.

Continue Reading: Law at the End of the Day: Keren Wang on “Religion in China: Historical and Legal Context” and Chinese-Vatican Relations